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As you know, every medal has two sides, and human life has a bright and dark side. In a new book about V.S. Abakumov, the author shows both sides of this personality, using many unknown documents. Why did Kobulov and Beria pay special attention to Abakumov? After what events, was the SGO appointed head of the Rostov Directorate of the NKVD? Was Abakumov to blame for the capture of the Smolensk archive by the Germans? What miscalculations were made by the military counterintelligence SMERSH during the war years under the leadership of a general? Together with answers to these questions, the reader will learn the truth about the last minutes of the life of the disgraced head of SMERSH.

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V.A. I dedicate to Baturenko...

FROM THE AUTHOR

My first book about V.S. Abakumova came out in 2005. And to be honest, I didn't even think about the second book. But once, after a meeting with writers, where I was asked to talk about it and where I answered numerous questions, one of the prose writers present strongly recommended that I return to this topic again. Apparently, everyone liked the book, but this persistence haunted all these years ...

Why? I thought about this for a long time and, just in case, collected more and more materials about my hero, until I realized that it was time to start writing a book. So I came back to this topic for the second time...

As you know, every coin has two sides, and our lives are made up of light and shadow. Apparently, in that book about Abakumov, I told more or less about one side of the "medal" of his dizzying career, based primarily on personal impressions. Then it seemed to me that I got the opportunity to learn much more deeply not only the features of the professional activity of my hero, but also his character traits, his personal qualities, to feel his inner strength and iron will. In fact, this turned out to be not entirely true ... And this is the only reason why in the new book, using new documents, memoirs and eyewitness accounts, I would like to open the other side of the "medal", which explains, if not everything, then

a lot of things.

For example, why did Kobulov and Beria pay attention to Abakumov? After what dirty deed was he appointed head of the Rostov Department of the NKVD? Was Abakumov to blame for the capture of the Smolensk archive by the Germans? What miscalculations did the military counterintelligence SMERSH make during the war years under the leadership of Viktor Semenovich, etc.

I confess that the main milestones of the rise of the Minister of State Security remained unchanged, but everything else will turn out to be, if not incredible, then at least curious. After all, you must admit that it is very, very difficult to surprise the modern reader.

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Chapter 1

## ONE OF ABAKUMOV'S ENEMIES

### ORGANIZING SECRETARY AND WRITERS

The first story by Anatoly Naumovich Rybakov "Dagger" was published in the autumn of 1948. And already in 1950, his novel "The Drivers" was published, which was not just a reader's success, but a success, which was very important, especially among the intelligentsia. It was after this authentic work, where the characters were quite ordinary ordinary people, that the new writer became a frequent guest at premieres and all sorts of "cultural" events. Anatoly Naumovich was noted for this novel by the Stalin Prize of the second degree (1951). Naturally, they were accepted into the Writers' Union. Incidentally, the Writers' Union immediately gave him a one-room apartment on Smolenskaya Square, in an old house, it is true, but still ... an apartment. The circle of acquaintances began to expand. For dinner, Rybakov now went exclusively to the restaurant of the Central House of Writers.

Anatoly Naumovich himself, years later, would call the Writers' Union "ideologically a barracks" and "organizationally a department." In his memoir, he writes, in particular: "His collaborators dealt not with casual visitors, but with regulars, with writers. We were well acquainted with them, served their congresses, plenums, meetings, dined at the same restaurant of the Central House of Writers, went to the same Houses of Creativity, used the same polyclinic - the Litfond; it used to be that young employees married writers, lived with their husbands in writers' houses, writers at all times were settled in groups: in Lavrushinsky lane, on Furmanova street, on Lomonosovsky prospekt, in the Aeroport metro area, in Astrakhansky lane. The employees knew a lot about everyone, the writer's life flowed in front of them.

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I was treated with sympathy in the apparatus of the Union: young, already well-known, but sociable, democratic, went through the war, met with a smile, affably.

But now I come to the Union, it was at the beginning of March 1951, and immediately, from the very first moment, there was a feeling of danger, well-known, ingrained in all the pores of my being. A quick glance, curious or wary, a closed, aloof face, accentuated indifference, a forced handshake, as it were, feigned busyness - trifles that do not say anything to an ordinary person, but are completely understandable to me. The feeling of danger was familiar to Rybakov like no one else...

Anatoly Naumovich was born in Chernigov in 1911 into a Jewish family of engineer Naum Borisovich Aronov and his wife Dina Abramovna Rybakova. From the age of eight he lived in Moscow, on the Arbat. He studied at the former Khvostovskaya gymnasium, and graduated from the ninth grade at an experimental demonstration school-commune on Ostozhenka. After graduating from school, he worked at the Dorogomilovsky chemical plant as a loader and driver.

In 1930 he entered the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers, and exactly three years later he was arrested and a special meeting of the OGPU board sentenced him to three years of exile under Article 58-10, which meant "propaganda or agitation containing a call to overthrow, undermining or weakening Soviet power.

When the term of exile ended, Rybakov, not having the right to live in cities with a passport regime, wandered around Russia. He worked only where it was not necessary to fill out questionnaires.

In 1938, the future famous writer got a job at the Ryazan Regional Department of Motor Transport as a chief engineer. From there, in the fall of 1941, he went to the front, ending the war as head of the auto service of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps with the rank of major engineer. It was at the front "For distinction in battles with the Nazi invaders" that he was recognized as having no criminal record.

Rybakov was helped by impeccable performance and military awards: two Orders of the "Patriotic War" and four medals ("For Military Merit", "For the Liberation of Warsaw", "For the Capture of Berlin", "For the Victory over Germany"). Fully rehabilitation consists

only in 1960.

So, after the feeling of danger that has arisen, many years will pass. Anatoly Naumovich will be standing in the lobby of the Maleyevka Creativity House with Yevgenia Semyonovna Ginzburg, who spent eighteen years in Stalin's prisons, camps and exiles. Victor Nikolaevich Ilyin will pass by them, who will greet only Rybakov.

"Evgenia Semyonovna followed him with her eyes," he recalls.

- Who is this man?

- Ilyin, secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union.

- He is a KGB officer.

- Why do you think so? — I was wondering what she would say.

It's written on his face.

Ilyin served all his life in the "organs", and Evgenia Semyonovna at a glance recognized him as a KGB officer, such a face a former prisoner would distinguish among hundreds of others.

Similarly, a person who is being followed by Article 58 lives with the fear that they will find out about this, and at the slightest, barely perceptible sign, he feels danger.

At that time, in the capital of the Soviet Union, Moscow, there were as many as three Writers' Unions: the USSR, the RSFSR, and the Moscow Writers' Organization. The Moscow Writers' Organization was headed by

Sergei Mikhalkov. That is, he was its permanent chairman. However, his office with all the telephones was occupied by the organizational secretary Ilyin.

"...Mikhalkov appeared for half an hour a day," says Anatoly Naumovich, "without taking off his coat, he put his hand on the turntable's receiver. Loved helping people. asked:

- Whom to call?

Ilyin:

- Promyslova. (To the Chairman of the Moscow Council ...)

Mikhalkov (dialing a number):

— Vladimir Fyodorovich? Mikhalkov welcomes. Hello. (Covering the phone with his hand.) What to ask?

Ilyin: - An apartment ... Korotun ... Mikhalkov (into the phone):

- I'm talking about an apartment for Comrade Korotun ... As much as possible, Vladimir Fyodorovich, we ask, we ask, we write, we write ... What? (He covers the receiver with his hand.) When did you apply?

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Ilyin:

- Two years ago ... Personal pensioner.

Mikhalkov (on the phone):

- We have been writing for two years ... Well, how can you? An old member of the party, a personal pensioner, but he works, an excellent writer ... A strong man ... But what about, I know him personally, our golden fund ... Thank you, Vladimir Fyodorovich, thank you. What? (She covers the receiver with her hand.) What is your first name and patronymic?

Ilyin:

— Galina Vasilievna.

Mikhalkov (on the phone):

- Galina Vasilievna ... No, no, you heard right. I repeat: Galina Vasilievna...

Ilyin:

— Korotun.

Mikhalkov:

- Galina Vasilievna Korotun, have you taken note, Vladimir Fedorovich? Thank you dear, good health.

And nothing, such "typos" went down, after all, our own people, what's there!

In the sixties, Rybakov would write his famous novel Children of the Arbat, which would become one of the first works in the Soviet Union about the fate of the young generation of the thirties. The author of the novel will try to reveal the whole mechanism of totalitarian power and understand the "phenomenon" of Stalin and Stalinism. True, it will be published only in 1987. A sequel - the novel "Thirty-fifth and Other Years" - will be released in 1989, at the sunset of Gorbachev's perestroika.



When Anatoly Naumovich sits down to write his next novel, Fear, the secret archives have not yet been opened, and he will, as before, use the same sources as when working on Children of the Arbat. That is, quite official literature and stories of participants in the events of those years.

And one day an unexpected phone call will be heard in his house. A.N. Rybakov writes the following about this in his memoirs: "Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin called me, who for many years was the organizing secretary of the Moscow Writers' Organization, its true and sovereign master. Ilyin came to work exactly at nine, left not earlier than six, did not leave for lunch, brewed tea in his office, washed down sandwiches brought from home, an executive official with good connections in the party and Soviet

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circles, in the KGB apparatus, where he worked all his life, rising to the rank of general. However, at the end of the war or immediately after the war, he himself was imprisoned, kept in prison, then sent to some construction site for warning his friend about a possible arrest. After the 20th Congress, he returned to Moscow, and Polikarpov, then head of the Writers' Union, hired him to work in the newly created Moscow Writers' Organization.

Ilyin called me when he was already retired.

"Come in, sit down and talk.

Knows a lot. I went to see him on Lomonosovsky Prospekt. Ilyin led me into the office, opened the doors of the bookcase:

— See?

These were books by Moscow writers with dedicatory inscriptions: "To dear Viktor Nikolaevich..."

- Only none of yours is there ...

We sat down.

"Don't think, I'm not offended, I know the price of these gifts. Behind the eyes, what was my name? "General", "KGBist", right?

- Weren't you?

- Was. Do not deny. Served all my life. He served honestly. Like a communist. I saw a lot of things, but I did not lose faith. For this, he paid the price. Do you know my history?

— Heard.

And now I don't lose faith. That's why I place your novel so highly, it turned everything in me upside down. I had to read everything in the organs, you understand, everything was available. But you poked at the very place where this tumor grew from. Can you remove it, do you think?

- Hope.

They say you're writing a sequel. What years?

- The same. Thirties...

- Familiar time. Is our agency present?

- Certainly. Trials of Zinoviev, Bukharin... The case of Tukhachevsky...

- What materials do you use?
- By what was published ... Transcripts of the courts ...
- Few!

He looked up at me, and I knew from his look that I had made a decision.

- I worked in the central office, in the secret political department, all this went through us. I will answer any of your questions.

Under two conditions: no tape recorders, and you can refer to me as a source of information only after my death, unless, of course, my family suffers, this is on your conscience.

I met with Ilyin several times, talked for many hours. He helped me a lot. I knew the employees of the NKVD of that time, their biographies, weaknesses, strengths, I knew the mechanics of the work of this institution, I recalled individual situations, details, details that were necessary for my work.

The novel itself was published in 1990 ...

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The fifth book of Georgy Vladimov's works was his last, and, unfortunately, unfinished novel, Long Way to Tipperary, which he conceived as an autobiographical trilogy covering the period from 1946 to 1991.

In it, he conveys his conversation with Ilyin, from whom he tried to find out the details of the biography of one of the prominent Chekists: "- He (Masevich) was shot in 1939 ... For extreme cruelty.

- That is, in general, cruelty was allowed, but not extreme?

Viktor Nikolayevich did not hear my question. I asked:

"Is it true that he entered the prisoner's cell with a whip?"

- No, not true ... But nevertheless, he had a whip. Hung behind a closet in the office. On a carnation... If you want to write about him... Contact me. I'll try to remember something.

He got emotional and started talking:

"I saw how people... honored people... generals... on their knees begged the investigator - some kind of lieutenant - not to cripple them when he tortures or beats them."

According to Aleksey Teplyakov, the author of the article "Chekist for the Writers' Union", Viktor Nikolayevich, "Ilyin was an active organizer of the persecution of dissidents in the writers' milieu, from Sinyavsky and Solzhenitsyn to Galich and Voinovich. He collected information on those writers who transmitted their writings to the West, organized indignant campaigns against them, sought the exclusion of dissidents from the Union of Writers.

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Yuri Markovich Nagibin, a Russian prose writer, journalist and screenwriter, also had a "tooth" on him. Member of the Writers' Union since 1940. At the age of twenty, he published his first story, which was supported by Yu. Olesha and V. Kataev. In his diary, prepared for publication shortly before his death, there is an entry dated | November 1972: "Ilyin again reminded himself after a short break. This time, in order to disrupt my trip to Colombia-Venezuela with

arrival in New York. What a restless, lazy, stuffy and vile little man! And well, truly in the spirit of the times, the organizing secretary of the "big" Union of Writers Verchenko defended me. After two days of exhausting running around, calling, hoping and yearning, this is what I heard:

- The group was reduced, and you, as having nothing to do with the SSOD, were taken away.

The group was reduced only by me, but I just have a direct difference from Holendro, who has firmly remained in the group. I am an active board member of the USSR-Nigeria Society and just three days ago I hosted a literary evening for African students there. Verchenko did not bother to listen to what I told him at the first meeting, explaining the current situation. In one ear let in, in the other let out.

You involuntarily begin to respect Ilyin, he lies skillfully, convincingly, he is working on his lie (on form and content), and this bag of wet shit blurted out the first thing that came into his absent-minded head. When I told him how things were going, he was taken aback, blinked his stupid cunning eyes, and began to ask around town and village about the meeting with the American students...

Everything that happened to me is not new. But what is striking is the undisguised meanness and the carelessness in execution, which was not there before. Confident in themselves, in their necessity, the satraps finally unbridled. I am powerless against them. The Moscow Joint Venture is at the mercy of Ilyin, no one is even trying to "correct" him. Impunity and irresponsibility are included in the conditions of the game, otherwise he "does not vouch". What a striking human, or rather, anti-human type, the epoch has created! These bastards are filled with lies, like hotel bugs - with blood. The ability to lie is more valuable in a responsible worker than organizational and other qualities. No, not the ability to lie, but the readiness for unbridled, shameless lies. And here

Verchenko is taller than Ilyin, because he is lying, not caring about petty credibility. And what is the opposite of all this? If it were possible to suppress the "love of space" in oneself. How I would spit them all in their vile snouts! And for what? After all, it won't hurt them. You can take them only with fear, and so, at least stsy in the eye, all God's dew. Sad, sad..."

Vladimir Nikolaevich Voinovich, a member of the Writers' Union since 1962, met Ilyin many times. For example, in Ivankiada (or the story about the writer Voinovich moving into a new apartment), he very interestingly describes the image of Viktor Nikolaevich, again as secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union for organizational issues:

"I have been working with writers since 1924," he says.

Now, like most workers in the punitive services, he is sentimental.

- You heard: Igor Chekin, my age, died. It's our generation's turn. As Olesha said: the shells are exploding somewhere nearby. - And behind the glasses in a gold frame, a mean man's tear ...

"Now, if you were an honest person, you would say who let me sign this letter. - But then he retreats: - No, I do not insist on this. - A little later, and quite the opposite: - Pay attention, I do not ask who gave you to sign this letter.

One day, playing along with him, I said:

"Viktor Nikolaevich, but in your time you also did not believe in the guilt of some person and even suffered for him.

"So it was my friend," he said excitedly. "I knew him well.

With those whom he did not know well enough, he acted differently...

"I have always been loyal to the party, and I will die like that," these are his words.

His ideas about literature are quite primitive, but he does not pass himself off as an expert. But as for the investigative part, here he is a professional (and I think this is the biggest compliment he would like to hear). He does not treat his investigative duties formally. He thinks, invents, how to lure you into a trap in a more cunning way, to expose you to a blow, to use your mistake. He plays with you like a well-fed cat with a mouse when

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not only the result, but also the process of the game is important. At the same time, he may not feel any enmity towards you or may even sympathize with you, this does not matter and does not affect his actions towards you in any way. He has his own merits. You can shout at him, he will not be offended (although in the interests of the case he may pretend to be offended), you can flatter him, he will not believe. He is still a bit of an actor, and his attitude towards you at the moment means nothing. And if he passes by you without saying hello or, on the contrary, throws himself into your arms, do not pay attention, he just wants to make a certain impression on you. In fact, without greeting, he is not angry with you, but when hugging, he does not love you.

But the main impression he always wants to make on you is that now, when ideals are not set high, he may be an eccentric, but he serves the Party, and only it, and for her sake is ready to sit even in the office of the secretary of the Union. writers, even in a prison cell. They say about him that he keeps his word. This is not entirely true. Keeping his word is not always included in his plans, it is not always within his power, the specifics of his work does not allow him not to make empty promises, but when he promised something, was able to fulfill and fulfilled, he is clearly pleased and accepts expressions of gratitude willingly..."

In the "novel of his life" under the rather unusual title "Self-portrait", Vladimir Nikolaevich once again returned to the image of Ilyin, calling him a very outstanding person. However, according to the writer, the mind of Viktor Nikolaevich was a policeman.

"Policeman does not mean stupid, but only that a person sees simple explanations for everything and finds simple solutions. I think that Ilyin was not evil by nature, but he did everything that was necessary, considering himself a soldier of the party. It seems to me that he subconsciously invented this role for himself to justify all his actions ... "

And yet V.N. Voinovich, recalling the past, emphasizes: "In my opinion, Ilyin even treated me well, but since the party ordered, he was ready to bite into the liver. Still, sometimes doubts visited him, and Viktor Nikolaevich, squeezing me in the corner of his office and hiding himself with his palm from possible microphones, would ask in a whisper:

- Well, tell me, as they say, not for the record, but to me personally, do you really think that your "Chonkin" will ever be published

forged?

"Viktor Nikolayevich," I answered him loudly, "not only do I think, I know for sure that someday Chonkin will be published.

"Well, you are presumptuous," he shook his head.

"No, Viktor Nikolaevich, I am not at all presumptuous. It is you and your associates who are presumptuous because they think you are in control of time. And you just exist in it. If you remember history, you will see that not a single forbidden book was lost. All of them lived at least until the lifting of the bans, and only after that they entered into competition with other books ... "

Time will pass, and in December 1988, Viktor Nikolaevich (old and shaking) will modestly sit in the corridor of the journal Yunost, going into the editorial office on some business of his own. Excited employees of the magazine will run past him with some papers.

— What are you wearing? - unable to stand it, Ilyin will take an interest.

- The layout of "Chonkin", - they will answer him.

"They say," Voinovich writes, "he put his head in his hands and shook it as if he had been told about the end of the world."

The Russian Soviet critic and literary critic Benedikt Mikhailovich Sarnov in his book of memoirs also does not bypass the dark personality of Ilyin:

"There were different versions about how he became the organizing secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union. According to one, he was attached there by a familiar writer, one of his former clients. According to another, his new position was a direct continuation of the old one, and the very idea for this new position came from there.

Viktor Nikolayevich himself, of course, did his best to strengthen the belief that this second version was correct.

Once, when I was once again not allowed on some kind of foreign tourist trip, I expressed my indignation to him about this.

- Fine. I'll find out, he said.

And then, somehow bumping into me in the corridor, he gently took my elbow, took me aside, and, raising his eyes meaningfully to the ceiling, said:

— I recognized. There are no claims against you.

Writers trembled before Viktor Nikolayevich. But I had a suspicion that he was slightly bluffing, emphasizing that there,

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in THAT spheres, his influence still remains in line with his general rank. This idea prompted me the impression of my first meeting with him.

In the late fifties, a writers' housing cooperative was formed, which I really wanted to join. (It was the only way to get out of the communal apartment.)

At that time I was not yet a member of the Writers' Union. But just then, in some important report, Stepan Petrovich Shchipachev, who at that time headed the Moscow writers' organization, mentioned me. He named me as one of two or three promising young critics, and someone advised me to seek his help.

Stepan Petrovich greeted me kindly and expressed his complete readiness to support my request. He pressed the call button. The secretary appeared. He said:

Is Viktor Nikolaevich in place? Tell him that I need him.

Immediately - "on the half-bent" - Viktor Nikolaevich appeared. Bowing his head, he listened attentively to Stepan Petrovich. Taking me by the elbow, he took me out of the boss's office to his place. Quickly and very sensibly compiled the necessary paper, gave it to the typist. A few minutes later the petition—on the letterhead of the Writers' Union—was printed, signed by Shchipachev, and handed over to me. I was immediately accepted into the cooperative.

At that time I got the impression that the position of "organizing secretary" was quite insignificant, rather technical, for which such a slightly aged Molchalin is just suitable. But soon the appearance of Viktor Nikolaevich miraculously changed.

Not a trace remained of his silent manners. And when it turned out that the leaders of the Moscow Organization were coming and going (Shchipachev was soon replaced by Lukonin, Lukonin was replaced by Sergei Sergeevich Smirnov, Smirnov by Narovchatov), and Ilyin remained, everyone gradually understood who was the vice chairman of the office, Pound, and who was on - Standing owner.

The author of several dozen books of essays, short stories and short stories, a participant in the war Anatoly Mednikov in the 70s was a member of the secretariat of the Moscow branch of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR. In his diary, he often mentions the name of Ilyin.

For example, the personal file of the writer V.E. Maksimov was discussed after the publication abroad of his story "Seven days of

Here is what Mednikov recorded for the story of the secretariat meeting that took place:

"It began with Ilyin reading documents. He claimed that Maksimov was not his real name, the real one was Samsonov; that after his time in the camp, Vladimir Emelyanovich in Leningrad bought metrics in the name of Maksimov... However, no one paid much attention to this.

I found something else more interesting. At one time, Ilyin took care of Maksimov, "educated", had friendly conversations with him, secured an apartment for him. In Maximov's story, and Narovchatov recalled this, there is a positive character with a biography of Ilyin among dozens of negative communists.

After Ilyin, Narovchatov and other members of the secretariat spoke; everyone said that there was no place for Maksimov in the Writers' Union. The question seemed to be clear. But the well-known critic Al. Mikhailov. He said:

"Looks like I'll be alone." It's not clear to me. I have not read the story "Seven Days of Creation". When he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee on Staraya Ploshchad, he summoned Maksimov to him on behalf of Poli Karpov. We then helped him with the publishing business. I think that one cannot rely on the estimates of "Posev" and Princess Shakhovskaya, I want to read it myself and make sure ...

As he put it, "I reserve my opinion." This meant that when voting Al. Mikhailov will refrain. After that, Strekhin spoke and repeated what he had said at the bureau of prose writers—anti-patriotic, fascist literature. And he reproached the critic for his indecision and hesitation.

Ilyin took the floor for the second time.

"You have to be deaf and blind not to understand Maksimov," he declared.

Al. Mikhaylov, agitated, just as sharply objected to Ilyin that he had no right to think so and did not want to define his position from a tip or from other people's words. He was supported by Narovchatov and reassured the members of the secretariat, saying that we were gathering here just to exchange opinions freely, in accordance with the civil conscience of everyone.

Then a vote took place. All were exceptions, except Al, who abstained. Mikhailov. They called Maksimov into the room: he refused to appear at the meeting of the secretariat and was waiting for a decision,

sitting in a restaurant. Entering the room, Maksimov stopped at the door. Narovchatov read out the already stereotyped formula: "They considered Maksimov's work incompatible with his stay in the Writers' Union and decided to expel him from the USSR Writers' Union."

V.E. himself Maximov recalled his conversation with Ilyin in the following way: "I suggested that, although I would not repent, I would never publish in the West. At the same time, I ask only one thing: that they give me the minimum opportunity to earn money by literary work - on translations, on other translations of a literary nature. I didn't ask for anything more. He answered me very simply: "Do you want to set conditions for Soviet power? Don't make people laugh. On knees. And then we'll consider what to do with you."

No less remarkable are the words that perfectly characterize the inner world of Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin, spoken by him when Lydia Chukovskaya was expelled from the Writers' Union. To the protest of the writer Vladimir Kornilov, who quite calmly, without a shadow of fear, said:

- True men do not beat, even with words, an elderly, sick woman. Such an act is, to say the least, vile.

- Don't talk nonsense! In politics, gender doesn't matter. Our great leader Lenin was almost killed, shortening his life, also by a woman, Faina Kaplan. So that she and the next world was empty! shouted the enraged organizational secretary.

#### COMMISSIONER OF STATE SECURITY

Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin was born on November 6, 1904 in Moscow. In 1918, at the age of fourteen, he enlisted in the Red Army. There all the young years of the future organizing secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union passed.

In the summer of 1920, a political fighter of a separate squadron of the third cavalry corps, Ilyin, received a shrapnel wound during the battle and fell out of the saddle. Then for a long time he was treated in Vilna and Petrograd. After being discharged from the hospital, Viktor Nikolayevich became a cadet of the Elizavetgrad cavalry courses, and later a cadet of the military-political school of the Moscow Military District. Political commissar Ilyin was assigned to one of the squadrons of the cavalry regiment of the Special Purpose Division under the OGPU Collegium.

A few years later, Viktor Nikolaevich was fired for health reasons, due to poor eyesight. But he did not end up on the street, having received the position of secretary of the deputy head of the Military Industrial Directorate of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the USSR.

Here, literally in a short time, he acquired solid connections.

A few years later, Ilyin was appointed to the All-Russian Photo and Film Industry Joint-Stock Company Sovetskoye Kino, which was later renamed the Moscow studio of the Soyuzkinoehronika trust. The deputy director becomes none other than Viktor Nikolayevich himself. By the way, in 1929, in the year of Stalin's fiftieth decade, Ilyin had a chance to be photographed in this capacity together with the leader, which he was proud of for a long time.

And in 1933, according to the order of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he was mobilized into the bodies of the OGPU. A whole new stage in this man's career begins.

As Viktor Nikolayevich himself said, in the NKVD he first worked in the department of non-Bolshevik parties, Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, of course, former ones. Then in the "East" department. His opponents were the British. And, finally, he was transferred to the "culture" department. This is how ("culture") Ilyin abbreviated the content of his KGB work in secret political department.

According to A. Teplyakov, "the new Chekist showed himself to be a capable worker and did not enter into the intricacies of political investigation for long. Once in the states of the secret political department

(SPO), who fought against anti-Soviet elements, he began to make a rapid career. The ability to make a political program out of several statements disloyal to the authorities, to fit (with the help of agents) to it more "conspirators", often even unfamiliar with each other, to control with the help of intra-chamber agents-"hens" so that no one refuses to knocked out testimonies - that was the class of the KGB work of Ilyin.

There is an eyewitness account of how every morning at the so-called "planning meeting" the head of the Chekist unit, Ilyin, brought to the attention of the investigators the schemes of future testimonies of the arrested. According to these "patterns", the officers drew up protocols, which were then allowed to be signed by the arrested.

The famous Chekist M.P. Schrader will write in his memoirs how, after returning from vacation in Ivanovo, he went to the command

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sent to Moscow and met there the former Komsomol member of the Special Purpose Division, Viktor Ilyin. Just then, he was still working in the Secret Political Department (SPO) and was engaged in investigative matters.

"In response to my question," Schrader recalls, "who is the new people's commissar, Viktor began to praise his democracy and simplicity, saying that he walks around the offices of all the investigators, personally getting acquainted with how the work is going.

- And you had? I asked.

- Of course it was. I went in, and I have a prisoner under investigation. He asked if he would confess, and when I said no, Nikolai Ivanovich would turn around and bang him in the face... And he explained: "This is how you should interrogate!" He uttered the last words with rapturous enthusiasm.

Discouraged, with a heavy feeling, I parted from him. Indeed, for so many years under Felix Edmundovich, all Chekists were strictly required not to raise their voices at the arrested person, let alone hit, and now the "Stalin Commissar" himself teaches how to beat the arrested.

In 1937-1938. Ilyin was responsible for the development of the Mensheviks, and in December of the same 1938, he carried out Beria's special assignment to investigate the so-called case of Trotskyist sabotage on the roads in Orel and Rostov-on-Don. It was believed that the conspirators had infiltrated the ranks of the local leaders of the Soviet and party organs. As Viktor Nikolaevich found out, absolutely everything in this case was fabricated. He returned to Moscow, shocked by the primitiveness of the false accusations that he had to face, and reported to the leadership that the Oryol and Rostov NKVD simply fabricated cases in order to strengthen their own position and strengthen their reputation.

One of the intelligence leaders of the Soviet security agencies, Lieutenant General P.A. Sudoplatov, noted that Ilyin had professorial manners, and because of his mild, benevolent nature, he was highly respected by his colleagues in the "workshop".

In his memoirs, in particular, he writes: "After his presentation, the case was reviewed, and Ilyin was appointed to the post of head of the third department of the Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, which allowed him to arrest two important informants who supplied us with deliberately false information about

allegedly anti-Soviet sentiments among senior officials.

Ilyin summoned informants to Moscow and ordered them to provide detailed information on the cases of the two suspects. Having received their information, he was convinced that during the years of repression they had perfectly learned the art of slandering those whom they were working on. The falsifying informants were arrested and sentenced to ten years in the camps, and Ilyin received an award - the sign "Honorary



Chekist". Given Ilyin's personal contacts with writers such as Alexei Tolstoy and renowned musicians and composers, Beria often hosted him. Ilyin was also on friendly terms with Merkulov."

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Many people today know the name of the legendary intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov. The son of the Ural peasants with a purely Prussian appearance since 1938 carried out special tasks to ensure state security. In the capital, he ended up under the command of Major of State Security V.S. Ryzasny from the counterintelligence department of the central apparatus of the NKVD, which was engaged in infiltrating foreign embassies. And first of all, of course, German.

Once Kuznetsov's undercover reports were read by Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin. In them, Viktor Nikolayevich was struck, first of all, by the ability of the agent to compose a picture of the phenomenon from the details, to determine the mood in the theatrical environment.

"In political investigation, Ilyin believed, it is important to determine the socio-professional group that concentrates information and accelerates it, through which information waves run most intensively," emphasizes Eduard Makarevich in his article "Playboy of the Soviet Scale". – In the USSR in the 1930s, the most information-rich and relaxed group, in contact with which party leaders, people's commissars, military, our and foreign diplomats found inspiration, was bohemians: writers, poets, musicians, actors, and above all actresses.

They talked with the bohemia, made friends, flirted. In that drunken fermentation of feelings and passions, information was spinning and moods were exposed. A special talent was needed to capture and imbibed

these informational and mood flows. Kuznetsov possessed such a talent, and Ilyin understood it.

But besides the talent of an information hunter, he needed the talent of a person who could be trusted. And here Kuznetsov had no equal. And money and gifts for communication are like oil for a mechanism. Therefore, Kuznetsov led a small business - buying up, selling valuable and scarce things, and very talentedly succeeded in this path.

As an experienced human scientist, Ilyin noted these Kuznetsov abilities from the first meeting. They understood each other quite soon. Their views on the essence of the creative intelligentsia, on the methods of work in this environment, gave rise to ingenious moves ... "

The future intelligence officer visited theaters, listened to ensembles and the singing of individual famous Soviet singers. He walked with the artists in the Metropol and the National, and in their apartments he flirted and intrigued masterfully. It was in this way that the NKVD agent collected the necessary information in the environment that directly worried Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin.

A. Teplyakov calls it the main task of fighting the "internal enemy" - "from independently thinking scientists and writers to young students, often from youthful romance creating underground groups to explain to themselves and the masses the shortcomings of Stalin's policy, to study" true Marxism-Leninism ". Ilyin's department was engaged in the fight against "anti-Soviet formations" among the academic, scientific and technical, humanitarian, medical intelligentsia, workers of art and literature, the Soviet administrative apparatus, as well as among young people. Only for participation in "anti-Soviet political parties", "organizations" and "groups" in 1941, 23,648 people were arrested in the country. A considerable part of these victims is on the account of Viktor Nikolayevich's subordinates.

In the pre-war and war years, Ilyin showed himself to be a person who was able to fruitfully contact with counterintelligence. According to Sudoplatov, Ilyin and Maklyarsky during a series

For years, a very promising agent Demyanov ("Heine"), a native of the nobility, was "led" through a classic provocation (a weapon was planted on him), recruited in 1929 into an intelligence network. Later, Demyanov came under Sudoplatov's disposal and became the main person in the big game: the Chekists appointed him an emissary of the fictitious anti-Soviet organization Throne, threw him across the front line

the one where "Heine" was carefully checked by the Germans, recognized as valuable ... and made their resident, which cost them as a result the loss of more than two dozen agents.

By the way, until 1941, in the state security of the USSR, only one department was engaged in the fight against the "anti-Soviet element": the Department for Combating Counter-Revolution of the Cheka since 1917; Secret department of the Cheka since February 1919; Secret operational department of the Cheka since June 1919; Secret department of the Cheka-OGPU since 1921; Secret political department of the OGPU since 1931; Secret political department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR since 1934; 4th department of the GUG of the NKVD of the USSR since 1936; 4th Department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR since March 1938; 2nd department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR from September 1938.

And on February 26, 1941, the "eternal" Department was suddenly transformed into an "eternal" Directorate: the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR; from April 1943, the functions of the former 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR were transferred to the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR (Departments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 to the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR).

As of December 1939, the structure of the 2nd department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR included 12 departments:

1st - development of the Trotskyites, Zinovievists, right-wing oppositionists, Myasnikovites, Shlyapnikovites expelled from the CPSU(b), outrageous work;

2nd - the development of the former Mensheviks, anarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Bundists, clerics, provocateurs, gendarmes, counterintelligence officers, punishers, White Cossacks, monarchists;

3rd - the fight against the Ukrainian, Belarusian, Karelian-Finnish nationalist opposition;

4th - undercover development of the anti-Soviet Dashnak parties, Turkic-Tatar nationalists, Georgian Mensheviks, Musavatists;

5th - the development of writers, workers in the press, publishing houses, theaters, cinema, cultural and art workers;

6-s - development and maintenance of the Academy of Sciences, research institutes, scientific societies;

7th—detection and development of anti-Soviet organizations of student youth, the Narkompros system, children of the repressed;

8th - maintenance of the system of the People's Commissariat of Health and its educational institutions

references;

9th - maintenance of the system of the People's Commissariat of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's Office, the People's Commissariat for Social Security and their educational institutions;

10th - the struggle against the church-sectarian counter-revolution;

11th — maintenance of the system of physical culture organizations, voluntary societies, clubs, sports publishing houses;

12th — maintenance of Osoaviakhim, police, fire brigade, military registration and enlistment offices, reserve officers.

So, it is quite possible to imagine what kind of experience in the content of his Chekist activities Ilyin received in the NKVD, dealing with non-Bolshevik parties, Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries,

the Mensheviks. Then after working in the "Eastern" department and, finally, moving into the "culture".

Being engaged in the so-called culture, Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin knew his "ward" Vsevolod Blumenthal-Tamarin very well. And he was unspeakably surprised when he not only stayed in the temporarily occupied territory, but moreover, left together with the occupiers.

Vsevolod Aleksandrovich was born in 1881 — an actor, director, son of famous actors Alexander Eduardovich and Maria Mikhailovna Blumenthal-Tamarins. Officially on the professional scene since 1901. However, it is known that he has been playing since the age of seven. Graduated from the Moscow real school. Later he studied in the first year of the Tenishevsky College, but due to student unrest in which he took part, he was expelled. As Blumenthal-Tamarin himself recalled, they then threw a sent police spy out of the drawing room window. 35 students "dropped out" of the school for this. "After that, I decided irrevocably - I'm going on stage. He joined Schumann's operetta in Vilna, where his father was the director.

In 1917-1918 Blumenthal-Tamarin lived in Kharkov. At the Bolshoi Theater he played Oedipus Rex. At the same time, he was a member of the troupe of the City Theatre. In the autumn of 1918 he was busy in the performances of The Living Corpse, Marguerite Gauthier, Killer Whale and others. In 1919, when the city was occupied by units of the Volunteer Army of General Denikin, Vsevolod Aleksandrovich, in addition to theater work, was actively involved in social activities. But as soon as the Red Army entered the lands of Ukraine, Blumenthal-Tamarin was immediately arrested. Lunacharsky, who intervened in his fate, saved his life.

And just seven years later (1926), Moscow solemnly celebrated the 25th anniversary of Vsevolod Aleksan's stage activities.

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Drovich. Which, of course, speaks of his originality as an actor. At the anniversary performance, he played Keane. Lunacharsky himself announced the government decree on conferring the title of Honored Artist on the hero of the day. All evening A. Nezhdanova, N. Obukhova, L. Sobinov sang for him, E. Geltser and V. Tikhomirov danced, Heinrich Neuhaus played.

Nevertheless, Blumenthal-Tamarin leaves the theater of the former Korsh, gathers his own troupe and creates the Moscow Mobile Theater, with which he tours the country. He acted in films ("At the Far Outpost", 1940, dir. E. Brunchugin).

It is known that, deeply traumatized in childhood by the divorce of his parents, the famous actor throughout his life maintained a very close relationship with his mother and wrote memoirs about her ("Blumenthal-Tamarina and her time", published in 1939 in the journal "Theater").

Author of the book "Notes of an Actor. Geniuses and scoundrels" Georgy Bakhtarov recalled: "In 1931, I and two of my comrades in the Realistic Theater were offered to take part in a tour by Vsevolod Aleksandrovich Blumenthal-Tamarin to Tula and Kharkov. In Kharkov, the day before the end of the tour, he invited us to dinner at a chic restaurant on Sums kaya. In a separate room, a table was set for four people. I still remember all these unimaginable appetizers: amber salmon with lemon, anchovies, beluga in white wine, cold turkey with chestnuts, hot cutlets "Marechal" (something fantastically tasty from hazel grouse breasts stuffed with porcini mushrooms) and Finally, dessert — strawberries with whipped cream. Vsevolod Alexandrovich was in a good mood, enthusiastically talked about his youth, recalled theatrical legends, read Blok and Lermontov. At some point, an unfamiliar middle-aged man in glasses appeared on the threshold of the office. He listened carefully to the verses. Blumenthal-Tamarin, already tipsy, invited him to our table. The stranger approached and said: "Yesterday I saw you at Keene. You are an amazing artist! And you read poetry with inspiration. But in the nineteenth year in Odessa, by decision of the underground regional party committee, I had to shoot you! And only chance prevented me from doing it. You were accused of betraying Lisa V. She died in counterintelligence."

Blumenthal instantly sobered up. "This is slander and lies," he said, "when the Reds entered the city, I was arrested and sentenced

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ren to be shot. But the verdict was appealed, and the case was dismissed for lack of evidence of the accusation."

A well-started evening was completely ruined."

In 1941, Blumenthal-Tamarin turned 60 and in May he went on a tour with a program dedicated to the 100th anniversary of Lermontov's death. With the outbreak of war, which finds him in Western Ukraine in Chernivtsi, Vsevolod Aleksandrovich interrupts his tour and, having lost all his costumes, returns to Moscow with great difficulty. Then, having captured the most valuable things and the archive, he moves with his family to a dacha in New Jerusalem, which is 60 kilometers from the capital and next to the Volokolamsk highway. She was allocated to his mother in the dacha village NIL or Nauka. Art. Literature".

Blumenthal-Tamarin considered himself a German and repeatedly said: "They won't touch us - I'm a German." His father was indeed a German by nationality.

In October 1941, when German troops occupied Istra, they really did not touch the famous Soviet actor. Moreover, they were attracted to cooperation. For example, already on February 2, 1942, Blumenthal-Tamarin spoke on the radio with an appeal in which he called on his compatriots not to defend the Stalinist regime and to surrender. Further, such programs with the participation of the artist become regular: they go on the air every Tuesday and Thursday at 18.00. Vsevolod Aleksandrovich did not shy away from journalism, speaking in the newspapers of the enemy of his homeland with accusatory articles: "Blumenthal-Gamarin exposes the executioner of Stalin", "What you do not know about Stalin", etc.

On March 27, 1942, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentences Blumenthal Gamarin in absentia to be shot.

For the Germans, the former Honored Artist of the RSFSR heads the Russian Drama Theater in occupied Kiev, where one of his most famous productions was the reworked play "Front" by A. Korneichuk, which was staged under the title "So They Fight". He himself played the main role of General Gorlov in it. In a word, the famous Soviet artist put all the strength of his talent at the service of the Third Reich.

Deftly imitating the voice of Stalin, Blumenthal-Tamarin voiced the falsified decrees of the Soviet government. The speeches recorded on the German radio in Warsaw were broadcast on the occupied

territories. Then he moved to Berlin. There, in the emigrant newspaper Novoye Slovo, announcements were published about his performances in scenes from the performances: Lermontov's Masquerade, Ostrovsky's In a Crowded Place, Shakespeare's Hamlet, Chekhov's The Bear - February 17, 1943 - in the Schumann Hall, June 13, 1943 - in Bachsal.

On July 7, 1942, another speech by Blumenthal-Tamarin on the radio angered Stalin, and on August 13, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria allowed Sudoplatov and his subordinates "to hold a special event in relation to Blumenthal-Tamarin."

In August 1942, Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin flew from Moscow to besieged Leningrad, and in the evening in the headquarters dugout he patiently waited for the champion of Leningrad in boxing, the head of the searchlight station of a separate searchlight battalion of the 189th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the Leningrad Front, Sergeant Igor Miklashevsky.

When the soldier finally entered, the intelligent-looking Chekist briefly introduced himself: "Ilyin." That evening they talked for several hours, and then flew to the capital together. They say only

a few years later, Miklashevsky found out who the Chekist Ilyin really was.

In Moscow, Igor Miklashevsky (operational pseudonym "Udarov") began to prepare for to perform a special task.

Why did Viktor Nikolaevich choose Udarov for this?

Firstly, Igor was born (1918) into a famous theatrical family. His father, Lev Loshchilin, was a choreographer at the Bolshoi Theatre. Mother - the actress of the Chamber Theater Augusta Miklashevskaya - was reputed to be one of the first Moscow beauties. As you know, Sergei Yesenin himself dedicated to her in 1923 a cycle of poems "Love of a Hooligan". Blumenthal-Gamarin was married to Inna Loshchilina, the sister of Igor's father.

Secondly, "Udarov" studied at a prestigious Moscow school, where the German language was studied in sufficient depth.

Thirdly, "Udarov" was passionate about boxing, and his success in the ring was impressive. He quickly became a master of sports, was

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Leningrad middleweight champion in 1938 and 1939. In April 1941, he took first place in middleweight at the Leningrad championship, which automatically opened the way for him to participate in the USSR championship. The sports press noted his offensive manner of fighting, tactical literacy, mature technique beyond his years, endurance, composure.

In a word, Ilyin very subtly approached the selection of a candidate for a special task behind enemy lines, and, together with other Chekists, participated in his preparation.

On April 22, 1943, on one of the sectors of the Western Front near the village of Borisovka, Smolensk Region, "Udarov" under the guise of a defector went over to the location of the Nazi troops ...

"In accordance with the legend developed," writes the author of the article "Start Operation Raven," Nikolai Abin, "'Udarov" brought to the attention of German officers the information about his unfair "conviction" by the court of a military tribunal for hooliganism and direction to a penal company from which he deserted. But, apparently, something in his behavior aroused suspicion in the battalion commander, and he arranged a confrontation with two other military defectors. And here some discrepancies were found in their testimony. The threat of execution loomed over the scout.

A happy accident helped to avoid it. The translator, a former cameraman, among a pile of propaganda materials, came across the newspaper Novoye Slovo, which contained an article about Blumenthal-Tamarin. "Strikes" took advantage of the situation and turned it in his favor.

Suspensions were removed from him, the uncle's surname played a role. But the trip to Germany and the meeting of the scout with him, which was so hoped for in Moscow, did not take place. "Udarov", along with other defectors and prisoners of war, was sent to the Smolensk camp. It seemed that the Nazis had forgotten about him, but at the end of May 1943, a letter was received in his name from his uncle.

He wrote that he was "happy with the safe departure of his nephew from that terrible system", advised him to enlist in the ROA and promised to recall him to Berlin for propaganda work. Taking advantage of his uncle's advice, on June 15, 1943, Miklashevsky was enlisted in the 437th Eastern Battalion, and in October he on his own initiative approached the resident of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front with the conditional phrase: "Dear Lelechka, I feel good. Igor". TH

a message to the leadership of the 4th Directorate meant: "I legalized well, but I have no approaches to Blumenthal-Tamarin."

The first meeting of Igor Miklashevsky with his uncle took place in Koenigsberg on January 27, 1944. However, the liquidation of the former Soviet actor was prevented by a pistol misfire. He failed to reload the weapon ...

And only on May 10, 1945, "Udarov", with a shot from a parabellum, which he had stolen from his friend on April 18, put the last point in the traitor's biography. This happened in the city of Münsingen, when Blumenthal-Tamarin, abandoned by his fascist patrons and quarreling with the Vlasov leaders, spent whole days sitting in his apartment.

And on July 3, "Udarov" got in touch with the employees of the NKGB of the USSR in Paris, naming the password: "USSR agent "Udarov" has arrived." Then he reported: "The task is completed. I have the printed materials, documents and personal notes of the artist Blumenthal-Tamarin." But Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin found out about this many YEARS later ...

## BROKEN LIFE

According to A. Teplyakov, "the loving Abakumov set himself up by contacting one unreliable person. Ilyin told Abakumov that it was not a secret for him that "the latter had domestic ties with one woman, against whom ... there were compromising materials." Abakumov was furious. Ilyin for him became a personal enemy to be destroyed. First, Ilyin's comrade-in-arms from the Civil War, Major General Boris Teplinsky, was taken into circulation, in whose dossier some careless statements were recorded. He, unable to withstand the "application of physical measures against him," pleaded guilty to anti-Soviet propaganda.

Ilyin himself was accused of divulging official secrets, harmful conversations and patronizing Teplinsky. For the time being, the prominent Chekist got away with both relatives abroad and friendship with arrested colleagues. It turns out that Ilyin's wife's mother's brother and Ilyin's wife's father's brother lived already in the United States, and Ilyin himself received a reprimand in 1937 "for blunting political vigilance against the former. Chief

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UNKVD of the Leningrad Region Medved, convicted in connection with the villainous murder of S.M. Kirov". According to Sudoplatov, Stalin, having learned that Ilyin allegedly warned Teplinsky by phone about the interest in him from the side of counterintelligence, became furious and ordered the chatterbox to be arrested immediately. The head of the investigative department of the KGB of the USSR A.A. Kozyrev, being present in 1954 at the consideration of Ilyin's party case, stated that the reason for the arrest was Viktor Nikolayevich's claims to Abakumov about one of the women: M.P. also cites the same version. Schrader.

Ilyin himself spoke about his arrest (to M. Stepichev "Stand up for the truth"), which he remembered to the smallest detail, something like this: one day in the spring of 1943, the commissar of state security of the 2nd rank, deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR (04/19/43) and the head of the GUKR SMERTSI NPO USSR (04/19/43) Viktor Semenovich Abakumov asked Ilyin to come to his place. "Ilyin knew Abakumov even at the time when he worked as an assistant to the detective of the Gulag. Then he ended up in the investigation group, where he distinguished himself by his ability to fabricate "cases" against innocent people, "extract" from the arrested any confessions the authorities needed.

— Do you know Teplinsky? Abakumov asked straight away.

- I know.

- Where?

- This is my friend. They served in the army together. I recommended him to the party.

"Do you know that he writes one thing to you, while he himself thinks of something else?" Abakumov remarked gloomily. Unexpectedly, the owner of the office took out a photograph from the folder and said: - Here is his face. A person who does not inspire confidence.

- For such a conclusion, one facial expression is not enough ... I do not believe that Teplinsky could admit something bad, - Ilyin declared firmly. He is a reliable party comrade. Active participant in the civil war. Has three wounds. Patriot to the core. I answer to the Party for every word I say...

Abakumov stood up abruptly and spoke in an orderly tone:

- Cut off contact with him. But in such a way that he does not suspect anything. Don't you dare tell him anything about our conversation. Not a single word!

Seeing that Ilyin was not leaving, Abakumov asked:

- Do you want to say something?

It was clear to Ilyin that today the conversation would not work out, the situation was difficult, but even at this critical moment he could not deviate one iota from the truth.

"I know Boris Teplinsky better than you.

- Better than me? Abakumov flared up. "Don't forget, Commissar of State Security.

It was already late, but he decided to walk home. One thing is clear: a threat hung over Teplinsky. For what? And the more he thought that evening, the more he became convinced in his thought: no, he cannot recoil from a friend, betray a comrade, a faithful fighter of the revolution.

In April 1943, "Teplinskiy called Viktor at work and said that he was being summoned to the head of the personnel department of the Air Force. After that, Teplinskiy did not return to the apartment. Then it turned out that Abakumov himself had arrested the general, brought him to his office and, tearing off his shoulder straps, ordered him to be "dressed up" in an old soldier's tunic and trousers.

The next day, Deputy People's Commissar Kobulov suggested that Ilyin give a written explanation. why he not only ignored Abakumov's instructions to break off contact with Teplinsky, but also brought him to his apartment. Ilyin gave such an explanation and concluded at the end: "I wrote everything. There is nothing more to add. If it all happened again, I would do exactly the same thing."

On May 3, 1943, in the evening, Ilyin was summoned to Merkulov. Abakumov was already sitting here. In agonizing silence, Merkulov carefully read some paper. At last he finished reading, returned the sheets to Abakumov, and, turning to Ilyin, said muffledly:

"Your arrest has been ordered.

- Is it really now, when the fiercest battle is going on at the front, am I more needed in the camps, and not on the front lines? Ilyin said.

They didn't answer him. After Merkulov called, the head of the internal prison entered the office and took Ilyin to a solitary cell.

Already in the prison cell, something escaped from the lips of Viktor Nikolaevich about Abakumov:

- He once filed folders for me. But he quickly grew up thanks to his cruelty!

And now the head of the inner prison, who is well acquainted with Ilyin, says in embarrassment:

“Viktor Nikolayevich, you will have to go with me...

As Ilyin remembered for the rest of his life, at the same time he immediately made two violations of the order during the arrest. Firstly, he did not immediately take away Ilyin's personal weapon - a pistol, and secondly - did not remove his shoulder straps. All this has already been done by others in the inner prison...

And further. As General Sudoplatov notes, “Under the rules that were abolished only under Gorbachev, no one had the right to arrest a high-ranking official without the consent of his superiors. True, there were exceptions, but each time they were considered as an emergency. The arrest warrant was signed by the prosecutor, but in the lower left corner it must have had the sanction of the immediate superior of the person who was arrested: “Agreed” and a signature. As I said, there was no Beria's sanction in this case. That is, Abakumov arrested Ilyin without the sanction of Beria ...

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According to the service record (No. 268490), which is still kept in the Russian State Military Archive, Major General of Aviation Teplinskiy Boris Lvovich was born on August 12, 1899 in the city of Kharkov. Ukrainian by nationality, native language Russian (Ukrainian). Social origin: tradesman, profession before joining the service: student. The main profession of parents is recorded as stage workers. In the future, the mother indicated the profession of an actor. Non-partisan. Married: wife of Alexandra Vasilievna Savushkina.

Education: 8 classes of the 2nd Kharkov male gymnasium. Military: graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army.

Participated in battles:

Against Krasnov and Kaledin from 10.01 to 15.03.1918.

Petliura from April 9 to July 10, 1918.

On the Tsaritsyn Front from July 15 to October 20, 1918.

In the Offensive to Ukraine from 10/20/1918 to 02/1/1919.

Against Wrangel and Denikin from 07/16/1919 to 11/24/1920.

Injuries:

Wounded in the left shoulder on July 20, 1918.

Wounded in the left leg and shell-shocked on August 6, 1919.

Wounded in the right hand on August 3, 1920.

He entered the service as a private on July 17, 1916. Private of the 17th Chernihiv Hussar Regiment.

Service in the Red Army:

1 month — detachments of the Red Cossacks — formation instructor. December 21, 1917

3 months - detachments of the Red Cossacks - platoon commander. 01/10/1918

5 months - Bakhmut Workers' Regiment - head of horse reconnaissance. 04/23/1918;

5th Karachinsky Rifle Regiment - Chief of Cavalry Reconnaissance. 07/18/1918;



1st Sudzhinsky Rifle Regiment - head of mounted reconnaissance. October 11, 1918

3 months - Native hundred under the commandant of Kharkov - pom. commander of a hundred February 1, 1919

2 months - the commandant's office in Kharkov - adjutant of the combat unit. May 12, 1919

2 F of the month - Sumy fortress regiment - head of horse intelligence. 07/16/1919

6 months - 369th Infantry Regiment - adjutant of the regiment. 09/23/1919

6th Cavalry Regiment of the 8th Red Cossack Division - Adjutant of the regiment. October 14, 1919

3 and months - 46th division - for assignments under the head of the division. 1.04.1920

1 month - 52 rifle division - commanders. 07/15/1920

2% of the month - consolidated cavalry division of the troops of the 13th army - assistant to the beginning. staff for the operational part - 08/06/1920

11 months - 115th cavalry regiment - squadron commander. October 13, 1920

16th Cavalry Division - squadron commander. December 1, 1920

1 month - 16th Cavalry Division - for assignments at the head of reconnaissance. department. October 1, 1921

6 months - commander of the ChON and head of the Vseobuch of Crimea - secretary. September 28, 1921

5 months - head of the department of the OGPU troops of Ukraine and Crimea - for assignments. 03/20/1922

| year - the headquarters of the h.PU of the Ukrainian district - com. cavalry regiment.

September 1, 1922

3 years - Military Academy of the Red Army - student. October 7, 1922

11 months - OSNAZ division under the board of the OGPU - pom. com. div. October 29, 1925

Higher Border School of the OGPU - pcs. teacher. 11/1/1926

1st Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters - assistant to the beginning. Sh department. 1.11.27 RVS-381.

School of Chervonny foremen - teacher of tactics. 10.1.29, RVS-502.

10th Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters - Pom.nach. 4 sectors. 1.04.30 RVS-305.

10th Artillery Brigade - Chief of Staff. 11/15/30 RVS-907.

Military-Technical Academy of the Red Army - teacher. K-10. 11/17/31 R-0401.

Air Force Academy - Lecturer. 12/15/31 R-0468.

Boris Lvovich Teplinskiy was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the medal "XX Years of the Red Army". Later, after graduating from the Academy of the General Staff, he was left there as an adjunct at the Department of Aviation. He was fluent in two foreign languages: English and French. The last position was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Siberian Military District. Candidate member of the CPSU (b) since 1939.

well

General Teplinsky was arrested on April 28, 1943 as a participant in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. V. Smirnov in his book "Up to the highest measure" writes: "During the "investigation", Teplinskiy was forced to plead guilty to the fact that since 1929 he had been a participant in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy, in which he was involved by the former deputy head of the Operational Directorate - the appointment of the General Staff of the Red Army by Vakulich (in 1938 he was sentenced to death ...). Teplinskiy also pleaded guilty to anti-Soviet agitation. He then retracted his testimony about participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. Since there was no objective evidence to support this accusation, the accusation of Teplinsky of committing crimes under Art. 58-1 "6 ° and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, was withdrawn.

But

it doesn't mean

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for the release of Teplinsky from custody. After all, he confessed to conducting anti-Soviet agitation. Therefore, the "investigation" continued. How was it conducted? In the usual way for that time: by sleep deprivation, the use of many days of "racks", severe beatings.

At the very first night interrogation, which was carried out with prejudice, Abakumov knocked out two of Teplinsky's front teeth. And Boris Lvovich was forced to tell that Ilyin himself advised him on how best to behave in order not to give grounds for accusations of sympathy for the enemies of the people. It was after the testimony of the arrested Teplinsky that Stalin's sanction was obtained for the arrest of Ilyin.

At the confrontation, which Abakumov arranged with "love" for two friends, Teplinskiy, who had been beaten the day before, repeated his testimony. And Viktor Nikolayevich Ilyin, indignant at this behavior of the general, slapped him in the face, calling his friend a real woman.

Recalling these terrible days, Ilyin said: "With zeal, the investigation began to "create" a case against Ilyin-Teplinsky. It was entrusted to lead Likhachev and Sokolov. They enjoyed Abakumov's special confidence.

At first, Sokolov sought Ilyin's self-incrimination and giving false, slanderous evidence. Failed. They engaged in political compromise of Ilyin as a member of the party and a Chekist. At one time, Ilyin gave Teplinsky a recommendation for joining the party's candidates. Then he wrote a party review when Teplinsky was appointed head of the operational department of the Air Force. The investigators presented the case as follows: Ilyin, giving his recommendations, allegedly not only knew about the Trotskyist views and statements of Teplinsky, but also took part in these conversations. Ilyin objected:

- It's a lie! I refuse to answer provocative questions.

The investigators forced Teplinsky to admit the fact of Ilyin's participation in a conversation between Teplinsky and his comrade from the Academy, when they criticized the policy of the Central Committee from Trotskyist positions, while Ilyin did not agree with them and defended the policy pursued by the Central Committee of the party. Taking the blow unreasonably, Teplinskii wanted to save Ilyin by this, to alleviate his plight.

At the confrontation, Viktor Nikolayevich firmly and conclusively stated:

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"Teplinskiy is slandering himself, his comrade, and me. There was no such conversation. And it couldn't be!

The confrontation was interrupted, and Sokolov roughly pushed Ilyin out of the office. Teplinskii, realizing that he had been deceived by the investigators, completely retracted his testimony... And nothing, even the use of physical coercion, helped the investigators to make Teplinskii repeat his false testimony.

After the confrontation, walking along a narrow, darkish corridor, Ilyin thought that this conversation, apparently, would bring the denouement closer. An investigator walking nearby, as if guessing his thoughts, said:

- What are you stubborn?

"This is not stubbornness, but a struggle for the truth.

"It's the end anyway...

"Everyone will have one," Ilyin remarked. But we'll see who has it first.

- Let's see".

Years will pass. The former head of the department of the investigative department of the GUKR SMERSH, as well as the former deputy head of the investigative unit for especially important cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Colonel K.A. Sokolov would be retired at the age of 53 in June 1954.

When Ilyin is already working in the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union, he will be informed that one applicant is asking for an appointment with him. In the office of the organizing secretary, the petitioner began to neatly lay out his documents on the table. Having carefully looked at the man, Ilyin recognized in him that same investigator Sokolov.

"I think we know each other," he told him coldly, looking straight ahead.

The person who entered, looked attentively into the face of the former prisoner, turned pale, picked up his papers and flew out of the office like a bullet ...

But let's return to the memoirs of P. Sudoplatov: "Having not found witnesses to confirm the testimony of Teplinsky, Abakumov found himself in a difficult situation: after all, it was necessary to enlist the testimony of two witnesses. Since none of Teplinsky's entourage in the military elite even knew about the existence of Ilyin and could not testify against him, it seemed problematic to find a second witness for the prosecution, and without this it was impossible to transfer the case for hearing to the Military Collegium. Ilyin was beaten, deprived of sleep, but he not only refused to plead guilty,

but did not even sign the interrogation protocols. To formalize the case, they had to be presented to Stalin so that he would decide the further fate of the person under investigation, and Abakumov was afraid to appear before Stalin without a convincing indictment. Although Abakumov could not prove Ilyin's guilt, he still remained in prison.

Ilyin was summoned for interrogation for four years, from 1943 to 1947. He was kept in solitary confinement and periodically beaten to extract confessions. Four years later, they gave up on him, but for another five years he remained in prison, where at various times his cellmates were the Minister of Aviation Industry Shakhurin, Air Marshal Novikov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania. Ilyin did not tell anyone that he was a Chekist officer. According to him, he worked in the technical department of a documentary film studio. Realizing that he was a victim of the struggle for power, Ilyin promised himself not to admit to anything and it would be better to die than to tarnish his honor. He even managed to keep a sense of humor. One day he asked his interrogator, who was conducting the interrogation:

- And what does the ribbon on your chest mean?

The officer replied that it was the Order of Lenin. Ilyin remarked:

"This is the honor that has been conferred on me — the case has been entrusted to a person who has been awarded the Order of Lenin. So my work is very important!

In July 1951, Ilyin was transferred to Matrosskaya Tishina and placed in a special block of the prison of the Central Committee of the Party. The Committee of Party Control, which investigated the cases of members of the Central Committee and state security officers, dealt with those under investigation. The head of the prison warned him of serious consequences if he did not admit his guilt before the party: The new investigator, who appeared at the next interrogation in the form of a major general of justice, was the deputy military prosecutor of the Soviet Union Kitaev. To Ilyin's immense surprise, Kitaev demanded that he testify about the traitorous activities of Abakumov, in response, Ilyin asked for evidence that this was not a provocation. The guard led him out into the corridor and pushed him to the peephole of the cell, where the sworn enemy of Ilyina Abakumov was sitting.

Nevertheless, Ilyin refused to testify against Abakumov, far-sightedly reasoning that Abakumov had once reported everything to Stalin and if he, Ilyin, now tells about the fabrication

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cases forged by Abakumov, he can be accused of contributing to these crimes. Ilyin testified that in his work after 1933 he had no contact with Abakumov, only occasionally met him at the Lubyanka, and also during an inspection trip to Rostov in 1938. Kitaev was dissatisfied with his statement and transferred Ilyin back to the Lubyanka, where the interrogations immediately resumed. However, their tone became completely different. Now he was accused of misunderstanding his official duty, maintaining contacts and friendly relations with suspicious people. Six months later, the Commandant of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), Major General Blokhin, announced to him: for service omissions, the Special Council sentenced Ilyin to nine years in prison.

The term of imprisonment has expired - Ilyin served nine years. Before his release, he was offered to go to the office to complete the necessary documents. Ilyin told me that Blokhin was not only the head of the commandant's office, but was also responsible for carrying out death sentences (in a number of cases he carried them out himself), therefore, when he was summoned to Blokhin, he faced one For two seconds, his whole life scrolled through his mind. He was sure that now, this very minute, he would be taken to the commandant's office to be shot. However, he was taken to a regular office, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement regarding the circumstances of the case and the conditions of detention. He received a certificate of release, a temporary passport and his old uniform of the commissar of state security, now a major general, without shoulder straps, which over the years has become dilapidated."

On February 16, 1952, the indictment in the Teplinsky case was approved by Colonel Ryumin, Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR. In particular, it stated: "While studying at the Military Academy in 1923, Teplinskii established contact with a number of Trotskyists, shared their views, and himself opposed the policy of the party and the Soviet government. In 1927 he allegedly departed from Trotskyism. In 1927-1928 he met with the active Trotskyists Radek and Serebryakov. In 1933, in a conversation with Trukhin and Bessonov, he expressed "terrorist intent against the head of the Soviet government."

On March 27, 1952, the case of Teplinsky was considered by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The content of the minutes of the court session will note: "Teplinskiy pleaded guilty v

conducting anti-Soviet agitation and declared that he was in prison for the cause. Moreover, the court finds Teplinsky guilty of "that in 1937-1940, being anti-Soviet, among his entourage he conducted anti-Soviet agitation directed against the activities of the party and the Soviet government. During the Patriotic War in 1941-1942 in Novosibirsk, he continued to conduct anti-Soviet agitation, also directed against the activities of the party and the Soviet government. He declared the need to abolish military councils and the institution of commissars in the Soviet Army. Based on Art. 58-10, part 2 of the Criminal Code

RSFSR Teplinskiy is sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years with confiscation of all property.

Until the end of his days, Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin will remember how at night the clanging of the neighboring cell door was heard in the corridor and the creak of the boots of a man coming out of the same loneliness, who was once again taken for interrogation, was clearly audible. It was his friend Air Force General Teplinskiy. Ilyin drew attention to the creak of his boots in a past life - at the airfield. Now his step was uneven, with a clear arrhythmia... The arrhythmia appeared after a heart attack in prison.

For all the long years of imprisonment, both at interrogations and at face-to-face confrontations, Viktor Nikolayevich did not sign a single protocol. "I began to respect myself, I began to refer to myself as "you", the former Chekist often said with well-deserved pride.

Years later, Ilyin will tell Sudoplatov how, released late in the evening, without money, he decided to take refuge in the reception room of the MGB on Kuznetsky Most.

"He knew that the war was over, but he didn't know how it changed people's lives: he didn't know that a monetary reform had taken place in the country and completely different money was in circulation. He also did not know where his family was and what happened to them. In the morning it turned out that his wife had divorced him, because she had no information about him and believed that he was dead. She went out again, and their daughter lived with her.

Ilyin tried to contact Merkulov, who became Minister of State Control. He came to the ministry, the secretary reported to Merkulov, and then said that the name of Ilyin did not mean anything to the minister. He had nowhere to go. But he again returned to the reception of the MGB and made an attempt to call Shubnyakov, who was his

avenger.

He did not know his phone number and did not have a coin to call from the machine, so he dialed his old number using the internal phone in the MGB reception. The duty officer answered, who recognized him and spoke to him with obvious sympathy: Ilyin's reputation was still high among the veterans of the NKVD. It turned out that Shubnyakov was arrested in 1951, following Abakumov. An officer from the reception of the MGB lent Ilyin five hundred rubles (at that time it was a rather large amount) and advised him to immediately leave Moscow.

Ilyin went to Ryazan, where his cousin lived. There he got a job as a loader at the railway station. He reported his arrival to the city to the local department of state security on the railway, and two months later they helped him get a position as a loader foreman. True, they demanded from him that he tell his fellow workers that he was convicted not under a political article, but for embezzlement and other official crimes, and they promised to make a corresponding entry in the work book. But Ilyin refused, fearing that he might be accused of hiding his past. So at the age of forty-eight he started a new

life".

Boris Lvovich Teplinskiy was the first to write complaints to the top, on which an additional check was carried out. During it, he categorically retracted his "confessional" testimony, saying that they were literally beaten out of him. For ten days he was deprived of sleep: all this time he stood, he was severely beaten.

Also during the check it was established: "Teplinskiy was interrogated at night until 5-6 o'clock. He was summoned for interrogations 108 times, and only 15 protocols of interrogations were compiled. In addition, some of them are dated on the wrong dates when he was actually interrogated. Witnesses who accused him of conducting anti-Soviet agitation in 1943 retracted their testimony, saying that they had been forced to slander Teplinsky as a result of the beatings they were subjected to. Bessonov and Trukhin, who exposed Teplinsky of committing a crime, died in 1944. Other witnesses did not cite a single statement by Teplinsky that could be qualified as anti-Soviet agitation.

During the interrogation on February 20, 1954, Teplinskiy testified that before the consideration of the case in the court session, Colonel Flyagin, who had summoned him, recommended "not kicking" at the trial, otherwise he would be

Badly. When he asked Flyagin what kind of court eight and a half years after his arrest, he cynically declared: "Your stay in prison must be legally registered." Therefore, Teplinsky explained, he was forced to incriminate himself in court.

On May 14, 1955, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR considered the opinion of the Prosecutor General of the USSR, drawn up in accordance with Art. 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, and the sentence against Teplinsky was canceled due to newly discovered circumstances, the case was dismissed due to the absence of corpus delicti, and not because the charges were not proven, as suggested in the conclusion of the USSR Prosecutor General.

Soon the friends met... It is difficult to describe those seconds when Ilyin, already at large, in the town of Shcherbakov meets his emaciated and limping friend Teplinsky... They hugged tightly in silence, and then stood together and cried... Two adults, two generals, two participants in the Civil War, two ex-prisoners...

And then Boris Lvovich, with trembling hands, will take out a document from the desk drawer and hand it to Viktor Nikolaevich. As if with blurred eyes, Ilyin will read briefly: "The verdict of the Military Collegium dated March 27, 1952 in relation to B.L. Teplinsky. canceled due to newly discovered circumstances, and the case was dismissed for lack of corpus delicti."

Later, in the party organ, Ilyin will be given a copy of a letter written by Teplinsky, in which the words of Boris Lvovich will sound like the tones of a bell: "I consider it a duty of my conscience to declare that the Leninist party spirit, loyalty to our friendship, which Ilyin showed in The course of the terrible nine years we have both experienced is one of the highest manifestations of the human spirit and is one of those qualities that every truly Soviet person can be proud of.

On July 31, 1953, the Special Conference terminated Ilyin's case due to the lack of corpus delicti, and in June 1954, his party card was returned to him. A. Teplyakov notes in his article: "During the consideration of the case in the CPC, party investigators noted that Ilyin, being a responsible employee of the NKGB, ... disclosed to his acquaintances secret data known to him in the service. So, in 1938, Ilyin, in a conversation with A.F. Rutkovsky, dismissed from the NKVD. (convicted in 1939 as a member of the anti-Soviet op

Ganization) informed him about the arrests of their mutual acquaintances of the NKVD and the nature of their testimony, and also told that the violinist of the Bolshoi Theater Orchestra (M.I.) Sadovsky, whom he knew, was arrested for espionage activities and, during interrogation, gave incriminating evidence against him, Rutkovsky, and that the NKVD planned the arrest of Rutkovsky.

Recognizing this, Ilyin will write in his explanations that he reported these data to Rutkovsky, "based on comradely relations with him that arose through joint work in the NKVD bodies." Also, Ilyin in 1942 "told Teplinsky's wife ... the data known to him about the transition to the side of the Germans, the former Major General F.I. Trukhin, whom they knew. (Chief of Staff Vlasov), with the goal of warning the Teplinskys to break off friendly relations with Trukhin's wife.

After rehabilitation, Teplinsky was returned to the military rank of Major General of Aviation, he moved to Moscow, where he again returned to the development of the most important scientific problems. For example, Boris Lvovich's work "On the Peculiarities of the Interaction of Aviation with Ground Forces and on the Role of Aviation in Modern Warfare" will be published in 1965. The surname of General Teplinsky will stand next to such names as M.V. Frunze, M.N. Tukhachevsky, S.S. Kamenev, A.I. Egorov, B.M. Shaposhnikov. And on December 1, 1972, Boris Lvovich Teplinsky died.

About his rehabilitation V.N. Ilyin told General Sudoplatov, who was just about to write a book that was published only in the nineties of the last century.

"After Stalin's death, he applied for rehabilitation. The first petition was rejected, but he was allowed to return to Moscow. Ilyin got a job in the transport department of the Moscow City Council. He was rehabilitated in 1954 after the execution of Beria and my arrest. For a year, he was denied the full pension due to state security officers. Serov opposed this, stating that Ilyin was compromised by his connection with Teplinsky, who was still serving his term as an enemy of the people.

Three days after my release from prison in 1968, Ilyin visited me. I learned that fate again smiled at him. In 1956, his former curator in the Central Committee became the deputy head of the department of culture of the Central Committee of the party. He needed an honest and experienced administrator for the post of organizing secretary of the Moscow branch

Union of Writers. Ilyin's previous work experience, a former commissar of state security for culture, made him a suitable candidate for this post. In addition, he was supported by such writers as Fedin and Simonov. The party leadership needed a person in the Writers' Union who would know everyone, including informers. Ilyin perfectly matched his new position and worked in the Writers' Union until 1977.

## CONFESSION BEFORE DEATH

In 1976, Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin decided to retire. There is a very curious entry about this event in the diary of the writer Anatoly Mednikov: "... And here is the organizational plenum of 1976 that I remember. The first issue was the nomination of Mikhail Lukonin to the position of the First Secretary of the Management Board. This proposal was made by Mikhalkov. He said about Lukonin: "Great Russian poet, prominent public figure, warrior, laureate of the State Prize, secretary of the USSR Writers' Union". Then Narovchatov took the floor and read his poem about how he and Lukonin left for the front in October 1941 from the Kyiv station. Then he said that Mikhail Lukonin was an "internationalist", brave, but prudent, because one can be brave recklessly.

After the vote - "throne speech" by Mikhail Lukonin. She was short. By the way, he said:

- It's not that difficult, the Moscow organization. She is spiritually healthy. The line pursued by Narovchatov and Smirnov is correct, and I will continue it... No one is going to lead in the sense of leading a writer's pen. We are creating a calm creative environment," Lukonin noted.

But Ilyin was not suitable for a calm creative environment. I don't know if he had a preliminary conversation with Lukonin, a direct explanation. When, on which of the sleepless nights Ilyin decided to leave. First, at the party group, and then at the plenum, his announcement of retirement was unexpectedly heard for everyone. The secretary of the city committee, Makeev, who was sitting in the presidium, said the kindest words about Viktor Nikolayevich: well-deserved, respected, but such a statement was received. The opinion of the City Party Committee is to be respected.

The writers have begun. Poet Sergei Smirnov, prose writers Grigory Baklanov, Sergei Bol spoke well about Ilyin.

Dyrev, Pyotr Sazhin, Viktor Poltoratsky - all elderly people who, to one degree or another, enjoyed the attention and goodwill of Viktor Nikolayevich. Ilyin's retirement itself was not disputed by anyone, since there was his statement. However, it became unclear: why should the organization lose such an excellent employee?

And perhaps that is why some nervousness arose in the presidium. Then, in order to reassure people, Ilyin himself took the floor. He said: "Dear comrades! For twenty years of work, a lot of work had to be done. I wore out my nervous system. The instinct of self-preservation dictated this to me

solution". Makeev immediately responded to this: "Well, well! Who is in favor of respecting this instinct?"  
Voted unanimously...

... Nua Viktor Nikolayevich Ilyin for many years occasionally appeared in the club at party meetings, greeted all his acquaintances with emphatic respect, but he sat quietly in the hall and never again spoke at the writers' house. He died not from illness, but after being run over by a car not far from the house where he lived for a long time in the same entrance with Sergei Sergeevich Narovchatov.

All his life, Ilyin not only did not hide his belonging to the State Security Committee, but also mentioned more than once that he personally knew many leaders of the OGPU-NKVD, with some of them he began his service career at the time of his Komsomol youth, in the twenties and thirties. years...

He knew a lot of secret and terrible things, this former General Ilyin, and took a lot with him to the grave. Was it then, in the early nineties, so old that it could be considered equally useless and safe? He himself, in my opinion, did not think so. After all, it is no coincidence that, according to rumors leaked to the press, his last words, lying on the pavement under the wheels of the car, were: "Who knocked me down?..."

The portrait of Ilyin is complemented by such a case, emphasizing the special, Chekist humor: The son of L. Kuznetsova saw off the daughter of Viktor Nikolaevich from a protracted party. "Already after midnight we approached the room occupied by the Ilyins. Viktor Nikolaevich was dozing on the sofa in the hallway, apparently waiting for his daughter. Hearing the creak of the door, he opened one eye and distinctly said to his son: "Once again you bring my daughter so late, I will give

father."

And one more little touch. B. Sarnov recalls how his cousin asked to register his daughter as his literary secretary. She could not enter the full-time department of the Institute of Foreign Languages, she entered the evening department. "And there they needed a certificate (even if it was fake), confirming that she was working somewhere. The matter was simple. I had to write a statement, they gave me the appropriate paper, with which I had to go to some office (trade union, or something), where they registered (by contract) domestic workers, secretaries and other employees from private individuals for free employment. Only one obstacle could serve here: too little income of the employer. Therefore, in the application, I exaggerated my income somewhat.

Having written the application and having come for the paper, I had no doubt that it was already there for me - ready. But the secretary... said:

- Viktor Nikolaevich did not sign your certificate. He told you to look at him.

I looked.

Viktor Nikolaevich was, as always, polite. Having inquired about how I live, and having received an appropriate answer, I slowly set to work. I began to ask about the girl whom I want to register as my literary secretary: how old is she, what did she do before, is she a relative of me? I, without blinking an eye, replied that no, not a relative. This lie was easy for me: during the whole time of this conversation I saw that it was not my possible relationship with my future literary secretary that worried him, but something completely different.

And suddenly, at some point, I felt that all this anxiety of his had disappeared as if by hand. It happened when a direct question about my Irka - who is she? - I answered: "Student evening party."

It was like a stone fell from his soul. He quickly waved the paper I needed and mercifully released my soul to repentance.



He understood, of course, that the certificate was fake. But this "linden" did not bother him at all. And that's what worried him. As I was then told, shortly before my visit to Viktor Nikolaevich, Volodya Maksimov appointed as his literary secretary the well-known dissident Volodya Bukovsky, who had just been released (alas, not for long) from prison. And Viktor Nikolayevich decided, just in case, to feel me: does the girl I want to provide with a fake certificate belong to the same gang of dissidents?

human rights defenders."

As we can see, the writers had an ambiguous attitude towards Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin. But many, of course, did not like him or even hated him. "KGB", as they called the organizational secretary behind his back, could not be their friend. Why is there a friend - even a comrade! However, most of them did not know the whole tragedy of his life. The writers around him did not know how once Ilyina was broken by his colleague Abakumov all his life. How the system broke him down for many years in a prison cell, and then at large for a hundred and first kilometers. But if at least one of them turned out to be in the role of Ilyin hated by him, then I wonder what he would have done in his place? But many of them believed that he lived in spiritual comfort until a ripe old age and seemed unbearable. Not really! It's just that this man went through such ... and survived, contrary to the system, contrary to Abakumov, despite death, that, as a strong man, he survived many. Including your enemies...

Unlike most, the testimony of the literary critic and writer Vladimir Fedorovich Ognev can be called warm, objective and, if you like, honest. In "Gleams of Memory" he writes: "About Ilyin, who just didn't write later. Everyone, of course, blasphemed. And he was not the worst of the many who were assigned to us "for order". Better than many. It is known that he himself was imprisoned for the same thing, for which he had to imprison others. He had his own concept of honor, devotion to the idea had the limits of at least elementary decency. For subsequent guardians, these qualities were generally inaccessible.

Today, we confess, it is strange to read the story of Roy Medvedev. V.N. Ilyin interrogates Bukharin first - they drink tea with sandwiches, talk about the "case", then, seeing that Bukharin is tired, Ilyin invites him to lie down on the sofa right there, in the investigator's room. Covering himself with a leather jacket, Bukharin sleeps. And only somewhere in the first hour of the night he leaves for the cell. The notion that the "good" and "evil" investigators were designed this way is reasonable. But let's put it this way: "evil" and could not play the role of "good" ...

I don't know how things went with Bukharin. As for me, I know.

Ilyin had, as he understood, good feelings for me. He liked to talk on neutral topics or talked about his time in prison. It turns out that he knew poetry and wrote them himself. By God, not graphomaniacs. I remember one thing in particular—despair. "Three steps forward, three

step back. There is a wall. And there is a wall. He sat in the punishment cell, waiting for the verdict, and, apparently, pierced - he began to write poetry. It is important to feel in time in someone else's shoes. Undoubtedly, blinkered and limited, Ilyin, while serving the regime, was no stranger to steps "to the side," not only to the wall.

I remember how he got a photograph of his father from a secret archive for Okudzhava, how sincerely he was offended that Bulat allegedly forgot the photo on the table in the restaurant. I remember how he begged Slutsky and me to persuade Korzhavin not to emigrate, as Boris and I almost persuaded him. But the next day his wife persuaded him. Ilyin shook his head: "Well, what will he do there! He's not like that..." "Not like that" – in the mouth of the KGB general meant a lot.

In those days, without Ilyin's visa (it was believed that - the Board of the Moscow Region), no one could go on a business trip abroad. Neither could I after signing the "Letter of the 63s".

Ilyin invites me. "The rules are the same for everyone," he says sternly, "but if you write a letter of repentance, for me, I will put it in a safe, and I give my word of honor ..." I diligently shake my head so that there is no doubt, that I should not continue, I will not repent.

"Wait a minute," irritably, "do you really think that I am asking you to renounce? If you want to work, if you want to travel, you have to follow the rules. And the rule is simple. Are you sorry, because the truth is that you and your comrades could not change anything?"

Is this a hint? I take a piece of paper and food: "Now I regret that I signed the letter of the 63rd. It did not change anything - neither in the fate of Sinyavsky and Daniel, nor in the position in literature. Signature.

Ilyin reads the paper and ... laughs! Laughs! Then he tears the paper into small pieces and, already continuing to giggle in falsetto, gives the go-ahead: "Go, Ognev."

I'm calling Slutsky. Boris seriously, after a pause, drops dryly: "Don't have any illusions. But V.N. good. It's good in its own way," adds Boris, just in case. I agree.

Of course, they didn't let me go abroad, but the fact that Ilyin did not serve the "rules" so scrupulously is beyond doubt for me.

He knew a lot both on one side and on the other side of the barricades."

In 1949, a guard brought a new prisoner to the cell where Viktor Nikolayevich was sitting. It turned out to be the writer Abram Gontar. They got to know each other. Years later, A. Gontar will tell: "The first

time, I, to tell the truth, was confused. It seemed to me that there was no way out of these walls ... But my happiness in these incredible conditions was that Viktor Nikolaevich turned out to be my cellmate. He understood my condition and urged me: "Do not slander yourself and do not slander others; truth will prevail. You are a communist and have no right to act against your conscience. I myself am a Chekist and I am here because I did not want to compromise my conscience..." I spent almost a whole year in the same cell with Viktor Ilyin, and this man became for me an example of a communist who never for a moment stopped believing in the justice of Lenin's parties.

In the archives of the Writers' Union there are copies of documents signed by Ilyin, in which he petitioned the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court for my rehabilitation. I was still in the camp when Viktor Nikolaevich sought out my family and found words of comfort for her. I know that he helped in the rehabilitation of the family of the poet I. Fefer.

It is no coincidence that one of my first poems after rehabilitation was dedicated to V.N. Ilyin. It ends with the words:

The handshake saved me

In a moment of great loneliness!

This poem was published in my collection Silver Threads.

Member of the CPSU since 1940. Member of the Writers' Union.

"About our integrity," recalls V.F. Ognev. - Already after the retirement of V.N. met me on the street. Called for a visit. I hesitated, mumbled that I was going on vacation. I felt sorry for him. He kept talking about the fact that while he was working, he was given so many books that there was no place to keep them, and now they have "forgotten". I especially remember: "Oh, Ognev, if only you knew what dedications! What confessions of friendship! And who do you think? - he smiled bitterly and for some reason raised a thin, arthritic finger to the sky ... "

In 1990, Viktor Nikolayevich Ilyin, who was already poorly sighted, was hit by a car near his Houses.

He had a fairly spacious room, all filled with books. And indeed, there are a great many autographs on the author's copies of books - certainly warm and friendly.

For example, from Fedin himself: "Dear friend, Viktor Nikolaevich, I congratulate you, a sensitive, talented organizer of our writing life. Thank you for all the good things. Be healthy, happy. Your Fedin.

Or from Konstantin Simonov himself: "I would like to tell you about the deepest respect that I have for you, for the enormous work that you have invested and continue to invest in our difficult social and literary work ... You are a real person, a person who gives yourself to people... Live longer and work longer with us — I really want this, loving you and loving the work that you do."

The writer Anatoly Rybakov, not for the first time, carefully examined the room of the old Chekist.

- You have already seen everything, and now listen and remember. It will be very useful for you," Ilyin said and smiled enigmatically. - Abakumov appeared in our department in the spring of the 37th as a simple detective of the secret political department. Prior to that, he served as the same security officer in the 3rd branch of the Gulag Security Department. At first, Vitya Abakumov filed papers with us. I was not fit for more. But soon he went uphill. First, he was appointed assistant head of the SPO department, and then head of the department. Even under Yezhov, he set up cupboards with confiscated books in his office, but in all his life, probably, he had not read a single one. Dark, uneducated, swearing, a womanizer, a foxtrot, such a bear, but he considered himself a great dancer.

Already under Beria, he became the head of the Rostov Regional Directorate of the NKVD. And this is immediately after the head of the department! Moreover, the Rostov department was one of the largest in the people's commissariat. So, after that, he appeared at the Lubyanka (and he often ran into Moscow) somehow noisily, like the most big boss. The same one who until recently interrogated his former bosses and colleagues in the SPO. In general, he walked noisily, did not shout, did not knock, did not stamp with his boots, but all the same it was clear that a big boss was coming. He doesn't give way to anyone, rushing like a tank in the middle of the corridor, nods his head to both acquaintances and strangers, and nods to sentries in passing, and they don't even ask him for a pass, they already know by sight.

Anatoly Rybakov tried to remember everything close to the text. After all, there were no tape recorders, and one could only refer to Ilyin

after death... And yet, a few meetings gave a lot for the novel, but, alas, not all. The old man's memory let him down. The years have taken their toll...

well

In his novel, Rybakov introduced the image of a Chekist under the real name of Sharok. Ilyin knew him well. But whether Viktor Nikolayevich himself did not know much, or did not want to tell the whole truth about him, is unknown. As if the SYSTEM did not let him go even before his death. So, it didn't work and confession!

Chapter 2

## CHEKIST OF A NEW GENERATION

### BORN IN A FLOOD

He was born on April 11 (24), 1908 in Moscow in Khamovniki!. By the way, "khamovniks" in Muscovite Rus' were called the inhabitants of one of the numerous palace black settlements, who were engaged in weaving table linen for the palace. It was there, in Khamovniki, that the four children

The Abakumovs were named Victor, which means "winner". It was there, in Khamovniki, that he was baptized in the church of Nikola at the place of residence of his parents, in a working quarter near the Khamovniki barracks.

Victor's father, Semyon Semyonovich Abakumov, before the revolution worked at the Keller brothers' Moscow pharmaceutical factory as a simple worker, and his mother, Efrosinya Petrovna, as a seamstress in various workshops, and, in addition, she had to take sewing home to earn extra money. The Abakumovs lived, like many mere mortals in Rus', hard. "Father's salary was very low, a family of 5 people (brother, sister and me) was always in need," Viktor Semenovich writes years later in his autobiography. Rozh-

Khamovniki is a historical district of Moscow, located in the eastern part of the modern Khamovniki district. The administrative district of Moscow, which includes the historical district of the same name, as well as Luzhniki, Maiden Field, Plyushchikha, Ostozhenka.

The death of a famous Chekist in the future really "spoiled" only one important event — a catastrophic flood, which became one of the largest in the history of Moscow. It happened, as the chroniclers report, on April 10-14 (23-27), 1908, due to a super-snowy prolonged winter, sharp warming and rains. It is for these reasons that the water level in the Moscow River rose 8.9 meters above the permanent summer horizon - it overflowed its banks, flooding low-lying areas and embankments. Neglinka, Kuznetsky Most, Zaryadye, Bolotny Island, Sadovniki, Kadashi, Zatsep, Khamovniki, Dragomilovo, Luzhniki turned into a real Venice. The Moscow River and the Vodootvodny Canal merged into one channel up to 1.5 kilometers wide. The walls of the Kremlin were flooded on average up to 2.2 meters from the level of the pavement. The Tretyakov Gallery almost died, the tram did not work, and half of Moscow was left without electricity. About 100 kilometers of Moscow streets and lanes went under water. A fifth of the city's territory was flooded. Among other things, this huge calamity happened on the eve of Easter.

On the birthday of Viktor Abakumov, the Russkoe Slovo newspaper, in particular, wrote: "Two or three warm days in a row and several rains at once so unanimously promoted the melting of snow and loosened the ice that the rapid and multi-drainage flood of the Moskva River was already beyond doubt. <...>

By 9 o'clock. vech. The center of the city - the entire area between Moscow and the Vodootvodny Canal presented an original picture full of amazing beauty. Starting from the house of Protopopov, at the Stone Bridge, it was no longer possible to pass either to Neglinny Proyezd, or along the Kremlin wall, or along the Moscow Embankment, since all this was flooded with water. A small dry oasis was only at the entrance from Balchug to the Moskvoretsky bridge. Further along the Moskvoretskaya embankment, it was possible to drive only as far as Kitaisky passage: it was no longer possible to move forward on horseback towards the Ustyinsky bridge, and the policemen heroically threw themselves into the water, grabbing the curious townsfolk and forcing them to turn back.

It was possible to get to the Ustyinsky Bridge only by a roundabout way - through the Kitaisky Proyezd, Solyanka and to the Ustyinsky Proyezd. From half the last, the crew fell into a huge lake formed from the junction of the waters of the Moskva River and the Yauza. When moving

cut Ustyinsky bridge horror took. The old unreliable bridge trembled from the strong pressure of the water. <...>

All Sadovniki were in the water, the "Swamp" turned into a real sea, Kadashevskaya and Bolotnaya embankments were completely filled with water, with all the streets and alleys leading to them. <...>

With great difficulty, sitting already with legs on the seat of the carriage, it was possible to drive along the Raushskaya embankment. Here the water was seething. The picture between Moskvoretsky and Kamennye bridges was especially beautiful. On the one hand, the Kremlin walls, brightly lit by the electric lamps of both bridges, sank in the water, on the other hand, the beautiful houses and mansions of Sofiyskaya Embankment were reflected in it. <...>

Every minute there were boats with passengers returning from churches with lit candles. Just like on the Grand Canal in Venice. Only there were no serenades. <...>

Where the real Venice was at all, it was in Dorogomilovo. <...> Here the Moscow River has overflowed with might and main. <...> On Bolshaya Dorogomilovskaya Street, all the rooms on the first floors were flooded with water by almost 1 arshin. <...> The Bryansk railway station turned out to be cut off from the whole city, and it was possible to get to it only by boats or on the shelves of carts. For delivery to the station they took 20 kopecks. per person, putting 15-20 people on the shelves. <...>

All adjacent alleys and streets were completely flooded with water, and the inhabitants of the first floors and basements fled in any direction. <...>

Here, in the darkness, soul-rending cries were heard: "Sentry! Help!" The whistles of policemen blew, the public rushed from the square of the station.

From the windows of the second floor of Ushkov's house, surrounded on all sides by water, they shouted that the inhabitants of this house were being robbed.

How are they robbed?

"They came in boats, breaking doors and robbing flooded apartments.

Windows were opened in Ushkov's house and people demanded the police, boats to detain the robbers. The public demanded that the policemen immediately find the policeman and get the boats. How this story ended, we do not know ... "

As reported in the same newspaper the next day, the flood caused a lot of grief to some, and brought benefits to others:

traded lamps, kerosene and candles, as yesterday. In some large lamp stores, almost all the "inexpensive" goods were snapped up by the evening. The fact is that in the morning the electric station of the French society became active, providing electric energy to almost the entire city, except for the city trams.

According to the newspapers of that time, tens of thousands of people suffered from the flood. In this case, only two drowned. To assist the victims, a special Committee was created - from all over Russia, people sent money, clothes, food to the "sunken" Mother See. For example, donations in favor of flood victims in Moscow and the Moscow province were accepted by the Moscow Merchant Administration. On April 23 (May 6) charity performances were held at the Bolshoi and Maly theaters, which were sold out. All tickets were sold out in the morning, and the mass of those who wanted to get on them remained, as Russkoye Slovo literally emphasizes, "overboard".

And in six days, 50,000 rubles, donated by the Sovereign Emperor himself, will be distributed among those affected by the flood. For this purpose, the mayor, the mayor and representatives of all departments and institutions will be present at the meeting, chaired by the assistant to the commander of the troops, General Glazov. For the share of the victims in Moscow, they will assign the amount of 16,000 rubles, and the remaining amount of 34,000 rubles - to the Moscow province.

In addition, stock exchange and merchant companies will collect 65,000 rubles for the benefit of those affected by the flood...

But the most striking event of 1908 will be the Tunguska event or the Tunguska meteoroid - a hypothetical body, probably of cometary origin, which caused an air explosion that occurred in the area of the Podkamennaya Tunguska River on June 17 (30), 1908 at 7:14.5

minutes local time. The power of the explosion is estimated at 10-40 megatons, which corresponds to the energy of a large hydrogen bomb.

Here is what Russkaya Gazeta of that time would write on its pages:

"July 03 (June 20), 1908 KERCH, 19, UT. Yesterday and the third day at night, an unusually bright aurora, unprecedented here, was observed in the sky, reminiscent of the northern lights. The phenomenon of pre

abated only in the morning.

July 04 (June 21), 1908

White Nights

As it turns out now, white nights were also observed in Moscow, on the night of Wednesday and Tuesday. This phenomenon attracted the attention of many and served as the subject of lively conversations. In the northwest, the sky was brightly lit with a greenish light. <...>

July 05 (June 22), 1908

Province

rare atmospheric phenomenon

Tsaritsyn

(From our correspondent).

On June 17 in Tsaritsyn-on-Volga a rather rare northern light was observed for the temperate zone. Just after sunset, a strong streak of light appeared in the northern part of the sky. The usual evening twilight seemed endless, and it was light well past midnight. It was a white Petersburg night. All objects were illuminated by some kind of greenish light, and shadows fell from houses and fences, as if in moonlight. This phenomenon continued until dawn, when the northeast lit up like a bright glow of a huge fire.

The townsfolk, interested in a rare atmospheric phenomenon, interpreted it in their own way.

- The end of the world is coming.

The coming of the Antichrist! some said.

"Wars, internecine strife, invasion of foreigners," others explained.

The majority took the northern lights for the glow of a large fire in one of the nearby villages.

Who knows if the parents told their son about these and other cataclysms and events, but in April 1917 Viktor Abakumov turned nine years old, and he had to remember April 18 (May 1) for the rest of his life, as well as the days and months that follow. According to an eyewitness, despite the cold weather (snow, rain, hail), more than three-quarters of the entire Moscow population converged on the streets and squares of Moscow at that time: "from 11 am to 2 pm. During these three hours we walked along Sretenka, Bolshaya Lubyanka, Lubyanskaya Square, Theater Passage, Teatralnaya, Voskresenskaya and Red Squares and then along Tverskaya to Strastnaya Square. Everywhere there are clouds of people - demonstrating and contemplating. Daemon-

countries with banners. Of course, red, sometimes with rich decorations, gold and silver braids and tassels, as well as embroideries and drawings of various emblems. The troops also took part in the demonstration with their orchestras, but I cannot say that they pleased with their appearance. Somehow they walked discordantly, emphasizing democratically - there was no formation order, the officers were obscured and, mixing with the soldiers, did not give the necessary military tone, in a word, it was no longer an army, but a crowd.

However, this is now a daily occurrence. And we "bourgeois" already somehow have little faith in the power of such an army - an army that is not dressed in uniform, unbuttoned, unstretched, does not recognize ranks and elders in its way of life, all-smoking, wandering with a civil clubfoot gait and ready in case of something "punch in the face" to his boss, who allegedly also gave them to the soldiers earlier. The junkers went best of all, and it is understandable - there is complete consciousness here.

In less than six months, in the afternoon of October 25, V.I. Lenin will declare publicly at the session of the Petrograd Soviet: "The workers' and peasants' revolution, about the necessity of which the Bolsheviks have been talking all along, has come to pass. The oppressed masses themselves will create power. The old state apparatus will be smashed to the ground and a new administrative apparatus will be created in the form of Soviet organizations.

From now on, a new period is beginning in the history of Russia, and this third Russian revolution must ultimately lead to the victory of socialism.

In the meantime, in Moscow, where Viktor Abakumov lived, still, starting from October 20, they were still waiting for the "performance" of the Bolsheviks. The frightened townsfolk were preparing for armed attacks on their apartments at night. In general, the real "St. Bartholomew's Night" was expected.

But the revolution did not come to Moscow until the morning of October 28, 1917.

An eyewitness to the events wrote in his diary on November 10: "So, the Bolsheviks carried out a coup in their favor, but "not without bloodshed," as Trotsky boasted. In Moscow alone, they say, there are from 5,000 to 7,000 victims, and how many buildings, property and all good things have been damaged cannot be counted.

Already on Saturday evening, October 28, shots from rifles, machine guns and cannons were heard all over Moscow, but where did it happen?

was impossible.

On the 30th, on Monday, it was quieter, but it was dangerous to go far from home.

At every step, evil soldier figures. They were joined by the "Red Guards", young, poorly dressed people from those who are always looking for places and who in the past years clung to the Khitrov market and constituted the so-called "golden company".

On the 31st, Tuesday afternoon, the shooting was terrible. There is nothing to think about leaving the house.

On Wednesday, November 1, I tried to get into the office, where I was responsible for a lot of money and documents, but I reached the back streets and alleys only as far as Lubyansky passage, it was impossible to go any further: shells, shrapnel and bullets were flying along Lubyanskaya Square. They say that the junkers are desperately defending the telephone building and the Kremlin. The post office and telegraph are in the hands of the Bolsheviks. He returned home to the music of gunshots. Overhead and somewhere close, invisibly, bullets whistled, hitting the walls of houses, breaking windows, rattling on roofs, injuring, killing and frightening civilians, as well as crows and pigeons.

There were madly rushing cars with mad people who looked angrily at every passer-by and were ready to incessantly shoot at faces they did not like.

On Friday, November 3rd, the Military Revolutionary Committee issued a "manifesto" in which it solemnly announced that after a five-day bloody battle, the enemies of the people, who raised their armed hand against the revolution, were utterly defeated. They surrendered and disarmed. At the cost of the blood of courageous fighters - soldiers and workers - victory was achieved. From now on, people's power is being established in Moscow - the power of the Soviets of the river. and s.d.

On Wednesday, November 8, real newspapers finally came out, that is, Russk. Word", "Russian. Ved.", "Morning of Russia", etc. On the first pages there is a mourning announcement about the death of many Moscow residents who accidentally died during these days or fell ideologically.

Nobody works in the ministry. Officials do not recognize the new government.

Everything is taken from them by violence. Everything is confused. Everything went into final horrendous devastation leaps."

Immediately after the revolution, Abakumov's parents lost their jobs in enterprises. His father got a job as a stoker cleaner in one of the capital's hospitals, and his mother in the same hospital as a cleaner. Until 1921, he himself studied at the city school. In Russia, these schools existed since the spring of 1872 specifically "for the urban population

nia, and mainly for the poor part of it. With the aim of "delivering a complete general elementary education and giving those information that can be most useful in practical life."

City schools were subdivided into one-, two-, three-, and four-class schools. In all schools, the course of study lasted six years. This division was based on the number of teachers and money allocated for the maintenance of schools. In the curriculum of such schools, as a rule, the following subjects were compulsory: reading and writing, Russian, arithmetic, practical geometry, geography and history, information from natural history and physics, drawing and drawing, singing, gymnastics.

In 1921, Viktor Abakumov graduated from four classes of the city school, and at the end of the year, as he himself wrote in his autobiography, as a boy, he volunteered for the Red Army, where he served in the 2nd special assignment of the Moscow brigade CHON!. They enrolled a young Muscovite as a nurse.

CHON - Parts of the Special Purpose of the Cheka of the USSR (1919-1925) - military-party detachments created at factory party cells, district committees, city committees, ukoms and provincial committees of the party on the basis of a decree of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated April 17, 1919 to assist the bodies of the Soviet authorities to fight counter-revolution. guard duty at especially important objects, etc. For the general leadership, a responsible organizer was allocated under the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and organizers under the provincial committees, ukoms, etc. Initially, CHONs were formed from members and candidates of the party, and later from the best members of the Komsomol. The first CHONs arose in Petrograd and Moscow, in addition, in the central provinces of the RSFSR (by September 1919, they were created in 33 provinces).

CHONs of the front line of the Southern, Western and Southwestern fronts took part in front-line operations. In November 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) adopted a resolution on the introduction of CHONs into the Vseobuch system, only with the preservation of their independence of formation and readiness for use by order of the local party organization. On March 24, 1921, the Central Committee of the Party adopted a resolution on the basis of the decision of the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b) on the inclusion of the ChON in the militia units of the Red Army. The personnel of the CHON was divided into personnel and militia (variable). In September 1921, the command and headquarters of the CHON of the country were established, in the provinces and districts - the command and headquarters of the CHON, the Councils of the CHON at the provincial committees and party committees. In December 1921, there were 39,673 personnel in the CHON. and variable — 323,372 people. The CHON included infantry. cavalry, artillery and armored units. In connection with the improvement of the internal and international situation of the USSR and the strengthening of the Red Army in 1924-1925. by decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) CHON were disbanded.



In 1922, Abakumov's father died, and at the end of the next year he was demobilized from the army, as the units of the CHON began to be gradually disbanded as unnecessary. In his autobiography in 1939, Viktor Semenovich wrote: "At the end of 1923, he was demobilized from the army. Due to unemployment, I worked throughout 1924 as a worker in various temporary jobs."

In 1925, Viktor Abakumov joined the Moscow Union of Industrial Cooperation as a packer, where he worked until the end of 1926. In 1927, he received the post of shooter of the first detachment of the military-industrial guard in the USSR Supreme Economic Council. In the same place, in 1927, he joined the Komsomol.

Already at the end of 1928, Abakumov again got a job as a packer, but only in the warehouses of the Central Union, where in 1930 he joined the CPSU (b).

Later, in his autobiography, Viktor Semenovich writes: "In the same year, when the workers were being promoted to the Soviet apparatus, I was nominated through the trade unions to the system of the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR, where I worked as deputy. head of the administrative department of the trade and messenger office and at the same time was the secretary of the Komsomol organization.

Having worked for only 8 months, in September 1930, by the decision of the Zamoskvoretsky district committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, I was sent to a leading Komsomol job at the "Press" stamping plant. At this plant, I was elected secretary of the Komsomol organization. Subsequently, at the Press plant, I was elected a delegate to the Zamoskvoretsky conference, and at the conference I was elected a member of the plenum and bureau of the Zamoskvoretsky district committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League. In this regard, I was then transferred to work in the district committee of the Komsomol, head. military department."

By the way, Viktor's mother, working as a cleaner in a hospital, earned little, but after working for thirteen years after the revolution, she fell ill and retired. Of the closest, the future Chekist had a sister and a brother. However, life gradually improved. The Komsomol career foreshadowed Abakumov a real "bright" future, much more than he would have been listed among ordinary proletarians. Now he was allowed to trump with his proletarian origin, which brought him out of the very bottom thanks to the October Revolution.

## ASCENT FROM THE PRACTITIONER

In January 1932, on a party voucher, Viktor Abakumov was appointed to a more than modest position as a full-time trainee in the economic department of the authorized representative of the OGPU in the Moscow region. Just this year, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks announced the next party recruitment of "the best and most proven communists" to the state security agencies. After appropriate practice, the former young Komsomol worker is appointed authorized representative of the OGPU for the Moscow region as an authorized representative of the economic department.

All in the same 1932, Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, a full-time trainee of the 5th department of the IVF PP of the OGPU MO, was certified as follows: "Active and executive, works intensively. Focuses quickly. The horizon is developed, but further work is required to expand public knowledge."

Since 1933, he was already authorized by the economic department of the OGPU, then the economic department of the GUGB NKVD.

From the certification of the authorized 1st department of the Economic Directorate of the OGPU Abakumov Viktor Semenovich for 1933: "He has a great attraction to operational work. Impetuous. Sometimes he thinks little about the consequences of the undercover course of work. He did not take part in investigative cases. Disciplined."

From the certification of the authorized 1st department of the Economic Directorate of the OGPU Abakumov Viktor Semenovich for 1934: "He has an attraction to operational work. Impetuous. Quickly draws conclusions, sometimes unfounded. Sometimes he thinks little of the consequences. He did not take part in investigations. Disciplined. Educational guidance is needed."

The author of the memoirs "NKVD from the inside: Notes of a Chekist" M.P. Schrader calls the young Chekist Abakumov a mediocre operative, a fox trot and an unprincipled person. As a witness to the initial nomination of Viktor Semenovich, he, in particular, writes: "In 1933, when I was working as the head of the 6th department of the ECU of the Moscow Region, I received a call from the First Deputy Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU of the Moscow Region Deutsch! and recommended me "ho-

Deutsch Yakov Abramovich (1898-1938) - commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank (11/29/35). 2nd deputy envoy of the OGPU in the Moscow region (1932-1933). 1st Deputy Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU for the Moscow Region (1933-1934), 1st Deputy. early UNKVD Mo

BUD

good guy", who did not work well with the head of the 5th division, and although he "is not enough stars from the sky", but "really, very much ask for him". Deitch didn't say who exactly asked, but judging by the tone, they were very high-ranking persons, and most likely their wives.

"Take him in and make a man out of him... And if that doesn't work, kick him out to hell." Then Deutsch added that Abakumov was almost the adopted son of one of the leaders of the October uprising, Podvoisky.

Since I just needed workers, I received Abakumov, entrusting him with the ceramic and silicate industries, and warned me that I would demand a full-time job and would not tolerate any amorous and fox trot cases in my department. (I first made inquiries about Abakumov's weakness for these cases with the head of the 5th department.)

During the first two months, Abakumov reported to me several times about the enormous activity he was allegedly developing.

Taking advantage of the fact that my wife's close friend was accepting his courtship, Abakumov visited me several times with her at the Select Hotel, where I first lived, and then at the apartment that I received at the Bolshoi during that very period. Kiselny Lane. Moreover, twice - once in a hotel, and the second - in an apartment - at the moment when Abakumov was with me, Ostrovsky unexpectedly came in! Go away!" - and Abakumov instantly retreated.

Two months later I decided to check Abakumov's work. On the day when he was supposed to receive his agents, I arrived at the safe house without warning, embarrassing Abakumov a lot, because I found him there with some pretty girl. Having offered Abakumov to sit in the first room, I, left alone

skovskaya region (1934-1935), early. UNKVD of the Kalinin region (1935-1936). opera. secretary of the people's commissar Affairs of the USSR (1936), early. secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR (1936-1937), beginning. UNKVD Azovo of the Black Sea Territory (1937), early. UNKVD Rostov region. (1937-1938). Arrested March 29, 1938. Died during the investigation.

Ostrovsky Iosif Markovich (1885-1937) - senior major of the State Security Service (11/29/35), manager of the OGPU of the USSR (1931-1933), head of the AHU of the NKVD of the USSR (1934-1936), arrested on March 29, 1937, sentenced on June 20, 1937 to be shot.

with this girl, began to ask her how she knew that such and such an engineer (whose name appeared in the report she signed) was a pest. And also, what does she understand in production technology, being a clerical worker? She replied that she did not know anything, and the report was compiled by Viktor Semenovich and asked her to sign it. Further, without much difficulty, I managed to establish that she and Abakumov had developed an intimate relationship from the very beginning of the "work".

When checking the other two girls "recruited" by Abakumov, the picture turned out to be the same.

The next day, I wrote a report to the management of the ECU about the need for the immediate dismissal of Viktor Abakumov as decomposed and unsuitable for operational work, and indeed for work in the authorities. According to my report, Abakumov was fired from the ECU. But some "strong hand" supported him again, and he was appointed as an inspector in the General Directorate of Camps.

I don't know exactly when he was transferred from the Gulag back to the NKVD, but apparently he turned out to be a capable and growing falsifier and executioner, and therefore, after joining Yezhov's organs, he was appointed head of the UNKVD in the Rostov region.

It must be assumed that Abakumov, like many other scoundrels who took off in 1937-1938 with dizzying speed up the career ladder, made his career with the help of healthy fists and sadistic inclinations, which, at the direction of Yezhov, and then Beria, successfully applied against innocent people.

I did not know the main stages of the dizzying career of the Abakums, but I heard from one of my comrades that he had a hand in the provocative case of a group of military leaders headed by Tukhachevsky. In any case, I was stunned when I learned that Abakumov, the head of the Rostov regional department of the NKVD, after the bloody defeat of the party and leading cadres of the Rostov region, became the head of a special department of the Center. And then, among the few who began their career under Yezhov, he continued it with even greater success under Beria. During World War II, he was the head of SMERSH - "Death to Spies", a renamed special department, then Deputy Minister of State Security - Beria, Deputy Minister of Defense and, finally, Minister of State

security.

People of this type were nominated as especially entrusted to leading work in the bodies, and they were presented with special and, in essence, unlimited powers.

In the 30s, when Viktor Abakumov came to work in the Economic Department of the OGPU, the number of bodies grew, but the quality of the selection of employees left much to be desired. The fact is that as a result of party mobilizations, OGPU employees were sent to economic work, thereby weakening the apparatus of punitive organs.

According to O. Mazokhin, the author of the book "VChK-OGPU. Punishing sword of the dictatorship of the proletariat", "at that time, a study was made of the materials of the Central Attestation Commission, which qualitatively characterize the composition of the central apparatus in terms of its main departments... "cultivating" it to a greater extent than it had

place".

It was in the thirties, according to the author, "the Economic Department of the OGPU in the Center and its subdivisions in the field were created and constantly strengthened, which played a major role in ensuring the economic security of the young Soviet state."

The Economic Department was the body leading the fight against crimes aimed at undermining the economic life of the USSR.

In the same 1932, the next order of the OGPU (No. 963/s of October 11) announced the redistribution of the functions of the department of the ECU OGPU:

1st department — machine-building industry, fuel, energy;

2nd department - ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy;

3rd department - rubber, chemical, construction industry and Gosplan;

4th branch - military industry;

5th branch - light industry;

6th department - supply and cooperation;

7th branch - foreign trade;

8th department - agriculture;

9th branch - finance - credit;

10th branch - technical intelligence;

11th department - technical.

For example, one of the most important activities of the economic divisions of the OGPU was the collection and analysis of information on economic issues. The responsibilities of the ECU included providing information to the leadership of the state on the state of the country's economic life. Also, a lot of attention in ECU was paid to the creation of a network of informers at enterprises, institutions and organizations.

The service of Viktor Semenovich in the ECU of the OGPU really did not work out and he was first transferred to the position of a simple representative of the 3rd branch of the Operational Department of the Gulag Guard, and then to the position of an operational commissioner. He served in the Gulag with || August 1934 to April 15, 1937. Authorized for exactly one year (until 16.08.35). The rest of the time the operational commissioner is one year and eight months. And yet why?

The memoirs of the old security officer Schrader cannot be completely ignored, although, of course, they contain many inaccuracies. However, everything that is said about the weaknesses of the young Chekist is true. So it was. Yes, and there were many more...

True, there are other opinions on this matter. The author of the article about Abakumov "He traveled to the Kremlin in Himmler's car" E. Zhirnov writes: "It is believed that Abakumov was damaged by his not moderate passion for dancing and women. Colleagues called him a foxtrot because of his love for this dance. And he was allegedly transferred to the Gulag because Abakumov recruited women exclusively for sexual purposes, and used safe houses for intimate meetings.

It is unlikely that this was true. Most operatives have always viewed female agents as a kind of bonus to their salaries due to harmful working conditions, and no one has ever been punished for this. As one retired general told me, in the state security they often recruited beautiful, but operationally useless ladies, so that on occasion there would be something to "treat" the authorities. "She's signed up! The old man recalled, grinning. "No husband, no relatives, no Gugu, complete secrecy."

In fact, Abakumov was not let down by the ladies at all. As Colonel Sergei Fedoseyev, who had known him since 1937, told me,

Abakumov, like many other people who did not receive a systematic education, lacked analytical skills and limped memory. Going to report to the authorities, he convulsively, moving his lips, memorized the figures, dates and facts relevant to the case, and still more than once got into a mess. On the other hand, his strong physique made him indispensable during searches and arrests. A person with such abilities was very suitable for the Gulag.

Another author, A. Teplyakov, in the book "Terror Machine. OGPU-NKVD of Siberia in 1929-1941", based on authentic evidence and documents, emphasizes: "It is important to note that it was very difficult to leave the Chekist service on your own. It was believed that the quick dismissal of an unsuitable employee compromised the managers who accepted him, since

the person leaving the system was already aware of the secret working methods. The understanding that Chekist work consists in recruiting, conducting provocative "operational games", merciless investigations and executions caused a psychological break in novice workers. Most agreed with the proposed fate, the rest tried to resist. In the 1930s, the voluntary abandonment of the "organs" often cost a membership card. So, in 1934, an intern of the Special Department of the OGPU PP for the Ob-Irtysh region, Ya.P. Azarenka was expelled from the party a few weeks after enrolling in the service for filing a letter of resignation and "disorganizing work among young employees of the OGPU." When cadets of the Novosibirsk NKVD school founded in 1935 submitted reports of expulsion, these attempts were regarded as "desertion from the battlefield of the class struggle" and were resolutely suppressed. After appropriate suggestions, the cadets took away their applications and publicly repented at the Komsomol meeting of their "anti-Party and cowardly act." Even a morbid condition did not guarantee against accusations of desertion..."

According to Vadim Kozhinov, "the NKVD figures themselves, who were subjected to repressions, but still survived the rampant terror, usually talk about themselves precisely and only as victims." This is about M.P. Schrader, author of "NKVD from the inside. Notes of the Chekist. We read further: "In 1937, Schreider was the deputy head of the NKVD department of the Ivanovo region (the head was the famous Chekist V.A. Styne), and in February 1938, on the personal instructions of N.I. Yezhov (as he himself reports in Zapiski)

received a considerable promotion: he became Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Kazakh SSR (at that time, Stalin's brother-in-law, Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank, S.F. - in office) he allegedly tried in every possible way to resist the "Yezhov" terror.

But simultaneously with Schrader's book, although completely independently of it, in the same year 1995, a transcript of the plenum of the local regional party committee held in August 1937, preserved in the archives of Ivanovo, was published - a kind of extraordinary plenum, which was commanded by Secretary of the Central Committee L.M. Kaganovich and Secretary of the Party Collegium of the Commission of Party Control under the Central Committee M.F. Shkiryatov. And the already yellowed transcript showed that (I quote) "Schreider attacked the secretary of the city committee (Ivanovsky. — V.K.) of Vasiliev's party. He expressed indignation at the fact that Vasiliev, who had connections with an enemy of the people, was taking a seat on the presidium...

- I have no (! - V.K.) data that Vasiliev is an enemy, - he said (Schreider. - V.K.), - but I will allow myself to express distrust to him.

Then Schreider accused the head of the NKVD department, Styne, of counteracting the repressions and allegedly having a connection with the former NKVD officer Kornilov, who in 1936 was accused of collaborating with the Trotskyists. Styne, an old Chekist, an active participant in the civil war, was immediately removed from his job, and subsequently arrested and shot... Schrader expressed his distrust of several other responsible workers, without giving any reasons for this."

Meanwhile, in his memoirs, Schrader not only presents his relationship with Styne as truly comradely, but also assures that he warned this famous Chekist more than once and opened his eyes to Yezhovism!

Alas, this kind of "forgetfulness" is typical for the authors of recently published memoirs..."

As for Iosif Ostrovsky, he himself could not claim the role of a clean Chekist and a person. For example, in April 1933, Rudzutak receives a letter from an employee of the printing house of the OGPU, in which he reads about the "ugliness" taking place in this secret organization: "The letter says that Ostrovsky

Iosif, Assistant to the OGPU Manager, is an adventurer; he furnished the apartment with furniture from Yusupov's estate, and so on. Previously, while living in Kyiv, he was engaged in smuggling, was involved in the Pankra-

Tov, who was shot.

Yafedov Fedor is a friend of Ostrovsky, convicted more than once. A well-known reveler, he supplies high-ranking officials of the OGPU (Katsnelson and others) with prostitutes.

Vanshrein Yakov works in the Economic Department of the OGPU, a former smuggler, known in Kyiv, has been sued more than once. Buying gold. He was known under the nickname Yashka, was involved in the case of smugglers. According to O. Mozokhin, Rudzutak forwarded this letter to Stalin with a request to instruct Yagoda to carefully verify the facts presented.

And finally, about the foxtrot. People's Commissar Lunacharsky, a subtle party connoisseur of beauty, is said to have been very annoyed by the tango and foxtrot that had become fashionable during the NEP period. Why? "These rhythms are not humane, they cut your will into a patty... The bourgeoisie goes along the foxtrot line to such confusion, Dadaist ingenuity and ridiculous, unpleasant sounds that all this will undoubtedly lead to the direct opposite of music — anti-human noise, and that's it. But the music will not end: by that time we will turn the head of the bourgeoisie and begin our work.

We have an opportunistic trend that says that the attempt to eradicate the foxtrot from the clubs is in vain. We stand for joy, we have reasons to rejoice and dance. We have young forces which have already won gigantic victories and which still have many victories to be won. Why don't they dance? But the question is - what should they dance? Why, without fail, if you dance, then only a foxtrot? I don't see any data for this, and I welcome the attempt to create one's own proletarian dance. In the foxtrot, the main thing is from mechanization, from dulled eroticism, from the desire to dull the feeling with drug addiction. We don't need it, we don't need that kind of music."

Well, that was the opinion of the new government. However, her faithful servants did not always and not always agree with her. As eyewitnesses said. Victor Abakumov went to visit only with a gramophone. "This is my portfolio," he said. In the recess, which was there, he always had a bottle of vodka and already chopped sausage. In a word, in the circle of friends, the young Chekist was known as a good guy: "Women,

Of course, people went crazy with him - he is handsome, has his own music, an excellent dancer, and even with a drink and a snack.

But how did the young detective differ from his colleagues or bosses?

For example, Chekist leaders, as a rule, felt like prominent statesmen. Huge power allowed them to feel like masters of life or people of a special rank. What can I say, if one of the people's commissars of the NKVD singled out the swagger of the Chekists as an indispensable type of internal and external ... And hence the boorish attitude of the Chekist authorities not only to those under investigation, but also to their subordinates. Hence the virtuoso mastery of obscene vocabulary, which, by the way, was called the universal language of the Chekist. The swearing was suitable for conversations not only with the arrested, but also with each other.

These and other negative character traits of the Chekists had a long history. Thus, the prominent Chekist M. Berman wrote: "Working in the Cheka often corrupts communists who have not yet been 'fired upon', and they, under the guise of 'guarding the revolution', sometimes begin to do outrageous acts." It is not surprising that during the period of the most difficult economic and food situation in Soviet Russia, the heads of departments and territorial Chekas began to leave part of the requisitioned money and jewelry in their safes and then send it to satisfy personal and operational needs.

F.E. himself Dzerzhinsky in 1921 specified in one of the circulars: "The work of the Chekists is hard, thankless (personally), very responsible and important in the state, causing strong dissatisfaction with both individuals and sabotage institutions. At the same time, work full of temptations for all sorts of abuses of power, for using one's position and the mere fact of serving in the Cheka for personal gain."

As E. Zhirnov writes, "during the heyday of the new economic policy and the revival of private entrepreneurship, some semblance of decorum was observed by the security officers only in the capital and large cities. In the provinces, the employees of the OGPU protected small merchants and large NEPmen, and therefore they had enough funds for recreation to the fullest - they drank, spent time in gambling dens and with prostitutes.

But not so long ago the Chekists, who received a meager monetary reward and the same food rations, were in

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state of hunger. From here discipline fell, anger arose. It got to the point that the employees of the Cheka were forced to engage in prostitution, and the employees went to a banal robbery. And all because of hunger.

E. Zhirnov writes: "Convulsive mass executions of Chekists turned out to be just as ineffective as forgiveness. The decrease in the number of malfeasance and robberies under the guise of searches began only after the relative normalization of supplies and the payment of salaries.

After that, the leadership began to turn a blind eye to the facts of self-supply of the Chekists, only if they did not become widely known. And only those whose violations looked especially malicious and caused a wide resonance were put up against the wall ...

After Dzerzhinsky's death in 1926, his comrades-in-arms and middle-level leaders, who had a serious experience of bribery, came to power in the state security. So the enrichment business grew and expanded over the years. However, the old traditions were not forgotten either.

The history of "currency rivalry" between the OGPU and Torgsin (the state trade office engaged in the sale of goods to the population in exchange for currency and jewelry) is noteworthy. "It is not known who was the first in the OGPU to come up with the idea to use Torgsin to fulfill the plan for" mining "the currency - most likely, there was no definite plan," writes E.A. Osokin. — Agents of the OGPU began to follow the buyers in Torgsin, identifying the "holders of valuables", and then using the usual methods (threats, arrests, searches, confiscations) forced them to hand over the valuables to the state free of charge. Some Chekists observed secrecy - they followed the buyers covertly, establishing his place of residence, then they came with a search. Others acted clumsily, apparently trying to catch the "gold hoarder" red-handed: they broke into the store with weapons, arrested people right at the counter, took away the cash currency, and along with it the purchased goods. After such operations by the OGPU, Torgsin's income fell, and the financial plan was in jeopardy. From all over the country, the board received complaints from Torgsin's offices about the actions of local branches of the OGPU.

It is curious that the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Trade even held talks with the Economic Department of the OGPU, explaining their right to sell for "effective" (non-Soviet) currency. Nevertheless, complaints about the actions of the OGPU employees - arrests of buyers in

Torgsine, searches in apartments, confiscation of currency and goods - continued to come until the very closure of the association.

On September 23, 1933, under the heading "Top Secret", the OGPU order No. 00325 "On discipline in the bodies and troops of the OGPU", signed by G. Yagoda, was issued. It said: "A significant number of facts noted recently speak of manifestations of indiscipline, and in some cases a complete lack of discipline in the ranks of the Chekists. Indiscipline begins with such manifestations as carelessness, careless wearing of uniforms, drunkenness and licentiousness, which inevitably leads not only to a deterioration in the quality of work of each individual Chekist, but also to a dulling of energy and vigilance in the fight against the K.-R. . And here's another one: "A dirty, slovenly, dissolute, drunken Chekist is a disgrace to our ranks and should be immediately expelled from them. These Chekists, as a result

chatter and gossip often divulge the secrets of our work, thereby playing into the hands of enemies. Such security officers also should not have a place in our ranks. External lack of discipline, lethargy, personal disorganization leads to untimely, and sometimes complete failure to comply with operational instructions and orders.

Such a Chekist begins to put off until tomorrow what he can and must do today, immediately, in order to timely identify and strike at the enemy.

Recently, there have been serious cases of violations of discipline, expressed in unacceptable slowness, and sometimes even direct failure to comply with the orders of the OGPU and the Plenipotentiary Representatives by lower bodies."

Apparently, it was this order that could well have played a role in the transfer of Viktor Abakumov to the Central Office of the Gulag. Let us only note that, in this way, he was only "reprimanded", not sent to the periphery, that is, to the most remote division of the same GULAG. Of course, connections also played a role.

#### THE FLYWHEEL OF REPRESSION AND THE FLYWHEEL OF CAREER

The work that Viktor Abakumov did in the Gulag was called operational for a reason. The secret-operational department, and earlier the third information-investigative department provided leadership and conduct of the operational-Chekist service.

of prisoners, special contingent and civilian employees of corrective labor camps and colonies of the NKVD.

His tasks included:

- ensuring the timely detection of enemy activity among prisoners and other camp contingents, timely prevention of organizational counter-revolutionary actions among them;
- ensuring timely detection and prevention of impending group armed and individual escapes, as well as theft and plundering of camp property. And besides, the organization of work on the identification and undercover development of the unexposed criminal ties of prisoners who remained at large, as well as the management of investigative work on cases opened in forced labor camps and colonies of the NKVD. At its core, this is nothing more than ensuring state security in labor camps, carried out at the expense of a complex of operational-Chekist measures.

Judging by the tasks that V.S. Abakumov in the Gulag, being a detective, and judging by his attraction to operational work, it can be said with confidence that the few years he spent there were not in vain. In any case, he gained knowledge, skills and abilities in counterintelligence practice in undercover work on prisoners in order to identify their previous criminal activities and connections that were not revealed during the investigation, as well as in undercover work on civilians suspected of espionage. He had to engage in the identification and prevention of sabotage.

Moreover, five years of service in the OGPU-NKVD, after two years of leading Komsomol work, could not have been in vain for Viktor Abakumov. And this despite the fact that he was still quite young. In 1937, when he joined the 4th Secret Political Department, he was twenty-nine years old. True, Abakumov's youth was not entirely suitable for a career in the NKVD. Much younger people came. But it is precisely such in Rus' that harness for a long time ... For each fate there is a time!

Indeed, the junior lieutenant of the State Security Service (12/20/1936) Viktor Semenovich still did not distinguish himself in any way, did not advance in any way, and therefore arrived at a new duty station in the 1st department of the 4th department



GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR again to the ordinary position of a detective. Did he know what would happen next? Hardly.

And he ended up in the Secret Political Department at the most historic time, before the June 1937 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (June 23-29). This plenum is called by historians only as "a significant starting point for the beginning of the rout of the party-Soviet nomenklatura", when in the weeks preceding its beginning and during the work of the plenum itself, leading workers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the first secretaries of regional committees and regional committees, were arrested, people's commissars.

On May 8, 1937, lieutenant of the State Security Service Lev Emelyanovich Vlodzimirsky was appointed deputy head of the 1st department. The tasks of this department included the fight against the former oppositionists, who were now referred to only as the "Trotsky-Bukharin gang of spies and saboteurs." According to N. Petrov, "In Moscow, Vlodzimirsky specialized in conducting investigations. He was immediately entrusted with the cases of the most important arrested persons. At the end of 1937, together with the future Minister of State Security Abakumov, he conducted interrogations of the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee N.V. Margolin. Both were so zealous in beating and torturing Margolin that in desperation he tried to hang himself in a cell on a rope made of scarves.

By the way, shortly before this "case" Viktor Semenovich was awarded the next rank of "lieutenant of the State Security" (05.11.37).

In the summer of 1938, one of the organizers of the Soviet foreign intelligence, senior major of the State Security Service, Yakov Isaakovich Serebryansky, was arrested. Until February 13, 1939, he was kept in custody in the internal prison at Lubyanka without the permission of the prosecutor. Only on February 21 he was fired from the NKVD in connection with his arrest. During the investigation conducted by V.S. Abakumov, and after him the deputy head of the NKVD investigation department, Solomon Milshtein, Serebryansky, were subjected to "intense methods of interrogation." It is known that his first interrogation took place on November 13, 1938. And on November 12, L.P. Beria wrote the following resolution on the document: "Comrade. Abakumov! It's good to interrogate!" Four days later, Beria himself, his deputy Kobulov and Abakumov took part in the interrogation of Serebryansky. A talented intelligence officer was severely beaten and forced to incriminate himself. Interrogations, accompanied by torture and torment, continued.

It is not known why, but the old Chekist Vedernikov once testified, contrary to the facts, that Abakumov even under his finger

I didn't touch the investigators: "It used to be that you interrogated some kind of pest, and he lies, dodges, composes all sorts of fables. Here you listen, then you can't stand it and roll a slap in the face at him so that he doesn't tell fairy tales. It happened in my practice and such, which is a sin to conceal, happened. He was young and hot. But Abakumov, he doesn't, he won't touch the person under investigation with a finger, he didn't even raise his voice during interrogations. I remember that one of the Trotskyists tormented him so directly. He collapses on a chair, like a mother-in-law on pancakes, and is impudent, even threatens. We say that you, Viktor Semenovich, endure, give this boor one time to reduce his ambition. He looked at us like we were enemies of the people."

Considering the inconsistency of the testimonies, it is very interesting to dwell on A. Teplyakov's study "Terror Machine", where he cites irrefutable facts of "playing by the rules": "Paradoxically, but in the KGB world famous for its cruelty, unlike it was filled with partisans accustomed to murder and demobilized servicemen, in the 1930s and 1940s they really tried to select the best. According to the party Komsomol mobilizations, the OGPU-NKVD bodies accepted active young people tested from a moral and political point of view, often with a pronounced craving for knowledge. But neither the leading workers, nor even students of technical schools and universities could bring their individuality into the "organs". The Chekist collective, like the strongest acid, rapidly destroyed the personality, leaving slavish obedience and confidence that the authorities knew better. The Chekist machine turned people into cogs and gears. The personality of each Head of the Regional Administration left a very strong imprint on his subordinates. E.G.

Gershtein rightly noted: "Of course, people who had a penchant for sadism went to this work, but there were also those who were brought to bestial cruelty by the whole system and the mutual responsibility of all employees." It must be taken into account that the Soviet youth was initially brought up in the spirit of blind devotion to the communist idea and leaders, hatred of enemies and dissidents, contempt for pity and mercy. However, neophytes in the OGPU-NKVD immediately observed a combination of the merciless power of the "authorities" over all other citizens with no less severe suppression of the personality of the Chekists themselves, who fell into an atmosphere of total surveillance, bossy tyranny, from

harassment of those arrested and special cruelty towards the repressed from among "friends". Chekists were immediately trained to break people during recruitment and interrogation, beat and shoot, and then forget themselves in alcoholic dope. The understanding that anyone mobilized into "organs" finds himself in a system that cannot be left voluntarily dictated adaptation to the KGB way of life and, as a rule, acceptance of it.

Since work in the "bodies" inevitably destroyed the personality, all possible human vices were concentrated in the Chekist environment: cruelty, often reaching sadism, arrogance, rudeness, deceit, slander, sycophancy, indifference, bureaucracy, denunciation, incitement, drunkenness, drug addiction, depraved stealing, theft and looting. The authorities put up with this, incl. because, as a rule, she herself possessed these qualities to an excellent degree.

But how could it be otherwise, could Viktor Abakumov not play by the rules?

Already in March 1938, he was appointed to the post of assistant head of the department of the 4th department of the 1st department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR. And this was the first promotion in his life since the day of service in the organs. For six years!

And on May 9 of the same year, Viktor Semenovich will be awarded a high award - he will be awarded the badge "Honorary Worker of the Cheka-GPU (KhU)". By the way, this sign was established by Order of the OGPU No. 1087 of November 23, 1932. Like the previous sign (At the anniversary), it was awarded for "outstanding merits", but at the same time, the applicant's service record in the bodies or troops of the OGPU was stipulated - at least 10 years. However, this criterion was not strictly observed, and in subsequent years, the badge of honor was sometimes awarded to party nominees who had recently got into the "bodies".

But then the summer of 1938 passed, and on August 22, L.P. Beria. He will be appointed People's Commissar on November 25, but the change of the head of the punitive department will be announced to the whole country in December - on the 8th.

Naturally, Lavrenty Pavlovich brought his people to the Lubyanka: both friends and comrades.

On September 29, 1938, after another reform of the state security agencies, a new structure was announced, in which the 4th Secret Political Department became the 2nd (by degree

importance

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areas of work). The head of this department was immediately appointed Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov, who had already headed the 4th department since September 15, where he paid close attention to Lieutenant of the State Security Service Abakumov.

On September 29, 1938, Abakumov was approved as an assistant to the head of the department of the 2nd department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, and on November 1 he was appointed head of the 2nd department of the 2nd department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.

B. Kobulov himself will later tell how in the fall of 1938, at one of the solemn meetings in the NKVD club, Abakumov made a terrible noise - he was indignant that the portrait of dear Lavrenty Pavlovich was hanging too far from the center of the stage. As E. Zhirnov writes, "it happened

this, as you might guess, at the very moment when Beria entered the hall. He became interested first in the cause of the commotion, and then in the employee who arranged it. Kobulov gave his subordinate a flattering description, and soon Abakumov received a new appointment.

Head of the 2nd Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, Senior Major of the GB B.Z. On December 17, 1938, Kobulov became deputy head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, and on December 22, 1938, head of the investigative unit of the NKVD of the USSR. He worked with Beria in the GPU of Georgia since 1925 and was the closest person to him. He walked along the corridors of the Lubyanka in one shirt with rolled up sleeves. At the same time, the huge belly swayed. Everyone who walked towards them huddled in fear against the wall.

The former head of the NKID press department, Yevgeny Gnedin, recalled how, after his arrest, he was brought to Kobulov (May 1939): "In front of me, at a solid desk, sat a fat brunette in the uniform of a first-rank commissar - a large head, a full face of a man who loves to eat and drink, bulging eyes, big hairy hands.

Kobulov finished talking on the phone. The final remark went something like this:

- He is already sitting and writing, yes, yes, he is writing, otherwise how!

Kobulov laughed merrily and smugly, obviously talking about a recently arrested man, who testified.

Turning to me, Kobulov put on a menacing expression. Without averting his eyes, he began to fill his pipe with tobacco from a tall Prince Albert box. I myself smoked a pipe and greatly appreciated this excellent American tobacco, which is in Moscow

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could not be obtained. In a menacing tone, Kobulov told me that I had been exposed and would soon be shot. He demanded that I tell him about my "connections with the enemies of the people."

Sergo Beria in his book described Bogdan Zakharovich as follows: "He had a big head and a fat face, giving him away as a person who loved to eat well, bulging eyes, large hairy hands and short crooked legs." According to the son of Lavrenty Pavlovich, Kobulov was a fat, disgusting type who had a weakness for luxury, especially for works of art.

One of the comrades of General of State Security E.P. Pitovranov told him a story typical of that time and those people: "He brought a document for Kobulov to sign, which was going to the Central Committee. The usual - we ask you to approve such and such a position. Signature: "Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs B. Kobulov." Bogdan looked at the paper and said: "It won't work. Remake." There were no errors in the document. Well, they corrected something, brought it again. The same story. The third time is the same. Finally, the guys guessed that the matter was in the signature. The document was reprinted for the fourth time with the signature: "B. Kobulov".

"Now that's right," said Bogdan, "the Central Committee already knows who Kobulov is."

All in the same September, at the suggestion of Beria, Vsevolod Nikolaevich Merkulov followed him to work in Moscow. He favorably differed from all of Lavrenty Pavlovich's inner circle with his education and intellect, having worked with him since 1922.

On December 17, 1938, Commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank Merkulov was appointed First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and Head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

Merkulov was fond of sports, he was good at drawing and even wrote plays. He was polite, spoke calmly, but was not decisive and ruthless, like his boss. Vsevolod Nikolaevich would later write about his appointment to Moscow: "I confess that, upon my arrival in Moscow, it was terribly hard for me to work in the NKVD of the USSR, which I did not expect when I was going to Moscow. On the one hand, at first I did not have sufficient operational skills ... on the other hand,

The new KGB "methods", which were then used and unknown to me until that time (after all, I had been working in the Party for 7 years), I was extremely oppressed."

Nevertheless, it was to him that Beria entrusted the most important cases and investigations. For example, on his instructions, Merkulov personally drove

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the body of Marshal Blucher, beaten to death during interrogation, for cremation. It was during interrogation by Merkulov on April 13, 1939, after five months of silence, that Chekist Yefim Evdokimov "confessed" to participation in the "Yezhov conspiracy".

It was these people, thanks to Kobulov's subtle instinct, who nominated Viktor Semenovitch to power in a very short time... In early December 1938, groups of five to seven state security officers left for regional and republican centers. "Only the first secretary of the regional committee was warned about their arrival at their destination," writes E. Zhirnov. - The scheme of actions of these brigades was the same in all cities. Right from the station, they came to the first secretary, announced that they had irrefutable evidence that the head of the local NKVD was an enemy of the people, and offered to immediately invite him to the regional committee. Then they arrested an unsuspecting colleague and went to the administration, where the secretary of the regional committee introduced them to the team as the new leaders of the state security of the region. The deputies of the head of the department and the heads of departments were arrested only after they handed over the affairs to their successors. As one of the state security veterans told me, the head of the department, whom he replaced, understood everything and for two weeks, handing over the farm, sobbed non-stop. Some of the "cleaned out" shot themselves without waiting for arrest. In Moscow, such incidents were considered a blunder: it was required that the change of power in the NKVD be carried out without unnecessary noise.

Abakumov, who carried out the change of composition in the Rostov NKVD, apparently, did not have any excesses. Already on December 5, 1938, he was appointed acting head of the UNKVD, and before the new year, he went from lieutenant, bypassing the rank of senior lieutenant, to become captain of the State Security Service. As Colonel Fedoseev told me, Abakumov appeared at the Lubyanka in a new uniform with three rectangles in his buttonholes and walked back and forth along the corridors for a long time: "he probably wanted as many comrades as possible to see his triumph."

To date, a huge number of books have been written about the Great Terror. Until now, many historians continue to argue about the causes of Stalin's repressions. However, in my opinion, the very fact of the action planned by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to eliminate a potential "fifth column" on the eve of a possible war, a "general cleansing" of Soviet society, is no longer in doubt. It's hard

believe today, but looking back into the depths of our history, one can notice that the period of mass repressions was not something unusual against the background of the previous development of the Soviet state.

As historians V. Khaustov and L. Samuelson state in their monograph "Stalin, the NKVD and the repressions of 1936-1938", "after the end of the civil war and the transition to peaceful construction, relations of cooperation between all segments of the population were not established in the country. A certain part of society was considered by the Soviet leadership as a force hostile to the new state, Soviet propaganda imposed on society the idea that there was an entire army of "enemies" in the country that hindered constructive construction. Along with the permanent use of coercive measures against the bulk of the population, a policy of persecution and isolation was carried out openly and secretly against the layers that occupied a certain social and economic position under the old tsarist regime, representatives of opposition parties and groups, and the suppression of dissent. The idea of civil peace did not become decisive in the worldview of Stalin and his inner circle.

After the end of the civil war, Stalin continued the persecution of all representatives of the opposition parties and groups within the RCP (6) - VKP (b) ...

The absence of public policy led to the fact that the methods of solving foreign policy issues and domestic problems were determined by a narrow group of members of the Politburo of the ruling Communist Party. All this strengthened the role of the personal factor, increased the level of subjectivity in decision-making in the context of the ideological confrontation between the USSR and the developed countries of Europe."

No less interesting is the opinion of State Security General Sudoplatov, who wrote in black and white about the participation of organs in the "Great Terror": "Consciously or unconsciously, we allowed ourselves to be drawn into the work of a colossal mechanism of repression, and each of us is obliged to repent for the suffering of the innocent. The scale of this repression horrifies me. Giving today a historical assessment of that time. the time of mass repressions - and they affected the army, the peasantry and employees - I think they can be likened to the massacres carried out during the reign of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. This applies not least to Viktor Semenovitch Abakumov.

"57

Chekists Sverdlov, Sharok and Kubatkin

August 30, 1952 on the table of Secretary I.V. Stalin A.N. Poskrebyshev, the courier put a special message from the Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev, addressed to HIMSELF. It was a statement by A.Ya. Sverdlov.

\*Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Comrade STALIN I.V.

Arrested SVERDLOV A.Ya.,

ex. member of the CPSU (b) since 1939, deputy head of department "K" of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR

Statement

Joseph Vissarionovich!

It is very hard to realize that mistakes and shortcomings, only now fully understood, led, against all aspirations, to criminal actions. Before my arrest, I myself, most of those around me considered me an example. From my early childhood, spent in a Bolshevik family, I strove to become an active member of the party, worthy of my father, this was the goal, the very meaning of existence. Almost all of my conscious life was spent in the KSM, the party, hard work. When he was not afraid of difficulties, responsibility, he tried to be principled in everything, he did not use his name or official position for personal purposes. However, having found myself in privileged conditions as a child, encountering dirty people who made their way into the environment of leaders, I early became arrogant, addicted to political verbiage, gossip. In the autumn of 1927, he succumbed to the Trotskyist demagoguery, spoke at school in defense of the Trotskyists, without ever being organizationally connected with them. Having understood after 1927 that the party was right, having joined the KSM, for some time I continued to consider the Trotskyists reinstated in the party as Bolsheviks, I did not immediately get rid of the verbiage, the Trotskyist attitude towards you, I made a terrorist statement, although I never had such intentions.

Having found myself in a healthy collective in 1930, completely devoting myself to the great KSM work, I began to straighten out, broke with my former friends from the children of 0 respondent workers, did not maintain contact with a single enemy of the party, stopped criminal gossip, chatter, but, downplaying their Trotskyism, not correctly assessing the conversations

30th year, hid and in 1935 was arrested. Having told everything, being released on your instructions, he sought to atone for his guilt. After graduating, he went to the VMS as a foreman, soon became a senior, deputy. early workshops. I asked the NKVD to check in practice, began to carry out instructions, led party work, in 1938 I was again arrested without any fault, according to Osinsky's testimony, which did not contain a word of truth, and was released only after your intervention. Since 1935, especially now, I thought that I owe everything to you, on your 70th birthday I wrote to you what I feel, how I live, read this letter!

I decided that I was done with the past, I lived only by work, I strove to grow, along with operational, party work in 1948, I graduated with honors from the correspondence Higher Party School of the Central Committee, wrote a checkbook, did a lot of work in sports organizations, the All-Union Committee, slept 4-5 hours. per day, but due to excessive self-conceit, a difficult situation, he got confused again.

Having worked until 1940 under the leadership of MATUSOV, who carried out criminal practices, he learned a number of vices. Being in 1941 appointed deputy. early department, actually leading an independent unit until 1943, imagined himself to be an outstanding Chekist, for whom not all generally accepted norms are obligatory, kept a / s literature, part of the weapons and sabotage devices received for special work, but did not hide this, did not pursue criminal goals. Overestimating myself, communicating with the leading officials of the Ministry of State Security, industry, culture, who extolled me, I decided that I sat too long, outgrew the limits of the deputy, strove for greater scope, independence, especially since the immediate superiors did not correct anything, worked weakly, often slowed down the most serious questions. At the same time, after the change in the leadership of the MGB, the dismissal of a number of old workers by Abakumov, feeling, in contrast to the former, a wary attitude towards myself, I decided that the new leadership was evaluating me based on materials about the past, would not contribute to growth, only kept me in force Your instructions do not give work in full force, there are no prospects. I only blamed my past for this, I thought that life had turned out unsuccessfully, I succumbed to decadent moods, I began to fear the past, I got confused, made mistakes, criminal actions, which I described in detail

investigation.

Having sharply reassessed a number of facts, I realized that, in essence, I pandered to ABAKUMOV, carried out a nationalist practice.

BUD

It is incredibly hard for me, because there have never been enemy plans, I did not hide my actions, I considered my moods to be correct, I did not have secret conversations with anyone, I did not discuss criminal plans, I did not maintain organizational ties. He was never close to Abakumov and his entourage, many things in him were in doubt, several times he began to write to the Central Committee (one draft was preserved), but did not finish it. Nationality never played a role for me, I did not sympathize with the Jews, as such, I always considered myself Russian by my mother, documents (metrics), there were no Jews in the family, Russians prevailed among my acquaintances, there were Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians; confused, he decided that in relation to the Jews, excesses are allowed, talk about alleged oppression, a painful reaction to them, but not nationalism. So he succumbed to nationalist sentiments and pursued nationalist practices. .

I deeply realized my guilt, I repent and ask you to forgive me, to help make amends for it. During this time I have experienced so much, I realized that I will never stumble again, I can work immeasurably better, finally become a real person, but help me get on my feet, live my life fruitfully. I ask you to give me the biggest, most difficult task, the more difficult it is, the sooner I can prove to you personally, to the party, my sincerity.

If possible, allow me to continue my previous work in order to rehabilitate myself in my team.

I ask you to forgive and help not only for yourself, but for those close to you, my mother is 76 years old, 50 years in the party, she lives the last days, with what consciousness she will die. Daughter finished school. I ask for the sake of the memory of my father -

before all I am guilty, but I must make amends.

Joseph Vissarionovich! I am to blame for many things, I got confused many times, but I was not a degenerate, an enemy of the Party, a traitor, I assure you, you, the Central Committee, will never have to regret that they helped you return to system, all the strength, abilities, life I will give to the cause that will be entrusted. SVERDLOV.

Now let's move on to the book of memoirs called "Unforgettable". It was written by Anna Larina-Bukharin, the daughter of Yuri Larin, a prominent revolutionary, ally of Lenin, who later became the wife of one of the leaders of the Soviet state, Nikolai Bukharin. Why? You will surely guess...

"One detail of Yagoda's biography indirectly extended a thread to thoughts about my investigation and recalled a difficult episode experienced in the recent past. Yagoda was related by family ties to Ya.M. Sverdlov - married to his niece, sister's daughter. Nevertheless, he had to fulfill Stalin's instructions to arrest Andrei Sverdlov's son and his closest comrade, the son of the famous Bolshevik revolutionary V.V. Osinsky, Dima. Yagoda would never have taken such a step on his own and could not have been the initiator in this case. Both young men (they were 22-23 at the time) were then studying at one of the military academies and knew me well. THEIR arrest made me extremely excited: for everyone in the environment to which we belonged, this became an inexplicable event. It happened in 1934 or early 1935, I don't remember exactly.

I told Nikolai Ivanovich about the arrest of Dima and Andrei, who was extremely surprised and decided to call Stalin to find out the reason. Stalin was contacted immediately. "Let them, let them sit," he replied, "they are freethinkers" (I was not mistaken, he put it that way, "freethinkers", not freethinkers). To the question of N.I., in what way their free-thinking was expressed, Stalin did not answer anything intelligible. "It seems," he said, "that they have Trotskyist views."...

Nikolai Ivanovich asked Stalin to release the young men, not seeing a crime in their "freethinking", and sadly laughed at Stalin's answer: "they are freethinkers." Assuming that V.V. Osinsky himself could talk with Stalin about his son, N.I., although he mentioned Osinsky's son during the conversation, he mainly asked for the release of Andrei Sverdlov - his father Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov died in 1919.

- Koba, I ask for Yakov Mikhailovich, in memory of him this must be done. It's a pity for the boys, their arrest can only anger and ruin them. Both of them are capable, budding young men.

"I don't deal with these matters, call Yagoda," Stalin answered irritably and hung up.

Call Yagoda N.I. considered it meaningless.

I.D. Osinsky and A. Sverdlov were soon released."

But this story, like any other, had a continuation ...

"... By the end of September 1939, that is, after ten months of my stay in a Moscow prison, I was summoned for interrogation.

Again, an interrogation, that is, an objective investigation of the case to find out the truth, cannot be called my conversation with the investigator. At the same time, this was not a typical for that time interrogation with prejudice, with the use of torture or psychological influence, with the aim of deliberately obtaining knowingly false testimony. Rather, these were crossings of the same motives that sounded during a conversation with Beria. Nevertheless, the first call after a long "rest" hit me like a butt on the head.

I entered the office, where I had already visited. The same Matusov was sitting at the desk, the same one who, together with Yezhov's deputy Frinovsky (by this time already arrested, possibly already shot) talked to me, convincing me of the need to go to Astrakhan exile voluntarily in order to avoid the use of violent measures. This seemingly gentle cherub had outlived almost all the responsible officers of the NKVD since the time of Yezhov (perhaps he also worked under Yagoda) and, as I later found out, died a natural death. I don't know what position he was in, but not as an ordinary investigator.

Hello, Anna Mikhailovna! Glad to see you! Matusov said in an incomprehensibly enthusiastic tone, as if we were old friends and came to visit him.

"And I'm not at all glad to see you," I answered his stupid greeting. — You did not fulfill the promises given to me before deportation to Astrakhan. There was "no care, no job, no apartment." In addition, you did not fulfill the main thing: you did not give me a meeting with N.I. after the end of the investigation. But they promised to call me from Astrakhan for this purpose. They didn't give him a chance to say goodbye to him.

At that moment, the door to Matusov's office opened and Andrei Sverdlov entered. "For what purpose?" flashed through my mind instantly. I immediately assumed: he was arrested and summoned to a confrontation with me. Indeed, in my "case" in connection with the information received from Novosibirsk, Andrei Sverdlov, allegedly from my words, figured as a member of the counter-revolutionary youth organization. And although I denied this to Beria, I was afraid that in the event of a second arrest, Andrei would confirm the existence of a counter-revolutionary youth organization. He will slander himself and me. The case for this time is typical. However, looking closer at Andrei, I came to the conclusion that he does not look like a prisoner.

go. He was wearing an elegant gray suit with well-pressed trousers, and his well-groomed, self-satisfied face spoke of complete well-being. Andrei sat down on a chair next to Matusov and carefully, I won't say without excitement, peered at me.

- Meet Anna Mikhailovna, this is your investigator, - said Matusov.

- Like an investigator! This is Andrey Sverdlov! I exclaimed in complete disbelief.

"Yes, Andrey Yakovlevich Sverdlov," Matusov confirmed with satisfaction. (Here, they say, what kind of investigators we have!) - The son of Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov. You will deal with him.

Matusov's message seemed terrifying to me, I was completely confused. Perhaps it would have been easier to survive my initial suggestion of a confrontation.

What, don't you like the investigator? asked Matusov, noticing the amazement and confusion on my face.

- I don't know him as an investigator, but there is no need to introduce me to him, we have known each other for a long time.

Was he your friend? Matusov asked with curiosity.

- Let Andrei Yakovlevich himself answer this question for you.

I would not call Andrei my friend, but I knew him from early childhood. We played together, ran around the Kremlin ...

I did not tell Matusov any details of our acquaintance. She answered briefly:

- I know Andrei Yakovlevich quite well. In this case, as far as I know, he cannot be my investigator, I have the right to challenge him.



But Matusov repeated that, despite the circumstances, Sverdlov would be my investigator.

Seeing Andrei Sverdlov as an NKVD investigator was painful for me, because he was the son of Yakov Mikhailovich, most of whose comrades-in-arms had fallen victims of terror by that time; the children of well-known party leaders belonging to Andrei's entourage were also repressed...

° — Andrei silently listened to my dialogue with Matusov, then decided to speak out.

- What were you talking about me? he asked in a confident tone, which made it clear that my "chatter" would not affect the rest of

ness of his position, will not affect his career. And by nature, he was undoubtedly a man with careerist inclinations.

I only expressed fear, I explained to Andrey, that his first arrest would lead to a second one, and this time they would fabricate a counter-revolutionary organization of youth engaged in terror, sabotage, etc., and that I would be included in this organization. I thought that our acquaintance would contribute to this and would not improve the situation either for him or mine.

"As you put it," Andrey remarked (addressing me this time as "you"), "they will fabricate a counter-revolutionary organization"—we are not fabricating anything here.

I kept silent in horror and, oddly enough, only at that moment did I finally understand that there was an abyss between us, that we were on opposite sides of the barricades. I glared at Andrew. This ended our first date.

We met again two or three days later. The first shock has passed - you get used to everything. Another tormented me: having met him face to face, I was not immediately able to tell him to his face what I thought of him. I was indignant to the extreme, there was even an impulse to slap him, but I suppressed this temptation in myself. (I wanted to, because he was my own, and I couldn't for the same reason...) At the same time, I understood that Andrey's fall was by no means an unfortunate misunderstanding, it concealed an immoral and unprincipled character...

The interrogation was not what I imagined it to be. This time Andrei was softer, looked warmer. Passing by, he shoved an apple into my hand, but still he did not forget about his duties as an investigator. He was sitting at a desk in a small, narrow office. We looked at each other in silence. My eyes filled with tears. It seemed that Andrey was also agitated. Maybe I just wanted to see it in him.

We had similar biographies: we were both children of professional revolutionaries...

The activities of Andrei Sverdlov could not be regarded otherwise than as a betrayal. Cain's eyes were looking at me. But the culprit for the catastrophe of both his and mine was the same person - Stalin.

Andrey's silence was unbearable, but I myself was speechless for a while. Finally exploded:

"What are you going to interrogate about, Andrey Yakovlevich?" Nikolai Ivanovich is no longer there, and he has no need to obtain false evidence against him.

meaning, after a fight they don't wave their fists! And my life is in your hands, it's not for you to interrogate about it. And yours was clear enough to me until a certain time. That is why I defended you, declaring that you could not be involved in a counter-revolutionary organization.

Andrey, leaning against the desk, hunched over, looked at me with an enigmatic look and seemed to miss what was said past his ears. And suddenly he uttered words that in no way related to the investigation, perhaps it would be more correct to say, to the topic of our conversation:

- What a beautiful blouse you have, Nyuska! (My parents and all my peers called me Nyusya.)

Perhaps, at that moment, I felt sorry for the traitor, thinking that he was also in a trap, he just entered it from the other side.

- So, you liked my blouse (I also addressed Andrey with "you" or "you", depending on which emotions took over), but what don't you like?

Andrey immediately gathered himself, and the investigator appeared in him. He uttered familiar official words, which I had heard more than once from other lips:

- You are spreading harmful anti-Soviet fabrications, that the trials are a judicial staging and that your Bukharin did not commit any crimes against the state.

All the same motive. However, hearing this song from Andrey Sverdlov was incomparably harder than from Skvirsky or Beria.

"Do you think," I exclaimed, "that the Bolsheviks have betrayed their life's work?" Think, if it is profitable for you to think and it is easier to live. Do you sincerely think that your close friend, Dima Osinsky, is a counter-revolutionary, but you are not! That Fear Ganetsky is an enemy of the people, and you are a friend! You probably interrogated them too! Yes, perhaps only them, not me alone!

"You don't care who I interrogated!" Andrey shouted.

Then, like Beria, he fixed his attention on my conversations with Lebedeva. Expressed like this:

- She chatted too much, both in verse and prose, and from this chatter she heaped up a mountain of lies ...

... I immediately informed him that the "enemy of the people" Bukharin, after Andrei's arrest, telephoned Stalin and asked for him.

My interrogator's face changed, reddened with excitement.

— Really? he asked, although he perfectly understood that this was true, and I confirmed what was said. This time, my message put an end to conversations on investigative topics, and Andrey switched to family topics. he put it, "by the way," sends me his regards. "Hello, by the way", except for irritation, did not cause any other emotions in me. I assume that Andrei's wife did not know about our dramatic meeting.

However, I did not remain in debt and answered one hello with several. She conveyed greetings from Andrei's aunt, Yakov Mikhailovich's sister, Sofya Mikhailovna, with whom she had been to the Tomsk camp; greetings from Andrei's cousin, daughter of Sofya Mikhailovna, wife of Yagoda...

Did Andrei understand that he was sitting at the wrong table? I doubt it.

Our conversation was coming to an end, and I found the moment appropriate to ask my investigator to phone my grandmother and ask on my behalf if she knew if my son was alive, where and with whom. Andrew complied with this request. Called for me. That is how I learned that Yura, who at that time was in his fourth year, was living in Moscow with my aunt, his mother's sister. And, despite the severity of the conversation with Andrei, I left his office inspired.

I saw him three more times. But if at first I was able to notice at least glimpses of humanity in him, then later they disappeared.

I was again summoned for interrogation only a year and a half later, in February 1941. All three subsequent interrogations were brief. Andrei met me with a stern look and an incomprehensible cry:

Will you testify soon?

There was no logic or sense in this exclamation: a year and a half ago Sverdlov did not demand any evidence from me.

"We haven't interrogated you properly yet!" We'll put you in the Lefortovo prison, then speak up!.. This is a military prison, where you will understand what an investigation is! Sverdlov shouted.

I heard about the horrendous tortures in the Lefortovo prison from the wives of the NKVD officers who were imprisoned at the same time as me in the Tomsk camp. I did not have time to ask A. Sverdlov for what purpose he ho

even torture me, when all of a sudden, apparently. From a strong shock, from the fact that it was he who was talking to me like that, I felt that I was losing my sight: at first everything became cloudy and swirling, then, except for the bright spot of a burning lamp on the investigator's desk, I could no longer see anything.

- You have already committed the most terrible torture. Andrey Yakovlevich, I'm blind!

What are you pretending! Andrey shouted.

"I'm not faking, I don't see you," I said in a trembling voice.

I heard Andrew calling the doctor. Someone, obviously a jailer, led me by the arm to the doctor's office. A lamp and matches were lit before my eyes, and again, except for a spot of light, I saw nothing. This went on for two days. On the third day, vision gradually recovered. The prison guard watched me intensely. "Eye" rustled almost incessantly. My cellmates helped me with everything. As soon as the warder was convinced that I had received my sight, the next day I was summoned for interrogation.

Andrei this time was helpful and polite. He was interested in my health, especially my eyesight."

Soon Bukharin's wife found out who needed all this.

"To the master," Sverdlov answered curtly.

Andrei Yakovlevich Sverdlov was born in 1911 in the family of a prominent revolutionary Yakov Sverdlov. It is known that before his first arrest he was a Komsomol propagandist. Twice, in 1935 and 1937, he was arrested by the NKVD for anti-Soviet statements among young people. In the circle of his friends, he repeatedly and directly said that Stalin must be killed ...

Since 1938 at work in the NKVD. There are many testimonies about how he interrogated those under investigation. For example, the repressed colonel Meshcheryakov recalled how, during interrogation, Sverdlov knocked out 6 of his teeth with just one professional blow. Sverdlov was also rude to women. So in front of the nose of one of them, he simply waved his whip, threatening to beat her. For a long time, another repressed man, Lev Ignatovich Varshavsky, was afraid to mention aloud the terrible name of his investigator Sverdlov. Only once, having come to an appointment with a dentist and praising for the successful extraction of a tooth from the lower jaw, Lev Ignatovich could not stand it, saying: "You ask where everything is

my upper jaw teeth? They were removed to me in my youth by another "dentist" - Sverdlov!

Other eyewitnesses told how stubbornly unwilling to speak to the defendants, on the instructions of Sverdlov, the escorts fitted the victim's hand into the doorway of the investigator's office, after which Andrei Yakovlevich calmly slammed the door, breaking 4-5 fingers at once.

After the war, Sverdlov worked in the protection of the secrets of the Soviet atomic project, supervising scientists. As atomic scientists testified, when communicating with A.Ya. Sverdlov wafted some kind of sepulchral sadistic coldness. He was completely false, deceitful and had a penchant for posturing. In the last years of his service, Colonel A.Ya. Sverdlov served as deputy head of department "K" (counterintelligence) of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security. In 1952, he was arrested again in the Abakumov case.

After his release, Sverdlov worked in the 4th Secret Political Department of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and then, after his dismissal, at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, where he defended his dissertation for the title of candidate of historical sciences.

Andrei Yakovlevich died in 1969 from a broken heart. They say that lately he constantly felt a whisper behind his back: "Killer!"

During his lifetime, he managed to write and publish two books, albeit in co-authorship and under a pseudonym: the story "Two-Faced Janus" - 1967 (Yakov Naumovich Naumov, Andrei Yakovlevich Yakovlev (Sverdlov) and the story "Thin Thread" - 1968.

The stories told about the selfless work of the Soviet Chekists, who skillfully uncovered a complex and intricate case and exposed a major fascist resident. |

The third book - the novel "The Fight with the Werewolf" - will be published after the death of Sverdlov.

Andrei Yakovlevich's father, Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov, was born in 1885. Prominent political and statesman, revolutionary, Bolshevik. Chairman of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) from November 1917 to March 1919.

The period between 1901 and 1917 was spent in endless exile and prison cells. He died on March 16, 1919 and was buried in the necropolis on Red Square. For many years under the Soviet

the authorities said that Sverdlov died of a cold. However, it is known for certain that the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee died from a blow to the head received during a speech to the workers of the railway workshops of the city of Orel. One of them threw a log that hit a prominent Bolshevik. He was urgently taken to Moscow, where he became completely ill. After several days that Sverdlov the father spent in delirium, death came.

Paradoxically, but true. In the late 1920s, Sverdlov's son Andrei accidentally discovered eight very large diamonds from 22 to 36 carats in his mother's possession. And in 1935, Father Sverdlov's heavy fireproof wardrobe, which now stood in M.I. Kalinin (the keys were lost), they opened it out of curiosity. This large safe contained: banknotes of Tsarist Russia - in the amount of 750 thousand rubles, gold coins of pre-revolutionary minting in the amount of 108 thousand rubles, gold items - 705 items, blank passports of the Russian Empire - 7 pieces, completed passports of the RSFSR (three for men and four for women), foreign passports (one for men and one for women).

well well

Karl Radek and Grigory Sokolnikov were sentenced to prison in 1937 in connection with the so-called Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center. Others, namely G. Pyatakov, L. Serebryakov, N. Muralov, J. Lifshits and J. Drobni, were shot in general. Survivors

Radek and Sokolnikov seemed to confirm to the whole world the "objectivity and impartiality" of the "most humane" Soviet court.

But Stalin did not need a talented publicist and economist, like former oppositionists, to be alive. And a little more than a year later, in May 1939, Radek and Sokolnikov were still killed by their cellmates... At least, that's what they thought for many years...

However, the investigation into the circumstances of the murder of Radek and Sokolnikov, which began immediately after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, proved irrefutably that the leader himself and, of course, the perpetrators, were behind these murders.

N. Petrov, in particular, writes: "As P.V. Fedotov and Ya.N. Matusov:

"... The operational-chekist departments under political isolators sent their reports about the behavior of Radek and Sokolnikov and similar persons directly to Beria personally, who sent them or reported to Stalin, which was known to the employees of the department both from the words of Kobulov and according to the meaning, as far as I remember, of his written instructions on the reports of the political isolators." Moreover, both Fedotov and Matusov claimed that "the murder of Radek and Sokolnikov was committed on Stalin's orders."

Here are the details of the murder of Radek, set out in the dry clerical style of a document from the archives of the commission of N.M. Shvernik:

"In May 1939, an operative worker of the 2nd Directorate of the GUGB NKVD Kubatkin went to the Upper Ural prison. The first time he took with him a certain Martynov, allegedly a prisoner (identity not established), who was placed in the same cell with Radek, deliberately started a fight with him, but could not kill Radek and was taken away from prison by Kubatkin. A few days later Kubatkin again arrived at the prison with another prisoner named Varezhnikov. This prisoner was also placed in Radek's cell. The next day, May 19, Varezhnikov, having provoked a fight, killed Radek. The act drawn up by the prison administration states that Varezhnikov, who killed Radek, is allegedly a Trotskyist. In fact, Stepanov I.I., the former commandant of the NKVD of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, who was arrested in February 1939 for serious malfeasance, was encrypted under the name Varezhnikov. In November of the same year, at the direction of Beria, Stepanov was released from custody. The decision to dismiss the case states that he carried out a "special assignment" that has an important state

meaning".

And now let's get acquainted with the certificate of the chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR I.A. Serov to the Central Committee of the CPSU in the case of the "Anti-Soviet Center" about the circumstances of the murder of G.Ya. Sokolnikov and K.B. Radek: "No. 1621-s

June 29, 1956

Top secret...

Radek and Sokolnikov, after being convicted among their cellmates, began to assert their innocence and that the entire trial had been staged. Undoubtedly, this led to the fact that in May 1939 a decision was made to "liquidate" them. Documentary data available in the KGB archives indicate that

the murder of Radek and Sokolnikov was carried out under the leadership of Beria and Kobulov in accordance with a specially developed plan.

The direct implementation of these acts was entrusted to the employees of the 2nd department of the NKVD of the USSR - senior detective Kubatkin, detective Sharok and specially selected people from among the arrested, who secretly left for

assignment to the Verkhneural'sk and Tobolsk prisons, where Radek and Sokolnikov were kept.

As established, the murder of Sokolnikov was carried out under the following circumstances. Previously, Sokolnikov was transferred to solitary confinement, and on May 21, 1939, as planned, the head of the prison, Flyagin, detective Sharok, and prisoner Lobov, who arrived from Moscow (former assistant head of the OO LVO, convicted in connection with the murder of S.M. Kirov), attacked him and killed him.

At the same time, a fictitious act was drawn up about what had happened and a protocol was drawn up for the interrogation of the prisoner Kotov P.M. (Lobov appeared under this name). In this protocol, drawn up by the head of the prison, the circumstances of the murder of Sokolnikov were described as follows:

"The defiant tone in Sokolnikov's question aroused anger in me. I called him a fascist hireling, and that I have to bear responsibility for you and leaders like you. Sokolnikov immediately got up from the bed and began to approach me with a menacing look. I was sitting on my bed, next to which there was a chamber bucket, I grabbed it and with a blow to the head pushed him away from me" (Architectural file No. 300954, vol. 1, case sheet 138.)

Under similar circumstances, under the leadership of Art. On May 19, 1939, operative officer Kubatkin, Radek was also killed in the Verkhneural'sk prison of the NKVD.

And in this case, this pre-arranged murder was then framed as the result of a fight. Thus, in the act of Radek's death, drawn up by the prison administration, it is indicated:

"When examining the corpse of prisoner Radek K.B. bruises were found on the neck, blood flows from the ear and throat, which was the result of a strong blow to the head on the floor. Death followed as a result of beatings and strangulation by the imprisoned Trotskyist Varezchnikov, about which the present act was drawn up.

As established by the audit, soon after that, Kubatkin and Sharok, who had carried out the murder of prisoners Radek and Sokolnikov, who had previously worked as ordinary employees of the NKVD apparatus, were appointed - Kubatkin - Head of the NKVD Department of the Moscow Region, and Sharok - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Kazakh SSR. ...

Chairman of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR I. Serov".

As for Pyotr Nikolaevich Kubatkin, we will have to return to his person at another time and in another chapter. But it is worth stopping at the biography of Grigory Fedorovich Sharok. After all, A. Rybakov described him under his own name in the novel "Children of the Arbat".

Sharok was born in 1900 in the Vilna province into a peasant family. Russian. He graduated from a rural school, worked as a laborer at the construction of a railway line and at a factory. In 1919 he was drafted into the Red Army. He first served as a machine gunner, and since 1921 in the Special Purpose Division of the Cheka-GPU. In 1922 he joins the party.

Since 1924, after demobilization, he has been working in administrative and economic work - the manager of the affairs of the Supreme Economic Council, the manager of Moszhilstroy, a personnel officer in the People's Commissariat of Supply of the RSFSR. In 1927 he completed courses at the Moscow Industrial and Economic Institute. He tried to enter the institute, but the attempt was unsuccessful. Since 1932, he was again at work in the bodies of the OGPU: a commissioner, an assistant officer in the secret political department. From 1936 - junior lieutenant of the State Security Service, from November 1937 - lieutenant of the State Security Service, and from April 4, 1939 - senior lieutenant of the State Security Service.

From October 1939 - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan. Since May 1940, he was the head of the city department of the NKVD in Vilnius. From October 5, 1939 - Captain of the State Security Service, from March 14, 1940 - Major of the State Security Service, from February 14, 1943 - Colonel of the State Security Service.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he headed the task force of the NKVD of the 22nd Army on the Western and Kalinin fronts. And only then did he work for General Sudoplatov in the 4th department of the NKGB as deputy head of a department, and from August 1943 as head of the 1st department.

In 1943-1944. - Head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of Belarus, then Deputy Head of the UNKGB for the Gomel Region.

Since November 1945 - head of the UNKGB-UMGB in the Molodechno region. Since 1947, at work in the central office of the MGB: Deputy Head of Department in the 5th Directorate, since 1949 in the 7th Directorate.

In May 1954, he was transferred to the reserve due to age.

During the years of service in the state security, he was awarded: the Order of Lenin (1954), the Order of the Red Banner (1954), the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree (1945), the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degrees (1948), two Orders of the Red Star (1943 and 1944), the Order of the Badge of Honor (1940) and 11 medals.

In retirement from 1961 to 1968 he worked as an instructor at the Central Automobile and Motorcycle Club in Moscow. Died in 1981.

#### HEAD OF REGIONAL DEPARTMENT

When Lavrenty Pavlovich came to the NKVD, the first thing he did, as expected, began to get acquainted with the leadership of the people's commissariat. So, with the approval of the new head of the Rostov regional department of the NKVD D.D. Grechukhin, during the conversation, Beria asked if anyone had recruited him into any anti-Soviet organization.

And Grechukhin's fear was not at all in vain. It was he who came to replace Viktor Semenovich Abakumov at the end of 1938. For less than three months, Major GB Grechukhin led the UNKVD of the Rostov Region (from September 19, 1938 to December 03, 1938).

He was arrested on December 3, 1938, and already on February 22, 1939, he was sentenced to capital punishment under Art. 58-1 "a" and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Did he understand anything before his death, did he understand the intricacies of the SYSTEM? Unknown.

And shortly before that, all in the same 1938, to the famous writer M.A. Sholokhov was selected precisely from the NKVD of the Rostov region. It was not the first time they had approached him, but this one was much more serious ...

It all started with a letter to Stalin from an indignant writer, according to which a thorough check was organized with a visit to the place. On May 23, a memorandum from the Secretary of the Party Collegium of the Commission of Party Control under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks M.F. Shkiryatov and the head of the 4th department of the Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR V.E. Tsesarsky "On the results of checking the letter of comrade. Sholokhov

name of Comrade Stalin. The second copy of this memorandum was sent to the People's Commissar of the NKVD Yezhov.

In it, in an official tone, without a hint of embarrassment, it was emphasized: "In his letter addressed to Comrade Stalin, Comrade. Sholokhov brings a number of accusations against the workers of the NKVD of the Rostov region, which basically boil down to the following:

1. A group of employees of the NKVD of the Rostov region created and continues to create false cases against honest and loyal people to the Soviet government. "Hundreds of communists imprisoned by enemies of the party and the people are still languishing in prisons and exile" (from Comrade Sholokhov's letter).

2. In the bodies of the NKVD of the Rostov region, physical violence and lengthy interrogations are used against those arrested, pushing the arrested onto the path of slandering innocent people and attributing to themselves crimes that they did not commit. "We must put an end to," Comrade Sholokhov wrote, "with the shameful system of torture applied to the arrested."

3. Against comrade. Sholokhov, false materials were selected and provocative rumors were spread with the sole purpose of discrediting him. "In such an environment as it was in Veshenskaya, it was not only impossible to work productively, but it was also immensely hard to live. Life is tough even now. Enemies are still weaving a black web around me" (from Comrade Sholokhov's letter).

In his letter, Comrade Sholokhov demanded that the investigative files for 1937 and 1938 be reviewed, that the innocently convicted be released from custody and that the employees of the NKVD in the Rostov region responsible for these crimes be brought to justice. Comrade Sholokhov wrote: "We must carefully check the cases of convicts in the Rostov region last year and this year, since many of them are sitting in vain."

Naturally, corporate inspectors came to the conclusion that "the facts stated by Comrade Sholokhov in his letter were not confirmed." Especially since Yezhov himself was Shkiryatov's immediate superior in the Party Control Commission. His answer was not long in coming: in the fall of 1938, he was secretly taken out of Art. Veshenskaya, Rostov region, well-known activist, member of the CPSU I.S. Pogorelov. The head of the department, Grechukhin, confidentially informed him that an underground counter-revolutionary organization had been discovered in the North Caucasus.

organization headed by M.A. Sholokhov, the leading core of which includes: the secretary of the Veshensky district committee of the party Lugovoi, the chairman of the Veshensky district executive committee Logachev, the old Cossack Gromoslavsky (Sholokhov's father-in-law) and others. In particular, Grechukhin said: "Stalin and the People's Commissar of the NKVD Yezhov ordered us to expose and liquidate this organization. The issue was agreed upon with the Rostov Regional Committee of the Party, an order was received to arrest Sholokhov and his entire group, and the execution of this operation is entrusted to Pogorelov.

Pogorelov, in turn, although he agreed to take on this "operation", still did not believe that Sholokhov was an "enemy of the people." And when the great writer arrived in Rostov, he met with him at his own peril and risk and told him about the impending reprisal.

Sholokhov himself recalled: "They warned me that they would come to arrest me at night, and a brigade had already left Rostov. Our stanitsa Chekists, as I was told, have also been warned, they will be placed at the windows and gates... What should we do? Run! To Moscow. Where else? Only Stalin could have saved... And he fled. On a half. But I didn't go to Millerovo, but to the nearest station in another region."

In Moscow, Sholokhov wrote a short note to Stalin: "Dear Stalin!

I have come to you in great need. Take me for a few minutes. Beg.

M. Sholokhov. 10/16/38.

Stalin received the writer on October 23 at 18.30 and talked with him for 50 minutes. And on October 31, a meeting was held in the leader's office on the "case" of the writer, which was attended by Molotov, Malenkov, Sholokhov, Lugovoi, as well as Yezhov, Grechukhin and employees of his apparatus Shchavalev and Kogan, the head of the Veshensky district department of the NKVD Ludishchev. Pogorelov became the main witness.

At this meeting, in his last speech, the leader said: "A person with such eyes cannot be our enemy. Comrade Sholokhov, how could you think that the Party would give you offense? Good conditions for work should be created for the great Russian writer Sholokhov."

Incidentally, Mikhail Sholokhov met Yezhov's own wife, Evgenia Solomonovna, back in February 1938. Therefore, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, among other things, had personal motives for hating the famous writer. And that's why.



The acquaintance took place at the moment when Sholokhov came to Moscow to complain about the atrocities of the Chekists in his native Veshensky district.

"After a conversation at the People's Commissariat, Yezhov invited Sholokhov to his dacha, where the famous writer met with the wife of the no less famous Stalinist people's commissar," says A.E. Pavlyukov. Sholokhov liked Yevgenia Solomonovna, and when the writer visited the capital again in June 1938, he visited her at the editorial office of the magazine "USSR in Construction" under the pretext of his participation in the release of an issue dedicated to the Red Cossacks.

In mid-August 1938, Sholokhov once again ended up in Moscow and, together with the writer A.A. Fadeev drove to the editorial office of Evgenia Solomonovna, after which the three of them went to have dinner with Sholokhov at the National Hotel.

Evgenia Solomonovna arrived home that day late in the evening. Yezhov had already returned from work and was very dissatisfied when he found out how she spent her time, especially since it was clear from his wife's behavior that Sholokhov's courtship did not leave her indifferent.

The next day, Sholokhov was again at the editorial office, again they, now together, went to the National, but this time the matter was not limited to just dinner in a hotel room.

Listening to rooms in hotels, including the National Hotel, was carried out by the 1st Division of the Department of Operational Equipment. The order was set as follows. The rooms where the guests of interest lived were tapped according to special instructions coming from various operational units of the NKVD (such an assignment was received, in particular, to listen to Sholokhov's number during his previous stay in Moscow in June 1938.). Supervisors (stenographers), who did not have a specific task for a given working day, had to periodically, by free hunting, connect to various hotel rooms and, if the conversation they heard turned out to be interesting,

write it down.

On the eve of the day when Evgenia Solomonovna came to visit Sholokhov, one of the stenographers, having connected to the writer's hotel room and recognizing him by his voice, asked the management for permission for further listening. Head of the Operational Equipment Department M.S. Alekhine contacted the boss

Secret political department of A.S. Zhurbenko and, having received from him confirmation of the expediency of control, ordered to continue listening. Therefore, when the next day the unsuspecting Yevgenia Solomonovna and Sholokhov ended up in the writer's room, their meeting was conscientiously recorded, not only the words spoken, but also what, in the stenographer's opinion, was happening at that moment ("go to the bathroom", "go to bed", etc.).

On the next day, after reviewing the record presented to him, M.S. Alekhin immediately went to report to Yezhov. Upon his return, he called the assistant head of the 1st department, N.P. Kuzmin and ordered not to tell anyone about the incident, even the head of the department V.V. Yushin, who was on a business trip at that moment, and in the future all materials (transcripts and notebooks of verbatim records) in a sealed form and, in no case reading, hand over to him personally.

A friend of Evgenia Solomonovna Z.F. witnessed Yezhov's reaction to what happened. Glikin. Here is what she later said about it:

"The next day (after a meeting with Sholokhov) late at night, Khayutina-Yezhova and I, being at their dacha, were about to go to bed. At this time, N.I. arrived. Yezhov. He detained us and invited us to have dinner with him. Everyone sat down at the table. Yezhov had supper and drank a lot, and we were only present, as it were, as interlocutors.

Further events unfolded as follows. After dinner, Ezhov, in a state of noticeable intoxication and nervousness, got up from the table, took out some document on several sheets from his briefcase and, turning to Khayutina-Ezhova, asked: "Did you live with Sholokhov?"

After her negative answer, Yezhov angrily threw it (i.e., the document) in the face of Khayutina Yezhova, saying: "Here, read!"

As soon as Khayutina-Ezhova began to read this document, she immediately changed her face, turned pale and became very agitated. I realized that something was wrong, and decided to leave, leaving them alone. But at that moment Yezhov ran up to Khayutina-Ezhova, tore the document out of her hands and, turning to me, said: "Don't leave, and you can read it!" At the same time, Yezhov threw this document on the table to me, indicating which passages to read.

Having taken this document in my hands and partially familiarized myself with its content... I realized that it was a shorthand record of everything that happened between Khayutina-Ezhova and Sholokhov in his room.

After that, Ezhov completely lost his temper, jumped up to Khayutina-Ezhova, who was standing at that time by the sofa, and began to beat her with his fists in the face, chest and other parts of the body. It was only with my intervention that Ezhov stopped the beatings, and I took Khayutina-Ezhov to another room.

A few days later, Khayutina-Yezhova told me that Yezhov had destroyed the said transcript.

After all this big dirty business, Viktor Semenovich Abakumov arrived in Rostov.

In the prewar years, transport links in Rostov-on-Don improved significantly. New tram lines were laid, including those to distant city outskirts, and in June 1936 trolleybus traffic was opened. Rostov became the third city in the USSR (after Moscow and Kyiv) to receive this new type of urban transport. For guests of the city, one of the largest hotels in the country was built, which received the name "Rostov".

By 1937, there were 98 general education schools (including primary) and 8 universities, 19 technical schools, 4 music and art schools (by the end of the 30s) in the city.

Also in Rostov there were 34 scientific institutions, 110 libraries, 34 clubs, 9 museums, 6 theaters and 17 cinemas. In November 1935, on the former wasteland that once served as the border between Rostov and Nakhichevan, the construction of the magnificent building of the Rostov Drama Theater named after M. Gorky with a hall for 2200 seats was completed. On the eve of the war, Rostov was one of the largest industrial and cultural centers of the country. The pace of industrial production here was noticeably higher than in the country as a whole. In 1940, gross industrial output increased 18 times compared to 1913. Rostov produced 25 percent of agricultural machinery, 33 percent of zinc white and enamelware made in the USSR. The development of housing construction led to the growth of the city, the length of its streets increased by 140 km. In general, the territory of Rostov more than doubled by 1940. According to the census, in 1939, 510 thousand people already lived in Rostov. For 20 years

population

Rostov has more than doubled. Rostov occupied the stable tenth place among the cities of the USSR according to this indicator.

In a word, not Moscow, but it was possible to live here, and even more so the biggest and most terrible boss...

The regional administration, which Abakumov took over, consisted of the apparatus of the State Security Administration (economic department, secret political department, and others). It was this apparatus that was directly supervised by the head of the NKVD department.

Further, he was subordinated to: the internal security inspectorate, the police department, the reserve inspection apparatus, the fire protection inspectorate, the senior instructor, the communications apparatus, the financial department, and the secretariat.

According to the memoirs of one of the veterans of the State Security Service, "at that time, nothing special was required from the territorial departments - follow the instructions of Moscow and report on time. They ordered to review the cases of those arrested and convicted - we reviewed, many were released. They ordered to clear the defense enterprises of the Poles, potential enemy agents, - we cleansed."

Beria's son Sergo writes in a book about his father: "Then Abakumov was included in one of these groups. That's where he stepped up. With his direct participation, up to 60 percent of the prisoners arrested in the Rostov region were released. Then the version went for a walk that Abakumov "released prisoners indiscriminately", earning authority on this. Like it or not, I can not judge, but he did a good deed.

For example, the same Pyotr Kubatkin in the spring of 1939, being a senior detective, was appointed head of the Moscow Department of the NKVD. As M. Karikh emphasizes, the new chief "practically did not find a single employee there, whose rank would be higher than junior lieutenant. Most had neither the appropriate education nor professional skills. Meanwhile, the new head of the department inherited a mass of unfinished cases, initiated mainly under article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR: anti-Soviet agitation, sabotage, espionage. The general flow of accusations was dominated by cases of anti-Soviet propaganda. Having considered some of these cases, Kubatkin quickly figured out that they were opened without sufficient grounds. More than 100 cases initiated under Article 58,

he took out the motives

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a formal conclusion on their termination, so that all those arrested under it were released.

The first steps of the new leader saved the lives of many people, but they did not receive support from above. Pyotr Nikolayevich was reprimanded for his passion for the "liberal line" and "easy approach" to reviewing cases."

Something similar happened in Rostov, especially after the scandal with the writer Sholokhov. But it is hard to believe in the initiative of the nobility of the new head of the UNKVD. Not those times were, not those morals ...

On August 21, 1938, Professor Lev Aleksandrovich Velikhov (1875) was arrested. He taught at the higher educational institutions of Novocherkassk and Rostov-on-Don, and often gave lectures in the working centers of the Donbass. In 1937, he received a disability of the second group due to heart disease and was forced to retire.

And now the arrest and detention in the internal prison of the UNKVD of the Rostov region.

According to V. Shelokhaev, "during the investigation, the terms of which were repeatedly extended, he was interrogated 16 times. The materials of Velikhov's investigation file comprise five volumes. The 63-year-old professor was accused of five counts of Art. 58 at once. Criminal Code. He allegedly was "the organizer and leader of an illegal organization of Cadets in the Rostov region, which waged an active struggle against the Soviet power through sabotage, organizing personnel for an armed uprising against the Soviet power and creating terrorist groups to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government." Head of the UNKVD for the Rostov region V.S. Abakumov worked on a grand scale. The case, in which dozens of names of former leaders of the Cadet Party were named, promised career advancement, and indeed, he soon found himself in key positions in the NKVD of the USSR.

Having broken the will of an old sick man, the investigators forced him to confess that he had allegedly carried out counter-revolutionary activities since 1925, met regularly with former members of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party in Moscow and Leningrad, and received from them appropriate instructions on the formation of terrorist groups in Rostov and Novocherkassk, prepared an armed uprising in the Cossack regions, developed plans to assassinate the leaders of the party and government.

The testimonies contain fantastic information about, for example, that "from above | million citizens", that the Cadets were preparing an assassination attempt on Lenin in 1918", etc. and so on.

On June 28, 1939, the military prosecutor of the North Caucasian Military District refused to satisfy the request of the investigating authorities for another extension of the investigation, summoned Velikhov for interrogation, and then decided to end the case within five days.

At a meeting of the Special Meeting in Moscow on January 5, 1940, the professor was given 8 years with imprisonment in a labor camp, counting the period from August 19, 1938.

His further fate is unknown.

Former General Georgy Nikolaevich Maslyanikov (born 1868), before his arrest on March 19, 1938, on the eve of his seventieth birthday, worked as the chief accountant of the Hercules artel. Descendant of General V.N. Belopolsky in his study points out: "It is characteristic that the charge was brought much later - on December 14, 1938. The fact is that the investigator did not have compromising information (except for the main thing at that time: he had a former general in front of him!), Therefore, he stated : "Write about your counter-revolutionary activities." In response to the answer of the arrested person that he does not conduct any counter-revolutionary activities, the methods of torture investigation followed: for 9 days they were forced to stand "in a stance", without moving, beating with fists in the face and kicking in the back, insults and, finally, especially painful beatings with rubber truncheons.

The seventy-year-old man realized that his heart could not stand it, and decided, under the influence of his cellmates (among them, of course, there were "decoy ducks") to give the required testimony. The investigator provided him with a "program", and Maslyanikov wrote with the help of a cellmate that one day Captain Dubrovsky came to his artel, said that he was from General Artamonov from Paris, and recruited him into a counter-revolutionary organization. The investigator took the testimony, said that it was a draft, and he would draw up the protocol later. It was April 9, 1938. After that, Maslyanikov was not summoned for interrogation for 8 months ...

The general was called for interrogation only on January 27, 1939, then there were two more interrogations on February 7 and February 19, 1939. They showed that during this time the investigation had received, or rather, concocted "evidence".

The fact is that the interrogation of Maslyanikov's colleagues in the "Hercules" did not give the desired result. Colleagues commented on him

well, they said that he taught them accounting, he didn't talk about political topics ... Only one of them (culturalist, candidate for party membership), trying to curry favor, showed that Maslyanikov was against Soviet power .. because to questions about salary he answered: "They will charge you as much as you need. Don't interfere with work, you won't understand anything anyway."

But in July 1938, the testimony of R., an accountant for the artel of the blind in Rostov, a former Cossack colonel, appeared. These testimonies occupy 30 pages in the case file and were taken as the basis of the indictment... It was organized, according to the version of the investigation, in 1922... To organize it, Colonel Danilov was illegally delivered and landed in the Sevastopol region on the instructions of Generals Krasnov and Bogaevsky from Istanbul. He

moved to Novocherkassk and began to form an underground. At the head of the organization were two Cossack generals ... "

And only 8 generals, 7 colonels, more than 10 sabotage groups, dozens of participants. Isn't it "good work"? The indictment for all this nonsense was signed by the head of the NKVD department for the Rostov region, Captain V. Abakumov.

At a closed meeting of the military tribunal of the troops of the North Caucasus District, which took place on May 25, 1939 and lasted only 40 minutes, the general was found guilty under Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (paragraph 2 - armed uprising, seizure of power in the center or in the field; paragraph 9 - sabotage, paragraph 10 - anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation, paragraph 11 - joining a K/R organization) and sentenced to 15 years in prison with the defeat of political rights for 5 years.

Maslynikov died in the Oryol prison on October 27, 1940. And there is nothing surprising in this. Another thing is surprising: at the trial, standing in splendid isolation, the general pleaded not guilty, refused his previous testimony, said that he did not know the persons listed in the indictment, but the name of Dubrovsky, who allegedly recruited him into the organization, he took from Pushkin's story.

This was the only way the NKVD department worked under the leadership of Abakumov, and nothing else. Is it not for such work that he will be approved in this position on April 27, 1939? Is it not for such a job that he

own the rank of senior major of the GB (bypassing the major) on March 14, 1940? Is it not for such work that he will be awarded the Order of the Red Banner No. 4697 on April 26, 1940?

In September 1937, the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory was divided into the Krasnodar Territory and the Rostov Region. During the first two years of its existence, the Rostov region lost almost 12 thousand people. By 1939, mass arrests were on the wane, but repression continued. People continued to disappear and were never seen again.

The places of their burial are still unknown. For example, in the same Rostov region, only one thing has been documented - Volovya Balka near Taganrog. But three dozen people are buried there. Where the rest is still unknown!

It is noteworthy that it was on January 10, 1939, and not before, that Stalin signed his famous cipher telegram. Here is her text:

"26/sh

Cipher of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

TO THE SECRETARIES OF OBCOMMS, TERRITORIAL COMMISSIONS,

Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, People's Commissars

OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, TO THE HEADS OF THE UNKVD

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union learned that the secretaries of the regional committees - regional committees, checking the employees of the UNKVD, accuse them of using physical force on those arrested as something criminal. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party explains that the use of physical force in the practice of the NKVD was allowed from 1937 with the permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was pointed out that physical impact is allowed as an exception, and, moreover, only in relation to such obvious enemies of the people who, using the humane method of interrogation, brazenly refuse to extradite the conspirators, do not testify for months, and try to slow down the exposure of the conspirators remaining at large. , — consequently, they continue the struggle against the Soviet power also in prison. Experience has shown that such a policy gave its results, greatly speeding up the work of exposing the enemies of the people. True, later

In practice, the method of physical coercion was defiled by scoundrels Zakovsky, Litvin, Uspensky and others, because they turned it from an exception into a rule and began to apply it to honest people who were accidentally arrested, for which they suffered due punishment. But this does not in the least discredit the method itself, since it

correctly applied in practice. It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use physical pressure against representatives of the socialist proletariat, and, moreover, they use it in the most ugly forms. The question is why socialist intelligence should be more humane in relation to \*inveterate\* agents of the bourgeoisie, \*sworn\* enemies of the working class and collective farmers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers that the method of physical coercion must continue to be applied, as an exception, against open and non-disarming enemies of the people, as an absolutely correct and expedient method. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union demands from the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties that they be guided by this explanation when checking the workers of the NKVD.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. Stalin \*

(+ \_\_\_ \* Inscribed by hand by Stalin).

And imagine being beaten. And how!

Colleague Abakumova L.E. Vlodzimirsky, being the head of the investigation unit, personally dealt with the case of the "military conspirators" (Loktionov, Rychagov, Smushkevich and others) in 1941. Former investigator V.G. Ivanov will show in 1956: "I summoned the arrested Loktionov at the direction of Rhodes and brought him for interrogation to the office of the head of the investigation department of the NKVD Vlodzimirsky. During the interrogation, Vlodzimirsky and Rhodes demanded testimony from Loktionov about his anti-Soviet work. Loktionov pleaded not guilty. Then Vlodzimirsky and Rhodes ordered Loktionov to lie on his stomach on the floor and began to beat Loktionov in turn with rubber sticks in front of my eyes, continuing to demand evidence from him about anti-Soviet activities. The beating continued for a long time with short breaks. Loktionov rolled on the floor from blows, from pain, and roared, and shouted that he was not guilty of anything. During the beating, Loktionov lost consciousness, and he was pumped out with water."

At the same time, in 1956, another witness, the former head of the 1st special department (accounting and archives) Bashtakov, testified how the deputy head of the investigatory unit, captain of the State Security Department Rodos, together with Beria and investigator Esaulov, brutally beat a member candidate before being shot. Politburo of the Central Committee of Eikhe, in retaliation for his statement at the trial: "Seeking from Eikhe a false confession that he was allegedly a spy, Rhodes,

Beria and Esaulov knocked out Eikhe's eye. However, even after that, Eikhe pleaded not guilty." In more detail, it looked like this: "In front of my eyes, on the instructions of Beria, Rhodes and the Esauls severely beat Eikhe with rubber sticks, who fell from the beatings, but he was also beaten in a lying position, then he was raised, and Beria asked him one question: "You confess that spy?" Eikhe answered him: "No, I don't recognize it." Then the beating of him by Rhodes and Esaulov began again, and this nightmarish execution of a man sentenced to death continued only five times in my presence. Eikhe's eye was gouged out during the beating. After the beating, when Beria was convinced that he could not get any confession of espionage from Eikhe, he ordered that he be taken away to be shot."

Another person under investigation of Rhodes, head of the department of leading Komsomol bodies of the Komsomol Central Committee Belosudtsev, in his statement to Stalin dated February 20, 1940, described the methods of work of this executioner as follows: "Rhodes took a twisted rope with a ring at the end and let's stretch it over the body ... I wriggled, rolled on the floor and finally saw only one brutal face of Rhodes. He doused me with cold water, and then forced me to sit on the edge of the chair with the coccyx of the anus. I again could not stand this terrible dull pain and fell unconscious. After a while, having regained consciousness, I asked Rhodes to take me to the restroom to urinate, and he says: "Take a glass and urinate." I did this and asked where to put the glass. He

grabbed it and brought it to my mouth and let's pour it into my mouth, and he shouts: "Drink, shit in human skin, or testify." I, being beside myself, but what to say, everything was indifferent to me, and he shouts: "Sign, sign!" - I said: "Come on, I'll sign everything, it's all the same to me now."

By the way, in a couple of months this same Rhodes was awarded the Order of the Red Star. It happened on April 26, 1940. Day after day with Abakumov.

December 14, 1939 in the autobiography of V.S. Abakumov writes: "While working in the NKVD bodies (UNKVD MO, ECU NKVD, 3rd department of the Gulag, 2nd department of the GUGB), I was always at grassroots work.

In 1939, the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR was nominated for a leading Chekist work - early. UNKVD of the Rostov region. While working as head of the UNKVD of the Rostov region, I was elected a delegate to the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. I am a member of the Bureau and Plenum of the Rostov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and a member of the Plenum of the City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Wife - Smirnova T.A., daughter of a shoemaker. Studying at home."

By the way, Tatyana Andreevna Smirnova remained the common-law wife of Viktor Semenovich. Then for some reason it was fashionable to get married without registering. This is how many of Abakumov's comrades lived, without formalizing their marriage for years.

On February 25, 1941, Abakumov was appointed Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

After the division of the NKVD of the USSR on February 3, 1941 into two people's commissariats - the NKVD and the NKGB, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00212 of February 26, 1941, a new structure of the NKVD of the USSR was announced. L.P. remained the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. Beria.

S.N. was appointed the first deputy people's commissar. Kruglov, then two "clean" deputies: V.S. Abakumov and V.V. Chernyshev and two more I.P. Maslennikov (by troops) and B.P. Obruchnikov (by staff).

As Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Abakumov supervised the Main Police Department (GUM), the Main Fire Department (GUPO) and the 3rd Department of the NKVD (counterintelligence support for the border and internal troops of the NKVD, fire protection and police).

WHO ARE THE Executioners From the NKVD?

Executioner - a person who carries out a sentence of death or corporal punishment, tortures ...

At the end of 1937, a certain Lukhovitsky, an ordinary investigator from the NKVD, conducted the case of Arkady Yemelyanov, the former head of the Main Construction Department of the USSR People's Commissariat of Food Industry.

In 1955, after rehabilitation, Yemelyanov, in his testimony to the military prosecutor of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, Major of Justice Kozhura, will tell how the same investigator "worked" with him: "... Do you know why you were arrested?" Lukhovitsky asks me. "No, I do not know". Lukhovitsky took a step forward, spat in his face and swore at him. I rushed at him. He was waiting for this and kicked me in the groin. I fainted. I woke up on the floor in the restroom, which was opposite the investigator's room, in wet and bloody clothes with broken lips and nose. Lukhovitsky was standing next to me and the paramedic who gave me medicine, felt my pulse and said: "There is nothing terrible." I was led back into the room and placed against the wall. Lukhovitsky warned me that I would stand on the "conveyor line" until

until I sign the deposition. I mocked until the morning. He was replaced by another 23-25 years old with curly blond hair. He was there until the middle of the day, trying to persuade him not to torture himself and to testify. Then he came in civilian clothes aged 20-22. Lukhovitsky replaced him late in the evening. Yes, three days. I was on my feet the whole time. They didn't give food. On duty, Lukhovitsky was not given water and was not allowed to smoke. On the fourth day, blood vessels and legs burst on my swollen legs

turned into a formless mass of blood. Hallucinations appeared, at times I lost consciousness, fell. They lifted me up and, as Lukhovitsky put it, "cheered me up with punches": needles and pins were pierced in bottle caps, which went out 2-3 millimeters. They pricked the sides, from below the legs. Other methods of "cheering" were also used: when I closed my eyes, they pulled out the hair from my beard and mustache. "Write on a piece of paper who recruited you, we will not draw up a protocol." "Who exactly am I supposed to testify against?" "You yourself must know. But this person must be known in the country and must belong to the leadership of the party." — "Member of the Central Committee?" "Let it not bother you, even if it is a member of the Politburo, and keep in mind that we already have Politburo members Rudzutak, Kosior, Chubar, Eikhe." "And what testimony might you be interested in?" — "Get the theses. They just need to be developed." Unable to withstand the "conveyor," he wrote: "I consider further resistance to the investigator pointless. I admit that I went into..." A few days later he called: "Are you thinking of testifying?" "I already gave, what else do you need?" - "This is bullshit. We need real evidence." I was silent. "Go to the Lefortovo prison and write everything you need there." Two or three days later, at night, Lukhovitsky was interrogated in Lefortovo with two more investigators and beaten for an hour with a rubber truncheon, twisted from bare copper wire, trampled underfoot.

Two left, brought Temkin (Aron Temkin, head of the supply department of the People's Commissariat of Food Industry...). Temkin: "I was a witness when the people's commissar of the food industry ordered Yemelyanov to kill Mikoyan." Temkin was immediately taken away.

"Do you confirm what Temkin said?" - "I understand everything".

"Temkin's testimony is a secured death sentence, and your fate now depends on you." I did not sign the fabricated protocol of interrogation. They beat me again and put me on the rack. They stepped on their heels and tore off their nails. In October, I signed without reading it."

By the way, Arkady Yemelyanov was forced to sign 82 pages of "handwritten" testimony, that is, dictated by the investigator. For which he received "only" 15 years in the camps

Viktor Semenovitch Abakumov simply could not help but be an executioner, having crossed the threshold of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR in 1937. He worked there during the most terrible time for the Soviet people and for the Soviet country: 1937 and 1938.

Could it really have passed or bypassed him? After all, if he did not know how to do something, then he was taught, and he had to learn. How else?

Writer Yuri Druzhnikov once wrote down the memoirs of Chekist Spiridon Kartashev: "I had hatred, but at first I didn't know how to kill, I studied. During the Civil War, I served in the CHON. We caught deserters from the Red Army in the forests and shot them on the spot. Once two white officers were caught, and after being shot I was told to trample them on horseback to see if they were dead. One was alive, and I finished him off..."

I personally shot 37 people, sent a large number to the camps. I know how to kill people so that the shot is not heard ... The secret is this: I force you to open your mouth and shoot close. I am only covered with warm blood, like cologne, but no sound is heard. If it weren't for the seizures, I wouldn't have retired so early."

On July 30, 1937, Nikolai Yezhov signed Order No. 00447 "On the operation to repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements." According to this order, falling into the first category of the repressed meant execution, and into the second - into the Gulag. Unfortunately, there was no third category.

The beginning of the events, called decades later the "Great Terror", is dated July 3, 1937, when the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin handed over to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N.I. Yezhov and the regional governing bodies of the party, the decision of the Politburo taken the day before to start a campaign of repression ... And after July 4, absolutely all units



The Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR immediately began to look through their file cabinets and archives in search of the victims indicated in the order...

There was a lot of work, but when the execution of order No. 00447 began, it became much more. People catastrophically not hwa

For example, in 1937 alone, 936,750 were arrested on cases of the NKVD (234,301 for counter-revolutionary crimes, including anti-Soviet agitation, and 157,301 for other crimes). A total of 790,665 were convicted (including 353,074 to capital punishment).

In 1938, 638,509 were arrested on cases of the NKVD (593,326 for counter-revolutionary crimes, including 57,366 for anti-Soviet agitation, and 45,183 for other crimes). A total of 554,258 were convicted (including 328,618 to capital punishment).

That is, in 1937-1938, 681,692 were sentenced to capital punishment. For comparison, from 1921 to 1929, only 23,391 were sentenced to capital punishment in cases of the Cheka-OGPU. From 1930 to 1936, in cases of the OGPU-NKVD, 40,137 were sentenced to capital punishment. And from 1939 to the first half of 1953, 54,235 were sentenced to capital punishment. You must admit that the figures very accurately reproduce the dynamics of the Great Terror and those two years (1937 1938) in this regard are indicative.

Alexander Isayevich Solzhenitsyn in his famous "Archipelago" writes about the investigation in the security agencies of the USSR: "If Chekhov's intellectuals, who were all guessing what would happen in twenty, thirty or forty years, would have been told that in forty years in Russia there would be torture As a result, they will compress the skull with an iron ring, lower a person into a bath with acids, torture him naked and tied with ants, bedbugs, drive a ramrod heated on a primus stove into the anus ("secret brand"), slowly crush the sexual parts with a boot, and in in the lightest form - torturing you for a week with insomnia, thirst and beating you into bloody meat - not a single Chekhov play would have reached the end, all the heroes would have gone crazy house".

Further, Alexander Isaevich emphasizes that there was no such list of tortures and bullying, which would be handed over to the investigators in a printed form. It was simply required that each investigative department deliver to the tribunal a given number of confessed rabbits within a given period of time. But it was simply said (orally, but often) that all measures and means are good, since they are aimed at a lofty goal; that no one will ask the investigator for the death of the person under investigation; that the prison doctor should interfere as little as possible in the course of the investigation. Probably arranged to

risky exchange of experience, "learned from the best"; Well, "material interest" was declared – increased pay for night hours, bonuses for shortening the investigation period; It was warned that investigators who would not cope with the task ...

Realizing that the elders are insured, some of the ordinary investigators (not those who frenziedly revel) also tried to start with weaker methods, and in building up to avoid those that leave too obvious traces: a gouged out eye, a severed ear, a broken spine, and even and solid blue of the body.

That is why in 1937 we do not observe - except for insomnia - continuous unity in different regional departments, among different investigators of one department. There is a rumor that Rostov-on-Don and Krasnodar were distinguished by the cruelty of torture. In Krasnodar, they came up with something original: they forced people to sign blank sheets of paper, and then they filled them with lies themselves. However, why torture: in 1937 there were no disinfections, typhus, corpses lay in human crowding for 5 days, those who went crazy in the cells were finished off with sticks in the corridor.

He gives a list of some of the simplest tricks that broke the will and personality of the prisoners, leaving no marks on his body.

1. Night. At night, a prisoner torn from sleep cannot be balanced and sober in the daytime, he is malleable.
2. Persuasion in a sincere tone.
3. Rough language.
4. Hit by psychological contrast.
5. Humiliation preliminary.
6. Any technique that confuses the person under investigation.
7. Intimidation.
8. Lies.
9. Game on attachment to loved ones.
10. Sound way.
11. Tickling.
12. Extinguishes a cigarette on the skin of the prisoner.
13. Light way, etc.

There was another way to make people talk - beating that left no traces:

"They beat with rubber, they beat with mallets and sandbags. It hurts a lot when they hit bones, for example, investigators

boot on the shin, where the bone is almost on the surface. Brigade commander Karpunich-Braven was beaten for 21 days in a row. (Now he says: "And after 30 years, all the bones and the head ache.") Recalling his own and according to the stories, he counts 52 methods of torture. Or here's another way: they clamp their hands in a special device so that the palms of the person under investigation lie flat on the table, and then they hit the joints with the edge of the ruler - you can scream! Should be singled out from beating especially - knocking out teeth? (Karpunich was knocked out eight.)".

There was such an investigator Alexander Grigoryevich Khvat. In 1938, from the post of head of the Organizational Department of the Central Council of OSOAVIAKHIM, he came to work in the NKVD in the 2nd department of the 6th department of the 1st directorate. He was then already 30 years old. Naturally, they immediately appointed him an operational officer and awarded the rank of junior lieutenant of the State Security Service.

As early as November 1938, Khvat took part in the investigation into the case of arrested senior officials of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, who were accused of belonging to an anti-Soviet organization headed by B.E. Kalmykov. During interrogations at Khvat, Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the KBASSR Kh.B. Khaburov, initially denying his guilt, eventually confessed to being a member of the aforementioned organization, although he later retracted his confession and stated that he had slandered himself and others after applying physical pressure to him.

In 1939-1940, as an investigator, assistant to the head of the investigative unit of the GEM of the NKVD of the USSR, Khvat conducted the affairs of his wife M.I. Kalinin, former Deputy Commissar of the KBASSR D.V. Kashcheev, and in 1940-1941 - the case of the vice-president of the All-Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Academician N.I. Vavilov.

"Famous business"! Khvat tormented the vice-president of the All-Union Agricultural Academy of Agricultural Sciences, academician Vavilov, for eleven months, calling him four hundred times for long, hours-long interrogations.

"That, according to eyewitnesses, after these interrogations, Vavilov could not walk on his own: the guards dragged him to cell No. 27 in the Butyrka prison and threw him near the door. The inmates helped Vavilov climb onto the bunk and take off his boots from his huge, swollen, blue feet. The academician was put on the so-called "racks" - this torture meant that a person for ten or more hours (sometimes it stretched for days, and then the tortured veins burst in their legs) were not allowed to sit down ... After half a year of such an investigation (Vavilova accused of espionage and sabotage) from a strong, pull up

even a slightly dapper fifty-year-old man, the academician turned into a very elderly person," says Evgenia Albats.

She miraculously managed to meet with the same investigator...

"I went up to the third floor of this house and called. The door was opened by a middle-aged woman.

- Does Alexander Grigoryevich Khvat live here?

"Daddy," she called softly.

He left the next room. Broad-chested. Once upon a time, apparently, he was tall. A bare skull framed by short-cropped gray hair. Old age, although he looked younger than his eighty years, betrayed a shuffling gait and a kind of hunched figure. No, more precisely, not a hunchback, but a bentness: as if something was pressing on him from above and more and more bent over in a strange half-bow, pressed him more and more to the ground. Then I will understand: it was not only age that crushed him - fear.

Grasp opened my editorial certificate with a professional gesture, read it carefully, and consulted the photograph.

— On what question? asked.

"Let's go into the room," I said, delaying the possibility of being expelled.

"Please," he obediently opened the door of the room and let me through.

There was a double bed in the room - it was clear from the crumpled pillows that he was lying when I arrived. There were also two bedside tables for linen, a wardrobe, a couple of chairs. Nothing else.

Hvat put a chair by the window so that the light fell on my face. He himself sat down against the wall.

I started in the forehead:

- Did you work as an investigator of the NKVD?

- Yes.

- Remember, in the fortieth year you conducted the case of Vavilov, an academician ...

"Of course I remember...

Grip's obedience startled and bound me. I expected anything but this. All prepared ahead of time aggression was not needed.

An old man was sitting in front of me. Just an old man. Tired and

sorry, sick...

I awkwardly squeezed out:

- Witnesses say that you applied to Vavilov ... (I was looking for a softer word) harsh investigative methods...

"I categorically reject it," Snap answered quickly and learnedly. "There was another investigator, Albogachiev," he immediately sold his colleague. - Nationalist, - added ...

- Albogachiev - he was a poorly educated person. Well, natsmen, you understand ... - again repeated Hvat. - He had with him ... relations were not very good ...

"Tell me, did you believe that Vavilov was a spy?"

- Of course, I did not believe in espionage - there was no data. That is, there was a conclusion of the undercover department - there was such a one in the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD: so and so, spy. The undercover department "developed" it, but they didn't pass the data on to us — they left it at their place. They also wrote arrest warrants in such cases. Well, as for sabotage, he did something wrong in his agricultural science. Here I gathered an expertise — the academician headed it, I went to Trofim Lysenko. They, that is, academicians and professors, confirmed: yes, it did harm.

- Didn't you feel sorry for Vavilov? After all, he was threatened with execution. So, humanly, it was not a pity? ...

The grip laughed.

- What do you mean sorry? - That's what he said. "Well, is he alone, or what? ..."

For his ruthless work, already in September 1944 Khvat was promoted to the rank of colonel. That is, in just six years, from 1938 to 1944, he rose from junior lieutenant of the State Security to this high rank. He had orders, medals.

He was fired from the authorities in 1955. The grip did not disappear: from the same year he worked as the head of the 1st department of the department of the Institute of Applied Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in 1958 he got a job as the head of the department and secretary of the party bureau of the Department of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building.

They remembered Hvat at the end of 1958, during the rehabilitation period. Now, in a change to the previous wording: he was dismissed from service due to official inconsistency with the application of restrictions on pension provision, provided for by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2509 of September 24, 1953 v. being at work in the organization

"1

nah NKVD-MGB USSR "by the decision of the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU was expelled from the party.

The head of the NKVD for the Kalinin region, D. Tokarev, once testified about the arrival in the city of Kalinin in the spring of 1940 of a group of high-ranking NKVD workers headed by Blokhin to execute the Poles held in the Ostashkov camp. "When everything was ready for the start of the first execution, Blokhin, as Tokarev said, went after him: "Well, let's go ..." We went, and then I saw all this horror ... Blokhin pulled on his special clothes: brown a leather cap, a long brown leather apron, brown leather gloves with leggings above the elbows. It made a huge impression on me - I saw the executioner! On the very first night, a team led by Blokhin shot 343 people. In the following days, Blokhin ordered that no more than 250 people be delivered to him for execution of the party. In the spring of 1940, under the leadership and with the direct participation of Blokhin, 6,311 Polish prisoners of war were shot in Kalinin," writes N. Petrov.

Vasily Mikhailovich Blokhin began his KGB service in 1921, having been assigned to the 62nd battalion of the Cheka troops in Stavropol. He is only 26 years old.

Three years later, Blokhin was nominated for the post of Commissioner for Special Assignments of the Special Branch under the OGPU Collegium. In fact, since August 22, 1924, his duties include, among other things, the execution of death sentences.

In March 1926, Blokhin was appointed temporary acting commandant of the OGPU, and in June of the same year claim in this position.

As N. Petrov writes, "in 1937-1938, Blokhin participated in the most high-profile executions. He commanded the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and high-ranking military men sentenced along with him. The USSR Prosecutor Vyshinsky and Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court Ulrich were present at the execution. Sometimes the "iron commissar" Yezhov himself indulged in his presence. Under him, the execution action took on the features of an artistic production. In the autumn of 1937: "Before the execution of his former friend Yakovlev, Yezhov placed him next to him to watch the execution of the sentence." Yakovlev, standing next to Yezhov, turned to him with the following words: "Nikolai Ivano-

"R

vich! I can see in your eyes that you pity me." Yezhov did not answer, but was visibly embarrassed and immediately ordered Yakovlev to be shot.

Blokhin's career turned out to be impetuous due to the special demand for professionals like him.

If in 1935 he was awarded the title of "captain of the State Security", then already in 1944 he became a commissar of the State Security, and in 1945 - a major general. On the chest of this executioner-general sparkled: the Order of Lenin, three orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War of the first degree, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Badge of Honor, two badges of the Honorary Chekist, etc. D.

Today it is difficult to even imagine a general shooting people with a German Walther. They say that in all the years of his service, he personally shot at least 10-15 thousand people in the Lubyanka. It was for these merits that he was awarded and rewarded. For example, they awarded him with an honorary weapon - a Mauser, and a gold watch, and even an M-20 (Victory) car.

In 1953, Blokhin was retired by order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 107 of April 2, 1953, with an announcement of gratitude for 34 years of "impeccable service" in the authorities. For 36 years of service, he was granted a pension of 3,150 rubles. Huge money for those times! But, after the deprivation of the general rank in November 1954, the payment of pensions from the KGB was discontinued. He died on February 3, 1955 from a myocardial infarction. It turns out that the executioner had long suffered from hypertension of the 3rd degree. Who knows, maybe she was professional?

Blokhin had both colleagues and subordinates. For example, in 1922-1929 acts of executions were signed by G. Khrustalev, G.V. Golov, P.I. Maggo, A.K. Chernov, A.P. Rogov, F.I. Sotnikov, V.I. Shigalev, P.P. Pakal'n, R.M. Gabalin, I.F. Yysis.

At the same time, most of them were employees of a special department under the Collegium of the OGPU, which was engaged in the protection of Soviet leaders. They were listed as "commissioners for special assignments" (A.P. Rogov, I.F. Yysis, F.I. Sotnikov, R.M. Gabalin, A.K. Chernov, P.P. Pakal'n, Ya.F. Rodovansky Others did their hard service in the commandant's office of the OGPU near Blokhin: P. I. Maggo and V. I. Shigalev Later they would be joined by I. I. Shigalev, P. Yakovlev, I. I. Antonov, A. D. Dmitriev, A. M. Emelyanov, E. A. Mach, I. I. Feldman,

D.E. Semenikhin.

After the executions, as after any hard work, these men had a booze. One of them will recall: "Vodka, of course, they drank until they lost consciousness. Whatever you say, the job was not easy. They were so tired that they could barely stand on their feet. And cologne

washed. To the waist. Otherwise, do not get rid of the smell of blood and gunpowder. Even the dogs shied away from us, and if they barked, then from afar.

B. Sopelnyak in his book "The Executioners of the Stalin era" says: "Nature took its toll and punished the executioners in its own way: they retired severely disabled. The same Maggo completely drank himself, acquired a whole bunch of a wide variety of diseases, and died shortly before the war. Pyotr Yakovlev developed atherosclerosis, emphysema, varicose veins, and deafness in his right ear - a sure sign that he shot with his right hand. \

His colleague Ivan Feldman retired as an invalid of the group with so many diseases that he did not live even a year. And Lieutenant Colonel Yemelyanov, as they say now, has gone crazy. The order for his dismissal reads as follows: "Comrade. Yemelyanov is being retired due to an illness (schizophrenia) associated exclusively with long-term operational work in the authorities."

A former Latvian shepherd, then a prison guard and, finally, an exemplary employee for special assignments, Ernest Mach, found himself in the same position. Mach devoted twenty-six years to his beloved work, rose to the rank of major, was appointed educator of the "youngsters" - that was the name of the young Chekists, received several orders and became a psycho.

In any case, his immediate superior, in a report to the management, asks to dismiss Mach from the authorities as a person "suffering from a neuropsychiatric disease."

Lieutenant Colonel Dmitriev retires as a disabled person of the first group ...

But the two brave colonels Antonov and Semenikhin retired not because of illness, but because of their age. Judging by their track record, they understood in time what the daily shooting at live targets leads to, and made their way to the leaders of the groups - in other words, they themselves did not shoot in recent years, but only watched how their subordinates do it.

By the way, in 1937 they themselves became victims and were shot by G.V. Golov, P.P. Pakaln, F.I. Sotnikov. Yulis (1931), Maggo (1941), V. Shigalev (1942), I. Shigalev (1944) died of their own.

Indeed, it was not easy to be an executioner!

Returning to the executioner Boris Rhodes, whom N.S. Khrushchev called a worthless man, with a chicken outlook, literally a degenerate in moral terms, I would like to dwell on some thoughts of his son.

In particular, Valery Rodos recalls: "Then in Moscow I did not see him for weeks: I woke up - he was not there, at work, went to bed - he was still at work. He came at night, left at night - such a gangster job.

The son did not see his father, and the father did not find time to talk to his son. He had no time. In 1938-1941, Rhodes conducted the most high-profile cases, interrogating prominent leaders of the country, scientists and artists. These are members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks S. Kosior and V. Chubar; candidate members of the Politburo P. Postyshev and R. Eikhe; General Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee A. Kosarev; members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. Stetsky and N. Antipov; a number of secretaries of regional committees: Kabardino-Balkar - B. Kalmykov, Omsk - D. Bulatov, Ivanovsky - I. Nosov; prominent military leaders Meretskov, Stern, Loktionov, Smushkevich, Rychagov and other military leaders, and leaders of the defense industry, who were arrested in 1941; writer I. Babel, director V. Meyerhold.

It was he, Rhodes, who tortured them and forced them to give false evidence against himself under torture.

And now his son reflects: "Dozens of times I myself mercilessly sentenced my father to be shot, I myself led him to the execution, mentally cocked and pulled the trigger, and a bullet of repentance pierced my own head ...

Sometimes, if no one close to me was around for a long time, I brought myself to tears, to sobs, to fainting with these masochistic exercises. I am an old man, this is not easy, I am ashamed to admit it, but what is this shame worth next to that great shame for my own father.

Hundreds of times I built my father's defense, picked up excuses, frantically searched for and found lies and flaws in Khrushchev's speech, in himself. In the CPSU, in Beria's management of the punitive body, in the legitimacy of the existence and activity of this body itself, in Stalin's policy, in the Leninist revolution, in Marxist ideology, in the structure of the state.

And now he finally speaks in defense: "Well, there would be no my father. In general, I wouldn't have been, I wouldn't have been born, I wouldn't have gone to the Chekists, but I would have become,

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as befits a Jew, a men's tailor, like his father, my grandfather... What then? Would these Chubar, Kosior and Kosarev have survived? Wouldn't they even be arrested? Nonsense!

Yes, not he, not my father started a case against them, signed warrants for their arrest. He is only an assistant. Executor. The main killer is not he, not the father! If it were not for him, all the same, these and all the others tortured by my father would have been arrested, beaten, tortured, broken, extorted confessions, tried and shot in the same way and in the same terms! Their lives, their blood, was not what my father needed—the damned revolution."

Here he defines guilt: "My father is personally guilty of not wanting to cut men's trousers, he wanted to rebuild the world, to compete with the Lord God.

He is guilty of joining the demonic Komsomol... in the satanic team of "moral degenerates" — the Chekists did not disdain to GO.

In that he tried to be better than others in the demonic camarilla, he became a fanatic.

My father is to blame for the fact that, once he understood where they were with whom, he failed to get out, and having failed to get out, he did not shoot himself.

But he finds a mitigating circumstance: "His elder brother Leo, the kindest of them, told me that his father shared with him, complained about fate, for a bloody debt, repented, revealed the secret that he often thinks to shoot himself. I feel sorry for my wife, small children - well, yes, but what about, a moral degenerate.

Lev was a rustic peasant, not much of a fancy, but I did not believe him. I would like to believe, I would dream, but I thought and worried about all this too much and hard.

But Nelya, my older sister, told me the same thing once. She and I, our father's beloved daughter... just a couple of times, and then only briefly, talked about him. And she knew more than me. He often talked to her, told something about himself. And so she told me that one day my father confessed that life was not so sweet for him, and if not for her, not for the family, not for my mother, he would have shot himself.

I would like to believe in all this, but what about the sophisticated fantasy of the executioner, when he not only interrogated with predilection, he tortured, as they had not tortured before him ...

He excelled in these executions and apparently enjoyed himself. But, being a weak man (he tortured people, I have no

those who had the opportunity to answer him), he would never have been able to shoot himself. To do this, he had to be at least a little stronger, more courageous, and also have at least some kind of soul that could have at least a little compassion ... But, apparently, she didn't exist, or she rotted in the executioner together with a person!

## HEAD OF SPECIAL DEPARTMENTS AND SMERSH

IN AUTUMN 1941

On the third day of the war, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Senior Major of State Security V.S. Abakumov was reading the documents he had just brought in in his office. One of them, called "information," said: "...Top secret. PROGRESS OF MOBILIZATION

Mobilization in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the districts of Moscow and the Moscow region is taking place in an organized manner.

The district military commissariats of the city and the region continue to receive a significant number of applications for early enrollment in the Red Army. Only in 29 districts of the city and region 3539 such applications were submitted.

At the same time, in some district military registration and enlistment offices, facts of insufficient preparedness in the organization of conscription were noted and negative sentiments were recorded among conscripts.

The district military commissariat of the Shchelkovsky district was late with the staffing of the teams for 5-6 hours. The dispatch of complete teams was delayed due to the lack of a plan for the transportation of personnel composition...

## STATE OF TRADE

By 6:00 pm on June 23, queues at grocery stores in Moscow were significantly reduced.

Over the past 6 hours, queues were observed only at six large stores, mainly for salt, sugar, cereals, matches

kami and kerosene.

In June, the delivery of flour in the amount of 48 thousand tons to the districts of the Moscow region is planned. As of June 20, only 18 thousand tons were actually delivered.

In some part of the trade network of districts of the region, there were no food products for sale / Noginsk, Mytishchensky, Ukhtomsky, Kuntsevsky districts ...

In the Shchelkovsky district, during June 23, sugar was sold one and a half times higher than the daily norm, cereals 3 times and bread 2 times ...

In total, on June 23, 40 buyers and speculators were detained in Moscow and the Moscow Region Human".

This report was for the past day and passed through the police line. Other documents, too, were not yet disturbing, because they did not yet bear the seal of the catastrophe. The one that will appear much later.

In less than a month, Viktor Semenovitch will be appointed to a more responsible and even more significant position - the head of the 3rd Directorate of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR. The date will also be recorded in the documents - July 19, 1941. In the midst of the Great Patriotic War. That is, from that day on, the thirty-three-year-old Abakumov headed the Office of Special Departments. The one that in the 43rd will be renamed SMERSH.

And on the eve of this appointment, literally in eight days, he will be awarded the next special rank of commissar of the State Security Committee of the third rank (07/09/1941).

According to E. Zhirnov, "Abakumov's business also went well in his new post. The authorities were still confident that they could rely on him, and among his subordinates he managed to



pass for a man of his word, a stern but fair and caring commander.

Abakumov's leadership style was largely different from Beria's and Kobulov's management methods. Both of his bosses believed that discipline could only be based on fear and shouting. Beria could call the offender and not accept him for a day, but also not let him out of the waiting room, and subordinates, without leaving their chairs, received heart attacks or saddles. Kobulov could swear at any subordinate.

Abakumov, according to the memoirs of his subordinates, cursed only the leaders, whom he considered guilty of any miscalculation.

those ordinary employees. And almost all the Smersh officers with whom I had a chance to talk told some story about how Abakumov took care of them or their families: for someone he got increased rations, and for someone he gave his personal plane, to fly to the rear to sick loved ones. The stories about the caring Abakumov, as is usually the case, acquired incredible details during retelling, and each special officer firmly believed that in a difficult moment he could turn to his boss for help and in no case should let him down. And Abakumov could calmly demand results from subordinates, and at any cost.

A veteran special officer recalls: "He came to us as an already established Chekist. He had enough experience, after all, almost ten years in the organs. Based on the smallest details, not always, but quite often, he drew the right conclusions and made the right decisions. In what he had to pay tribute - his grip was strong. He demanded the unquestioning execution of his instructions, and he never forgot about these instructions, and if he decided something, he never deviated from his decision, cruelly insisted on his own. It was not easy to work with him, but there was always the certainty that the next day he would not say: I did not entrust you with anything like that. The Chekists highly valued Abakumov, although many were afraid of him."

Operational work, as well as relations with colleagues, Abakumov always built extremely simply. The operations he personally designed were never particularly elegant. "He did not like and did not know how to think over and organize subtle multi-move combinations. The approach was cavalry: chop - and the end of the matter. He believed that the simpler the operation, the better," recalls the veteran.

For example, in Leningrad, during the blockade, special officers used the following technique to increase the number of identified agents and alarmist provocateurs. The agent visited the few surviving acquaintances and talked about the need to surrender the city, the Bolsheviks had gone mad, and so on. The only ones not arrested were those who could get to the phone and tell where they should be about the guest and his state of mind. For those who did not report, they came to the "funnel". Falsified cases from beginning to end could be found in almost any investigative department or department of special departments.

By the way, the main task of the Special Departments during the war was a decisive fight against espionage and treason in the parts of Krasnoyarsk.

noah army. Also, this struggle should have been aimed at eliminating desertion in the immediate front line.

Only now the struggle against the "counter-revolution" was relegated to the background. But quite recently, the Special Departments of the NKVD were assigned special tasks to combat counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the army and navy, border and internal troops.

Nevertheless, the war dotted all the "and".

In August 1941, while watching the flights of German reconnaissance aircraft, the Air Force Headquarters of the Moscow District noticed that they were photographing the roads leading to the capital. As a result

Evaluation of the reconnaissance data revealed that the enemy was preparing an offensive precisely along these roads. Then the commander of the Air Force of the MVO N.A. Sbytov immediately decided to organize "air monitoring of the situation on the roads in the Moscow direction by regular flights of our fighters on all threatened sectors of the front. Every four hours, two fighter planes of the air regiment assigned to this direction swept over all the roads. However, for a long time such observation did not give any special results.

"And on October 5, at dawn, scouts reported: along Varshavskoe highway, about 50 km from the city, of course, in our

the rear, German tanks and infantry march in two columns," recalled Lieutenant General of Aviation Nikolai Alexandrovich Sbytov. - The information is extremely important, therefore it needs to be

careful check. I had such a Major Karpenko, an inspector for piloting technique, an exceptionally brave man. I'm sending you to check. He flies back and reports: "Comrade Commander, there are definitely German tanks coming, a lot." Then it turned out that a whole German corps, bypassing the flank of our troops in the Moscow-Smolensk direction, passed practically without a fight to our rear and was calmly moving towards Moscow.

We don't have any reserves. Only construction battalions and women who dig trenches for our troops, who are not.

Just the day before, the commander of the district, Artemiev, left for Tula, for some unknown reason, so I reported about the Germans to Telegin. "What do we do?" - speaks. "Let's raise cadets of military schools - there is no one else. There are two military schools in Podolsk, though

delay a little, and in the meantime, maybe some reserves will come up. And I will create an aviation fist - I will take a little bit from everywhere I can. I'll scrape together two or three regiments and I'll strike from the air, we'll delay again."

Agreed, agreed. It was 7 o'clock in the morning with minutes. And in vain Telegin now writes in his memoirs that I reported to him either at 12, or at 15 o'clock. At that time, the head of counterintelligence, Abakumov, was interrogating me himself, and the question of my arrest was being decided. Okay, in order. I made all the orders along my line, gathered aviation, the air group was already preparing for 12, maximum by 13 o'clock to strike at the German tank column. Suddenly a bell rang (and Malenkov put the Kremlin telephone for me): Abakumov invites me to his place. Even, he says, we will send a car if you want. No, I say thank you, I'm on my own. Okay, come to Lubyanka. They take me straight to Abakumov, and in his office Merkulov, Beria's deputy, and the head of counterintelligence of the Air Force headquarters are looking at me from the corner; Abakumov immediately:

- Where did you get the idea that German tanks are moving along the Varshavskoe highway and are already almost near Yukhnov?

I report: so, they say, and so.

- And if these are not German tanks, but ours?

I speak:

— The pilots were proven, they could not make a mistake, besides, I sent them twice for insurance. I am for I answer these data.

And then Abakumov generally suffered:

- On what basis, in fact, do you conduct reconnaissance of roads in our rear, and not in Germany? Reconnaissance is conducted behind enemy lines, and not in one's own. And if in his own way, then the question is: why is this being done? Or maybe in order to create a panic in Moscow? - and stuff like that. Now, he says, let's check! Call here Klimov, the commander of the sixth air corps!

Klimov arrives, says:

"I didn't send planes, I don't know anything.

— Aha! And where do you, Sbytov, have photographs of German tanks on the Warsaw highway? I do not have it either?

I explained that the tanks had been detected by visual observation, photographs could not be taken from combat fighters, and that reconnaissance planes had been flown out, there were entries about this in the corresponding logs at headquarters. Checked - there are records, thank God.

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But Abakumov doesn't care:

- You cannot command, we believe that you should be removed from your post. Go!

- Where to go?

— How where? To yourself!

- And I thought, in Butyrka.

- You will still have time for Butyrka.

I come to my office, there is already a sentry standing by Telegin. I went into the office, took out a Mauser, put a submachine gun next to me, and I thought: if they come to pick it up, we will fight.

Telegin, it turns out, did not take any measures that we agreed on in the morning.

Artemiev soon arrives, and we began to call the head of the Main Operational Directorate of the headquarters, Vasilevsky. He says that our tanks cannot be there. So, definitely German. But no action was taken. And Artemiev did not accept. And it's already 18:00. Almost dark. Aviation can no longer be used today. So one day is wasted.

Only Abakumov does something: he sent a colonel with an interrogation protocol, and it says that I specifically wanted to arrange a provocation in order to create panic in Moscow, the flight of responsible officials, and so on. I took a pen and wrote: "The last reconnaissance has established that the Germans will occupy Yukhnov by the end of the day," and I signed it. And then I think: I signed in vain. They will sign, the rest will be taken out somehow, and that's it, nothing will wash you off. Okay, I'm sitting and waiting. I called Stalin's secretariat, they said: "There is a meeting of the State Defense Committee, it was ordered not to connect anyone." So he sat like a stump until the morning.

By the way, the commander of the Air Force MVO Sales was three years older than Abakumov. And unlike the chief special officer, who had no education at all, he graduated from the Military Technical School of the Red Army Air Force Special Services in 1928, the Military Flight School in 1929, the 1st Military School of Pilots. A.F. Myasnikov in 1934, as well as the operational faculty for the improvement of senior command personnel at the Academy of the General Staff in 1939.

Among other things, Sbytov had extensive experience in leading aviation units and formations, possessed good organizational skills, was persistent in carrying out his decisions and was a demanding commander. But most importantly, he was a professional in his field and took his place ...

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As for Viktor Semenovich's work style, in 1941 it differed little from the work style of his protégés and leaders. And, in essence, he was the same: he kept on fear and shouting. He couldn't come up with anything new.

But back to October 1941. While Sbytov "was sitting like a stump until the morning," operational groups of the NKVD of the USSR were working at the front, sent there in order to find out the true state of affairs. According to the first results, a corresponding report was written, which said: "By 18 o'clock. On October 5, the enemy, with a force of up to one battalion with 12 tankettes with mortars, having occupied Yukhnov, reached the line of the river. Ugra and saddled the Warsaw highway, where he entered into battle with the airborne battalion of our 53rd air brigade located in the area. After the enemy infiltrated at the junction of the 33rd and 43rd armies, the rear units of these armies began to flee in panic and on October 5, from early morning, stretched out along the highway. to Moscow itself ... Between Yukhnov and Medyn on October 5 at about 3 p.m. Sorokin, the captain of the 53rd air brigade, blew up an iron suspension bridge across the river. Shan, which is located about 8 km west of Medyn. As a result of the explosion of the bridge, on the one hand, it is difficult for our units and vehicles to escape; on the other hand, an obstacle has been created for the advance of our units towards the enemy. Due to the created panic, on October 5, all VNOS posts and anti-aircraft batteries were removed from the Yukhnov-Maly Yaroslavets section. They were removed as a result of the fact that Lieutenant Sorokoumov, who is in command of the VNOS posts in this sector, incorrectly informed the commander of the air defense regiment Vasiliev in Moscow and obtained an order from him to remove the VNOS posts. Enemy aircraft were heavily machine-gun fired and bombed day and night on October 5-6 on the section of the highway from Maly Yaroslavets to Yukhnov.

Colonel Vlasov, head of the aviation department of the Frunze Academy, who visited Podolsk for an inspection, stated in his report:

"1. The direct defense of Moscow inspires great concern, because. its system lacks organizational leadership and management of those units that are designed to carry out these tasks, and the evil for us - disorganization - still continues to flourish.

2. This was revealed most illustratively in the situation of October 6-7, which I had to observe personally and through my subordinates.

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commanders. So, on the night of the 5th to the 6th, on alarm 70 km from Moscow, southwest of Podolsk, in the area of Lukoshkino, Voronovo, Kresta, a company was thrown out consisting of students of the Military Academy. Frunze and to the Lopasnya area - a company consisting of students of the Artillery Academy named after Dzerzhinsky. Both of these companies were subordinate to their heads of academies and the commandant of the city of Moscow. I was ordered to organize a collection point for reports from these companies in Podolsk and inform the commandant of the city of Moscow and the Head of the Academy. Frunze on the situation in the sector of operations of these companies. The task of these companies is to cover the approaches to Moscow and conduct reconnaissance to the river. Nara. On the spot, in the region of Podolsk, I found that inside the city, except for two policemen, there is no military guard, on the roads to Podolsk there are only posts that check passing cars. And at this time, when, according to the commissar of the air unit and the chief of staff of this air unit, Captain Taran, in the area of the Podolsk airfield, in the evening, the technicians of this unit saw how 8 paratroopers were dropped, but they didn't shoot at them and didn't even see where they disappeared.

Senior Lieutenant Nikulin, sent by me to the airfield to check the defense of the airfield, went through the entire airfield, walked around the aircraft, reached the very chief of staff, Captain Taran, and no one stopped him or checked him. In this atmosphere of irresponsibility and disorganization, it was impossible to establish whether the paratroopers had really been dropped.

3. The defense of Podolsk, this one of the main directions on the outskirts of Moscow, is also unorganized, and no one has yet been engaged in this and apparently did not want to do it ... As a result of this, the command of the district, the commandant of the city of Moscow and the heads of the academies, not knowing the actual situation on the outskirts of Moscow, they supplement this disorganization by throwing two companies of students of the academies ahead of the units present there, and themselves 70 km away from the control

These companies communicate through the Podolsk communication point by talking on city phones in clear text... This disorganization was further compounded by the fact that remnants of units of the 43rd and 33rd armies had accumulated in the forest near Belousovo. who had more than 200 vehicles, the vast majority of Red Army soldiers without rifles; in the forest near Lukoshkino - 500 people of the artillery regiment led by a commissar and dozens of vehicles. In addition, more than 50 vehicles were detained in Podolsk, as well as about 350 privates and 40 people on

commanding staff who arrived in different ways in Podolsk from the front.

The mobility of the work of the district headquarters can be judged at least by the fact that two battalions of the infantry school in / Maloyaroslavets were sent by rail through Moscow, when they could be transferred on vehicles, of which there were more than a hundred idle in Podolsk. Loaded in the evening, these battalions had not yet arrived in Maloyaroslavets by the morning of the next day ... "

Thus, only on the morning of October 6, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Vorozheykin, called Sbytov and said: "I inform you that the GKO approved your actions at its meeting! This, of course, the Germans are coming. Immediately muster all the forces that you can muster, and strike!"

"And since yesterday I have everything assembled and ready," recalled Sbytov. - They started hitting. Immediately destroyed about 100-120 tanks, about 300 infantry vehicles. But by this time the Germans themselves were a little delayed. I think they got suspicious. After all, there was no resistance, as they walked on a walk. And they thought they were being lured into a sack. We went carefully, probing the area with reconnaissance. Yukhnov was occupied, as I predicted, on the evening of October 5th. After our air strike, they dispersed from the main road in order to complicate the actions of our aviation. Nevertheless, we stubbornly went forward, at a pace of about 10 km per round.

Stalin's order was received: to delay the advance of the Germans at any cost. At least 5-7 days. And what to detain, is unknown. I organized a command post near Podolsk, next to it I created an operational supply depot for attack aircraft. On the way of the Germans, we were able to put only the same Podolsk cadets with only two anti-tank guns and my planes, which stormed the advancing German troops several times a day.

Very often passing on a trolley bus a monument to Podolsk cadets, which is located in the city of Podolsk at the intersection of Kirova Street, Parkovaya Street and Arkhivny Proyezd, I could not help but think about the feat of these eighteen-nineteen-year-old boys. Those who gave their lives in the hardest battles of the autumn of 1941 because of criminal miscalculations, stupidity and mediocrity of military leaders and leaders of the country for which they died ...

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In 1939-1940 artillery and infantry schools were established in Podolsk. And on October 5, 1941, when the Germans occupied Yukhnov, reaching the approaches to Maloyaroslavets, when a gap appeared in the defense of the Soviet troops on the Ilyinsky combat site of the Mozhaish defense line of the capital, they were not only remembered, but removed from classes, alerted and sent to the defense of Malo-Yaroslavets. The combined detachment of cadets, and these are 2,000 cadets of artillery and 1,500 cadets of infantry schools, were assigned the combat mission of blocking the way for the Germans in the Ilyinsky combat sector for 5-7 days, until reserves from the depths of the country approached.

On October 6, the boys arrived at this combat site and took up defense along the Luzha and Vypreyka rivers from the village of Lukyanovo to Malaya Shubeika. For several days, the cadets held back the German advance, repulsing an attack by the Germans many times superior on October 11, and an attack from the rear on October 13. German tanks approached with red flags, but the deception was exposed and the tanks were destroyed.

On October 16, German troops captured the defensive lines in the Ilyinsky combat sector, and almost all the cadets who held the defense in this sector died.

It is known that in the battles on this sector of the front, Podolsk cadets destroyed about 5 thousand German soldiers and officers, knocked out or disabled about 100 tanks, while losing two and a half thousand of their comrades.

Eternal memory to them!

## DIARY OF A SUBJECT

August 23, 1941] the captain of state security I.S. Shabalin was appointed head of the Special Department of the 50th Army of the Bryansk Front. This army was formed in July-August on the basis of the natives of the Bryansk and Oryol regions on the basis of the 2nd Rifle Corps of the Bryansk Front. Ivan Savelyevich left Ulan-Ude for Moscow on August 12 for an appointment, and arrived in the capital on the 21st. The former People's Commissar of the State Security Service of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, without realizing it, will go down in the history of the Second World War thanks to the fact that he will keep a diary, the first entry in which will appear on August 12 - on the day of departure to the capital, on the train. As P. Polyakov writes, "what is amazing in this diary is not even its extraordinary history.

riya, but the very fact of its conduct and existence. History's notorious penchant for irony manifested itself here in full: after all, it was the special departments that were called upon to make sure that no one in the active army kept any diaries, justifying this precisely by the fact that the treasured notebooks could get to the enemy and be used against us. But Shabalin did not extend this rule to himself: apparently, he believed that nothing would happen to him, and if it did, he would have time to destroy the diary.

However, one should not forget the position that the captain of the State Security Service held before his appointment to the front - the people's commissar of the ASSR. And this is a very responsible and, I would say, solid position. Moreover, the author of the diary allowed himself such a "weakness", having a desire to speak out, to fix for himself the important historical events in which he took part for the first time in his life. Apparently, he really did not doubt that even in the event of his death, the records could get to the enemy. He had such a responsible position and now...

A few words about Shabalin, whose biography is unusual and interesting...

Ivan Savelyevich was born in 1902 in the village of Yamorka, Yaransk district, Vyatka province, into a middle peasant family. In 1914 he graduated from a rural school. For five years he worked on his father's farm. From 1919 to 1920, he served in a detachment to combat desertion and send bread from the regions as a private of the 1st Vyatka Territorial Regiment. Then for another four years he worked on his father's farm.

In 1924 he was drafted into the army, where he was a foreman of a company of the 166th Infantry Regiment (until 1927). He joined the party there in 1926. He worked for another year on his father's farm and only in 1928 began his career in a completely different vein: head of secret correspondence, technical secretary of the factory committee of the Verkhne-Isetsky metallurgical plant in Sverdlovsk, from 1928 to district court.

He came to the organs of the OGPU on the 29th and immediately became an authorized representative of the plenipotentiary in the Urals. In the same year, he was appointed district commissioner of the OGPU for the Upper Urals region. In 1931, he was the district commissioner of the OGPU for the Staro Utkinsky district. In 1932 - he was a cadet of the Central School of the OGPU of the USSR, and after it

endings - replace

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steward of the head of the political department of the MTS for the OGPU-NKVD in Rovny, Odessa region (1933-1935).

From this position, he was taken to the Directorate of the State Security Committee of the UNKVD for the Leningrad Region. There he is first a commissioner of the department, then a detective and, finally, the head of Dzerzhinsky

district department of the NKVD of the city of Leningrad.

After five years of work in the city on the Neva, Ivan Savelievich was appointed to a new position - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR (07.01.40).

On November 19 of the same year, he was already People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of this autonomous republic. On February 26, 1941, he was appointed People's Commissar for State Security.

And so, on August 21, 1941, he arrives in Moscow, where he writes down on the same day: "... immediately went to the OK and, to my surprise, was immediately assigned."

The next day, a new entry follows: "I begin the formation of the Special Department of the 50th Army."

August 23: "I was in the People's Commissariat. I read the order. Received the rank of major of state security.

August 24: "We continue to equip ourselves. We get uniforms. I brought Comrade Boriskovsky's overcoat to the People's Commissariat, sent a telegram to Nadia, I'm going to Bryansk.

August 25: "I'm nervous. No car tires, no gasoline. The composition of the department is not yet complete. At 17.00 we left Moscow for Tula.

August 26: "Spent the night in the car. We continue our journey in five cars. People are in a good mood."

August 27: "We arrived at our destination in the village of Vyshkovichi, near the city of Bryansk, settled in an agricultural technical school."

August 28: "In the morning, anti-aircraft guns fire on German aircraft. Went to the front line division positions."

August 29: "Accepted business. The device is running. The enemy is undertaking raids on the city of Bryansk. Machine guns and anti-aircraft guns are knocking. German planes fly away with impunity. Our hawks are not yet seen But".

August 30: "I went to some divisions to give practical instructions."

September 2: "We moved with headquarters to the village of Chaikovichi, near Ordzhonikidzeograd".

September 3: "The city of O. is almost deserted. In many places it was destroyed by enemy aircraft."

September 4: "Bryansk was badly damaged by German air attacks. Entire city blocks have been destroyed."

September 5: "While visiting the front line, I swam in the Desna and watched the bombardment of our front line by German aircraft. The attack lasted approximately 2 hours and was fierce. The planes dived and retired with impunity."

September 6: "The army is not what we are accustomed to imagine in our homeland. Huge shortcomings. The attacks of our armies are disappointing."

September 7: "They interrogated one red-haired German prisoner of war, a ragged guy, covered in lice, extremely stupid."

September 30: "The situation with the personnel is very difficult. Almost the entire composition of the army was selected from people whose homeland was occupied by the Germans. They want to go home. Inactivity at the front, sitting in the trenches demoralizes the Red Army. There are cases of drunkenness of the team and

political composition. People sometimes don't come back from reconnaissance. The enemy conducts weak mortar fire. He strengthens the advanced positions perfectly. We live in a dugout. It gets a little cold, especially in the morning.

Yesterday, September 29, 1941, the commander of the army summoned me to the command post. There was an extremely interesting conversation about the political and moral state of the troops and our measures. At night I returned to my dugout, without light, in terrible darkness. I returned very upset. Things are going badly. Does Moscow know the actual situation at the front.

On the way through the collective farm fields one can see a lot of bread collected in stacks and stacks. How much good is lost! It becomes scary. Some Red Army soldiers collect rye for horses. They dig their own potatoes and prepare firewood.

October 1: "I got up early in the morning. From Moscow arrived t.t. Tutushkin and head of the Special Front Department Begma. It gave a good boost. Then everyone left in divisions, as well as my two representatives. In the divisions, the situation is unfavorable both with our apparatus and with the command and political staff. It doesn't work well.

A good lesson for us will be the catastrophe that occurred with 42 Red Army soldiers in the 258th Infantry Division and the like.

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dealing with 18 people in the 217th Infantry Division. It is shameful that we overslept and the investigation of the case does not bring the necessary result.

Conclusion: The position of the 50th Army is not brilliant. It consists almost entirely of people whose relatives are in areas occupied by the enemy.

Cruel measures are required from us and from the command. Many military institutions and part of our apparatus are still working, as in peacetime. This was also facilitated by the fact that the army had been on the defensive for almost two months and was conducting only artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire, and then only periodically and very weakly. At night, the men in the forward positions of the defense sleep; the Germans put up posts and go to spend the night in the village. This is not a war, but a parody. There are no active actions, attacks, and because of this, unhealthy manifestations arise among the Red Army soldiers.

Today I saw the Muscovites off. He returned to his dugout and ate these lines by candlelight. The soul hurts, the mood is desperate. Nevertheless, the situation must be immediately restored, and this must be done at any cost.

October 2: "I got up at 8 o'clock in the morning, had breakfast: bread, cheese, tea with syrup. There is a report that the enemy is advancing on the flank of the 13th army of our front. We can hear artillery fire all the time. I like our guns, or, as the Germans call them, "devil artillery". If we had these guns here, it would raise the spirit of our army. Enemy vehicles often fly by, anti-aircraft guns are heard. Yesterday a German prisoner of war was captured, ragged and covered in skins. Their mood is not at all militant. Their minds are blank, literally dark. I didn't expect this. At 17.00 hours the enemy advances along the entire front, in several sectors he pressed our troops and crossed the Dnieper. Artillery fire can be heard throughout the day.

October 3: "I slept in a dugout. Got up at 7:30. They shout that Comrade has arrived. Kolesnikov. So I went to the second echelon. We exchanged views on the enemy's offensive. It is shameful that the enemy again won a victory, broke through the position of the 13th army, occupied the city of Kromy, located 30 kilometers from Orel. Cuts us off. He occupied several villages on our sector of the front. At 12.00 we left for the sector of the 258th division, where we spent 2 hours, in order to return to T. in the evening. The fire of our artillery is strong, the infantry is preparing to attack. There is an order to return the lost positions. In the evening when I write



these lines, the situation has not yet cleared up. The communication department is not working well. The headquarters is the same. |

In the rear sit cowards who are not prepared to retreat. Oh my god, so many flatterers here. K. says that in Orel the NKVD is already being evacuated. But there are still 150 kilometers from us to Orel! What confusion, what helplessness! If only there was a firm hand here! A well-thought-out assault - and the Germans will run without looking back. Their forces are exhausted compared to our army and our retreat seems to the Germans somewhat of a surprise.

As early as 10/1/41, a German soldier appeared with us and declared: "Tomorrow we will attack you along the entire front." He saw strength in our army, but this strength trembled and gave the enemy the opportunity to force the Desna with impunity at several points. However, our artillery did a good job in the sector of the 258th Rifle Division, and the enemy left many dead and wounded on the battlefield."

October 4: "Early in the morning, with Comrade K., who came to me from the village of T., I went to Petrov. We sat for about 2 hours and exchanged our views on the course of the German offensive. At 12.00 we left in cars to Dyatkovo. On the way we met K., head of the Special Department of the 217th division. He said: "I'm looking for a command post for the 217th division." We gave him instructions. On the way we also met the commissar of the 217th division. He told us about the situation, we had little faith in him. We met a group of Red Army men and sent them to the division.

The position of the 217th division is as follows: on 2.10.41, the Germans carried out intensive artillery preparation, smashed machine-gun nests and the positions of our riflemen, drove away our forward posts and went over to the attack. German aviation was active and did not give our forces the opportunity to turn around.

Result: 766 on the right flank lost; division communication is broken. Regiment No. — interrupted and no one knows where she was left. About 20 people remained from the 755th regiment. The rest are dead, wounded or dispersed. The division lost leadership. The Red Army soldiers were left to fend for themselves. Everyone comes with a weapon. No more than 3 thousand people remained of the division, and these are also dispersed.

Today the Germans are not advancing, they are only conducting reconnaissance. They seem to have a lot of power here. Here it would be necessary now to attack, but there is nothing for this. Two powerless armies stand against each other, one afraid of the other.

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In the evening: they say that the Eagle is on fire. We were bypassed. The entire front, i.e. 3 armies, got into pincers, surrounded, and what are our generals doing? They think". It has already become a habit: "I evade the environment, we surrender the front", but what now? But it must be said that individual sections of the front are surprisingly stable; it was embarrassing for the enemy. But, despite this, we are already half surrounded - what will happen tomorrow?

At 22.00 I went to the forest and spoke with the commander of the army, Major General Petrov, about the situation. He said that the front could not help here any more and asked me: "How many people have you shot during this time?" What should this mean?

The commandant brought a liter of vodka. Ah, now to drink and sleep, maybe then it will be easier.

The prospects for war are far from rosy, as the enemy has driven a powerful wedge into our front. But we, as always, have lost their heads and are not capable of any active actions.

October 5: "We got up at 8:00 in the morning. I went to shave. Big queue. I didn't wait. I stood by the car for an hour, the engine was not working. At 11 o'clock I went to the site of the 260th Rifle Division, talked with the chief of staff, slept in the second echelon, got lost and ended up in the forward positions of one of our battalions. I found the second echelon in the village of Ormenka,

shaved and washed. With the head of the Special Department Comrade. Kleiman went to dinner. Dinner was excellent, service too. The division retreated very little, they have heavy losses, against the 260th division the enemy concentrated 3 divisions. The Germans go on the attack at full height. Our soldiers literally mow them down.

On October 4, 1941, our tanks went into action and, after completing their task, returned to the village of Shimyatovo, where they were bombarded. Fools, put them in a heap and did not disguise.

Conclusions: The division fights well, the Red Army soldiers are brave.

In the morning the Guards division arrived. The commander of this "devil artillery" says they were also bombed. The division has 3 guns firing in volleys. He has not yet received a mission on our front.

German soldiers have only jackets, they take off their overcoats from the dead Red Army soldiers and wear them. To distinguish them, they cut off the sleeves to the elbows.

The tanks set off in the direction of Bryansk. Probably they are

give behind the enemy.

October 6: "At 9.00 am K. returned from the front. He says the headquarters has moved. The military council and the operations department remained. The special department is completely cut off. He (K.) therefore returned to us. K. was there for about 2 hours, he says that he is going to the headquarters of the front. His heart hurts. I did not advise him to go, then I told him: "Well, go, only come back in the evening." We then exchanged views on today.

At 15.30 hours it was reported that enemy tanks surrounded the headquarters of the front. There is shooting. Then there is no news from the headquarters of the front. Around 17:00, the tanks returned to the city. We were told about this during lunch. The second echelon left on bicycles for the village of Gololobovka. In the evening, reconnaissance reported that there were 6 tanks and 5 or 6 motor vehicles with infantry in Bryansk. 2 regiments were thrown to drive the enemy out of Bryansk. There is an anti-tank gun. The infantry of the 154th division has not yet arrived. Bryansk is on fire, the bridges across the Desna have not been blown up. The enemy is active. The Guards Division left at the disposal of the commander of the 290th Infantry Division. There is no panic, but a state of nervousness.

At 5 o'clock I stayed in the dugout, the car was ready to leave. It is a pity for Comrade K. It is very possible that he stumbled upon enemy tanks. He had such a presentiment, and he could not find a place for himself. The general makes preliminary decisions. Waiting for instructions from Moscow. It is impossible to take the army from the front, since the 3rd and 13th armies are on the left, which can get into a difficult situation. The inevitability of the encirclement of the entire front, and not just our army, is obvious.

Rifle divisions hold the original defensive sector. The front command, represented by the chief of staff, General Sakharov, and front commander Eremenko, has already ordered the divisions to be withdrawn to the second sector of defense. However, they themselves changed this order. During the entire time of the German offensive, the leadership of the front headquarters lost control and probably lost its head. It would be much better to give the army the opportunity to act independently.

The supply of ammunition is intermittent. On October 5, 1941, there were about 100 trains in Bryansk. Managed to send them somewhere else. According to the head of logistics, approximately 130 tons of fuel remained, but how much remained on separate sections of the railway, unknown."

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October 7: "I got up very early. There were no significant changes at the front. Divisions hold their positions. Fighting is going on outside the city of Bryansk. Both of our regiments of the 154th division

reflect the offensive of the regiment. At 6 pm the enemy occupied most of Bryansk. There is a decision to change the command post. At 16 o'clock we left the city of Bryansk, in accordance with the order to withdraw.

So, we will also leave the city of Orel.

At 18:00 we left with a task force in 3 vehicles to the rear area in the village of Ogor and arrived there at 24:00. The distance is only 40 kilometers. Panic and rumors of all kinds are all around us. It was painful for me to leave my dugout. We lived here in the forest for more than a month and felt at this place, so to speak, at home.

History has never seen anything like the defeat of the Bryansk Front. The enemy approached from behind and surrounded almost 3 armies, i.e. at least 240 thousand people who occupied an area of approximately 600 km in size along a curved line of defense. An order arrived from Moscow to the leadership of the headquarters: "The entire front must withdraw." A huge effort seems to start people fleeing.

We haven't seen a single plane of ours in recent days. We surrendered cities almost without a fight. The front command lost leadership from the first days of the German offensive. They say that these fools have already been confiscated and sent to Moscow.

Retreat! All the efforts that were made to strengthen the defensive zone turned out to be in vain. Giant effort! This line is used by the Germans if we drive them back. The command of the front on 10/6/41 was transferred to Petrov. It is interesting to note the following. I come to Petrov, he says: "Well, they will also shoot me soon." "Why not?" I ask him. "Yes," he says, "I was appointed to command the entire front." I answer: "If you are appointed, then you should take up the cause and strive for victory." "Well, yes, but you see, however, in what position the front and its army are. I still don't know what is left of these two armies (3 and 13) and where they are."

October 8: "The village of Ogor. I didn't sleep the whole night. At 5:00 am I sent out the second echelon. 8 operational workers and two cars remained in the village. At 10 am, the four of us drank a liter of vodka and had a good breakfast. I went to bed in the car and slept well. Edunov woke me up. I went out in a truck to

establish contact with the command post, which has moved to another location, no one knows where.

All the residents have stayed here, they are harvesting potatoes. Not a single shot is heard. How quickly the horrors of war are forgotten! At 6 pm, a great noise of motors is heard, artillery and machine guns are heard firing. At 9 pm I. arrived with a group of people from the command post. 150 wounded arrived. The school was equipped as an infirmary. I slept in the car."

October 9: "Woke up at 8 o'clock, slept badly. At 9 o'clock I went to the command post, saw Petrov and Shlyapin. I learned that the second echelon left as unnecessary, one way or another he could be captured. All day long they were shooting all around, planes were constantly flying. Light snow fell during the night. At 8 pm the artillery depot was set on fire. There was a terrible cannonade; a giant flame was visible, I went out of the forest into the field to watch this fireworks. It is beautiful. The night is dark, there is a little rain.

October 10: "The four of us slept in the same car. Very cold. Got up at 7 o'clock. It's snowing, it's falling in big flakes. We had breakfast from old stocks, accidentally got boiling water and warmed up well. At 11 o'clock we left for the Khvastovichi area. There are a lot of cars and people on the road. The dirt is impassable; the whole road turned into a viscous dough. We stopped in the village of Sloboda. I met Nikonov from the 217th Infantry Division, he told me that their losses in people were 75%, and part of the weapons was also lost.

October 11: "We spent the night in the village of Berezovka. At 10 o'clock in the morning, Comrade I. came and said that Comrade Misha Chernetsov had been killed in the village of Ogor on October 9, 1941, during a bomb explosion.

I feel very sorry for this lovely man. He was buried near the school near the linden alley.

At the hour 30 min. The Germans began shelling the field near the headquarters with mortars. The army headquarters left in disorder for Avdiivka. The road was already dominated by a disorderly heap of motor vehicles; 4 German planes were circling above us, twice we stopped our car; the planes were flying very low, anti-aircraft guns were firing all around, but in vain. The planes didn't drop bombs, which was strange, but they probably didn't have them with them.

The situation for the army is sad; where the rear is, where the front is, it's hard to say. The ring in which the army is located is narrowing. Convoy ar-

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missions are cargo, all columns are drawn there. The army suffers significant losses in men and materials."

October 12: "At 5 o'clock in the morning we arrived in the village of Buyanovich.

We immediately had breakfast, I drank a glass of vodka and went to sleep in the car. At 10 o'clock in the morning they woke me up. It turned out that while I was sleeping, German planes dropped 4 bombs and fired at the village with machine guns. One hut is on fire. Two people from the sanitary battalion were killed. I shaved while firing cannons and drank tea. The population in these villages does not receive us very friendly. This should be noted. Enemy mortars are firing. I sent to headquarters to find out how things were going. At one hour 30 minutes the enemy began to conduct heavy mortar fire. The headquarters quickly went in the direction of Frolovka. Arriving at the cemetery, I stopped the car, then stood at the edge of the cemetery, watched the fire of enemy mortars and the chaotic flight of the army headquarters.

Approximately 1,000 cars were moving in 3 rows. The commander of the army rode past and pointed to the forest. We got into cars and drove to the forest, located one kilometer from village B. We were going to go in the direction of village F. In the forest, I stopped the car and ordered to go to the crossing through Moscow. I myself walked through the forest.

When I arrived at the crossing, I met comrades Edunov, Zaitsev and Shlyapin. We stopped at the crossing and watched the restoration of the road. Our cars were already on the other side. Suddenly, 3 cavalymen arrived and reported that the Germans were there. At the same time we started to fire from light machine guns and mortars. There was a mess. Our soldiers started firing; I and S. slowly retreated into the depths of the forest. Bullets and fragments of grenades whistled around us. I lost all the operational staff, wandered until the evening. The shooting stopped. The commander, members of the Military Council and the chief of staff left, they were no longer in the forest. In the evening I received an order: to withdraw at night to the village of Nehochi.

The mood is gloomy. We were close to breaking through. The Germans were expelled from the village of F. And now we must again go inside the ring, which, of course, will become even narrower.

October 13: "All night long I didn't sleep a wink. I lost 2 cars. Last night I met comrade I., this morning I met the driver F., who told me that all the operational staff was in order. Intense cold. There are no gloves or warm underwear. I go

in the gymnasium. We are moving very slowly, stuck in a swamp. There were about 1000 cars. We spent the whole night building a crossing, moving cars with the help of a tractor, and despite this, we did not finish it until morning. There were about 50 trucks left in the swamp and about the same number on the field.

At 6 o'clock in the morning the Germans began to fire many mortars. We arrived at a small stream where a German reconnaissance armored car found us. He signaled, and the enemy opened mortar fire on our convoy. We stopped at a stream. The night passed quietly. We were building a front."

October 14: "The enemy pushed us into the ring. Continuous cannonade. Duel of artillerymen, mortars and machine gunners. Danger and horror almost the whole day. I'm not talking anymore about the forest, the swamp and the overnight stay. I haven't slept since the 12th. I haven't read a single newspaper since October 2."

October 15: "This is terrible, I'm dizzy; corpses, the horror of war, we are constantly under fire. Again I am hungry and have not slept. I took out a flask of alcohol. I went to the forest for reconnaissance. We are in total annihilation. The army is defeated, the convoy is destroyed. I am writing in the forest by the fire. In the morning I lost all the Chekists, I was left alone among strangers. The army has collapsed."

October 16: "I spent the night in the forest. I haven't eaten bread for three days now. There are a lot of Red Army soldiers in the forest. There are no commanders. During the whole night and in the morning the Germans shelled the forest with weapons of all kinds. At about 7 o'clock in the morning we got up and went north. The shooting continued. On vacation, I took a bath. We got food and cooked dinner. I found a small blanket for myself, a field flask and a bag. It has been raining since morning. Then the rain turned into sleet. We got wet to the skin. We are tormented by a terrible thirst, we drink swamp water.

In the evening we came to the village of K. Hellishly cold, damp. We built tents, lit a fire, dried our clothes, the four of us went to the collective farm and got straw. We slept very restlessly. On the road we saw a German convoy, let it pass. We stumbled upon dead Red Army soldiers. There are heaps of abandoned gas masks and helmets along the way."

October 17: "I woke up hungry. The Red Army soldiers have already kindled a fire. I dried my overcoat. We soon had breakfast and then moved on. For the third day we have not had bread. Came out

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for reconnaissance at the edge of the forest. A German reconnaissance detachment found us and fired on us with a mortar. In the evening we crossed the railway and the canal, got hay for the night. A German patrol discovered us and fired on us with light machine guns and mortars. I left hay on the way. The night was terribly cold, although in the forest we slept on hay.

October 18: "Without breakfast, we continued to move through the forest. We saw a German patrol. There was no shootout. As always, we went through the swamp. At about 12 o'clock we stopped for breakfast, dried our clothes, ate warm soup and porridge, a piece of meat for 4 people, some potatoes and peas. I shaved. At night, there will be a crossing over the highway. It is under fire. Unfortunately, I don't have the blanket anymore, because yesterday, while crossing the railway line, it disappeared. Terribly cold."

October 19: "All night long we walked in pouring rain through marshland. Impenetrable darkness. I don't have a single dry thread on me anymore. My right leg is swollen. It's terribly hard to move. At dawn we stopped in the forest. With great effort, I dried myself by the fire and dressed without eating or sleeping. We now have a path through a treeless area. We divided into two groups, half of us have no weapons. During the day I went out of the forest as a guard, but to no avail. Intelligence went beyond the forest to ..., but the Germans were there. You can hear the firing of light machine guns and mortars. At this, the diary of the head of the Special Department of the 50th Army ends ...

It is known that this 50th Army was encircled in early October 1941 as a result of a deep breakthrough by H. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group that began on September 30th. And on October 7, all three armies of the Bryansk Front turned 180 degrees and began a breakthrough from the encirclement. According to the report of the future Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Eremenko, by October 20, 1941, 1,600 people from the 217th Rifle Division, 1,524 people from the 290th, and two regiments with artillery entered the Belev area.

According to modern researchers, the 50th Army was surrounded and broke through with heavy fighting due to the mistakes of the General Staff and the front commander, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In particular, V.R. Yeratov from the Karachev Museum of Local Lore

writes: "For example, M.Yu. Myagkov directly points out that if for the 13th Army (Major General A.M. Gorodnyansky) and the 3rd Army (Major General Ya.G.

sa and Guderian meant the actual encirclement, then for the 50th Army (Major General M.P. Petrov) there remained the possibility of a retreat to the northeast, to the city of Belev. By October 8, the command of Army Group Center was able to cover this northeastern direction only with the forces of the 112th Infantry Division and partly of the 52nd Infantry Division (2nd Army). Here the Germans did not have a solid front. However, the successful breakthrough of the 50th Soviet army to Belev was soon stopped by order of B.M. Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. All attempts by army units to break through in a southeasterly direction (on the Resseta River) were unsuccessful. Having lost over 80% of the personnel and more than 97% of the artillery, having lost the commander, General M.N. Petrov, the remnants of the army nevertheless left the encirclement, but in the direction to the northeast, to Belev.

The breakthrough of individual units and the fighting on Resset continued for more than two weeks. As a result, only 11.5 thousand fighters and commanders managed to break out of the encirclement - all that was left of the army of more than 100 thousand people.

The commander of the 50th Army, Major General Mikhail Petrovich Petrov, was only forty-three years old in that cold autumn of 1941. During the years of his service, he only graduated from the Tambov military infantry school (1923), advanced courses for armored officers (1932), and higher academic courses at the Academy of the General Staff (1941). He also took part: in the storming of the Winter Palace, in the national revolutionary war of the Spanish people and the liberation campaign of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. By the way, for the skillful and courageous leadership of the tank battalion, Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After Spain, he commanded a brigade, a division, and in 1941 he took over the 17th mechanized corps of the Western District. Already in early August of this year, Mikhail Petrovich took command of the 20th Rifle Corps, which, after fighting in the Gomel direction, was reorganized into the 50th Army.

Since mid-August, Petrov's army covered the Bryansk-Kaluga direction. During the Oryol-Bryansk defensive operation in early October 1941, the formations of the army and the front were surrounded, and on October 7, the General Staff ordered General Petrov to lead the troops of the front instead of Commander Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko.

It is believed that General Petrov died on October 10 near the village of Golynka, Karachevsky District, Bryansk Region. However, as the authors of the publication of the diary of I.S. Shabalina P. Polyan and N. Pobel, "the next day, October 20, 1941, Shabalin met with Major General Petrov, with whom he died southwest of Pasika at 4 pm."

But it is not so. Southwest of Pasika, the head of the Special Department, Shabalin, died, and General Petrov died much later and in a completely different place. This was told by the son of the commander A.M. Petrov to Marshal A.I. Eremenko: "In the battles on the river. Resseta Mikhail Petrovich was seriously wounded in the upper part of both legs. Not only could he not move, but from loss of blood he was unconscious almost all the time. The army headquarters had a long way to go with battles. Transportation of a seriously wounded person in such conditions was impossible. I had to leave General Petrov in one of the remote villages under the supervision of a doctor and a nurse. It was believed that in the future, even if the territory was not liberated in the near future, Petrov, with the help of partisans, would return to the mainland after his recovery. A group of Red Army soldiers led by a doctor and a nurse delivered the wounded man to the small forest village of Golynka (Karachevsky district, Bryansk region). The Nazis bypassed this remote village side. The wounded man was placed in the house of the Novokreshenov collective farmers. The Red Army soldiers then returned to their own, but the doctor and nurse remained. Petrov had gangrene. He ordered the nurse to leave, apparently to establish contact with the partisans, since she was a native of these places. Approximately a week later, about ten days later, the Nazi submachine gunners descended on Golynka. The doctor disappeared into the forest. They did not have time to move the wounded man, and he remained with the Novokreshchenovs. The Nazis came to this house as well. The hostess covered the general with an old sheepskin coat and answered the question of the enemies that it was hers.

an ailing peasant who went into the forest and was blown up by a mine. No one in the village saw the general, and the Nazis left, having completely robbed the peasants as usual.

After this incident, the doctor soon brought a group of Red Army soldiers making their way to the east. They made a comfortable stretcher out of poles and carried the general to an abandoned lumber camp 7 km from the village. Here lived a forester and several people who were hiding Soviet people. The Nazis have not yet reached here. Here Petrov was placed in a separate room, relative safety allowed

improve care. But the gangrene got worse. It was decided to take him to Karachev, where there were faithful people among the doctors of the district hospital, in order to perform an operation. We began preparations for this difficult transportation. Petrov himself, however, did not approve of this decision. His condition deteriorated sharply. After spending about 10 days at the lumber station, Mikhail Petrovich died. He was buried at night. It was the middle of November 1941."

As for Shabalin's diary, after his death the entries came to the Germans. According to the authors of the publication, "the Germans found his diary quite an interesting trophy! An accompanying letter to the command of the 2nd Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht said about this diary that "it gives an interesting picture of the mood of the commander of the 50th Army, General Petrov, and his inner circle during the battle for Bryansk and is characteristic of the fighting spirit of the enemy. It shows that the difficulties of command and control of troops and the tension of the enemy's troops are much greater than ours. The diary should be used in work with the troops."

By the way, the Germans took possession of the diary, pulling it out of the dead man's tablet, and then sent it to the appropriate Abwehr unit, where the entire text was translated, read and duplicated for the information of a certain circle of people.

The authors of the publication state: "Already translated into German, on November 3, 1941, it was sent by the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian in parts. And in early March 1942, one of its copies was captured by the Red Army. Then the turn of the Soviet counterintelligence officers came to figure out what was happening, translate from German back into Russian and carefully study the half-opened doors of the fate of its author.

And one more historical fact. In Shabalin's diary, the name Edukov is mentioned more than once, correctly Edunov. This is none other than Shabalin's deputy Yakov Afanasyevich Edunov. After leaving the encirclement, he was appointed head of the NKVD OO of the 9th Army of the Southern Front, then he was appointed head of the NKVD OO of the 48th Army of the North-Western Front, in March 1943 the head of the NKVD OO of the Volga Military District, in April 1943- head of the UKR SMERSH of the North-Western Front and in February 1944 the head of the UKR SMERSH of the 2nd Belorussian Front.

In 1951, General Edunov will head the 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, and finish his service in the bodies in 1956 in the position

Head of the NGO KGB for the Belarusian Military District. Well, Yakov Afanasyevich was just lucky. He will live a long life and die in 1985.

## SMOLENSKY ARCHIVE

When the city of Smolensk was liberated, and this event took place on September 25, 1943, then some time later, all the same autumn, his personal secretary put only two pages of typewritten text on the table of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It was a certificate of the results of the Nazi occupation of the city. It is known that Stalin boldly underlined with a red pencil only one line in this document, in the place where it was said about the seizure of the party archive by the Germans. In the margins, he only added: "Comrade. Shkiryatov - to create a commission, sort it out and report on the results in a month ... "A little lower, the leader added: "T.t. Beria, Abakumov - to assist in the investigation ... "

Today, some historians, trying to make the disappearance of the Smolensk archive more significant than it actually was, practically assert that Abakumov was summoned by Stalin in the early April morning of 1942. For example, Georgy Chernyavsky, Doctor of Historical Sciences, in the article "The Fate of the Smolensk Archive — a Mirror of the Bolshevik Totalitarian Regime" writes: "At a sign from Stalin's secretary Alexander Poskrebyshev, the Chekist entered the office and introduced himself in a military way. Stalin did not answer. He pretended not to notice the visitor and silently continued to walk measuredly along the carpet for several minutes. Following this, coming close to Abakumov, in a quiet and at the same time furious voice, the "leader" asked: "What do you feel, comrade Abakumov, when your subordinates lie to you?" The nature of the question posed clearly meant that Stalin accused Abakumov himself of lying. However, in just a few minutes, the matter began to be clarified. But these minutes seemed terribly frightened lackey-executioner

eternity.

Quiet, at first hidden anger of Stalin broke out, he scolded Abakumov with the dirtiest words. Tom wanted to fall on his knees and beg for mercy, for sovereign mercy. But it was well known that such behavior could only lead to even greater sovereign wrath of the lord. Finally, only slightly

sighing, Stalin explained: "your people reported to me last autumn that during the retreat from Smolensk everything of value was taken to the east, and now it turns out that they forgot the party archive! We gave the most valuable weapons to the Nazis! I can see from your eyes that you have no idea how much this idleness will cost our party and state."

Further, Chernyavsky clarifies: "After a short time, the chief archivist of the Central State Archive of the October Revolution and Socialist Construction of the USSR, a Bolshevik with pre-revolutionary experience, Joseph Perelman, who was considered the largest expert in the field of archiving, stood at attention in front of the deputy people's commissar. Formally, Perelman seemed to be in no danger, since the system of party archives was outside the sphere of responsibility of his department - his archive kept the documentation of the highest state authorities and administration, as well as trade unions and some other public organizations. The general department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was responsible for the party archives, and their evacuation during the war was entrusted to the department of Abakumov himself.

And a few more details from the article: "However, having heard the question and finally understanding the essence of the matter in the inconsistent and not very clear presentation of the authorities at first, Perelman turned pale and said: "There are secret, secret decrees there!"

Abakumov remembered the above story for the rest of his life, right up to his execution in 1954 as a "member of Beria's gang"... However, he told about it only once, to an investigator in the Lefortovo prison, where he was held in solitary confinement. re without a surname, like prisoner No. 15. At the same time, Abakumov "split" only when he found out that the "great leader and teacher" had given his soul to the devil.

The protocol of this interrogation has been preserved in the Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, is now available to researchers and is a documentary confirmation of the story.

given above".

The problem is that the first meeting between Abakumov and the leader took place only on March 31, 1943. This date is detailed in notebooks (journals) of records of persons accepted by Stalin from 1924 to 1953. Yes, and the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, that is, Stalin, he became all in the same 1943 - April 19. On this day, he was appointed head of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR.

If we talk about Abakumov's story to the investigator in Lefortovo prison, then it could be just a story, not evidence. Consequently, no protocol of interrogation, which would reflect the mention of the Smolensk archive, does not exist in real life. And even more so, it is not stored in the FSB Archive. But this is, so to speak, by the way ...



The very same question about the Smolensk Party Archive arose precisely in the autumn of 1943. Moreover, it will continue much later... But everything is in order.

As the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Belarus, Panteleymon Kondratyevich Ponomarenko, recalled, already on the second day of the war, after analyzing the military situation, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to launch an evacuation. In the middle of the day, he called Stalin and announced the decision of the Belarusian Central Committee. Stalin thought for a while and said: "Okay, proceed with the evacuation. In addition to the population, and especially children whose parents have gone to the front, take out the most important part of the state and party archives and state values, which you consider necessary to take out in the first place. Do it in such a way as not to create panic and keep order. Everyone should understand that evacuation is also an element of war."

"One way or another, during June 23-24, they managed to take out the valuables of the State Bank and savings banks, archives of party bodies from Minsk," writes E. Ioffe, professor at the Belarusian State Pedagogical University named after V.I. Tanka, Doctor of Historical Sciences. - According to the testimony of the same M.I. Sarychev, preparations for the evacuation went on in the building of the Central Committee ... throughout the day on June 24th. As soon as the order to evacuate was received, the archives were "loaded on vehicles with lightning speed and sent to Mogilev under cover of darkness."

Official instructions to archival authorities, according to I.V. Dorogush, "came only on June 30, 1941. A plan was developed for the evacuation of valuable documentary materials from the state archives of the NKVD-UNKVD, located in the threatened zone, signed by the deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR V.V. Chernyshev. It gave instructions to the Archival Department of the NKVD of the BSSR on the removal to Penza of state archives: the October Revolution and socialist construction, the archive of the Minsk region, the historical archive in Mogilev "and only" Order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 0401 of August 30, 1941 to all archival bodies were given extensive

instructions on the issues of protection and evacuation of documentary materials, as well as on the unloading of state archives from materials that do not have a scientific, historical and operational values."

And what about in Smolensk? There, in the very first days of the war, according to the decision of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Regional Executive Committee of June 23, 1941, a special commission was created to evacuate the inhabitants of Smolensk and all state property of the region. As reported in the book "History of the Smolensk Militia (1941-1945)", "it included the head of the MD UNKVD G.I. Shishkov. It was necessary to solve the complex problems of evacuating state property and valuables. In addition, police officers were entrusted with the tasks of strengthening the protection of public order, combating spies and saboteurs, alarmists, and embezzlers of personal and state property. This is how G.I. himself remembers this time. Shishkov in his report to the Secretary of the Smolensk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks D.M. Popov: "I, as a member of the commission, was assigned the role of providing all applications for automobile and horse-drawn transport at the request of factories and plants, warehouses, bases and institutions for the evacuation of industrial equipment, valuable raw materials, food and other property. Colossal efforts were required, involving a large number of police officers, in order to cope with this difficult task. In the conditions of the frontline, when vehicles were already mobilized, this was an extremely difficult task. However, the commission found hundreds of vehicles and hundreds of horses every day in order not to disrupt the cargo transportation schedule. Until the very last hours of our troops leaving Smolensk, the commission did not stop the evacuation of state property. The work did not stop during the bombardment by enemy aircraft!"

Considering that only on July 11, 1941, the German 39th motorized corps, having broken the resistance of the 19th Army, which had not had time to concentrate in the Vitebsk region, began an attack on Demidov. Dukhovshchina and Smolensk, then the time for the evacuation of the party archive from June 23 was actually enough.

So it, in fact, was, at the end of June, the Smolensk Party Archive began preparations for the evacuation of documents. However, only on July 8, 1941, when the front came close to

borders of the Smolensk region, the "Regional Committee for the Evacuation of the Population, Livestock and Property" instructed the export of funds of the party archi

va to the east of the region - to the city of Yukhnov (now the Kaluga region). But only 6 trucks with personal records of party members reached this city. From there, by order of the Department of Affairs of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, these documents were transported to Kazakhstan, to the city of Uralsk. The other part of the documents of the party archive, and these are separate protocols of meetings of the bureau of the regional party committee, documents of the apparatus (departments) of the regional committee, minutes of meetings of the bureaus of district committees and city committees of the CPSU (b) of the Smolensk region, sent to the regional committee as information on the activities of local party bodies, was burned archive employees in July 1941, just before the capture of the city by the Germans.

The main set of documents of the Smolensk Party Archive ended up in the hands of the enemy. Of the part they seized, 541 files were separated from the general mass of documents, most likely for use in anti-Soviet propaganda. Chronologically, cases were distributed as follows: 1917-1920. - 24 cases; 1921-1924 - 49 cases; 1925-1928 - 124 cases; 1929-1932 - 122 cases; 1933-1936 - 156 cases; 1937-1941 - 50 cases; different years - 16 cases. But the separation of cases was carried out later, but for now, together with the books of all Smolensk libraries, the archival documents remaining in the city were brought to the building of the Smolensk Cathedral, and then taken to Poland. It is known that only in 9 months of 1943 the occupiers were able to take out of Smolensk 4 railway cars stuffed with archival documents. True, they got a lot of trouble with this archive. Thus, on March 19, 1943, the head of the Main Working Group "Ostland", Dr. Nerling, in a report sent to Berlin on the trip of the group's leadership to Smolensk, indicated in his report: "Transportation of the communist party archive from Smolensk to Vilna, which cost a lot of time and labor nevertheless ended. The archive arrived in Vilna in good condition." Another representative of the group, Einsatzführer Nemtsov, on May 2, 1943, specified in a new report: "The last acts of the party archive located in the Avramiev Monastery were sent to Vilna on April 30, so that the entire party archive is now located there." That is, at first the Germans transported the Smolensk archive to Vilnius and only then to Bavaria. In February 1945, at the Pszczyna station, more than a hundred kilometers from Krakow, units of the 4th Ukrainian Front recaptured wagons with archival documents from the enemy. Among them were documents Smo

Lena party archive. Already in April, the documents, loaded into several railroad cars, returned to Smolensk. But the selected array, the same one from 541 cases, turned out to be much to the west - in Bavaria and after the victory fell into the hands of the command of the American troops. From 1947 until returning to Russia, these documents were in the US National Archives in Washington.

So how did all these documents get to the enemy?

On July 15, at 17:00, the main forces of the enemy's 29th motorized division approached Smolensk and, deploying in battle formation, began an attack on the city from three sides: along the Roslavl, Kiev and Krasninskoe highways.

By 20 o'clock, the German units entered the central part of Smolensk with battles. An hour later, the Germans appeared from the side of the Roslavl highway. At 24.00, a new bridge across the Dnieper was blown up, and after 2-3 hours the old bridge was blown up.

At dawn, the enemy crossed the Dnieper in the area of Kolkhoznaya Square and Rachevka, after which fighting began for the northern part of the city. During the whole day, the enemy managed to cross to the northern bank of the Dnieper and capture the main part of the city. On the same day, three Soviet armies were in the operational environment: the 19th, 20th and 16th.

Such a rapid offensive quite naturally gave rise to panic, and not only among the fighters and commanders. To a greater extent, this affected the Soviet officials, who, leaving everything, were in a hurry to escape from the city. Thus, the entry of advanced enemy units into the city,

street fighting in the city, the encirclement of the Soviet armies became the main reasons for both the impossibility of evacuating the party archive and destruction.

All this had to be dealt with by the commission of Shkiryatov, who was assisted in his line by People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria and the head of the GUKR SMERSH NPO USSR V.S. Abakumov .. Much had to be studied and investigated by their subordinates. Naturally, they began this investigation from the very first days of the war.

For example, I had to turn to the materials of the "military expert commission on the issue of the abandonment of Smolensk by our troops on July 15–16, 1941," headed by General I.P. Camera.

"The results of the work of this commission were summarized in November 1941," says D. Komarov. "According to the data collected by the commission, the direct defense of the city was "engaged in

with a total number of 6.5 thousand people", and in the garrison "there were no personnel units, but only spare and special ones". Regarding the battles directly for the city, the commission draws an unambiguous conclusion: "The battles directly for the city of Smolensk on 07/15/1941 continued extremely transiently." Both the command of the garrison and the command of the 16th Army, which were responsible for the defense of the city, did not take effective measures to ensure a stable and effective defense of Smolensk: "instead of organized resistance to the enemy, in the southern part of the city, the available forces. ... the defense of the city took the form of scattered battles with the enemy", "on the part of 16 A, who knew about the difficult situation of the city, no real measures were taken, and the entire fight against the advancing enemy was transferred only to the head of the garrison." With regard to those units that covered the southern part of the city, the conclusion of the commission, based on the conclusions of the Military Council of the 16th Army, sounds unequivocal: "they turned out to be extremely unstable and, during the first clash with the enemy, surrendered the city without any armed resistance."

Interestingly, the conclusions of the commission about the rapid capture of the city without the staunch resistance of its defenders are confirmed by the documents of the German side: "When we entered this dead city, a ghostly picture opened before us. No shots were heard. Separate appeared Soviet soldiers rushed to their heels. All bridges across the Dnieper were destroyed."

In the course of the investigation, counterintelligence officers again had to return to blowing up bridges across the Dnieper. How this happened was testified by the writer I.F. Stadnyuk: "The chief of staff of the army, Colonel Shalin Mikhail Alekseevich, a highly experienced, sensible staff officer, a participant in the civil war, was extremely surprised to learn that the Smolensk bridges had not yet been mined. Shalin did not share Malyshev's previous conviction that the explosives planted in the bridge trusses could facilitate the sabotage of German agents and summoned the head of the army's engineering service to his bus. They immediately composed a draft order, addressing it to the head of the Smolensk garrison, Colonel Malyshev. The order, written in red pencil on a half-sheet of paper, categorically demanded that the bridges across the Dnieper be immediately prepared for an explosion, that their security be strengthened, and that, if there was a danger of the enemy capturing the bridges, they should be blown up without delay. This command went beyond

the competence of one military commander, and it was decided to jointly sign the army commander, Lieutenant General Lukin, a member of the Military Council, Major General Lobachev, and the chief of staff, Colonel Shalin.

When they came with the draft order to Lukin's dugout, they found Lobachev there as well. After reading the prepared document, both generals looked at each other with concern. Lukin asked Shalin:

"But do you understand that these bridges are of strategic importance?"

"I understand, comrade commander, that's why we can't delay even a minute preparing them for the explosion.

"We need the sanction of the front headquarters," Lobachev reminded.

"By morning the sanction will come," Shalin promised and explained to Malyshev: "Instead of the communication lines intercepted by the Germans, the signalmen are now laying a bypass through the Dorogobuzh forests.

"Make a request by radiotelegraph," Lukin ordered Shalin and signed the order. Handing over the paper to General Lobachev for signature, Lukin said to Malyshev and the head of the army engineering service who were standing nearby: "Place explosives in the farms and prepare everything for the explosion. In case of danger, call me ... Until the front headquarters gives the go-ahead, this piece of paper is not valid. He pointed to the order that Shalin had already signed. - We give it to you, as they say, in advance, in case of an emergency ...

The southern part of Smolensk had to be abandoned. Hospital vehicles with the wounded, doctors, nurses rushed over the bridges to the Transdnipr region, the "inhabitants" of the Lopatinsky Garden were evacuated - the leaders of the regional party committee, the regional executive committee, and city districts.

A "flying" military council gathered on one of the bridges: Colonel Malyshev, wounded by a shrapnel in the temple, the first secretary of the regional committee Popov, the chairman of the regional executive committee, the head of the NKVD department of the region ... They decided the only question: to blow up or not to blow up the bridges. Everyone agreed that it was necessary to blow it up. But there was no communication with the headquarters of the 16th Army (...). Two days after the bridges were blown up, at the disposition of the troops of the 16th Army, which was trying with all its might to recapture Smolensk from the Germans, a plane landed, and in it a representative of the military prosecutor's office of the Western Front with a warrant for the arrest of Colonel Malyshev Pyotr Fedorovich ... »

Major General A.A. testifies. Lobachev, in 1941 a member of the Military Council of the 16th Army: "It was reported to the front headquarters that the south

naya part of Smolensk is in the hands of the enemy, the defense of the northern part has been organized, attempts to restore the situation have not yet been successful; Forcing the Dnieper in the absence of pontoons seems difficult. Immediately a request came: "On whose instructions were the bridges across the Dnieper blown up?" Radioed. Received a new radiogram. This time from the prosecutor of the front: "Malyshev, who blew up the bridges across the Dnieper and prevented the restoration of the situation in Smolensk, was arrested and taken to the headquarters of the front."

All these events unfolded on July 16. Malyshev appeared at the checkpoint in Zhukovka only the next day, at about 7 pm. Lukin left for the 152nd division. I spoke on the phone with General Gorodnyansky. The division commander was clearly alarmed by the situation on the left flank of the 46th division, where scattered groups of fighters began to move away from the river and the railway.

"Apparently, some kind of provocation," the division commander of the 129th concluded.

"Comrade Colonel, let's go to Smolensk to put things in order," I suggested to Malyshev. On the way he asked: "Why did you blow up the bridges in Smolensk?"

He answered with a question:

Have you read Stalin's July 3rd speech? — and after a pause, he continued: — I blew it up. I had no other choice.

- And closed the way to restore the situation?

- If I left the bridges and the Germans crossed to the northern bank of the Dnieper, you would be the first to arrest me.

"But it has to be done now. You are under arrest, Comrade Malyshev. There is such an instruction: to arrest you and send you to the headquarters of the front.

Malyshev smiled sadly:

- Bosses know better...

Separate groups of fighters appeared behind the airfield. We stopped and built them. Three hundred people were gathered.

- Attention! Follow me, march!

I led the column to the Dnieper, Malyshev brought up the rear, and I thought that people were going back, so they can believe, they will definitely believe in victory!

The soldiers lay down in defense in the rye, almost at the very river. The advance was noticed on the other side, and machine guns immediately began firing. We answered. Now not a single person has risen and left the front line. The shelling intensified, enemy mortars started talking. A fragment of a mine wounded Malyshev in the head.

"I won't go anywhere," he answered when they suggested that I go to the medical battalion.

— Well, stay, contact Gorodnyansky and hold on! I agreed.

At the command post, a new radio message from the prosecutor was waiting: "Why didn't they arrest Malyshev? Take action. Convey to the headquarters of the front.

I answered: "Malyshev was wounded, remained in combat formations, commanded a unit on the banks of the Dnieper."

A plane arrived for the colonel from the headquarters of the front.

Petr Fedorovich Malyshev was then forty-three years old. Graduated from the Military School of Ensigns (1917), courses "Shot" (1923 and 1930) and the Frunze Military Academy (1935). He was a battalion and regiment commander. The richest experience. However, fate seemed to test him for special strength. In 1937 he was arrested and until 1940 Petr Fedorovich was under investigation. In February of this year, he was reinstated in the ranks of the Red Army and put at the disposal of the Directorate for Command Staff. And in February he was appointed commander of the 64th Infantry Brigade.

At the beginning of the war, Colonel Malyshev commanded the 3rd reserve rifle brigade. He was appointed commander of the 64th Infantry Division, but did not accept the formation, as he performed duties in the defense of the city of Smolensk. After the city was occupied by the enemy, he was arrested for the second time and until March 1942 was under investigation. After his release, due to the lack of corpus delicti, Malyshev was appointed commander of the 288th Infantry Division. From December 1943 until the end of the war, he was commander of the 4th shock army. Lieutenant General (1943). Retired since 1959. He died in 1972.

But then a month passed, and Matvey Fedorovich Shkiryatov, deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee, with the help of Beria and Abakumov, having completed the investigation, reported to Stalin about more than twenty servicemen who were "revealed" of cowardice and negligence in the performance of their duties during the defense. Smolensk. Almost all of them were convicted. Part of the responsibility was placed on General Lukin, because he could not defend the city. Particular blame was laid on the assistant commandant of Smolensk, Bochkarev. Allegedly, on his command, the bridge across the Dnieper was blown up earlier than the situation required. However, General Lukin

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this time he was in German captivity, and Bochkarev died during the bombing.

There was another interesting continuation of this story ...

Prince Alexei Shcherbatov in May 1945 toured the surrounding areas of post-war Germany with an American chauffeur corporal. He was looking for new materials that might be of interest to the Americans. One day, on the way from a small Bavarian village, he

met a Lithuanian priest. "I approached and explained our mission," the prince recalls. He nodded in understanding and asked in German:

— Do you know this language? Shall we communicate on it?

- Yes I know.

- You are obviously Russian.

- Prince Alexei Shcherbatov.

- Very nice. Can I trust you? In my barn there is a huge archive of the Smolensk GPU, disguised with a silo. The documents taken out at the end of 1943 were hidden by the Germans, packed in boxes. I had already been visited by Soviet agents, I hid this fact, realizing that they were not sure about the exact location of the archive. Please report this find immediately. Here are very important papers taken out by Himmler. Save the documents, otherwise they will be destroyed."

Later, Shcherbatov managed to find out that the archive was divided into two parts: "The first one, from 1917 to 1936, was in the church of St. Peter and Paul. The second - from 1937 to June 1941 - in the former building of the Smolensk district court, where the main department of the NKVD was located. From Smolensk, surrounded by the Germans, the Red Army fled, they did not have time to evacuate the documents. The party leadership gave the order to "explode and set fire to the archive." Fortunately, this did not happen. The first part was saved because a member of the Cheka, von Engelhardt, received an order but did not follow it. After shooting his partner, he reported the archive to the Germans who entered the city. Thanks to his German roots, Alexander was immediately perceived as a Volksdeutsch — a purebred German, and was left at the archive until the end of the war in Bavaria, where our first meeting took place. The building of the NKVD administration with the second part of the archive stored there was set on fire, but the Germans managed to put out the fire, and the documents were hardly damaged."

On December 13, 2002, a press conference was held at the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation dedicated to the return of the Smolensk Archive to Russia...

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## LZHEVOINSK PART

GKO Decree No. 187SS "On the transformation of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate into Special Departments" dated July 17, 1941 stated: "The main task of the Special Departments for the period of the war is to consider a decisive fight against espionage and treachery in the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line."

In GKO Decree No. 3222SS/OV with the approval of the "Regulations on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defense (SMERSH) and its Local Bodies", among the tasks of the SMERSH bodies, the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts occupied its separate and special place. And it must be said that special counterintelligence officers coped with this task very successfully. To date, many books, articles and publications have been written about this. However, despite the successes of the Special Departments and SMERSH in this struggle, there were, as they say, miscalculations. Where are they not? But this miscalculation will go down in our history as having no analogues. Therefore, it is necessary to dwell on it in more detail ...

The war found Nikolai Maksimovich Pavlenko in Minsk, and already on June 27, 1941, a mobilized military engineer of the 1st rank was appointed to the position of assistant engineer of the 2nd rifle corps. By the way, the military rank "military technician | rank" was then equated to the military rank of "senior lieutenant". They first appeared in the Red Army in 1935 with the establishment of personal military ranks.

Since the beginning of the war, the Second Rifle Corps was in the reserve of the Western Front, and then became part of the 13th Army of this front. The corps included only two rifle divisions: the 100th and 161st. It was they who, under the command of Major General A.N. Ermakova, in cooperation with the 44th rifle corps of the army, advanced at the end of June 1941 to the line of the Minsk fortified region, fought heavy defensive battles with the 3rd tank group of the Nazi troops. Under the blows of superior enemy forces, the formations of the 2 Corps were forced to retreat beyond the river. Berezina to the region of Borisov and to the south, and then beyond the river. Dnieper, where they entrenched themselves at the turn of Kopyev, Nov. Bykhov. For example, this is how the Assistant Chief of Operations described the brief results and conclusions from the battles for Minsk

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of the Headquarters of the 2nd Rifle Corps Captain Garan on September 17, 1941: "The battles for Minsk in the defense zone of the 2nd Rifle Corps were fierce and dynamic. The enemy, taking advantage of superiority in moving parts, sought to strike at the flank and rear of the corps. The infantry of the 100th and 161st rifle divisions showed high stamina even without artillery, boldly repulsing tank attacks, setting them on fire. When the enemy tanks managed to break through the positions of our infantry, the latter fell upon the enemy infantry, inflicting enormous losses on them. From the first days of the fighting, the rear organs and headquarters began to properly disguise themselves, move along the roads in small groups, which reduced their losses. Anti-tank artillery, having no practice of combat with enemy tanks on the first day, suffered significant losses.

On June 27 and 28, 1941, the 100th Rifle Division lost up to 45 guns, mostly anti-tank. The rate of fire of anti-tank artillery turned out to be insufficient to deal with mobile German tanks. Infantry casualties, although accurate data were not collected, were low. Losses from air bombardments and machine-gun fire from the air, despite the low altitudes and the absolute dominance of enemy aircraft, turned out to be

very little..."

On July 10, the 2nd Corps took part in the Battle of Smolensk, and on July 24, as part of the 13th Army, it was included in the Central Front, and on August 15, the Bryansk Front, in which it fought defensive battles on the river. Sozh, Judgment and Desna.

In August 1941, the 50th Army was formed on the basis of the 2nd Corps. The one whose Special Department was formed by the author of the diary, Major GB Shabalin. Unlike him, Pavlenko had already done some fighting. True, even at the headquarters of the corps, but it does not matter. There were enough impressions there too. The military technician perfectly saw the complete confusion reigning at the front, and sometimes even chaos. I saw how the headquarters passed on all the new orders and orders, and they simply fell behind the rapidly changing situation. I saw how the military leadership, stunned by the unforeseen development of events, brought even more confusion with their actions inadequate to the situation. It turned out that the sacrificial courage and steadfastness of the soldiers alone was clearly not enough. Lack of interaction, loss of control, ignorance of the true situation aggravated and

without that, the situation of the troops is extremely difficult. With every fiber of his soul, Navlenko felt the onset of an imminent catastrophe ... And he was almost not mistaken: in the first days of July, out of 44 divisions of the Western Front, 24 were completely defeated, and the remaining 20 divisions lost from 30 to 90% of their forces and means. Needless to say, if by the end of the first day of fighting the entire control system of the front was paralyzed.

On the Southwestern Front, the picture was no better: about 30 divisions actually ceased to exist and about 70 lost more than 50% of their personnel...

Everything hung in the balance, and the Germans stubbornly moved towards the capital. In general, neither war, nor even death, were included in the plans of the senior lieutenant. That is the only reason why in September 1941 he issues a false travel certificate for himself (fortunately, in a large headquarters this is not

was a problem) and, together with his driver, the Red Army soldier Shchegolev, deserted to the city of Kalinin, which he knew well. On the way, the assistant engineer of the corps picks up several deserters who have joined him. A little more and all the difficulties and dangers behind. In Kalinin, he decided to get lost. As E. Khrutsky writes, "Before the war, Pavlenko was a man of money. A skilled foreman can always make fictitious outfits and acts. He was a wild and generous person, so he had a wide circle of acquaintances. It was with them that he lived in the rear city. But the war was coming. The city began to evacuate. The former military technician had no choice. For desertion, he could well have received the highest measure.

In Solnechnogorsk and Klina, Pavlenko accidentally met several colleagues from the pre-war artel. During one of the next feasts, his fellow countryman, a sixteen-year-old boy Ludwig by the name of Rudnichenko, demonstrated his exceptional abilities to tipsy friends. Right in front of their eyes, he cut out a stamp from a rubber sole with the inscription "Sector of military construction work No. 5 of the Kalinin Front." Actually,  
Since this all started...

Very soon, an organization with the same name appeared in front-line Kalinin. Given the confusion of that time, a military unit that suddenly appeared out of nowhere surprised no one. Years later, the investigation will record the date of this event - March 1942. Now, without difficulty, Pavlenko managed to open the factory

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forged documents, a settlement account in the Kalinin regional office of the State Bank, and then receive there the funds transferred from the FEP-165. In a local printing house, for a bribe with products, he printed several thousand letterheads of his organization. With forged documents (forms, food certificates, travel certificates and other documents), deserters received food in warehouses. Uniforms were first purchased at the bazaars, and only then they established contacts with some employees of the clothing factory named after Volodarsky and the Kalinin regional industrial cooperation.

"In those days, Pavlenko's 'syndicate' consisted of only a few people, Shchegolev's car and a couple of horses," says E. Pavlova, author of the article 'Millions of a False Colonel'. "But soon there were already several dozen workers, because Pavlenko skillfully organized a drink with the right people, generously "thanked" them, and then sent official requests for labor to the military commandant's office and Kalinin's commissariat. And right there, the ranks of the fictitious organization began to replenish at the expense of non-combatants discharged from the hospital after being wounded. Then Nikolai Pavlenko agrees with the head of one of the evacuation points, doctor 1st rank Bidenko, that he enrolls all UVSR-5 fighters for all types of allowances of the evacuation center, and for this, UVSR-5 makes free repairs buildings. He also collects equipment abandoned on the roads: cars, bulldozers, excavators. From the deserters most devoted to him, he creates an "officer corps" and even his own counterintelligence. To begin with, the military technician "assigned" the military rank of "military engineer of the 3rd rank", that is, "captain", to himself. Which was logical for believability.

Now the gang, as they say, has legalized completely, "contracts have appeared for the performance of road and construction works with various organizations of Kalinin, which regularly transferred "fees" to him. The "commander" spent part of the funds on food for the rank and file and the salaries of the officers of the unit, and appropriated the rest together with the accomplices."

In the autumn of 1942, when the Kalinin Front was liquidated, Pavlenko gave a large bribe to the commander of the 12th air base area (RAB), Lieutenant Colonel Tsyplakov, as a result of which the personnel of the pseudo-military unit were enrolled in all types of allowances of the 12th RAB. True, I had to change, just in case, the "sign" to "UVR-5", that is, without the letter "C".

For the uninformed, I will only emphasize that the so-called SLABs, or Air Base Areas, appeared in the Soviet Air Force in April 1941, as a completely new "autonomous"



system of rear aviation services. Each RAB consisted of two or three air bases, which in turn had 3-4 service battalions (BAO). Each RAB was supposed to support several air divisions in its area of responsibility, and each BAO (Battalion of airfield services) supported its own aviation regiment.

The 12th RAB included the 12th separate communications company (later a battalion), the 212th separate operational communications battalion, the 112th separate motor transport battalion, the 210th technical team for the collection and evacuation of captured ammunition (from 29.3.45 to 9.5.45), the 38th technical team for the cleaning of emergency aircraft (from 25.11.42 to 29.9.43), the 12th separate trophy-evacuation company (from 21.4.44 to 9.5.45), 585th a separate anti-aircraft machine-gun company (from 21.4.44 to 9.5.45), the 12th laundry detachment (from 23.12.42 to 30.9.43 and 21.4.44 to 9.5.45), the 12th field military warehouse (from 19.2.43 to 30.9.43), the 420th field cash desk of the State Bank (later the 1298th field cash desk of the State Bank) and the 684th military postal station.

Serious organization. But even more serious was the fact that this RAB had a Special Department, and later the SMERSH counterintelligence department, which could be headed by a whole colonel. And just such a department, as well as others before it, simply missed the stay of the deserter Pavlenko in Kalinin, as well as the creation of a pseudo-military unit or simply a gang by him. The most surprising thing is that the organs of the NKVD really worked, including in this city.

For example, in a special report by the head of the NKVD for the Kalinin region, Major GB Tokarev, about the identification and detention of deserters, it was said: "C | December 1941 by | April 1942 3341 deserters were detained. Including:

1. Arrested and put on trial - 1949 people.
2. Sent to military units, transit points and special departments - 1392 people.

A large number of deserters were found in the areas liberated from the German occupiers. Thus, 700 people were detained in the Kunyinsky district."

All is well, but Pavlenko never caught anyone. Moreover, he did not even arouse any suspicions in anyone. Apparently deserters were easier to catch one by one. But the whole organization

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it was impossible to calculate. This is another precedent of the organization created by Pavlenko!

"Pavlenko's unit, which changed its sign to UVR-5, moved after the advancing Soviet troops, keeping a safe distance from the front line," says the book "100 Great Adventurers." — On the way to the border of the USSR, Pavlenko's people earned about a million rubles under contracts. To increase the volume of work performed, replenishment was required. Then Pavlenko began to recruit soldiers who had fallen behind their units. M. Zavada, chief of staff of the UVR, said: "People were recruited, as a rule, from those who had fallen behind military units... Drivers were taken along with the car... When they approached the Soviet state border, there were more than two hundred people in the UVR. Half of them are deserters and people hiding from being drafted into the army in the field." They were armed with up to 100 firearms and huge stocks of captured property.

Part of Pavlenko followed the Soviet troops through all of Poland and ended their "combat" path near Berlin. Here the "builders" engaged in outright robbery of the local population. By the end of the war, part of Pavlenko turned into an armed gang dressed in the uniform of Soviet military personnel.

At his first interrogation, the "commander" of the pseudo-military unit, not without pride, claimed that as part of the 4th Air Army, his "UVS" reached Bialystok, and then to the Oder, having built a lot

airfields and receiving only gratitude from the command. However, investigators from the Main Military Prosecutor's Office will establish that the main efforts of UVS were directed not at all to the construction of military facilities. Some members of this organization systematically plundered everything they could get their hands on: building materials, cars, fodder.

In 1944-1945, on the territory of Poland and Germany, members of the UVS, under the guise of collecting trophy property, seized cars, tractors, motorcycles, radios, guns, accordions, bicycles, carpets, sewing machines, stole livestock, stole food and other material values. The investigation will establish for certain: "according to far from complete data, about 80 horses, at least 50 cattle, a large number of pigs, about 20 trucks and cars, up to 20 tractors, were stolen in Germany,

electric motors, auto-tractor trailers, a significant amount of flour, cereals and sugar.

From the book "100 Great Adventurers": "Already after the victory, the commander of the UVR, who gained strength and became insolent, established contacts with the military representatives of the Department of Clothing and Carriage Supply of the USSR Ministry of Defense, as well as with representatives of the temporary military commandant's office of Stuttgart and received at his disposal a railway echelon of thirty wagons. In addition to tens of tons of flour, sugar, cereals and hundreds of livestock, ten trucks, five tractors, several cars and other equipment were taken out on it. The gang returned home with rich booty, with orders and medals. According to fictitious documents about the imaginary exploits of the UVR fighters, Pavlenko received over 230 awards, which he distributed to his most distinguished associates. He also awarded himself two Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degrees, the Order of the Red Banner of War, the Order of the Red Star, and medals.

Upon returning to Kalinin, Pavlenko immediately demobilized everyone who knew nothing about the criminal nature of the unit. After selling the loot, he paid each of his "soldiers" from 7 to 12 thousand rubles, to "officers" from 15 to 25 thousand, and kept 90 thousand rubles for himself.

Having abandoned part of the exported equipment in Kalinin, Pavlenko created and headed the civil construction artel "Plandorstroy".

"Pavlenko was indeed a great schemer," E. Pavlova believes. - Perfectly understanding the nature of people, he easily made very expensive gifts, knowing full well that later he would not be refused. For example, Pavlenko handed over a passenger car to the Tula regional military commissar Rizhnev, and he ordered to place a UVS on the territory of the Shchekino district. Later, using connections with Rizhnev, Pavlenko and his accomplices stole state funds under the guise of receiving demobilization benefits. Rizhnev also received a "makeweight": a cow, a carpet, a radio and scarce products. More than once, according to fake documents, the "office" received money through the Klin, Solnechnogorsk and Galich military registration and enlistment offices.

The combinator did not forget about his beloved: he bought two decent houses - in Kalinin and Ukraine - and several cars "Po

trouble."

In contrast to the war, when Pavlenko acted with absolute impunity, in peacetime it became much more difficult to "work". And he goes to Lvov. away from familiar and habitable places. It later turned out that in February 1948 the prosecutor's office of the Kalinin region opened a criminal case against him. Heading the artel "Plandorstroy", he stole money in the amount of 339,326 rubles and was on the All-Union wanted list.

In Lviv, as it turned out, Pavlenko could not come up with anything new. Having gathered his gang, he again creates the "Office of military construction", but under a different number: "UVS-1". The scheme was still the same. Rudnichenko made all the necessary seals and stamps. The criminals ordered and printed the necessary forms and documents. With the help of all the same bribes, offerings and

feasts, close contacts were established with local officials and state security agencies. Needless to say, if candidates for work in the "UVS" were selected through the Department of the Ministry of State Security in the Lviv region, which checked those who wanted to get a job for loyalty to the Soviet regime and the absence of any contacts, connections with the bandit underground.

The new military unit did not differ from other military units in practically nothing. The daily routine was also observed there, classes in combat and political training were held. Every day a daily outfit was appointed, a guard was serving, sentry post No. 1 guarded the Red Banner.

As E. Pavlova writes, "there was no end to those wishing to conclude contracts with such a respected organization! Several top secret lists are filed in the file, which list dozens of enterprises and organizations that have entered into "economic relations with the construction sites of UVS-1." Among them are the "Zapadshakhtostroy" trust, the Zolochiv Mine Administration of the Ministry of Coal Industry, SMU-2 of the "Belkhlad Stroy" trust of the Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry of the BSSR, the Chisinau winery "Gratieshty", the Tiraspol winery, UNR-193 of the Ministry of Construction of Engineering Enterprises, etc. D.

In total, the criminals only for the period from 1948 to 1952 concluded 64 contracts for a total amount of more than 38 million rubles. UVS accounts were opened in the 21st branch of the State Bank of the USSR, and through them it was possible to receive

more than 25 million rubles.

Pavlenko even built railway lines under these contracts. For example, if there were no specialists in his "UVS", then he gladly hired them from outside, paying in cash 3-4 times more than the same specialist would have received for the same work at a state enterprise. However, in the "UVS" they lived, as under serfdom. To keep the workers, they were never paid their wages in full. The accrued money was delayed for two or three months. All documents were taken away from the workers, and in return they were issued certificates from the UVS about their receipt. Moreover, the documents, as a rule, were not returned back. They worked at UVS for 14-16 hours a day. With a salary of 400-500 rubles, Pavlenko could easily give 100 rubles for a newspaper. Earning huge money for those times, Pavlenko used some of it to bribe the regional and republican leadership. As the investigation will establish, only on the territory of the Moldavian SSR, the Pavlenko group involved in its activities the Minister of Food Industry K. Turcan and his deputies Azariev and Kudiyukin, the first secretary of the Tiraspol CC of the CP (b) of Moldova V. Lykhvar, several managers of industrial banks, the secretary Beltsy of the Civil Code of the Communist Party (b) of Moldova L. Rachinsky and many, many others.

During the investigation, it turns out that Pavlenko's UVS organization was well-armed and undercover, had its own counterintelligence headed by Konstantinov. "From the very beginning and until the liquidation of the UVS, its participants procured in large quantities, and often with the help of the MGB, pistols, rifles, machine guns, light machine guns and grenades. Subsequently, they will count: rifles and carbines - 21, machine guns - 9, light machine guns - 3, pistols and revolvers - 19, grenades - 5, more than 3000 pieces of live ammunition. UVS units were scattered across several regions: the Baltic states, the Moldavian SSR, Kyiv, Odessa, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Mogilev regions. During the operation to detain a criminal group, they will be seized: 32 trucks, 6 cars, 2 tractors, 2 excavators. In addition, 14 fictitious stamp seals and thousands of various forms printed in a typographical way. Pavlenko himself was on excellent terms with the entire leadership of the Lviv region. Even during festive celebrations, he was always next to them on the podium and in the presidium.

max, dressed in the ceremonial uniform of an engineer-colonel with all orders and medals on his chest.

"We calculated the UVS by chance," writes E. Pavlova. — A party member by the name of Efremenko decided to be vigilant and wrote a letter addressed to Marshal Voroshilov. It followed from it that some officers were distributing government bonds among the civilian employees who worked in the UVS. The workers handed over the money for them, but the bonds themselves did not receive. The letter also said that Colonel Pavlenko was hiring fugitive convicts and former policemen.

The signal was not ignored, and on October 23, 1952, a criminal case was initiated in Lviv. During the very first interrogations, the circumstances stated in the letter were confirmed. It was established that the bonds were bought on the black market in Lvov. One of the "officers" decided to earn extra money in this way, and as a result, the entire organization failed. Other facts immediately surfaced, which could not but alert the investigators."

On November 5, 1952, the criminal case was transferred to the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office. Already there, to requests to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, the same type of answers were received: "The UVS is not subordinate to Glavvoenstroy, Pavlenko is not listed as serving in the Soviet Army."

The operation to eliminate the mysterious organization was carefully prepared. It was decided to take the UVS-1 headquarters and all its units on the same day. On November 14, 1952, more than 300 people working in the Air Force were detained, including 50 officers, sergeants and soldiers.

The "commander" himself and the "chief of counterintelligence" were also arrested.

The investigation into this case lasted two and a half years, and it was conducted by a whole team of senior officials of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, headed by V. Markalyants and L. Lavrentiev. They then found out the criminal biography of Nikolai Maksimovich.

Pavlenko was born in 1912 in the village of Novye Sokoly, Kyiv region, in the family of a miller. The family was large: seven brothers and sisters. In 1928, a sixteen-year-old teenager left his father's house to seek his fortune in the city. To get a job, attributed to his age as much as four years. In later life, he will repeatedly use this proven method:

change year

and place of birth. His family was dispossessed of kulak exactly a few months later, sent to Siberia. The boy himself turned out to be extremely smart. At first he worked as a road builder, worked as a simple worker in the Glavdortrans system. Then he entered the road department of the Minsk Polytechnic Institute, where he studied for only two years. I had to leave the institute when I found out that a response had come to a request from the personnel department about his kulak origin. In 1935, Pavlenko was arrested on suspicion of embezzlement at a construction site where he worked. He had to spend a little time in prison, but even then he managed to get out. During the Great Terror, Nikolai Maksimovich was recruited and recruited by the NKVD to develop materials against two Trotskyists. For this, he was recommended to a very serious organization called Glavvoenstroy. There he quite successfully coped with the positions of foreman, senior foreman and head of the construction site. It was there that he acquired many of the skills that were so useful to him later when creating UVS. He perfectly mastered the method of postscripts, learned how to work with documents "correctly", and, most importantly, perfectly understood how and on what it would be possible to make good money in the future. In a word, he knew perfectly the socialist methods of managing the economy in the field of road construction. And he also perfectly learned to live and act according to the unwritten rules established in real life.

life.

According to the testimony of one of the witnesses, Nikolai Maksimovich looked quite flashy, exactly in accordance with his position: "... of medium height, a plump figure, almost fat, wears glasses with black lining, gray hair, shaved head. melting, brown eyes, big belly. But the hype passed quickly ...

When the trial began on November 10, 1954, almost all of the seventeen defendants, including Pavlenko, were charged with three articles: undermining state industry through the appropriate use of state enterprises, anti-Soviet agitation and participation in a counter-revolutionary organization. The indictment of the judge of the tribunal was read in turn for several days, and the description of the entire criminal history of the creation of a powerful fictitious military construction organization fit into 164 hefty volumes of the criminal case.

The verdict of the Tribunal of the Moscow Military District in the UVS case was proclaimed on April 4, 1955: Pavlenko was sentenced

rily to execution with confiscation of his personal property. The remaining defendants received from 5 to 25 years in prison with confiscation of property and deprivation of awards.

"I committed many crimes, but I never had anything against the Soviet state and did not aim to undermine its economic power," Pavlenko said at the trial. — We did not withdraw state funds from the bank, but received legitimate money for the work performed. I plead guilty to participating in the embezzlement of public funds."

In his book *Criminal Moscow*, Eduard Khrutsky writes: "When I dealt with this grandiose scam from the time of the cult of personality, the only one of its kind, I thought that the talk about total surveillance of organs was somewhat one-sided. They followed under the wise guidance of General Abakumov, paying more attention to the letters of Captain Solzhenitsyn and the statements of Major Kopelev and thousands of other soldiers and officers who were in a defeatist mood.

How else to explain that within the strict army framework there was a unit of "Colonel" Pavlenko.

Of course, this is not possible today. The late Nikolai Pavlenko looks like a petty riffraff in comparison with a huge gang of merry crooks stealing budget money."

It is hard not to agree with this opinion, because for ten years the pseudo-military unit acted at the side of special officers, Smershevites and EMGBeshniks. All this time they were led by Viktor Semenovich Abakumov. The gang was exposed precisely when he was in solitary confinement.

## THE REVERSE SIDE OF MILITARY COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

In the memoirs of veterans today one can often find a negative attitude towards special officers of the Smershevites. It is difficult for us to judge this, but they were there and have every right to their soldier's truth. For example, Alexander Moiseevich Slutsky recalls: "The crews tried not to talk about political topics, they knew that it would be expensive. They criticized the army authorities, and then only among their own, and only within the crew. And the "special officers" came across different, but mostly selected bastards served in the "organs", others were not kept there for a long time.

One incident is very well engraved in my memory. This was in October 1944. One crew from our company managed to get out of the damaged tank. All five men made it safely from the battlefield to the rear of the battalion. They brought food. The crew sat down under a tree, trying to somehow "move away" from everything experienced in battle. The tankers who survived earlier looked with sympathy at their comrades. A battalion "smershevets" with the rank of captain appeared, accompanied by two soldiers from his "office". He stopped not far from this crew, and sent his soldier with an order to the tank commander - "Immediately report to the captain!".

"Their Chekist high nobility" himself did not want to go through these fifteen meters. The tank commander replied to the messenger - "When we sing, then I will come! According to the charter, even the marshal has no right to interfere with the meal of the personnel. "The special officer did not calm down and again sent a soldier with the same

requirement for a lieutenant. The enraged "special officer" asked the crew commander: "Why did everyone burn down, but your crew completely survived?!"

Regarding the informers in the company from the "special officers", Alexander Moiseevich says the following: "And where they were not. But I don't remember that the brigade SMERSH touched us in any way. The "informer" was the commander of the second group, senior sergeant Nikolaenko, an old-timer of the brigade. He was from somewhere in the Kuban. There were several Kubans in my reconnaissance group, so they said out loud - "such a bastard - we are not a countryman ..."

It's not that Nikolaenko was a coward, there are no such people in intelligence, but apparently he really wanted to stay alive. Our scout Volodya Ivanov told him straight to his face - "In search, you quietly sit out like a barn mouse, and run to SMERSH five times a week. Look, don't freak out."

And those who fell into the "special clutches" directly fighting on the front lines, at the beginning of the war, were either simply shot, not giving a chance to rehabilitate themselves in battle, or, at best, they were sent to undermine German tanks and machine gun emplacements. I saw it with my own eyes. Saw..."

Ilya Zakharovich Frenklakh, a participant in the war, expresses his attitude towards those who served in the Special Departments simply and clearly: "Only hatred. I have no other feelings for them. I remember too well how in 1941 they shot us on the spot without any serious guilt, without trial or investigation. For every little thing

they shot... Have you heard such a word - decimation? The execution of every tenth in the ranks. It seems to me now that this very decimation was arranged for us. After the barrier from the NKVD drives you into the attack with machine-gun bursts in the back, it's hard to inflame love for these Chekists. And after all, they shot us without sparing anyone. Those who have not encountered this will not understand me ... This must be seen ...

And the command staff of the Chekists fired in piles.

They shot Colonel Ushakov, a former teacher of the military department at my institute. They announced that he had been shot for cowardice...

But knowing the realities of that time, I am more than sure that the colonel was simply made a "scapegoat" for the failure of the offensive.

Later they shot, with the same wording in the verdict, Colonel Nikitin, my head of the military department, he was a regiment commander at the front.

And such atrocity happened on the Leningrad Front all the time."

Another veteran, Iosif Mironovich Yampolsky, is no less categorical: "They interrogated several times in the special department, but they didn't really bite into the liver, let's say, they mocked me, but at low speeds. There, 80 percent of us were from the former encirclement. I was "shaken" for only one reason - I left the encirclement on my own, and not as part of a group. For the first month after leaving the encirclement, I didn't even write letters to my wife, I didn't want to reassure in vain that I was alive ... And they already sent her a "funeral" for me ...

At the beginning of the forty-fourth, I was introduced to a high order, so a special department "ruined" the performance due to a single exit from the encirclement - they say, it was not checked enough ...

And the fact that by that time I had already been wounded five times in battle, had several military orders and two medals "For Courage" - they were not interested.

If you don't know, I'll tell you - the orders of the Red Banner and Lenin required a visa of a special department for an award list.

The public was a bastard - these special officers. They could even hit an officer in the face.

They enjoyed their power and impunity.

There was another story connected with special officers, but it will seem fantastic and implausible to you, and therefore I will save your healthy skepticism. Then the "specialists" almost shot me for no particular reason, but the division commander Krasnokutsky saved me. Fronto

I would tell it to the vicks, they know that anything can happen in a war... And there was plenty of villainy in the war... But I would like to tell another story, so that you can imagine what kind of arbitrariness the "specialists" did. My wife has two cousins, both tankers, both Heroes of the Soviet Union - Matvey and Yevsey Vainruba.

Matvey commanded the tank units of the 62nd Army of Chuikov in Stalingrad, he once personally assigned me a combat mission, and I didn't even know that we were going to be relatives, I thought that he was just my wife's namesake ...

After the war, we communicated very closely with Yevsey. He was a unique person. At the beginning of the war, he was the intelligence commander of the 150th Panzer Division. This was the only person in the Red Army who, being in the rank of captain, was honored in July 1941 with a personal mention in a German leaflet dropped on the positions of our troops. It's one thing when generals are mentioned in leaflets, but here it's just a simple captain. I saw these leaflets, the text is as follows: "Drive your Jew-captain to the rear, otherwise we will destroy you all and will not take you prisoner." The man was of exceptional courage. At the end of the war Yevsey Vainrub was the commander of the 219th tank brigade of the 1st mechanized corps. The brigade was assigned to a rifle division from the 47th Army to support an infantry attack. Weinrub waited for the order to attack, but there was none. They asked for the headquarters of the division by radio, but there was no answer. He moved his brigade forward, but it was too late. The Germans had already managed to cover the advancing infantry with dense fire and launched a counterattack. Our advance has faltered. Weinrub was summoned to the division headquarters. The divisional commander, with difficulty restraining his anger, asked him: "Lieutenant colonel, why didn't your tanks support the infantry?!" Yevsey replied: "I did not receive a signal to attack."

The general turned to the division chief of staff: "Did you give a signal to the brigade commander?"

"That's right," the chief of staff replied. "The signal was transmitted several times, but the brigade commander did not respond to it." The general began to yell at Yevsey: "Because of you, half of the division was killed! To arrest!". From the twilight of the dugout, the major, head of the special department of the division, stepped out and: "Give up your weapons!". They kept the special officer in the dugout for several hours, he took the protocol of interrogation, but Weinrub did not see what the major was writing down, the protocol was not given to him to sign. The major special officer left, returned after a while: "Get up! he snapped. — For pro

manifest cowardice in the performance of a combat mission by the military tribunal of the 47th Army, you are sentenced to death!". Weinrub was taken aback: "What the hell is a tribunal?! Has there already been a meeting? Are you condemning a person in absentia to be shot?! The major, without letting himself come to his senses, ordered his assistant lieutenant: "Remove his insignia and government awards!" They put Yevsey in a "lorry" between two escorts and drove along a field road. We stopped at a haystack. The lieutenant built his soldiers in a line: "Load!". Rifle bolts clicked. Weinrub understood with all hopelessness - this is death, and asked the "special officer": "Lieutenant, let me smoke." The special officer hesitated to allow it, but after a couple of puffs he said: "Well, that's enough! While there is life there is hope!". And then it was like in a movie. A car appeared on the road. The brigade commander said: "Lieutenant, look ..." He lazily turned his head: "Well, let's put the "jeep" going, but what do you care?" "Yes, he is coming to us! To us!" The brakes creaked, the major jumped out of the car: "Stop the execution!" Weinrub was saved by the head of the political department of the brigade, Kosmachev. Having learned about the arrest of the brigade commander, he rushed to the radio operator of the commander's tank. He showed: there was no signal to attack. Having seized the log of radio communications, Kosmachev rushed to the division commander, from him to the commander...

Here stood the combat officer Weinrub, crying... What is easier to survive: to go into a mortal battle or to experience the triumph of someone else's meanness?...

Komkor Krivoshein addressed personally to the commander, demanding to punish the "special officers", but ... "

No less interesting is the story of Efim Naumovich Bilder: "They came across different. In the 49th Artillery Division we had a "special officer", a former school teacher, a "cute guy". He came to us with the Order of Lenin on his tunic. So he, our food chief Slutsky, was brought to court for a simple anecdote... The All-Seeing Eye never slumbered... Shortly before the end of the period of Smolensk battles, Budnik, the commander of the regiment, was seriously wounded. He went to the batteries in two cars to present awards to distinguished fighters. With him in the car was also the deputy chief of artillery of the army, and two other people. In the second car was one of our battalion commanders, such a healthy Jew, Captain Grisha Pak. The Germans accurately fired their guns at these two vehicles at the entrance to the front line. There was a direct hit in Budnik's car, he was seriously wounded,

and killed the rest. So Grisha Pak pulled him out of the shelling...

Instead of Budnik, they sent Lieutenant Colonel Khilko to command the regiment. And somehow, in a lull, Khilko went off to the rear for a couple of days, to visit his friend, leaving instead of himself for these days, "to the regiment", a deputy and a political officer. But our "special officer" found out about this absence without authorization or unauthorized by the authorities, and immediately "signaled" to his "institutions", and after Smolensk, as the guys later told me, our Khilko was put on trial for this case ... looked - neither at the rank, nor at past military merits ...

Somehow our regimental "special officer", Senior Lieutenant Shchukin, a young and impudent bastard, decided to recruit me into his "informers".

I told him in response: "Fuck you Schukin on ...!"

He began to threaten me, saying that you are taking a big risk and you will regret it.

Once again I explained to him what I think about his mother and other relatives. But the "special officer" did not have time to "get even" with me, the Germans were ahead of him. In our regiment, many looked at the "special officer" with spitting. We had nothing to lose anyway.

There was no full-time special officer, but "these guys" did not leave our division unattended. All the soldiers hated the special officers, and the elderly soldiers called them "gepeushniks". But they tried not to say too much on the battery. There were a lot of snitches around. And then they began to "strengthen" our fighting spirit and vigilance. They staged a demonstration execution in the neighboring 115th regiment. They shot two "for fraternizing with the enemy" - a foreman and a soldier. There was a whole farm on the neutral line, so our people went there for milk and butter. The Germans also got into the habit of "eating" on the farm. There they talked peacefully with our fighters and did not enter into battle. These two Red Army men were accused of betraying the Motherland. I remember how they were shot."

Adamsky Izot Davidovich tells about meetings with SMERSH workers: "We have seen enough executions on the Volkhov front. There, for any trifle, there was one measure of punishment - execution ... Didn't take the village? - shooting. Did you leave the position? - execution ... And so on ...

Even for the loss of a sapper shovel, they could be put on trial by the tribunal. And at the end of the war, the "specialists" were not lazy ... I remember

one lieutenant from our brigade was arrested and tried at the tribunal for a joke. The content of the anecdote is as follows: "Moscow, railway station, the train is late for a day. He asks the commandant of the station: "What's the matter, why such a big delay?" In response: "What to do ... War" ...

Berlin, train station, the train arrives ten minutes ahead of schedule. They ask the commandant of the station, the same question. In response: "What to do ... War" ...

The question is, what is criminal and anti-Soviet in such an anecdote? But this lieutenant got his three months in the penal battalion, at the suggestion of our "special officer" for "enemy propaganda" ...



On the Oder, a drunken "special officer" slept all the time in my dugout, afraid to climb out into the light of day alone, so as not to get a bullet in the back. The "special officers" even had an order "on self-protection", which forbade movement without armed escort at any time of the day. After all, they settled scores with the "specialists" at every opportunity. I remember such cases ... And I remember very well.

One can treat such stories of veterans in different ways. However, one cannot deny the numerous facts of the real repressive policy, which was stubbornly pursued by military counterintelligence officers during the Great Patriotic War according to the patterns of the thirties. For example, in the Voronezh State University, researchers in the process of identifying and studying the archival and investigative files of military personnel called up from the territory of the Voronezh region during the war, established specific cases that directly testify to this: "The event on which the Special Department of the 22nd Army initiated a criminal case took place on the night of December 2-3, 1941. Apparently, due to the large losses of personnel, the Chekists could not organize an information network for operational information about incidents of this kind. Only five days later they learned about this event, on January 8, 1942, the Special Department of the division decided to open a criminal case. It said that 29 Red Army men, led by Lieutenant Zaburin, "not wanting to serve in the Red Army, on the night of December 3, 1941, left the combat guard in an organized manner and went over to the side of the enemy."

And although the same resolution noted that "the indicated persons are currently absent," the head of the Special Department of the Army decided: "Zaburina (then the remaining 28 names are listed)

subject to arrest and bring to the investigation under Article 58-1 point "6 ° ... Conduct the case against them in absentia".

The absurdity of the wording of this document is striking: there are no accused, but the Chekists threaten to "arrest" them, although they immediately back down, agreeing to conduct the case.  
in absentia.

Over the next few days, the staff of the Special Department of the Army and the military prosecutor simulated a flurry of activity in the investigation of this case. They interrogated not only the commander of the battalion in which the missing servicemen served, but also the commanders of neighboring battalions and even regiments. Several soldiers were interrogated who were at least superficially familiar with the disappeared. On February 2, the army special officers prepared the text of the "Indictment", where all 29 missing persons were charged under Article 58-1 "6 ° - treason to the Motherland." And 20 days later, the Military Tribunal of the 22nd Army also passed a verdict in absentia: "to subject everyone to the highest measure of punishment — to execution with confiscation of property."

The absurdity of such death sentences handed down in absentia, without interrogation of the accused, was clear to more experienced lawyers - members of the Military Tribunal of the Kalinin Front ...

... And in this case, the Military Tribunal of the Kalinin Front did not approve the verdict handed down by the Tribunal of the 22nd Army. On March 20, 1942, the front tribunal adopted a document, which is called "Determination" in judicial practice: "Since the verdict against 29 servicemen (surnames are listed) was passed in absentia, it must be canceled. Transfer the case for a new trial from the preliminary investigation stage."

Another example: "On November 25, 1942, the Military Tribunal of the 27th Guards Rifle Division sentenced senior sergeant I.S. Mitichkin, and with him four more Red Army men of the communications department, accusing them of treason under the same article 58-1 "6". Moreover, in this case, not one of the servicemen was in any German captivity for a single day. But the Special Division of the division, according to information from its informants, arrested everyone, writing in the "Indictment" that "the group intended to carry out their treasonous plans on the night of November 12-13, and this did not succeed due to circumstances beyond their control."

The evidence for these "treasonous designs" was so shaky that the commander of the 65th army (which included the said division

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Zia) Lieutenant General Batov petitioned for a mitigation of punishment. And the Military Tribunal of the Don Front, with its "Definition", reclassified the accusation and replaced the capital punishment — execution for 10 years in labor camps. During the investigation, one defendant "died of exhaustion," while the rest were removed from the front and sent to camps."

"To the first period of the Patriotic War," the researchers from VSU conclude, "there are 60 percent of the archival and investigative cases identified by us. In quantitative terms, this is 27 cases. Of these, only in three cases (this is 11 percent) the defendants were charged with anti-Soviet, or rather, "defeatist" agitation - Article 58-10 part 2...

All the remaining 90 percent of the cases were conducted under Article 58-1 "6 °, that is, treason to the Motherland. That is why we have examined in detail in this section the various options for the investigation and sentences under this article. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that subsequently all the accused who were involved in these cases were rehabilitated "due to the absence of corpus delicti". Thus, none of them actually committed any "treason against the Motherland". Their cases were falsified by the investigators of the Special Departments."

In the course of their painstaking work, researchers from the VSU came to another curious conclusion: "In the first period, the Special Departments, as we have seen, mostly. so-called "surrendered" prisoners were identified (even if the capture was carried out by superior enemy forces or if wounded Red Army soldiers who lost their weapons and ammunition were captured).

Now, these bodies were tasked with arresting soldiers of the Red Army who had come out of captivity, not only to prove their "voluntary surrender" to the enemy, but, above all, their recruitment in captivity by German intelligence, and, accordingly, their return to our territory already as German spies."

As an example, the researchers cite the following: "In this regard, the case initiated literally in the last month of the Patriotic War, when our troops were already fighting in Germany, is indicative. The events themselves, which served as material for the initiation of the case by SMERSH, occurred at the end of 1944. Moreover, military intelligence officers fell under suspicion - people have already been, it would seem, proven more than once. September 17, 1944 a group of military intelligence officers of the Reserve Front on a transport plane

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was transferred from the already liberated Lithuania to the rear of the enemy on the territory of Germany. For almost four months, scouts (in civilian clothes) successfully operated in the rear of the German troops, passed on important information to the front command. However, in January 1945, two of our intelligence officers from this group, T.E. Lopatin and A.A. Zaitsev, were detained by the German gendarmerie in a forest near the city of Insterburg. After several interrogations, they were placed in a concentration camp in the city of Zoldava.

On the eighth day, experienced scouts - one was a sergeant, the other a foreman - managed to escape from the camp. A day later they reached the advancing units of the Red Army. But a week of captivity cost them dearly.

For more than three months, the scouts were kept in a filtration camp, and then they were nevertheless arrested. On April 8, the arrest warrants for Lopatin and Zaitsev were approved by the head of the SMERSH department of the Reserve Front, Lieutenant General Khannikov. The text of each resolution ended in words:

"Under dubious circumstances, he escaped from the concentration camp... There are grounds to suspect him of being involved in German intelligence agencies... To be arrested and searched."

Until the end of April, the SMERSH investigator interrogated each of the arrested three times. Every time after the story of the scout about a short stay in captivity and escape from the German concentration camp, he demanded: "You are lying. Give evidence, when and by whom you were recruited, what tasks you received..."

However, the investigator failed to obtain any confession: the scouts had nothing to confess. The accusation of espionage crumbled. I think that two unusual documents filed into the archive and investigative file played a significant role in this: denunciations by SMERSH secret informants. As a rule, documents of this kind are not filed in the archival and investigative file, but are stored in the personal file of the informant himself - as a characteristic of his active (or inactive) activity. But in rare cases such denunciations end up (apparently by mistake) in the cases of the accused. We got just such a case.

It turned out that in the group of intelligence officers (it was codenamed "Khoron"), out of 11 people, two were part-time secret informers of SMERSH. Upon returning from a mission from the German rear, they wrote detailed reports to the SMERSH department about

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their observations of the behavior and conversations of other members of the group. The documents are of the same type, quite detailed (8 pages and 5 pages), written by informants in ink on large sheets of paper. Each of them is called "Report of agent 'Clean' on work in the group 'Horon'..." (In another case, the agent hides under the nickname "Combat").

Luckily for the accused Lopatin and Zaitsev, the agents characterized their activities behind enemy lines positively and did not record any "counter-revolutionary" statements in both reports. Thus, in these secret documents, the SMERSH investigator could not find anything that would give him grounds to charge two intelligence officers with espionage. Therefore, on May 4, 1945, the deputy head of the SMERSH department of the 1st Baltic Front ... approved the "Resolution", ending with the words:

"Materials that expose Zaitsev and Lopatin as belonging to the intelligence agencies of the Germans have not been obtained by the investigation. Therefore, guided by Art. 204 p. "6" of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR,

Resolved: Criminal prosecution of Zaytsev A.A. and Lopatin T.E. stop, release both of them from custody"".

And one more thing that researchers from the Voronezh State University tell about: "Vasily Nikolaevich Pshenichnykh, born in 1907, from a peasant family, 8th grade education, even before the war he served 6 years in the Red Army. Then he worked in cultural institutions, in the regional newspaper, and in 1939 he was again drafted into the army. Passed the Soviet-Finnish war. That is, he was a personnel commander.

During the Patriotic War from the first months he participated in fierce battles near Smolensk and Yelnya, wounded and shell-shocked. In July 1943, his division launched an attack on the city of Mtsensk, Oryol region. Unexpectedly V.N. Pshenichnykh, already a company commander, with the rank of captain, was arrested by the SMERSH department of the 63rd Army on charges of "defeatist" moods.

During the first interrogations, he categorically denied any such sentiments or statements. But two weeks later, as it seemed to us, unexpectedly, in response to the investigator's questions, he said:

"I want to confess and declare to the investigation that, being in a defeatist mood, I systematically said that we could not defeat the Germans, that the Red Army would not defeat the German army..."

Such a confession gave grounds to the Military Tribunal to issue a sentence, where, under Article 58-10, part II, the defendant received 10 years

camps with the deprivation of the military rank of "captain" and loss of rights for 5 years.

V.N. Pshenichnykh completely served his 10 years in the camps, although from prison he repeatedly submitted applications to the highest authorities of the Soviet state, with a request to review the sentence as unfair. And having already been released from the camp, in 1961 he wrote a long, detailed complaint addressed to N.S. Khrushchev, where he described in detail the torture to which SMERSH officers subjected him: "For four days I did not sign a false, implausible, fabricated material. On the fifth day, brutal, inhuman torture began. Beat! They twisted their arms and legs. They put a dog muzzle on his head and squeezed it with such force that blood flowed from the ears and nose. And they give you to sign a fabricated deed.

For eight days and eight nights I was subjected to brutal torture by the investigators of the 287th Infantry Division... And I signed all the material that I am an enemy of the people...

From the camp I filed 11 complaints addressed to Stalin, but I did not receive a response to a single complaint.

... So I became a victim of the monster of the human race, Stalin.

Captain of Justice M. Delagrammatic during the war years worked as a court clerk in the military tribunals of the corps, army, and large garrisons. As he himself recalls, this small position allowed him to see the Soviet repressive machine face to face. As a graduate of the Faculty of Literature of the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature (IFLI), he was mobilized on July 7, 1941. After completing a ten-month course for military lawyers at the Delagrammatica Military Law Academy, in May 1942, with the rank of military lawyer, he was sent to the disposal of the Military Tribunal of the Southern Front. Already there he was appointed to the Military Tribunal of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps, where he penetrated the secrets of Soviet justice. Here is what he writes: "In each division, corps, army and front there was a three-element system of punitive organs (the term of that era): the Special Department of the NKVD, the military prosecutor's office and the military tribunal.

The functions of the Special Department of the NKVD (head, deputy, investigators, commandant, fighters, pre-trial detention chamber) included monitoring the political and moral state of the corps, identifying state criminals (traitors, spies, saboteurs, counter-revolutionary organizations and groups of persons -

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conducting anti-Soviet agitation, and others), conduct investigations into state crimes under the supervision of the prosecutor's office and refer cases to military tribunals. In the corps, the head of the Special Department was Lieutenant Colonel Rudenko, a Ukrainian between thirty-five and forty, a tall, stout man who wore a black leather coat. I got acquainted with the employees of the Special Department in the officers' canteen. The secretary of the Special Department, Anya Rybakova, was quite sociable, telling the circle of tribunals and prosecutors about some details of the "creative laboratory" of the special officers.

They had at their disposal a large staff of commissioners in regiments and battalions, as well as an extensive network of secret police. Quite often special officers attached to cases submitted to our tribunal a sealed envelope with the inscription: "Only for the chairman of the VT" — it contained intelligence information about the defendant. So, for example, the source "Reikin" reported that the defendant - a man "cunning and treacherous", served as an officer in the White Army. It was easy to figure out that the defendant was only sixteen at that time. However, this semi-teenage semi-adolescent age did not serve as an excuse for the tribunals. Sometimes the seksots acted as witnesses (or false witnesses, if the situation required it) in court."

It is interesting that, according to the memoirs of M. Delagrammatica, the everyday work of the tribunals was directly related to the situation at the front: "The cruelty of the punitive policy was determined by defeats and successes: during our retreat, military tribunals handed down tough sentences and spared no patrons." Even in a lull at the front, the Special Department, the prosecutor's office and the military tribunal did not sit idle: "The latter mainly considered cases on charges of desertion, self-mutilation (crossbows), malfeasance, etc. Most of all, perhaps, there were cases of desertion ( 193.7, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR).

There were also cases of "espionage" in a lull: "Thus they shot Olga Serdyuk, a woman from Kiev, who was accused of espionage. A young, large woman, a military nurse, appeared before the court. She was accused of the heaviest crime - 58-16, that is, treason committed by a soldier. This corpus delicti included not only going over to the side of the enemy, actively assisting him, but also espionage. While compiling the protocol, I did not find any facts of espionage activity in her testimony. She admitted she was recruited

in a prisoner of war camp, gave a subscription to cooperate with German intelligence - this was the end of the matter. But for the military tribunal, the very fact of recruitment was of fundamental importance, not even accompanied by intelligence activities. Moreover, the recruitment was known only from the words of the person under investigation, without any material evidence. And now - a guilty verdict and a quick execution.

The senior secretary of the military tribunal, Sharkov, once shared with me a technique for identifying German spies. The head of the Special Department of the NKVD Corps, a tall and stout man, entered the cell where there were servicemen who were to be checked (liberated or escaped from captivity, were surrounded, partisans), chose and took away any weak or fearful fighter, used his huge fists on him and thus received a confession of espionage. Further, the unfortunate awaited a painful investigation, a tribunal and execution. Such, apparently, is the nature of Olga Serdyuk's "espionage". Poor grain of sand in the Tribunal's car!

Shortly after the trial of Serdyuk, I was met by the commandant of the Special Department, took from the tablet the act of carrying out the death sentence and handed it over to me for inclusion in the case. In this act, the main role in the completion of the life drama was played by the commandant himself, and the prosecutor was always present. The surname, name and patronymic of the commandant were indicated in the document.

...Other espionage cases before our military tribunal were just as dubious. My colleagues from the military tribunal sometimes, not without causticity, asked the special officers why the German agents exposed by them were so inactive. Specialists have always had a standard answer: the most capable and active spies are sent to Moscow and sometimes re-recruited there.

Once Ioffe told me about a curiosity, which ended, however, in a good time: a colonel accused of counter-revolutionary agitation was tried (58-10, part 2 of the UKRSFSR), and they were sentenced to ten years in the camps. The whole "agitation" consisted in the fact that he told how he studied with S.M. Budyonny at the academy and he did not master decimal fractions.

M. Delagrammatica calls the Shifman case the clumsy work of the Special Department of the 58th Army: "Senior Lieutenant Shifman was the political commissar of field mail No. 1577 of our army. They worked there  
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mostly girls drafted into the army. Paradoxically, the political instructor, a representative of the party, was accused of anti-Soviet agitation (58-10, part 2 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). The political instructor denied the accusation, but admitted that in a private conversation he had told some facts about the distortion of the party's policy in the field of collectivization in the 1930s, about individual uprisings of peasants against collectivization, in the suppression of which S.M. Budyonny. Tribunal judgment

was harsh: eight years in labor camp with a defeat in political rights. Although everything Shifman said could be read in the "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks".

Many years later, I met Semyonov, the investigator in the Shifman case. "You see," he explained, "Shifman was a very bad person, he forced the girls from the field post office into cohabitation. Therefore, we attributed anti-Soviet agitation to him, so that it would be stronger. At first I was struck by Semyonov's frankness: after all, he openly admitted that he attributed to the accused crimes that he did not commit. But even this frankness cannot be trusted. The reason for the arbitrariness, obviously, was rooted in something else. One day, a tipsy special officer complained: "There are few arrests. There is no work to be seen", — this recognition, perhaps, is the main engine of their activity. In order for "the work to be visible", it was necessary to report brilliant successes to the demanding authorities, who set control tasks, it was necessary to constantly find and arrest enemies, expose spies, terrorists, anti-Soviet people, and transfer their cases to the tribunals. And finding real criminals is not easy, especially when Beria's Sherlock Holmes have chicken brains. That is why cases of state crimes had to be fabricated, molded and falsified."

According to the deep conviction of the captain of justice, "during the war, our soldier found himself between two fires: an external enemy and the Bolshevik repressive machine, which raged not only in the rear, but also right at the front and in the front-line areas, bloodthirsty looking for more and more victims".

It's hard to disagree with this!

May 15, 1942 V.S. Abakumov signed order No. 933 "on the shortcomings in the investigative work of the special departments of the NKVD of the military districts and measures to eliminate them." In this document, the very approach to shortcomings and violations in investigative work during

military counterintelligence agents. Thus, for example, it emphasizes: "In many cases, the investigation of cases is delayed. The investigation does not fully reveal the criminal activities of the accused and their organizational ties.

In a number of cases, the investigation of cases is carried out formally, limited to the interrogation of witnesses and the collection of circumstantial evidence, without seeking testimony from the arrested person about his practical criminal activities and enemy ties. The testimony of those arrested is not always verified and not properly documented. During interrogations, the evidence at the disposal of the investigation is not fully used to expose the enemy.

A special department of the NKVD of the North Caucasian Military District arrested Savelov, a former soldier of the Red Army, who had come from German captivity, who testified that the Germans had organized a school in Simferopol, where the captured commanders of the Red Army were sent.

The investigation did not find out from the arrested person what this school is like, who manages it, which of the persons known to the accused from captivity was sent to this school.

Despite the availability of data giving grounds to suspect Savelov as an agent of German intelligence, he was interrogated only once and the case against him was completed as an anti-Soviet.

The same Special Department arrested the German spy Shapochkin. The investigation into his case was also carried out superficially, the accused was not interrogated about the persons who, at the same time as him, were recruited by the Germans and transferred to our rear.

As for Razboev, who was arrested by the Special Department of the NKVD of the South Ural Military District, the investigation had materials that he voluntarily surrendered and, returning from there, praised the attitude of the Germans towards the population of the occupied territory among the military personnel.

The investigation had every reason to suspect the accused of espionage, however, having received from him a confession of voluntary surrender, they ended the case.

The special department of the NKVD of the PribvVO conducted an unsatisfactory investigation into the case of Isakov, who, while in captivity, was interrogated by the Germans three times, before being released from captivity, he was dressed in civilian clothes and appeared at the location of the Red Army under suspicious circumstances. Despite the obvious recruitment of Isakov by German intelligence, the accused

remained unrevealed by the investigation in espionage activities and the case against him was completed.

In the Special Departments of the NKVD of the Central Asian, North Caucasian, South Ural and Siberian military districts, individual cases of arrests of servicemen without sufficient materials were established.

In addition, in a number of special departments, facts were revealed when obscene expressions and counter-revolutionary slander of the arrested were reproduced in the protocols of interrogation ...

In the Special Department of the NKVD of the North Caucasus Military District, in addition to the indicated shortcomings, the investigation revealed the facts of incorrect execution of documents. Part of the warrants for arrest, especially for a group of those arrested from hospitals, has not been approved by anyone, and some have been approved by a senior detective who does not have the right to do so."

Literally in a month and a half, senior major of state security Babich will sign a closed letter from the Special Department of the NKVD of the North-Western Front about shortcomings in investigative work (July 9, 1942). Everything is much more specific in it: "The main shortcomings in the investigative work are:

a) unreasonable, unnecessary arrests, especially for the coloring "anti-Soviet element", and biased conduct of the investigation;

6) insufficient activity of the investigation in exposing the agents of the enemy, organizing crime crimes in the army;

c) insufficiently thorough and comprehensive investigation of cases of going over to the side of the enemy;

d) superficial, sloppy investigation, numerous cases of violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure."

As examples of unjustified arrests, the author of the letter cites the following: "The Special Department of the 144th arr. arrested the Red Army soldier Volkov P.A. for the fact that in a conversation with the fighters he spoke badly about the quality of food and the shortcomings of catering in the unit. Despite the fact that this was the only conversation on Volkov's part and that he was characterized positively in his service, the Special Department charged Volkov with counter-revolutionary agitation, the prosecutor approved this ridiculous accusation, and Volkov was sentenced to death by a military tribunal. (VT SZF canceled the verdict, the case was dismissed.)

Senior sergeant of the 1276th joint venture Kovalev D.Kh. read in the presence of the soldiers a letter received from his wife, a canteen worker. She

complained about the wrong action of the head. canteen, which threatened her with dismissal from her job if she did not hand over her warm clothes to the defense fund. After reading this passage, Kovalev declared: "Is there such a law as to forcibly hand over things", and added that after the war, if he remains alive, he "would turn his head for this canteen manager".

Kovalyov also read this letter to the political instructor.

Instead of taking measures through the relevant NKVD to check this case and punish the head of the dining room for an outrageous, provocative trick and thereby eliminate the grounds for Kovalev's discontent and inspire him with faith and respect for Soviet laws, the Special Department of the 384th SD arrested and put Kovalev on trial "for slandering the measures of the Soviet power", and Kovalev was sentenced to death. (The verdict is overturned.)".

"Why do such facts become possible in our practice?" - asks the senior major of the State Security Service and immediately answers it: "Because in these cases the heads of special departments did not solve the issue as befits serious party leaders, but with intolerable frivolity in Chekist work, without delving into the essence of the materials, did not control and did not check the correctness of the information of the secret apparatus.

Further, because our special officers often do not take the trouble to sort out all the details of a case, to find out the reasons for this or that misconduct or unhealthy moods, they do not see the difference between a truly anti-Soviet manifestation, arising from a hostile attitude towards the socialist system, and the expression dissatisfaction with one or another shortcoming, difficulty.

Some special officers are unaware that it is one thing to commit a crime of, say, a staff worker, a political officer or a literate, developed Red Army soldier who spread defeatist views, and another thing is the bewildered questions of an illiterate soldier who does not understand politics and often does not find the right answer to questions. doubts tormenting him because of the still poorly organized political work with each fighter separately.

It is not uncommon for special departments, while secretly revealing the unhealthy moods of individual fighters, do not immediately inform the military commissar about this, thereby depriving the political apparatus of the opportunity to influence such fighters in a timely manner with measures of education, persuasion, and explanation.

Leaving these fighters for a long time without individual Bolshevik influence, we  
themselves ino

when we admit the possibility of intensifying and inciting their negative moods on the part of enemy elements, thus bringing the matter to the point of the need for arrest ... "

Babich writes about the quality of the investigation in no less detail: "Some of our employees are inclined to explain the low quality of the investigation by the conditions of the combat situation, which requires a quick investigation and trial. This is the wrong point of view. On the contrary, it is precisely the need to quickly complete an investigation that reinforces the importance of quality in investigative work. Careful, well-thought-out investigative measures, compliance with the norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, accurate execution of investigative documents, attentive attitude to the details, methods, details of the case - all this does not slow down, but accelerates the investigation and the final decision on the case.

What shortcomings are the most common and usually lead to a delay in the investigation, to protests and the annulment of sentences of grassroots VTs, to the return of cases for further investigation?

The protocol of detention is not drawn up even when there is an opportunity for this. The arrest is often formalized with the sanction of the prosecutor only 5-10 days after the actual arrest. The testimonies of the defendant and witnesses, even when they are clearly doubtful and implausible, are not verified. In particular, they take the word of the enemy agents who confess, they do not check their testimony in all details. During the interrogation of such persons and, in general, those suspected in connection with German intelligence, questions are posed in such a way that they lead the person under investigation to ready-made answers, suggesting to him a "scheme" of testimony.

When detaining persons without documents who confess to desertion, and in general, in the relations of those arrested not from their own unit, the identity is not established, the relevant units and special bodies are not requested.

In the Bologovskaya operational group, the 5th department of the NKVD NWF in many cases of persons detained in the rear in civilian clothes and without any documents ... was limited to the initial interrogation, with the knowledge of the detainee that he had deserted from such and such a unit, and referred the case to court.

No verification of the identity of the detainees was carried out, it was not even found out whether the units named by them exist, whether such fighters really deserted from these units, when the escape was made, where the detainee was hiding, with whom he changed



uniforms, etc. As a result, unverified and dubious personalities were sentenced ... by applying Art. 28 and were sent to active units. Is it not clear that the enemy, counting on the application of Art. 28 can send his agents into our units in such an easy way?

The testimonies of the accused and witnesses are recorded incompletely and not in the way that the interrogated person shows, not in his words, but are arbitrarily formulated and "generalized" by the investigator. Face-to-face bets are recorded with obvious violations of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Instead of a detailed presentation of everything that the witness testifies, the investigator is limited to the question: "Do you confirm the previously given testimony?", To which the answer usually follows: "Yes, I confirm". The answers, explanations and statements of the accused do not record essentially all the facts, but only record the answer that says nothing: "I do not confirm" or "I categorically deny". During interrogation after the presentation of charges, the accusation and confession formula is stated in a general phrase, whether the accused admits or does not recognize himself guilty, without a specific list of those criminal acts of which the person under investigation is accused.

The interrogation does not clarify the reasons and circumstances that pushed him to the crime. Such a necessary document as an objective combat and political description of the command is not attached to the investigative files. The results of the investigation are not used to signal the command and political apparatus about shortcomings in military and political work in

parts.

All these mistakes are largely due to the fact that the chiefs of the OO of armies, divisions, brigades personally do little investigation, they rarely interrogate themselves, they do not check interrogation protocols during the investigation, they do not teach investigators on specific mistakes.

In addition, the absence of everyday business contact between special departments and the prosecutor of the division, brigade during the investigation itself also affects. Many shortcomings, ambiguities, because of which the case then walks through the authorities for months and returns for additional investigation, could be easily eliminated if, during the investigation, they consulted, consulted with the prosecutor.

The OOs of the 254th Rifle Division of the 11th Army were investigating the case of P.L. Bosenko, a former soldier of the 240th Ski Battalion. Bosenko, who was detained by a special division on April 1, testified that on March 28 a group of fighters of the 240th ski battalion, including Bosenko, was treacherously taken away to the Germans by the commander

platoon junior lieutenant Antonenko. On March 30, Bosenko was recruited by German intelligence, and on March 31 he was transferred to our side. Despite the fact that the investigation in this case of the special division and then the special barm was extended for two months, the main and simple question was not checked: was there a disappearance or capture of a group of servicemen on March 28 in the 240th division and under what circumstances this happened. Meanwhile, during the investigation, Bosenko did not name a single name of those 9 Red Army soldiers with whom he was captured, and his testimony of May 22 about the circumstances of recruitment is clearly doubtful and ridiculous: "... On March 30, in the evening, when we were taken to bathhouse, a non-German officer, who approached the bathhouse, took me by the sleeve of the quilt and said: "Come with me ..." Having given me the task and having received consent to complete it, the officer sent me back to the bathhouse ... investigation, the case is considered completed and sent to court!

A certain Konovalenko, who was detained on May 13, testified that from August 1941 to May 1942 he was captured by the Germans, recruited by them and on May 5 transferred under the guise of an escapee from captivity to our side. The testimony of Konovalenko recorded in the protocols is full of absurdities, for example:

1. The Germans gave him a fake Soviet certificate of a previous conviction and serving a sentence in a correctional labor camp. For what? To quickly take him under suspicion and detain him?

2. During the transfer, the Germans dressed him in new Red Army uniforms. For what? Isn't it clear that if the German intelligence really made legends about Konovalenko's escape from the POW camp, he would not have been dressed "to the point"?

Taking all the stories of Konovalenko at face value, the 11th Army OO without any verification of his personality considered the investigation completed on this.

And, finally, the head of the Special Department of the Front moves in a letter to the issue of investigating the facts of treason: "Not all employees of special bodies have fully realized the responsibility that we, special officers, bear for each case of treason among military personnel. Not all operatives understand that every defection to the side of the enemy is a major failure in our work, this is the defeat of a special department and a serious gain for the enemy, because a voluntary departure to the Germans, and even to the encircled 16th Army, not only does not give into the hands of the enemy some, sometimes very important information, known

betrayed by the traitor, but directly strengthens the morale and resistance of the German soldiers.

That is why every case of treason must be regarded as a truly extraordinary event in a military unit, requiring the most thorough, comprehensive investigation both to establish the very fact of going to the enemy, and to clarify all the direct and indirect causes, conditions, persons that contributed to the emergence of treasonable acts. ideas and their implementation.

That is why it is intolerable when some chiefs of special departments of divisions and brigades do not consider it necessary for themselves to personally investigate each case of treason at the scene of the incident, to reveal all its roots, to find and eliminate those blunders in their own work, due to which treason was not prevented. .

It is the underestimation of the facts of betrayal and our responsibility for them that explains the one-sidedness of the information of special bodies. As a rule, until recently, special reports avoided the question not only of the degree of guilt and responsibility of the commissioners who failed to prevent treason; also remain unanswered questions about the extent to which the operational staff conducted an investigation into an already accomplished fact quickly, thoroughly, comprehensively, who personally conducted this investigation, was the head of a special department at the scene of the incident, checked the commissioner himself in all details of the circumstances, during which there was a transition to the enemy (survey of the area, clarification of time, detection of traces, personal interview of eyewitnesses, etc.), or he conducted a clerical investigation, sitting at the command post of the regiment and taking the word of the commanders of the squad, platoon, who are not always interested in the full disclosure of the true picture of the incident".

And yet, a quite reasonable question arises, why did this happen?

Yes, because the mentality of special officers has not changed since the thirties. Because there were not enough educated people, in the full sense of the word. Because one of the Chekists was very lazy, taking a completely foreign place. Because people were different: there were people, and there were nonhumans...

Memorandum dated May 22, 1943 (a whole year has passed after Abakumov's order) A.S. Shcherbakova I.V. Stalin about the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army confirms this. Moreover, how intriguingly it begins: "According to your personal order, the main

The Political Directorate of the Red Army investigated the report of the commander of the 7th separate army, Major General Comrade. Krutikov on the work of the Special Department of the Army.

And then follow the most usual words in this case: "I report on the results."

The results were, frankly, depressing: "1. The Military Council of the 7th separate army questioned the correctness of Nikulin and Shvedov's accusations of espionage. According to the materials of the investigation conducted by the Special Department of the Army, the case was drawn as follows:

German intelligence resident Nikulin, who was supplied by German intelligence with weapons (pistol and grenades), received from German intelligence the task of conducting extensive espionage activities in

Red Army - to recruit spies, blow up bridges, set fire to military depots, Soviet institutions, etc. Nikulin had signal agents at his disposal, who, crossing the front line, passed on to the Germans espionage information collected by Nikulin. Among other spies, Nikulin recruited the commander of the Red Army, Junior Lieutenant Shvedov.

The verification of this case gave the following results: Nikulin I.A., born in 1910, served in the Red Army in 1939, participated in battles with the White Finns, was wounded, after which he was declared unfit for military service. Nikulin is completely illiterate (he only knows how to sign), he worked before the war and during the war as a carpenter at the Tikhvin timber exchange. Four Nikulin brothers serve in the Red Army. During the occupation, Nikulin lived for a month and a half in the territory occupied by the Germans. Nikulin met Shvedov at a time when the military unit in which Shvedov was located was located in the neighborhood where Nikulin lived.

According to the materials of the investigation, Ekaterina Ivanova, 15 years old, is a communications agent recruited by Nikulin. Three brothers and sister Ivanova serve in the Red Army.

Junior Lieutenant Shvedov, after several weeks of acquaintance with Nikulin, left with his unit for the Volkhov Front, near Sinyavino, from where he deserted. Shvedov was detained by the Special Department of the 7th Army, he was initially charged with desertion, and then with espionage. Some time after his arrest, Shvedov confessed to being a spy and testified that he had been recruited as a spy by Nikulin.

During interrogation me and comrade. Shvedov told Abakumov that after investigator Ilyayinen demanded that he name his accomplices, he, Shvedov, named two Red Army soldiers from the platoon he commanded. But Ilyayinen rejected these people and demanded to name other persons. After that he slandered Nikulin.

When arrested, Nikulin pleaded not guilty to anything; after being in the cell, he pleaded guilty to espionage.

The investigation established that there are no objective facts to accuse Nikulin and Shvedov of espionage. So, for example, Nikulin, who was illiterate in all respects and lives in a remote village, was allegedly given the following tasks by the Germans:

"I had to collect information:

1. On the disposition, quantitative composition and armament of the infantry, artillery, mortar, armored, sapper, engineering, special and rear units of the Red Army.
2. On the deployment of headquarters, military units and formations.
3. On the location of warehouses with ammunition, weapons, explosives, food, fodder, fuels and lubricants and other military property.
4. On the location and composition of defense installations.
5. On the location of airfields and the number of aircraft on them.
6. On the location of air defense systems.
7. On the condition of roads and the intensity of traffic on them.
8. On the construction of new roads.
9. On the political and moral state of the personnel of the Red Army units and the civilian population. Along with the collection of espionage information, the officer instructed me to carry out acts of sabotage, organize explosions of bridges, set fire to military depots and Soviet institutions."

This part of Nikulin's testimony was written in its entirety by Senior Investigator Ilyainen, and Nikulin, who barely knew how to sign, signed such an interrogation protocol.

The Special Department of the Army had a full opportunity to check the activities of the "signalman" Ekaterina Ivanova. However, Ekaterina Ivanova not only was not arrested, but was not interrogated, although there was every opportunity for this, since she continued to live without a break in the same place.

The investigation established that Ekaterina Ivanova did not receive espionage assignments from Nikulin and did not cross the front line.

The special department had every opportunity to find out how the pistol and grenades got to Nikulin. The investigation into how the weapon got to Nikulin established that Yekaterina Ivanova's brother, a boy of 13, once told Nikulin that he had trophy grenades and a pistol. Nikulin took away the weapon from the boy Ivanov, Nikulin gave the gun to Shvedov for bread, and used the grenades for jamming and catching fish. Employees of the Special Department could easily find out the issue of the origin of weapons by calling and questioning the boy Ivanov, the brother of Ekaterina Ivanova. This was also done, but it was not. Thus, as a result of a dishonest attitude to the investigation, Nikulin and Shvedov were charged with espionage.

Shvedov should have been arrested and tried as a deserter. Nikulin is guilty of illegal possession and failure to hand over captured weapons, but there were no facts and materials to accuse him of espionage. The military tribunal of the 7th Separate Army dismissed the charge of espionage.

The investigation of Nikulin and Shvedov was conducted by the senior investigator of the Special Department, Ilyainen, a Finn by nationality. Ilyainen previously worked in the NKVD and was fired.

Curzon, Deputy Head of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, directly supervised the investigation and actively participated in it. Curzon worked in the NKVD from 1929 to 1938. In 1938 he was arrested on suspicion of belonging to a counter-revolutionary organization. Then he was found not guilty and in 1939 he again worked in the NKVD.

Ilyainen and Curzon are guilty of dishonest conduct of the investigation against Nikulin and Shvedov.

2. A similar case of Nikulin and Shvedov is the case on charges of espionage of Yefimov. On November 29, 1942, Efimov, a Red Army soldier, was summoned by the investigator of the Special Department for interrogation as a witness. During interrogation, Efimov told the investigator of the Special Department that he, Efimov, had been captured by the Germans in 1941 and fled from there. This aroused suspicion and, in fact, was the basis for his detention. On November 30, during interrogation, Efimov confessed to being a spy activities.

An analysis of the investigative materials showed that the investigation into the Efimov case was carried out extremely superficially and in bad faith. All accusations are built only on the confession of the defendant himself. Moreover, all these confessions are full of contradictions and implausibility.

The Special Department had every opportunity to verify Yefimov's personality and collect more in-depth material about him. However, this was not done. The only objective evidence of Efimov's guilt is his surrender, being surrounded, captured in September 1941 and his stay in the territory occupied by the Germans. After Efimov returned from captivity and the Red Army liberated the territory where Efimov lived (Toropetsky district), he was again, after checking him in the NKVD camps, was drafted into the ranks of the Red Army, where he served for 8 months.

As a result of Efimov's categorical refusal at the meeting of the military tribunal on April 30, 1943, from his testimony and the absence of any other materials in the case, testifying to his innocence, Efimov was acquitted.

To check the behavior of Efimov during his residence in the occupied territory, later liberated by the Red Army, the senior inspector of the GlavPURKKA Colonel comrade Dolin and the senior investigator of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence Major comrade Kovalenko were seconded to the Toropetsky district of the Kalinin region. By checking on the spot (a number of people who knew Efimov were interviewed), they found that Efimov came from German captivity at the end of December 1941, lived all the time with his father, did not leave the village anywhere, during the time the Germans were in this area, communication and communication with them did not have, did not conduct anti-Soviet agitation and did not betray any of the Soviet activists. Meanwhile, according to the materials of the investigation, the case was portrayed in such a way that Yefimov, while living in the Toropetsky district, was allegedly closely connected with the Germans, drank with them in a restaurant, betrayed to the Germans the political instructor's wife, Maria Nikiforova, and conducted anti-Soviet agitation among the local population.

The senior investigator of the Special Department of the Army Captain Sedogin and the head of the investigative unit, who is also the deputy head of the Special Department of the Army, Lieutenant Colonel Curzon, are guilty of creating an unsubstantiated accusation of Efimov of espionage.

3. After the case of Nikulin, Shvedov and the case of Efimov, the military tribunal of the 7th army and its chairman, comrade Sevostyanov, began to express doubts about the correctness of the investigation carried out in relation to a number of people who had already gone through the tribunal and were convicted by the tribunal for espionage. Thus, the military tribunal began to express doubts about the correctness of the investigative materials on charges of espionage.

Pyshnova and Lyalina, Maslennikova and Nikitin, Stafeyev. It is not possible to conduct a proper investigation into these cases, since the convicts (except for Lyalin) were shot."

Thus, the investigation showed a completely light attitude towards the arrests of employees of the Special Departments in the 7th separate army. The following figures can serve as direct evidence of this: "In the first quarter of 1943, 15 people were arrested by the Special Department of the 272nd Rifle Division, and they were charged with counter-revolutionary crimes. Out of 15 cases, 8 cases were terminated in the Special Department and 2 cases by the military prosecutor's office.

In the 4th Rifle Corps in the second half of 1942, 215 people were arrested for counter-revolutionary crimes. 43 people, or 20% of those arrested, were released due to unsubstantiated charges."

As the memorandum says further, "it should be noted that the head of the Special Department of the 272nd Infantry Division, Major Bozhichko, at one of the meetings, stated that there was nothing wrong with these arrests and summoning witnesses, since the call of the Red Army soldiers to the Special Department is his own. kind of political work. That's it. And not otherwise!

Among other things, the check showed that the Special Departments in the methods of investigation allowed perversions and violations of laws. Specialists as chamber agents used persons already convicted of espionage to capital punishment. Also, in the practice of special officers of the army, egregious facts took place when the defendants, before being sent to the court session, were summoned to the investigation unit to give instructions so that they showed what they showed during the investigation in the Special Department. In the same practice, there were facts of intrusive and unnecessary presence of investigators from the Special Department of the Army at the court session.

The following conclusions were drawn for Comrade Stalin: "The audit showed that in a number of espionage cases the accusations were based only on the confessions of the defendants themselves, which is wrong. The Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, in general, did a significant job of exposing German and Finnish agents, and it is wrong to say that all accusations of espionage and sabotage were based only on the confession of the defendants themselves.

The generalization made in the report of the commander of the 7th separate army that the investigating authorities are not taking measures to search

and the arrest of foreign intelligence residents, is inaccurate. So, out of 30 agents and residents who passed according to the testimony of the defendants in 1942-1943, 5 were found and sentenced to capital punishment.

Thus, checking the work of the Special Department of the 7th separate army showed that there were major and serious shortcomings, as well as distortions, in the work of the Special Department of the Army and the special departments of the formations. |

In the memorandum, 5 special officers were named as specific culprits: one deputy head of the Special Department of the Army, who is also the head of the investigation unit; two senior investigators of the Special Department of the Army; one investigator of the Special Department of the fortified area and one security officer of the fortified area.

The first two A.S. Shcherbakov suggested that Stalin be dismissed from the organs and condemned by the decision of the Special Conference to 5 years in the camps. The rest are to be dismissed from the bodies and sent to the active army. And the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army complained to the leader: "Among the employees of the Special Departments (now SMERSH) there are many inexperienced, illiterate people. This shortcoming should be corrected by the transfer of several thousand political workers to counterintelligence agencies."

Subsequently, they will do so, but the political workers, being in the "skin" of the Smershevites, will not work much better.

#### ABAKUMOV AND SMERSH

In August 1954, in a conversation with investigator Eliseev V.S. Abakumov allegedly said: "The very cruel organization SMERSH, which I led during the war. A monstrous principle prevailed there: it is better to shoot three innocents than to leave one spy alive. Frankly, I should not be shot for this, but quartered, but this is today. During the war, it looked like an absolute norm. I do not presume to judge whether this could have been avoided. I think no. In 1941-1942, betrayal flourished in our army, while they retreated, the devil knows what was going on. Privates killed the commander, commissar, and entire units surrendered to the Germans. The Germans did not doze off either, they recruited our soldiers and sent them back to us, but with a mission. Basically, they betrayed not out of political considerations, as is often thought, but out of fear of the Germans. And to stop this pro

cess, it was necessary that fear also emanated from us, and no less in strength than from the Germans.

Ion proceeded, and how!

In February 1943, Abakumov was awarded a special rank - "commissar of state security of the 2nd rank", and on March 31, Stalin called him to an appointment. At 10:30 p.m., Viktor Semenovich entered the leader's Kremlin office together with Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Bokov, Ilyichev, Platonov, Shcherbakov and Merkulov.

Abakumov, together with Merkulov, stayed with the leader for only half an hour. It was about reforming the work of counterintelligence... Meanwhile, in the absence of the chief special officer, Merkulov held an urgent meeting of the heads of the Special Departments of a number of fronts and armies, where each of those present received 20 minutes to speak. Stalin demanded from the military counterintelligence agencies better work in the fight against spies and saboteurs. By April 1, 1943, Merkulov is preparing a draft resolution on the formation of the People's Commissariat of State Security and a diagram of the structure with an explanatory note. These documents, signed by Beria, are handed over to Stalin on April 2.

As conceived by Lavrenty Pavlovich, all operational-Chekist departments and departments were separated from the NKVD of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of State Security was formed on their basis. The Directorate of the Special Departments was to become part of the new department as one of the departments of counterintelligence.

NKGB (SMERINSH — death to foreign spies). However, Stalin did not like this project. Then, by April 4, Merkulov prepared the following version, where, without changing anything, he additionally proposed to strengthen technical departments in the SMERINSH department and create new units with functions for working in the rear. But the leader did not accept this project either. He ordered to return to the reform according to the same scheme that was put into practice on the eve of the war, and again combine the efforts of the leadership of the defense of the state with security in the army and navy. In fact, he demanded the subordination of military counterintelligence directly to the People's Commissar of Defense, which, first of all, Beria did not want. On April 13 at 22.05 Stalin again held a meeting with the leadership of the NKVD, and on April 15 at 23.35 the People's Commissar of Defense and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief invited Abakumov to the meeting as his future deputy.

When the question arose about the name of the military counterintelligence (the second project name is SMERNESH - death to German spies), Stalin told those present:

— And why, strictly speaking, should we talk only about German spies against our army? Let's call it "Death to Spies", or SMERSH for short.

That's what they decided on. On April 18 and 19, Stalin again received Abakumov, Merkulov and Beria in order to finally resolve the issue of reforming military counterintelligence. And on April 21, 1943, the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3222 ss / s was issued with the approval of the regulation of the GUKR SMERSH of the NPO of the USSR (April 19, 1943, by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415-138 ss, the Directorate of the Special Departments of the NKVD was transformed into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR ) SMERSH NPO USSR).

This document defined the specific tasks of the SMERSH bodies:

"a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and institutions of the Red Army;

c) taking the necessary agent-operational and other (through the command) measures to create conditions on the fronts, including the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity in order to make the front line impenetrable to espionage and anti-Soviet elements;

d) combating betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army (going over to the side of the enemy, harboring spies and, in general, facilitating the work of the latter);

e) the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;

f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

g) fulfillment of special tasks of the People's Commissar Obo

rony". "Even after the reorganization, the Soviet military counterintelligence remained a "state within a state," the author of the article believes.

"This is a terrible word SMERSH" O. Gerchikov. — The senior detective of the regiment did not report to the regiment commander, but to the head of the SMERSH division. The head of the main department of counterintelligence Abakumov, being the deputy people's commissar of defense, was subordinate only to the Supreme. There were 3 counterintelligence officers in the rifle regiment. In the division, according to the state, it was supposed to have 21 people including chief

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and deputy, cryptographer, investigators and commandant, plus a security platoon. There were approximately 400 SMERSH employees in the army. There was also agents - one person per department (i.e. 30

"informers" per battalion)...

Contrary to the anti-espionage name, the main object of SMERSH's work was not so much an external enemy as an internal one. According to counterintelligence veterans, the Soviet soldier, especially at the beginning of the war, only thought about how to surrender, desert, or shoot something for himself.

According to the counterintelligence officers' own data, in the first 2 years of the war alone, 576 German paratrooper agents were arrested and killed. During the last 5 months of the fall of 1944, army counterintelligence arrested 776 agents, in January-February 1945 - another 1326! Already after the end of the war, a military operation was carried out in Courland, neutralizing 1277 German spies... According to various estimates, during the war years, OSO and SMERSH caught from 30 to 60 thousand enemy agents, that is, approximately 3-6 spy divisions!

Were there postscripts in counterintelligence? Yes they were. According to the memoirs of front-line soldiers, one could fall into spies for "defeatist

sentiments" - for example, a laudatory word about the quality of German technology. Or "anti-Soviet agitation" - reading aloud a letter from home

about hunger in the rear. However, there were no more postscripts in SMERSH than in any Soviet organization.

Throughout the war, military counterintelligence officers played radio games with German intelligence. Passing on misinformation, they provided significant assistance to the army command in the preparation of strategic operations. Largely due to this, the Germans in the winter of 1944-1945. they failed to reveal the plan of the Soviet offensive in East Prussia.

The radio game "Aryans", brilliantly carried out by the counterintelligence, disrupted the preparations for an uprising of the local population in Kalmykia. The degree of misinformation of German intelligence is evidenced by the fact that planes with German saboteurs landed in the Kalmyk steppe after the Kalmyks were evicted to Siberia on Stalin's orders."

Of interest is the activity of counterintelligence SMERSH to suppress treason and desertion. For example, on June 17, 1943, the head of the counterintelligence front department, Major General

Ya.A. Yedunov presented to the military council of the front a list of measures that would be expedient to be carried out in formations and units to prevent treason "in the form of going over to the side of the enemy" and which can be conditionally divided into three areas: ensuring the impenetrability of the front line, political and educational work in the troops, increasing attention to the needs of soldiers on the front line. N.V. Grekov, revealing this activity in his article in the Military Historical Journal, writes: "Out of 31 items on the list of these events, 12 contained proposals in the first direction, i.e. the maximum strengthening of control, excluding the possibility of infiltration of enemy agents and traitors through the front line. Counterintelligence noted that due to the incorrect placement of posts on the front line and outposts, large sections of the space in front of our defenses were left out of any observation. The Front Directorate of Counterintelligence suggested that the SMERSH army leadership pay special attention to the organization of field guard duty, especially on the flanks and at the junctions of units. In his opinion, the possibility of "treacherous attempts" was determined by the proximity of the enemy's defense line, the intensification of his propaganda through the distribution of leaflets and through loudspeakers, the especially difficult conditions in which one or another unit found itself, the arrival at the forefront of an unexplored, "politically clogged replenishment".

In the presence of such prerequisites for desertion and treason, the commanders of the units were asked to expose the secrets of reliable fighters in front of our defense line, who were supposed to stop attempts to cross over to the enemy, detaining or destroying the traitors. Secrets should have been posted immediately where there have already been transitions, and all open



areas should be mined and covered with barbed wire. In general, it was necessary to "achieve a situation in which there would not be a single loophole," while counterintelligence demanded constant vigilance from the soldiers and commanders on the front line. In particular, all civilians or military personnel of other units who appeared at the location of the unit or combat guard should be immediately detained and reported to the commanders. Responsibility for observing the "strictest regime" on the front line was assigned to the command and political

Meanwhile, military counterintelligence pointed to serious shortcomings in the work of the command staff, which provoked the emergence of treasonable moods. For example, the head of the SMERSH Directorate of the North-Western Front informed the military council: "There are cases of arbitrariness, assault, rude, mocking and non-Soviet attitude on the part of individual commanders towards subordinates, and in some parts of the 23rd Guards Division these cases are massive, which greatly facilitates the work of the enemy. General Yedunov suggested that the military council warn the entire command and command staff of the front that those responsible for the "above-mentioned atrocities" would be brought to strict accountability, up to and including being brought to trial by a military tribunal. SMERSH inspired negligent commanders to take care of the soldier. Counterintelligence officers noted the facts when for several days (up to 19) in the 117th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army the combat guards did not change, and the Red Army did not rest. The leadership of the SMERSH front reminded army commanders of the need to strictly comply with the requirements of the charter, to carry out a change of outfit no more than 24 hours later, and to punish those guilty of violating charters.

As part of counteracting fascist agitation, the "Smershevites" suggested to the commanding staff and the political apparatus to intensify educational work at the forefront and take urgent measures to collect and destroy enemy leaflets. The soldiers of all parts of the front had to be explained that the possession of enemy leaflets is a criminally punishable act. At the same time, it was well known that in the overwhelming majority of cases these leaflets were used only for household purposes due to a lack of paper. Often the fighters, without much hesitation, sent messages to their relatives, written for the same reason on the back of German leaflets. Therefore, along with collective reading of newspapers, conversations, and other forms of educational work, counterintelligence officers suggested that the army authorities urgently find sources of supply for soldiers, at least on the front line, with smoking and writing paper.

Writer Iosif Linder, author of a series of books on the history of Russian and Soviet special services, laureate of the FSB Prize of Russia, in his interview with E. Lichtenvald names several reasons for the formation of the military counterintelligence SMERSH: "First of all, by the spring of 1943, the situation in the theater of military operations had fundamentally changed .

After the Battle of Stalingrad, it became clear that with all the operational and tactical skill of the Wehrmacht, the Third Reich no longer had enough strength and resources not only to attack, but even to hold its positions. It was not difficult to foresee that soon the Red Army would go over to a large-scale counteroffensive along the entire front line and the territories occupied by the Germans would be liberated. But it was equally obvious that the enemy would try to literally flood them with his agents. Therefore, it was necessary to prepare for large-scale checks of the population. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the years of the bloody war became a serious burden on the human psyche, people at the front changed — and not always for the better. War (like any global catastrophe), like a litmus test, reveals those human qualities, both high and low, that in ordinary life, perhaps, would forever remain hidden. Therefore, it is no coincidence that SMERSH's functions included control over the personnel of the army.

Finally, the third, but by no means the least important factor that led to the creation of a new special service: Stalin was not satisfied with the current situation, in which most of the operational information passed through the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Lavrenty Beria. It got to the point that materials from the agents of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army were placed on Beria's desk, and it was Beria who went to Stalin first to report, both for the NKVD and

and for military intelligence, and the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate acted as co-rapporteur with him. When Stalin removed the Main Directorate of Special Departments from the structure of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs... and transferred them to the People's Commissariat of Defense, he thereby radically changed the balance of power in the Soviet special services. Head of the Main Directorate of Special Departments Viktor Abakumov, heading SMERSH, became Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, i.e. passed into direct submission to Stalin personally ... Thus, from the deputy of Beria, Abakumov turned into an independent figure, practically equal to him.

The emergence of a new independent special service created additional operational capabilities: each such structure develops its own contacts, its own agent networks, which often help to identify spies and saboteurs who "slipped out" of the networks of other special services. In addition, just

The presence of a competing intelligence service capable of "rechecking" the data of the Main Intelligence Directorate, the NKVD and the MGB stimulated the latter to work more intensively, since the head of any of these departments understood that his position in the state apparatus largely depended on what information and how much promptly he will report to Stalin. Stalin, being a very good psychologist, was well aware of the effectiveness of the principle of "divide and rule."

In addition, he himself had experience of working illegally on foreign territory: in Vienna, a hundred meters from the Imperial Palace, a memorial plaque still hangs, announcing that this building was the headquarters of Stalin, who before the revolution headed a large "exov" structure. Subsequently, Stalin personally oversaw many operations through the Comintern and other special services. A huge number of documents written by him have been preserved, not only directives, but also instructions and plans for real operational measures. So he was quite capable of analyzing the intelligence reports flowing to him and making the right decisions.

conclusions.

Another thing is that even after putting together a mosaic of testimonies from all sources, it was not always possible to distinguish real information from enemy disinformation. For example, in 1942, intelligence reported on the preparation of a new offensive near Moscow - and the Germans hit Stalingrad. Something similar almost happened before the Battle of Kursk on the Kursk Bulge, and here the newly created SMERSH and its personal leader Viktor Abakumov played a huge role. The German General Staff, the Abwehr and the SD carried out a large-scale disinformation campaign. In order to throw specially made maps with Hitler's original signature to us, the Germans sacrificed an aircraft and the lives of several high-ranking officers. On these maps, Moscow was indicated as the direction of the main attack. The same information was also launched through other channels. But, thanks to the reports of SMERSH behind-the-front agents, it was proved that in fact the main accumulation of enemy forces is not in Moscow, but in the Kursk-Oryol direction. It must be said that it took a lot of courage for Abakumov to announce information about the Moscow

the onset of disinformation. In confirmation of the words, he cited reports of SMERSH agents embedded in various Abwehr teams. Abakumov perfectly understood how a mistake could turn out for him, but, being a man of very strong will, good operational acumen and intuition, he took responsibility and made a statement that greatly contributed to our victory in one of the turning points of the Great Patriotic War. This is just one example of the real impact of the work of SMERSH on the situation on the fronts.

According to Yevgeny Zhirnov, heading SMERSH, Abakumov under no circumstances changed his favorite tactic - to go ahead.

Colonel Tarasov recalls: "Once we took the enemy's reconnaissance group together with the territorial bodies of the NKGB and the troops for the protection of the rear of the front - they were subordinate to the NKVD. The group was made up of criminals recruited by the Germans, so they resisted

not long, and we took almost everyone. The most valuable thing is the senior and radio operator with a walkie-talkie. Who will take them? Everyone wanted. Abakumov stood up, not looking at anyone, went to the HF telephone and reported to Stalin that an enemy reconnaissance group had been detained by SMERSH and that it was promising in the sense of a radio game. Then he turned to those present and announced: "Comrade Stalin approved our radio game, so the elder and the radio operator to us, divide the rest as you like. Representatives of parallel departments were dumbfounded by such impudence. In general, taking everything in a rush was his favorite manner.

"The tactics of impudence brought Abakumov more and more success," E. Zhirnov continues, "since 1943, he began to submit directly to Stalin. Approaching the leader, he realized that the only way to consolidate his position was to seek his favor by any means. And here he was greatly helped by the experience of the Nazis, which Abakumov began to study in detail after the war. He was interested in the smallest details of the relationship between the Gestapo and the party, military intelligence with political intelligence, and the leaders of various special agencies with each other. In his personal cinema, the head of SMERSH, as his translator Daniil Kopelyansky told me, watched trophy newsreel for hours.

Soon, Abakumov's attentive subordinates suddenly noticed that he was copying the Reichsfuehrer in everything, down to the smallest detail.

SS Heinrich Himmler. Even for reports to the Kremlin, Abakumov traveled in Himmler's car. According to the Himmlerian model - blind obedience to the leader and no one else - Abakumov also built his relations with Stalin. He stopped even trusting his own intuition, now he only trusted Stalin."

In the book by A.Yu. Popov "Stalin's saboteurs" the author tells about how irritated the head of the SMERSH GUKR was caused by the enemy's defection to the side of the partisans. On this occasion, in August 1943, Viktor Semenovitch wrote to the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement P.K. Ponomarenko: "... the fight against enemy agents penetrating these headquarters and partisan detachments is entrusted to the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies. Despite this, there are a number of cases when spies, saboteurs, terrorists, members of the so-called "Russian Liberation Army and other formations created by the Germans, who have been exposed and confessed to partisan detachments, are delivered to our side without the knowledge of the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies, are interrogated by employees of the headquarters of the partisan movement, who are not used to investigating such cases, documents delivered from partisan detachments and protocols drawn up during interrogations of exposed spies are multiplied and sent along with messages to various addresses, as a result of which some serious operational measures become the property of a large circle of people...» |

P.K. himself Ponomarenko replied to Abakumov no less sharply: "... we consider it necessary to continue to transfer the captured enemy agents and materials that are only of interest to your administration to transfer to you. We are therefore extremely astounded by the claims set forth in your letter, with which we cannot agree in principle.

The fact that, as you say, the counterintelligence agencies are entrusted with the fight against enemy agents infiltrating partisan detachments, we only welcome this, although we hear about it for the first time. Another question arises, why, since the organization of SMERSH, none of the employees of this department spoke about how they were going and what they planned to do in order to organize work and launch a fight against enemy agents, why not a single event was carried out, but in partisan detachments none of your employees. You, as can be seen from the letter, believe that leading

The general organs of the partisan movement cannot, without the knowledge of the SMERSH counterintelligence organs, resolve the issue and, if necessary, deliver the enemy agents captured by the partisans from the enemy's rear and interrogate them.

It logically follows that the commanders and commissars of partisan detachments and brigades should also in this case be deprived of the right to interrogate enemy agents exposed and captured by partisans, these claims of ours are simply surprising, since they put the leading bodies of the partisan movement in an absurd position and are contrary to common sense. ... We receive from the relevant authorities a lot of information that interests us, for example, to say that the 4th Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR daily informs us and sends information, materials that are of great interest to the partisan movement. But from you, I repeat, we have not received a single material.

Commenting on these excerpts from the correspondence, the author notes that "Because of exorbitant ambitions, Abakumov tried to subordinate to his department, and without any reason, not only partisan counterintelligence. Abakumov also constantly interfered in the affairs of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, tried (he partially succeeded) to take control of the radio game with German intelligence, codenamed "Monastery".

It was still the same technique of impudence, the same method of going ahead. Apparently, Viktor Semenovitch never changed his habits...

Who knows whether Abakumov read the analytical work "The ABC of the Counterintelligence Officer", born back in 1925 in the bowels of the KRO OGPU, the author of which is unknown to this day? So, it is written there in black and white that "an agent must be an artist, he must always take good and clear account of his strengths and the strengths of the enemy, not go ahead without weighing all the chances of success. A correct assessment of the situation, thoughtfulness, determination, composure, the ability to give an answer and rebuff in any situation, without showing his confusion, are necessary for an agent. The more clearly the agent imagines the psychology of the person for whom he pretends to be himself, the better he understands and catches how this person would act and speak in this case, the more natural he will look and the more difficult it will be to distinguish fiction from reality. . The activity of Abakumov at the head of military counterintelligence suggests that he is not

in every way corresponded to the position he occupied. There was both determination and composure in him, but thoughtfulness and artistry were not always enough. All this, no doubt, can be attributed to youth, lack of vast professional experience and, of course, lower education, which could not but affect ...

So in his last revelations, Viktor Semenovitch told his investigator about one of his front-line episodes: "I was young, my blood was seething, I wanted to show everyone that I treat fear with contempt. And as proof, he took several loyal guards, inveterate guys, got into cars and on the front line, at points where, it seemed, they could not do without me. Once I was informed that a company or even a whole platoon of soldiers had shot down their commander, abandoned their anti-tank rifles and moved towards the Germans. Can you imagine, they laid bare the area for the exit of German tanks to our rear. And a blow in the back, and even a tank one, means the death of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. I chased the fugitives with my eagles in two cars. We overtook the main part of the deserters in the forest closest to the front. They gathered in groups and waited for the arrival of the Germans. Those who resisted were killed on the spot, the rest were lined up in a column and, accompanied by three submachine gunners, were sent to the rear for trial. They continued their search. And just like that, the storm began. The roads instantly turned into mud. While we were pulling each other out of the quagmire, night fell. Darkness and rain. As a result, we simply got lost. Moved in the direction of our positions. We came across a village. Weak light in the hut on the very edge. We looked around, like there were no Germans. Cars were driven under haystacks. We were lucky. The hostess turned out to be a soldier's mother. She warmed us up, put everything she had down to the last crumb on the table. "Eat boys, just don't give Russian land to the Germans!" We decided to move on with the first glimpses of dawn. Unfortunately, the Germans also decided. As soon as dawn broke, we put ourselves in order and were ready to set out, when a sentry ran in and reported: "Comrade General, we are surrounded, German tanks are moving along the road!" I looked out the window through the curtain, and there, as if on a movie screen, the black crosses on the sides of the German tanks floated by one after another. We are in cars and straight through the field into the forest.

The Germans did not arrange a chase. To clear our conscience, several shells were sent after us. In the forest, however, we are in some German

reconnaissance group came across, but my eagles finished with them in a few minutes. In general, by noon we got to our own. I let the guys go to wash, shave and, of course, sleep. And he went to the headquarters.

And the army headquarters is like a communal apartment: rumors spread instantly. I was walking and I was met by a member of the Military Council, an elderly man with whom I had very warm friendly relations. We said hello. I stand unwashed, overgrown, in an overcoat stained with clay. He looked at me carefully and said: "We were very worried about you here, and don't be offended, but your trips around the German rear are, in my opinion, frivolity." "The Germans happened to be there," I say. "It does not change anything. The Germans could have wounded you, taken you prisoner. It is known that they do not take political workers and your brother prisoner. They shoot right there. Probably, for you, as the head of counterintelligence, they would make an exception. They sent me to Berlin, handed me over to the Gestapo, they tortured me for a long time and, in the end, they shot me."

Didn't that prospect scare you? asked investigator Ivan Ivanovich Eliseev.

"There is no place before this. I just didn't believe in her. A member of the Military Council understood this and immediately painted a picture that I could not have imagined before, but which shocked me. "Do you know what the Supreme Commander would say when he was informed that Abakumov was captured by the Germans?" I shrugged. "We entrusted him to lead our counterintelligence, and he was taken prisoner." It was here that such fear overcame me for the past night and for everything that could really happen that I turned around and, without saying goodbye, went to my room. I locked myself in the working room and sat on a chair without moving for an hour and a half, or even two.

It is noteworthy that the Great Patriotic War forced, including the military counterintelligence, to recall again the theoretical developments of the 1920s, and skillfully use the acquired knowledge in the most difficult struggle against the special services of Nazi Germany. The purely executioner functions of the 1930s had to be relegated to the background...

SMERSH veteran Zinaida Pavlovna Kozina had a chance to work with Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov. She remembers him very warmly, calls him a decent person. And this is despite the fact that the head of the GUKR SMERSH once even arrested her. How

it was, Zinaida Pavlovna said in an interview with A. Bondarenko: "We, seconded, received monetary allowances not in the financial department, but in a dilapidated church on Pushkarskaya Street. And somehow I came, and there were five or six officers standing in line. We were standing, waiting, and then someone asked me what front I was from. I answered that it was from Karelsky, and someone said that now it seems to be the Far East ... But I ignored this information. I didn't need it, I got paid.

I returned to my place, and suddenly - a call to the eldest, they told me: "Kozina, to Abakumov!" Went. We were on the seventh floor, he was on the 4th, I know. I came, they immediately shoved me there - and like that, in two rows - the red stripes in a row are just like that. And he is sitting far away - he was so angry, angry, and at me immediately: "Who told you that your front is going to the Far East?"

I didn't answer because I didn't even have time to think. But he didn't listen to who told me - he didn't need it, he just says: "For six days of her!" - and me, so to speak, under the arms, and that's all, and led ...

I remember well how we walked—quite calmly with Gradoselsky—such was the man, young and tall. Came, took off the belt - that's all. He left, and the duty officer showed me - a room nearby. Table, stool. And here - a folding shelf was attached to the wall - you can't lie down. Well, I did six...

But then we met with Abakumov in a completely different way ...

I began to work, and soon, for some reason, the senior typist transferred me to her office. They put me a table in her small room, my typewriter, and all the other typists were sitting in a large room ... Somehow I decided that I would go and see how the girls with whom we worked together were doing. I come, but there is no one!

I come back, I say: "Anna, where are the girls?" - "The work is over, they parted on their fronts." - "And I?" "I don't know," she tells me. And what should I do? Okay, I'm working...

And somehow I get up in the morning - I lived at home - we have such a black plate, a loudspeaker, and they say that Abakumov was awarded the rank of "colonel general". While I was driving, I had a thought: "What am I missing? Now I'll write a report and I'll also go ..." I came, wrote and typed: "Due to the fact that I work here

not in my specialty, I ask you to send me back to my front." And that's it, she signed: "Kozina". I come, the boy sits, I ask: "Can't you report to Abakumov?" - "I will report." And I went to my room on the 7th. And then a call: "Kozina - to Abakumov!"

I was completely calm, I think: now he will look at the report and identify me back. Our front was still in Yaroslavl... I come, he receives me normally, not like then, for the first time, and alone. He says: "Well, what is it? Why are you being used outside of your specialty? What is your specialty?" I say that I am a stenographer, I was called on a business trip, but I work as a typist.

He asks me: "Well, you are a Muscovite..." When did he manage to find out? "Yes, a Muscovite..." - "So the war will end soon." "Yes," I say, "I understand." "And why are you, a Muscovite, going to the front? Stay here to work!" "I want to end the war at the front. When the war is over, I will return to Moscow," I calmly say this to him. Abakumov listened, listened, then said: "Well, I'll think about it! And then I'll tell you." With that I left...

The next day, in the morning, I literally just come to work - a call, and again "Kozina - to Abakumov!". I go and think: "Now, probably, he will say - get out!" I come, and he says to me: "Well, here's what - I thought about it and decided: you will work for me. I need such a stenographer - you will work as my personal stenographer"...

And there was still General Vradiy in the office - the head of the personnel department and, apparently, the deputy for personnel. Abakumov quietly says to him like this: "Finish her with my personal stenographer and keep in mind: here ... - I don't remember exactly, he said either "we are her", or "I am her", - he punished. Make sure that this does not happen in the personal file." Vradiy silently nodded and disappeared. It seemed like I also had to leave, but Abakumov continued: "You see," he pointed to the end of his long office, "there is a table there? And there's a phone. Here is your workplace. You will come and start working here, regardless of whether I am here or not here"...

... He dictated to me twice, and that's it. But I always came to work exactly in the morning. I worked a normal working day, like all typists: they finished everything at seven, and so I finished my work and left. He never detained me, there were no conversations - why or what? I'm probably the first

same day she asked: "Can I go home?" - "It is possible" ... But I don't even remember exactly this. And he, it turns out, left the office at 5-6 in the morning! It happened that I came - he left, walked along the corridor, and you couldn't hear him talking, and you could see that he went into the offices, but I don't know who he went to, with whom he talked. But not with the authorities - there were offices of the chiefs in different places, and next to it was, I would say, the rank and file ... "

Even in the memoirs of Zinaida Pavlovna, there was such an episode that somewhat characterizes Abakumov:

Equally, there were not enough people, there was a lot of work - you see, they even called from the fronts. He says, "Well, how are you? How are the girls, how do they live? The eldest replies, they say, everyone is tired, they want to go on vacation. "It's too early for vacation, let them wait," says Abakumov. "But give them a salary, and they'll take you all to the warehouse..."

... War, there is nothing in the stores! And so we arrived by bus to the alley behind GUM — this warehouse was there. They came in - I'm telling you exactly, I remember very well - shelves, shelves, shelves, from floor to ceiling, and rolls, rolls, rolls on them ... Where is the wool, where is the boston, where is what ... Abakumov ordered that each of us I chose myself according to the cut on the dress! Of course, their eyes ran wide - and each chose a piece of the cut for herself. And they cut off two pieces for me! I understood better in this matter - my mother sewed, and taught me. I realized: there was a roll of white and a roll of red, some kind of wool, probably not very expensive, but I stood and looked - perhaps I'll sew a skirt out of this, and a blouse out of this ... "

Zinaida Pavlovna believes that Viktor Semenovich loved the people, took care of the employees, respected them, no matter what positions they held.

The fact is remarkable. Everyone who worked with Abakumov spoke more than positively about him. Even his adjutant, at his own peril and risk, has preserved to our times the white general's tunic of his boss, which ended up in a private collection ...

In the words of some authors, SMERSH, headed by V.S., raged at the front and in the rear until 1946. Abakumov, who personally took part in the massacres of arrested officers. It is known that during the period 1941-1944 only 72,000 of them were repressed. For example, during 1941-1952, 101 generals and admi

ral, of which 76 were convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, 5 by a special meeting at the former Ministry of State Security of the USSR, 8 generals were released due to the absence of corpus delicti in their actions, and 12 people died while under investigation.

In this regard, the arrest of the Soviet military leader, Lieutenant General I.A. Laskin. He was born | November 1901 in the Ufa province. In 1919 he voluntarily joined the Red Army; participated in the Civil War. He graduated from infantry courses, an infantry school, the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. In 1936 he was the chief of staff of the 132nd regiment of the 44th division in Ukraine, in 1937-1939 he was an officer for special assignments under the commander of the Kiev military district, an officer for special assignments under the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. From 1939 to 1941 he was chief of staff of the 15th Sivash motorized division in Moldova. Since October 1, 1941 — chief of staff of the 172nd rifle division, formed in Simferopol. Six days later he becomes the commander of this division. Later Deputy Chief of Staff of the South Eastern Front. From August to September 1942 - Chief of Staff of the 62nd Army, from September 7, 1942 to April 17, 1943 - Chief of Staff of the 64th Army. On October 14, 1942, he was awarded the military rank of Major General. May 13, 1943 - Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Front. On October 14 of this year, he was awarded the military rank of Lieutenant General.

Among his awards: the Order of Lenin, the Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, three Orders of the Red Banner, the Cross for Military Merit on behalf of the President of the United States "in recognition of his exceptional heroism and courage shown on the battlefield on the Soviet-German front against our common enemy, Hitler's Germany."

A special page of his biography in the Battle of Stalingrad and the capture of Field Marshal Paulus: "In early January 1943, the Stalingrad Front, which included the 64th Army, surrounded the enemy units in the city area, completing the operation under the code name "Ring", and 31 January of this year, the Military Council instructs the Chief of Staff to go to the combat area as an official representative of the Soviet command and negotiate with the Nazi command on the cessation of hostilities by the Germans, their surrender, and also on

the surrender of the commander of the 6th Army, Paulus, and his staff. Ivan Andreevich picked up a group of officers, and leading it, went to carry out the task.

Ivan Andreevich described his meeting with the field marshal in his book "On the way to a turning point": "Our officer silently opened the door. The window in the oblong room was not blocked with sandbags. We immediately saw Paulus. Dressed in an overcoat, his hands folded back, he slowly walked from the door in the opposite direction. I entered the room. Paulus turned to the door and, seeing me, stopped... The fifty-three-year-old field marshal was of average height, thin, perhaps too straight, smart, well-groomed.

Now his face was pale. He looked at us with tired eyes. I identified myself and declared him a prisoner. Paulus came up to me and, raising his right hand high, said in bad Russian:

"Field Marshal of the German Army Paulus surrenders to the Red Army as a prisoner..."

For the capture of Paulus, the commander of the 64th Army, Lieutenant General Shumilov, presented his chief of staff to the Order of Lenin. The award sheet said:

"January 31, 1943, during the liquidation of the Stalingrad grouping of the enemy, commanded by Field Marshal PAULUS, when many more units of the Germans, including 71 infantry divisions, fought fierce battles with our advancing troops Comrade. LASKIN showed courage, bravery and selflessness.

Arriving in the battle area in Stalingrad, sowing. R. Queen Comrade. LASKIN personally, accompanied by one commander, under enemy fire, boldly with a clear risk to his life, approached CP 6 of the German Army and ordered the German guards to give way, went to the headquarters of General Field Marshal PAULUS, where he led the delegation that was there Soviet command, presented an ultimatum on the immediate surrender of the entire southern group.

Later Comrade. LASKIN organized the disarmament and surrender of the entire southern part of the Stalingrad enemy grouping, as well as the capture of General PAULUS and his headquarters, and personally delivered PAULUS with a group of officers to the commander of the 64th Army.

As a result of the heroic actions of Comrade. LASKINA, parts of the enemy's southern grouping laid down their arms and most of the mountains. Sta

lingrada was released. Tov. LASKIN deserves a GOVERNMENT AWARD

ORDER OF LENIN...»

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 4, 1943, General Laskin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. That's what they thought up there!

Nevertheless, the military career of Ivan Andreevich developed perfectly. And who knows what heights he would have achieved, which is beyond doubt, if not for the occasion.

In April 1943, the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate of the North Caucasian Front was headed by General Mikhail Ilyich Belkin. Jewish by nationality. He really wanted to receive a second Order of Lenin and in the summer of 1943 he turned to the chief of staff for help. The fact is that only the Military Council of the front could present Belkin for the award, and the chief of staff of the front, Laskin, for his part, could easily resolve this issue by putting in his weighty word before the Military Council. But he not only refused to help the Chekist, but also remarked sarcastically: "By the way, I don't know at all what your work at the front looks like." I managed to find exactly the same award sheet for Major General Belkin. Its text was neatly typed and, apparently, in the depths of the front's counterintelligence department, which was headed by Mikhail Ilyich. Judge for yourself: "Led Comrade. Belkin M.I. a team of military Chekists acting in the combat formations of the troops of the North Caucasian Front with the task of capturing and eliminating agents



of the enemy and his active accomplices in the territory liberated from the Nazi invaders - does an excellent job with this work, ensuring the safety of the ranks of troops and the area occupied by the SCF from the influence of enemy agents. When performing this task Comrade. BELKIN, who personally led the Task Force of the Chekists operating in the mountains. Krasnodar, on the very first day of the liberation of the city from the Nazi invaders, he captured a group of punishers from the German punitive body "ZONDERKOMANDA SS 10-a" under the Krasnodar Gestapo and the command of the 17th German Army. By a skillful and quick turn of the case of this group, the facts of the brutal extermination of several thousand Soviet people and captured Red Army soldiers were established and irrefutably documented by suffocating them with gases on the direct orders of the German command at the hands of the Gestapo.

The excellent conduct of this case ensured its consideration in an open trial, which received an international significance in the light of exposing the true face of the Nazi invaders.

At the same time, the nationwide consideration of this case further increased the legitimate fury of our people and troops in their desire to destroy fascism and its leaders.

Tov. BELKIN deserves a GOVERNMENT AWARD..."

Further, it is written in blue ink by a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front, Major General Bayukov: "Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree." This became a kind of insult inflicted on Belkin, a holder of the orders of Lenin and the Red Banner, some new and intractable chief of staff of the front (since May 13, 1943). You can understand it in your own way: either the Order of Lenin, or some kind of Order of the Patriotic War! But honestly, it's unlikely...

Nevertheless, the award sheet was sent to Moscow on July 27, 1943, and on October 25, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the award took place. One can only imagine how furious Belkin was. And then the chief of counterintelligence of the SMERSH front threatened the chief of staff of the front with unpleasant consequences, soon writing a denunciation ...

This will become known years later - on May 29, 1953, at a meeting of the Central Party Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU, when the issue of restoring Laskin in the ranks of the CPSU was decided. And then, in 1943, in the month of December, the chief of staff of the SCF was suddenly summoned to Moscow. First, he was received by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov and announced his appointment to the post of chief of staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Then the head of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR F.I. Golikov familiarized Ivan Andreevich with the draft order on appointment and sent him to rest in the sanatorium "Ar

khangel'skoe" ...

However, on December 18, an officer with the rank of major entered the room of the unsuspecting Laskin and demanded to go with him, allegedly on the orders of Golikov. There were two more officers in the car, who sat on the sides, and the black car drove off in the direction of the capital, stopping only in the courtyard of the building on Dzerzhinskaya Square.

In his unpublished manuscript of the book "Reflections on the Lived and Experienced," General Laskin recalls: "... Officers

they took away my personal weapon and searched my pockets. Everything stirred in me, the thought slipped through - for what? I was led into a large room without windows, they immediately removed the general's epaulettes from my shoulders, orders from my chest, and two guards, taking my hands above my hands, led me up an iron staircase to the most important person - the head of the General Directorate of SMERSH, deputy Beria to Colonel-General Abakumov, who examined me from head to toe and said in a fierce voice: "Speak about your crimes." I categorically replied that I had never committed any crimes against the Motherland and never thought of it ... "We wanted to arrest you," he continued, shouting, "back in 1938, together with Fedko, and in vain did not do it. And you before

so far tried to ignore our bodies. Now you will find out who we are!..” Laskin was arrested on suspicion of treason...

The betrayal expressed itself in the following way: “From August 6 to September 8, 1941, I found myself surrounded by German troops, writes N. Smirnov, author of the book “Up to the highest measure”. After leaving the encirclement, Laskin was first at the disposal of the Personnel Department of the Southwestern Front, and then at the disposal of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the NPO of the USSR.

Prior to that, on September 25, 1941, he gave explanations regarding the circumstances under which the 15th motorized rifle division was surrounded. As Laskin explained, by August 6, 1941 the 6th and 12th armies were completely surrounded. The latter included the 15th Motorized Division. By this time, neither tanks nor artillery remained in the division. The headquarters of the 12th army ordered the division to act at its own discretion. It was not possible to break out of the encirclement. The division commander, Major General Belov, was killed. Laskin took command. About 400 fighters and commanders remained in the division. They fought continuous night battles, trying to get out of the encirclement. As a result, the remnants of the division were divided into separate groups. By the morning of August 7, 1941, a group of 40 people remained with Laskin. They moved to connect with their troops, on August 8 they were discovered by the Germans. In the ensuing battle, 12 people were lost. On August 9, a decision was made: in view of the lack of ammunition and the inability to break through to their units with weapons (the detachment was 200 kilometers from the front line), bury the weapons, change into civilian clothes and continue moving east in groups of 2-3 people, which was done

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on the night of August 10th. It should be said that the order to change into civilian clothes in order to successfully get out of the encirclement of German troops was given by the commander and commissar of the corps, Laskin explained. Commissar of the division Konobevtsev and the commander of the 14th tank regiment Firsov left the encirclement with him.

In his explanations, Laskin concealed the fact that he, Konobevtsev and Firsov were detained by the Germans and interrogated by them. During interrogations, they were called by fictitious names. Laskin, together with Konobevtsev, fled from the Germans and on the 13th day went to the Soviet troops.

In a word, Belkin somehow became aware that Laskin had been interrogated by the Germans...

As a result, Ivan Andreevich Laskin was sentenced to eight years.

N. Smirnov continues: “At first, the Laskin case was considered by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on June 5, 1952. Laskin pleaded not guilty to anything and gave convincing evidence testifying to his innocence. The court sent his case for additional investigation. For the second time, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR considered Laskin's case on September 2, 1952 and found him guilty of committing a crime under Art. 193.17, paragraph “a” of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, according to which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In accordance with Art. According to the 2nd Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 7, 1945 “On amnesty in connection with the victory over fascist Germany”, the unserved term of punishment imposed on Laskin was reduced by half, i.e. for 7 months and 8 days. After which he was released. If we turn to the disposition of Art. 193-117, paragraph “a” of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, then it is impossible to detect a single sign in the actions imputed to Laskin that would give grounds for qualifying them under this norm of the Criminal Code. Laskin was convicted without any grounds for that.

On May 29, 1953, the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR considered the protest of the Prosecutor General of the USSR, agreed with the proposal contained in it, and the sentence against Laskin was canceled, and the case was dismissed due to the absence of corpus delicti in Laskin's actions.

On July 27, 1953, Laskin was given a certificate of his rehabilitation.

After rehabilitation, General Laskin studied at the three-month Higher Academic Courses. K.E. Voroshilov and served in the army until 1965, when he retired.

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Another well-known military leader, Lieutenant General Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin, met with Abakumov after his release from captivity and a five-month filtration all at the same Dzerzhinka. Mikhail Leshchinsky in the book "Shot by the Fatherland" very interestingly conveys the color of that long-standing conversation: "Lukin was taken to the elevator, taken to some floor, taken along the corridor and stopped at the door with a sign "Colonel-General Abakumov" . Narrow - narrow and very long cabinet. At the end of it, behind a massive, full-width office table, a man was sitting and writing. Only the top of his head is visible.

The man did not raise his head, did not say hello, but said briefly:

- Sit down.

Lukin took hold of the chair with his hand, trying to move it more comfortably—not from its place. The chair was bolted to the floor. The man wrote something for a long time, then pushed the folder towards him from the edge of the table and opened it. Lukin realized that Abakumov was leafing through his personal file.

- Lieutenant General Lukin?

- Yes.

— Mikhail Fyodorovich?

- Yes.

- There is no right leg, the left one is broken in two places?

- Yes.

Is the right hand not working?

- Yes.

- Who recruited you?

- Vlasov, Malyshev, Trukhin, Meandrov came to me. Together with the Germans, they recruited me. Vlasov suggested that I sign an Appeal to the Russian People, where I would declare Stalin, the Politburo, and our entire government to be enemies of the people.

- So what?

- You know that I did not sign and tried to keep Vlasov from this.

— Yes, we know it. Abakumov finally raised his head, looked intently at Lukin, and suddenly asked: "Tell me, are you an honest man?"

- And what bastard will say about himself that she is a bastard?

Abakumov feigned a semblance of a smile.

Your wife wrote me two letters.

- What did you answer her?

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— I was gone, I was on vacation.

- And your deputy could not answer? Or are you yourself on your return from vacation?

Abakumov was silent. He took hold of the cover of the Case, held it for a long time with two fingers, as if deciding whether to close it or not.

- Well, that's it. I have decided to let you out. You are a dedicated person. You will be enrolled again in the cadres of the Red Army. The service will not infringe. Don't leave your house for a week, don't tell anyone about anything. Tailors and shoemakers will come to your apartment and sew you a general's uniform. All.

Abakumov finally closed the folder. General Lukin did not know then that on the cover of his "Case" was written by Stalin's hand: "A betrayed man. To restore in the rank, if he wants, send him to study. Do not infringe on service." Nor did Lukin know what preceded this resolution. And the following happened. Marshal Konev reported to Stalin that Lieutenant General Lukin, who had been released from captivity, had been brought to Moscow. Apparently, Konev managed to convince Stalin that Lukin behaved with dignity and showed heroism in battles in the autumn of 1941 near Vyazma. Stalin even asked Konev to convey to Lukin his personal gratitude for this.

Marshal Konev will pass this conversation on to Lukin later. In the meantime, he was released by Abakumov. After all, he said so: "I decided to let you out."

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, Abakumov was awarded four orders: the Order of Suvorov I degree (July 31, 1944 - No. 216), the Order of Suvorov II degree (03.03.1944 - No. 540), the Order of the Red Star (1944 - No. 847892), the Order of Kutuzov I degree (04/21/1945 - No. 385) and three medals: "For the Defense of Stalingrad", "For the Defense of Moscow" and "For the Defense of the Caucasus".

For example, Viktor Semenovich received the Order of Suvorov of the highest degree "for the exemplary performance of special tasks of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army", and the Order of Kutuzov of the highest degree "for clearing the rear of the fronts of the Red Army." They say it's not thick. But he was not a military leader, he was not a commander. His duties included completely different tasks and functions. That is why for some he forever remained an enemy, and for others a very good person. Such was the essence of his work, such was the essence of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov himself.

## SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THE HEAD OF MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

In February 1945, a long column of Soviet vehicles was moving through the territory of East Prussia. The highway ran from Rastenburg itself to Ansbach. But the military vehicles suddenly turned onto a small road leading to a beautiful oak forest, where barbed wire appeared, which encircled the road to the very gates of the former headquarters of Hitler Wolfsschanze.

As Anthony Beevor emphasizes, "the soldiers of the border troops from the 57th division of the NKVD were on Soviet vehicles. They were commanded by officers dressed in military uniform, although they were not subordinate to the army command. As employees of SMERSH, they theoretically could answer only to Stalin.

The most important chief in this automobile column was Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov.

"It was Abakumov who was sent by Beria to carry out "special KGB events" in the rear of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. Here, under his command, there were twelve thousand NKVD servicemen - that is, more than all the German guard troops subordinate to the three army groups that invaded the USSR in 1941. Even Zhukov's front did not have such a number of military personnel of special units.

Wet snow lay everywhere. According to Abakumov Beria's report, the NKVD soldiers jumped off the vehicles and blocked the road. Meanwhile, he and other SMERSH officers began to inspect the area. Everywhere there are traces of the recent stay of the Germans. To the right of the main entrance were several stone checkpoints containing mines and camouflage material. On the left side there were several barracks where the guards lived. Soviet servicemen found epaulettes and the uniform of the guard battalion of the Fuhrer's headquarters there. The size of this battalion was, by order of Hitler, increased to the size of a brigade. The Führer constantly feared an unexpected parachute landing from the Russians.

Following further along the road, leading deeper and deeper into the forest, Abakumov constantly stumbled upon signs standing on both sides. His interpreter explained that they warn of in-

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circle mines. Abakumov described in great detail in his report all the details of the inspection. He knew that this document would then undoubtedly be reported to Stalin, who was interested in the details of Hitler's life.

The most surprising detail, however, was the long ignorance of the Russians about the location of Hitler's headquarters. It seems completely incomprehensible, given that in 1943 and 1944 they captured a large number of German generals who visited Wolfschanze at different times. Only two weeks after the arrival of the Red Army units, the Soviet command discovered this complex of buildings with an area of four square kilometers. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that it was quite difficult to notice the place of the stake from the air. All roads were topped with green camouflage netting. Any straight lines were masked by artificial plantings - trees and bushes. The lights were only blue. Even observation posts, thirty-five meters high, were no different from ordinary pines.

When Abakumov and his companions passed through the first inner perimeter, they saw massive reinforced concrete fortifications with barbed wire and minefields located in front of these fortifications. At some distance there were firing positions for shooters and barracks. Outside gate No. 1, all the bunkers were blown up last year, immediately after the Fuhrer's final departure from here on November 20, 1944. However, Abakumov did not have a clear idea of exactly when these premises were abandoned. They went through the second perimeter, then through the third. In the center of the complex, Abakumov saw several bunkers connected to underground garages. It turned out that the garages were designed for parking for eighteen cars.

Abakumov wrote that he and his entourage entered these bunkers with extreme caution. They saw a safe that was empty. The furnishing of all the rooms was extremely simple. The SMERSHA employees realized that they were on the right track when they saw a door in front of them with a sign “Adjutant of the Fuhrer”.

Soon they discovered Hitler's room. She was identified with the help of a photograph, where he and Mussolini were captured in this room.

Abakumov did not express any emotions about the fact that he was exactly where the Fuhrer gave the order to carry out a ruthless attack on the USSR. It seemed that most of all

reinforced concrete fortifications and their dimensions were drawn. Shocked by what he saw, he was probably already considering whether something similar could be built to protect the safety of Stalin and Beria. In his report, Abakumov specifically noted that it would be extremely interesting for Soviet specialists to visit Hitler's former headquarters and inspect all the bunkers and their organization there” (Bevor E. The Fall of Berlin. 1945).

Now, in 1945, Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov was no longer the same head of military counterintelligence as he was seen in 1941. The serious experience of the war lay not only on his shoulder straps. This experience could also be seen on the face of the head of the GUKR SMERSH. This experience could be felt in his short and stern speech. This experience remained as non-healing scars on his heart. Everything was...

On July 19, 1941, he was appointed head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR. There is little operational experience, and no purely "special" experience. The war has been going on for almost a month. It is necessary to study in parallel with the performance of one's direct duties. There are no other options.

One of the lessons will be the case of the former General of the Army Dmitry Grigoryevich Pavlov, who was arrested on July 4, 1941 in Dvinsk by order of the Central Committee.

On June 30, by order of Stalin, Zhukov summoned him to Moscow. Pavlov surrendered the defeated front to General Eremenko and the next day left for the capital. The first person he went to was Zhukov. According to the memoirs of the marshal, he did not recognize the former commander of the Western Front, he lost so much weight and haggard in just eight days of the war. Their conversation was difficult. On July 2, Pavlov was received by Molotov. Dmitry Grigorievich tried to explain why his front was broken through. On the third day, Pavlov left for Smolensk to receive a new appointment.

Marshal Timoshenko was appointed commander of the front, replacing General Eremenko. It was Pavlov who went to him.

The leader appointed Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis a member of the Military Council of the front, to whom, admonishing said:

- Find out there, on the Western Front, convene the Military Council and decide who, apart from Pavlov, is guilty of the serious mistakes made.

In theory, Pavlov should have been arrested back in Moscow, but the military counterintelligence officers closed the case. The former commander was taken

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on the way to the front. Beria was clearly unhappy. Consequently, Mikheev did not catch the moment, did not cope. L. Mlechin writes: "In the arrest warrant drawn up by the investigative unit of the 3rd Directorate (military counterintelligence) of the NKVD, Pavlov was traditionally charged as a participant in a "military conspiracy".

The arrest warrant was approved by Tymoshenko. Pavlov was told that "he was arrested by order of the Central Committee."

The interrogation of the former commander of the troops of the Western Front was recorded on July 7, 1941 at one hour and thirty minutes. Interrogated: Acting Deputy. senior battalion commissar Pavlovsky, head of the investigative unit of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR, and junior lieutenant of state security Komarov, investigator of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR.

From the second question immediately to kings:

"In that case, proceed to testify about your treacherous activities.

— Are you out of your mind? I am not a traitor," Pavlov replies. "The defeat of the troops I commanded occurred for reasons beyond my control.

Pavlovsky insists.

— The investigation has evidence that your actions over the course of a number of years were treasonous, which were especially evident during your command of the Western

front volume.

— I am not a traitor, there was no malicious intent in my actions as a commander of the front. I am also not guilty that the enemy managed to penetrate deep into our territory.

- How did it happen in this case?

And Dmitry Grigorievich describes the situation in which hostilities began. Pavlovsky, in the course of his story, only throws questions like firewood into a firebox. But somewhere around 4 p.m., it returns to the very beginning:

- If the main parts of the district were prepared for military operations, you received the order to march on time, then a deep breakthrough of German troops into Soviet territory can only be attributed to criminal actions as a front commander.

I categorically deny this accusation. Cheating and betrayal

I did not act.

The senior battalion commissar clarifies his question:

- Throughout the state border, only in the area that you commanded, German troops wedged deep into Soviet territory. I repeat that this is the result of treasonous actions on your part.

- A breakthrough on my front occurred because I did not have a new material part, as, for example, the Kiev Military District had.

- In vain you are trying to reduce the defeat to reasons beyond your control. The investigation established that you were a participant in the conspiracy back in 1935 and then had the intention of betraying your homeland in a future war. The present situation at your front confirms these data.

On July 11, the interrogation began at 13:30. Question for Pavlov

- During the interrogation on July 9 of this year, you pleaded guilty to the defeat on the Western Front, however, you hid your conspiratorial connections and the real reasons for the heavy losses suffered by the Red Army units in the first days of the war with Germany. We propose to give exhaustive testimony about your enemy connections and treasonous deeds.

Only now Dmitry Grigorievich gave up:

- Indeed, the main reason for the defeat on the Western Front is my treacherous work as a member of a conspiratorial organization, although other objective conditions, which I testified during the interrogation on July 9, contributed to this to a large extent ...

As is known, on July 19, Abakumov replaced Major Mikheev of State Security. He, accompanied by his deputy and adjutant, went to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front near Kyiv. And on July 22, 1941, the trial of the former commander of the Western Front and several other generals took place.

"The investigation into the case of Pavlov," states retired KGB colonel Boris Syromyatnikov, "and other generals of the Western Front, was entrusted to junior lieutenant of state security Komarov and battalion commissar Pavlovsky. (Komarov would later become a colonel, deputy head of the investigative unit for particularly important cases, and "distinguish himself" in that, having great physical strength, as written in the documents, "will apply it to those under investigation, forcing them to slander

wat yourself." In December 1954, he was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court for using illegal methods of investigation). Komarov and Pavlovsky generals were interrogated alternately, the first interrogation lasted 15 hours. The fact itself causes complete bewilderment: how can a junior lieutenant understand such a specific issue as the actions of the front, without being competent in this?

The first interrogation took place on July 7, and even the day before, on July 6, the notorious L.Z. Mekhlis personally compiled and, having secured the signature of People's Commissar Timoshenko, sent Stalin a telegram "about the Military Council's work", i.e. he, Mekhlis, arrested, including the chief of staff of the front, V.E. Klimovskikh, head of communications of the front A.T. Grigoriev and others. Mekhlis set the investigators the task of obtaining confessions from Pavlov that he deliberately opened the front to the enemy. And the investigators are trying to get the former commander to admit it."

Further, B. Syromyatnikov writes about how the draft verdict was presented to Stalin in advance for familiarization:

"In the project, Pavlov was accused of an anti-Soviet military conspiracy: "... He carried out enemy work, expressed in the fact that, for conspiratorial purposes, he did not prepare the command staff entrusted to him for military operations, weakened the mobilization readiness of the district troops, ruined the command and control of the troops and handed over his weapons to the enemy without a fight..." However, after reading this paper, the General Secretary called Poskrebyshchev: "Tell me, let them throw out all sorts of nonsense, like "conspiratorial activity". The rest of the text is fine."

This lesson became demonstrative for Viktor Abakumov. From it, he understood that before arresting the general, it was necessary to understand what the AUTHORITY would like from him, that is, the people's commissar of defense or simply Comrade Stalin. The displeasure of the leader can turn into big trouble.

Viktor Semyonovich learned the next lesson in the summer and autumn of 1941. For example, in the "Memorandum of the members of the commission of the NKGB of the USSR to the Commissar of State Security of the USSR on the results of the inspection of the security of premises and the storage of military operational documents in the General Staff of the Red Army" (June 30, 1941) and the directive of the NKVD of the USSR No. 271 of October 8, 1941, as well as in the orders of NPO USSR No. 375, 0281, 0422 on shortcomings in the work of receiving and transmitting cipher telegrams, the identified numerous violations in the organization

cryptographic service in the center and in the field. All of them were identified by the NKVD during surprise checks carried out on the personal instructions of L.P. Beria.

One of these reports stated:

"On June 29, 1941, the security of the premises and storage of military operational documents at the General Staff of the Red Army was checked. |

The following were subjected to verification: Operational Directorate (Operational point, general part, eighth department and communication center, as the places of the greatest concentration of important secret military operational documents).

As a result of the audit, the following deficiencies in the protection, storage and accounting of documents were established that contribute to the disclosure of military operational secrets:

a) Operational management. The general part is engaged in maintaining secret military-operational records management, control over the passage of military-operational documents and their storage in the Operational Directorate.

The audit found that the work of the general part of the Shelter was not established and the safety of documents passing through it was not ensured.



1. Cases with decrypted military telegrams stored in the operational center are not properly executed, that is, they do not have an internal inventory of the cipher telegrams contained in them and are stored in a table that six people have unnecessarily access to.

2. In the typewriting bureau of the Operational Directorate there is no firm established procedure that determines the printing, reproduction and accounting of operational documents and the destruction of draft materials and carbon paper.

Thus, drafts of military operational documents, after being printed from them in a typewriting bureau, were returned to the executor, by whom they were indifferently and individually destroyed without the participation of representatives of the general part of the OU.

Only single-use carbon paper is not taken into account and was found in large quantities with clear imprints of secret military operational texts on it. In addition, in the basket of the typewriting bureau, torn into two and four parts were found especially important military operational documents (operational summary, recording of telephone conversations, order of the Stav-

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ki of the High Command on the formation of military formations, etc.) that got there as damaged or extra copies.

The above shortcomings in the office work of the Operations Department should be attributed to inactivity and lack of proper control over the safety of documents by the head of the general part of the OS, Major Antontsev G.A.

As for the eighth (cipher) department of the Operational Directorate, there were no significant shortcomings in the processing, passage, accounting and storage of cipher military operational telegrams, with the exception of the fact that the department sometimes accepts texts of cipher telegrams that are not written by hand by the performers, but printed in several copies in a typewriting bureau.

Thus, typists get acquainted with the content of sent telegrams unnecessarily.

A significant shortcoming in the work of the eighth department is that it continues to work under the conditions developed in peacetime, namely: the processing, accounting and storage of military operational encrypted telegrams in connection with the fronts is not separated from the rest of the work of the department. These telegrams are recorded in the general log, processed by all cryptographers, stored in common rooms and common desks with the rest of the correspondence, and, being lost in the general correspondence, are not particularly controlled.

6) By the communication node. The communication center of the NPO is engaged in sending and receiving encrypted and open front-line messages by telegraph and radio and communicates with the districts. Violations in the passage, accounting and destruction of processed incoming and outgoing messages were not established.

The service premises of the general unit, the operation center and the eighth department of the Operational Directorate, as well as the communications center, basically correspond to their purpose in terms of storing military operational documents in them, but are insufficient in area, and therefore the work is crowded.

These premises are provided with appropriate tables and storages.

It should be noted that the General Staff, including the above-mentioned facilities, do not have reserve space for redeployment or transfer to another premises (shelter) for work in case of emergency.

tea needed.

The security of the General Staff, both external and internal, has not been strengthened and has basically been left as it was in peacetime.

The transfer of operational documents from the General Staff to other points around the city is carried out in the usual manner through the field communications without armed guards "(Sever A. Marshal from Lubyanka. Beria and the NKVD during the war years).

The Operational Directorate of the General Staff was served by one of the departments of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR. Viktor Semyonovich understood perfectly well that it was necessary to strengthen control over the maintenance of not only this brain of the Red Army, but also take control of the maintenance of all front headquarters, as well as the Main Directorates and Directorates of the Red Army, no less tightly. Otherwise, any small leak of information during the difficult months of the initial and already quite catastrophic period of the Great Patriotic War can become a huge evil at the most unexpected moment and in the most unexpected place. But then, by God, the head can be and not demolish.

Abakumov's next lesson was related to the sudden and unplanned departures of Comrade Stalin to the front. They weren't just scared. They drove the young Viktor Semyonovich sometimes into a frenzy. After all, everything could be ... Especially when he found out about it later than others.

As State Security Major Alexei Trofimovich Rybin said, "Since the Khrushchev era, everyone has been inspired that they say that Stalin led the fronts almost on the globe, without leaving the Kremlin. But I personally accompanied him on several trips to the front. I must say right away that I had a chance to see many famous people in a front-line situation. And I want to note: Stalin was even braver  
other military leaders.

The first time he went to the front in the terrible July 1941. Then, in the Maloyaroslavl direction, he examined the area in order to determine where to concentrate troops for the defense of Moscow. At the beginning of October 1941, we accompanied him to the Mozhaik-Zvenigorod defense line. I remember when we passed a village, the boys recognized the leader, ran after the cars, exulting: "Stalin is going to beat the Nazis!"

By the way, we usually went by two cars. On one, Stalin with two bodyguards, on the other, three guards. Plus

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there were 30 submachine gunners of the auxiliary guard on the bus (when they went directly to the front line area). (...)

...I will say more. Stalin at his dacha, even during the war years, was guarded by two machine gunners during the day, and three submachine gunners at night, but he always felt protected. Stalin was guarded by the whole system. (...)

...In mid-November 1941, the Supreme Commander went to Rokossovsky's 16th Army along the Volokolamsk Highway to see the Katyusha in action. As is known, by the fall of 1941, more than half of the rocket artillery - 33 divisions - were in the troops of the Western Front and the Moscow defense zone. It was here that this weapon gained its unfading glory. It was here that it received an affectionate soldier's nickname - "Katyusha". Stalin's trip was dangerous, because the Nazis were downright hunting for the Katyusha. It was already known that in October the legendary battery of Captain Ivan Flerov was surrounded and destroyed. Nevertheless, Stalin went. On November 13, 1941, the Katyusha division under the command of Captain Kirsanov, Hero of the Soviet Union, fired at enemy troops near the village of Skirmanovo (now the Ruza district). The result of the strike was 17 destroyed tanks, 20 mortars, several guns and several hundred Nazis.

There was an unwritten law at the front: after a volley, immediately change your place, because an artillery strike would follow, and then an enemy air raid. We began to change position. There was a lot of snow, and Stalin's Packard sat on its belly. The rocket launchers immediately left after launch, and we got stuck. The fascist shelling began, then the aircraft attacked. Stalin moved into an 8-cylinder Ford, the Packard was picked up by a tank and rushed to the highway. The Nazis would have known who they missed. But they could easily take Stalin prisoner. The gaps in the defense were such that a mobile reconnaissance platoon could freely slip through them and capture the "language of YAZYKOV".

By the way, after the victory in the Moscow battle, our special services got documents from the front-line reconnaissance of the Nazis, from which we learned that after the fire strike of Captain Kirsanov's Katyush on November 13, 1941, the Nazis dropped a landing group from the air into that area. So, we can say that we were very lucky then - we left on time. "

Remembered the former guard of Stalin and other trips of the leader

to the front:

Church of St. Nicholas in Khamovniki,

where Viktor Abakumov was baptized

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s by fu no.

N.I. Podvoisky. V.S. helped in every possible way. Abakumov in promotion

V.S. Abakumov at the beginning of G.G. Berry of your career

V.M. Molotov

I.V. Stalin and S.M. Kirov

MD. Berman - M.P. Frinovsky head of the GULAG OGPU

B.3. Kobulov - head of the investigative unit of the NKVD of the USSR

M.N. Tukhachevsky

N.I. Yezhov

Army General D.G. Pavlov

Moscow at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

G.K. Zhukov A.M. Vasilevsky

K.K. Rokossovsky K.A. Meretskov

A.A. Vlasov F. Canaris

V. Schellenberg

V.N. Merkulov

V.S. Abakumov

V.S. Abakumov in defeated Germany

Colonel General V.S. Abakumov - head of the GKR, deputy people's commissar of defense

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V.S. Abakumov - head of the MGB in 1951

A.A. Zhdanov

G.M. Malenkov

V.S. Abakumov was shot in Leningrad on December 19, 1954, one hour and fifteen minutes after the verdict. He was not even given the opportunity to ask for pardon.

RA State Prosecutor. Rudenko

Arrested V.S. Abakumov in Matrosskaya Tishina

"A couple of weeks before the counteroffensive, Stalin went to the village of Lupikha along Volokolamka, where the front-line hospital was located, met with the wounded who had left the battle. The fighters were downright taken aback when they saw the leader in the ward. Iosif Vissarionovich greeted, sat down on a stool and began to ask: what is the strength of the German today, and what is his weakness? The German was not the same, the fighters assured, he was already wrapping himself in rags, his heels were knocking from the cold, his arrogance flew around. And someone suddenly suggested: if only, Comrade Stalin, now hit them with all your might! Stalin smiled for the first time, probably since the beginning of the war: "We will fulfill your wish, comrade soldier."

There were front-line trips in 1942 and in 1943. I remember that in the first days of August 1943 we arrived on a special train to the Kalinin Front to see General Eremenko. Stalin stayed at the house of a master of a carding factory in the village of Khoroshevo. Beria brought carpets, crystal, all kinds of delicacies there. Stalin scolded him and ordered him to return to Moscow with all this belongings. Commandant Orlov, at the request of Iosif Vissarionovich, cooked borscht; ate, began to wait for Eremenko with officers. They only arrived at 5 am. The council of war began immediately. On it, by the way, the issue of holding a salute in honor of the capture of Orel and Belgorod, the first salute of the Great Patriotic War, was resolved. Stalin immediately called Moscow and gave orders. And when we entered the capital on the evening of August 5, the first victorious fireworks blazed over it."

Why was Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov weary of such trips of the leader, because he was not responsible for his protection?

Everything is very simple. The chief special officer knew perfectly well that Stalin went on such trips with a small number of guards. And being not far from the front line, there is a huge risk of its capture or even destruction by enemy reconnaissance groups. In the first years of the war, the front line was still quite transparent. Enemy reconnaissance worked intensively. And given the suddenness and secrecy of such trips of Stalin, to ensure the safety of the leader from the special departments was truly a difficult task.

You can read about how it was in the book "Shadows in the Lane" by the son-in-law of General Serov E. Khrutsky. Judge for yourself:

"On August 2, 1943, at two o'clock in the morning, Stalin called General Serov, the commissioner of the headquarters. Sleepy Poskrebyshv asked him to wait and went to report to the Supreme. A few minutes later he came out and said:

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- He asks.

Serov entered Stalin's semi-dark office and announced his arrival. Stalin did not react in any way, he continued to consider the map of hostilities. Serov visited Stalin several times during the war and always found him in the same position - leaning over the map. The impression was created that Stalin did not leave the table, on which lay graphic images of the fronts.

After waiting for a special Stalinist pause, the Supreme turned:

"Hello, Comrade Serov, I have an assignment for you that must be carried out in an atmosphere of special secrecy.

— Listen, Comrade Stalin.

- I'm going to the Western Front, you accompany me. No one should know about this trip, not even General Vlasik. All management of security and organization of the trip is entrusted to you. The route along the front will be specified on the spot. Leave immediately for Gzhatsk, prepare a house for me to rest. Meet our special train the day after tomorrow. Clear?

- Clear. I can go?

- Go.

Serov went to the reception room, called his adjutant, lieutenant colonel Tuzhlov, to the people's commissariat and ordered to take his "alarming" suitcase, machine gun, grenades, food and urgently drive up to St. Basil's Cathedral in a "jeep".

From Moscow to the front zone, General Serov left the three of us with a driver and an adjutant. In Gzhatsk, he met the leader's special train. Here is how E. Khrutsky wrote about this from the words of his father-in-law:

"An armored eight-ton Packard of the leader, a truck with food, and communications equipment were unloaded from the wagons. And suddenly seventy-five burning Georgians appeared in the form of railway workers with machine guns.

- Who are you? Serov asked the elder.

— Security, comrade general.

Serov was delighted, the issue of Stalin's security was resolved. Seventy-five people - this is quite enough to tightly close all the approaches to the house where Stalin was staying.

However, to the surprise of the general, the leader ordered everyone to be immediately sent to Moscow.

"Serov was extremely surprised why Stalin refused to guard, especially since he had no people. Only he remained, his

Adjutant Tuzhlov, General Efimov, two drivers, Fomichev and Smirnov, and Stalin's driver, Colonel Khrustalev. True, the employees of the local RONKVD disguised themselves very professionally and Stalin did not notice them.

Beria returned, having sent guards, and, passing by Serov, muttered:

"I will remember this for you."

It was already after the end of the Great Patriotic War, two weeks before the trip to defeated Berlin for the Potsdam Conference, that Stalin would receive a document stating:

"7 regiments of the NKVD troops and 1,500 operational personnel were delivered for protection. Organized security in 3 rings. The head of the mansion's security is Lieutenant General Vlasik. Security of the conference site — Kruglov.

A special train has been prepared. The route is 1923 kilometers long (in the USSR - 1095, Poland - 594, Germany - 234). 17,000 NKVD troops and 1,515 operational personnel ensure the safety of the route. There are from 6 to 15 guards on each kilometer of the railway track. 8 armored trains of the NKVD troops will run along the line. (...)

July 2, 1945.

L. Beria.

The leader was no longer opposed, reassuring everyone who was involved in his protection. This time V.S. was not nervous either. Abakumov. His SMERSH was also ready to provide all the necessary measures, including the protection of the leader and the conference itself.

One of the main lessons for Viktor Semyonovich was the relationship with Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. His style of work. The scale of the tasks he solves and, of course, organizational skills.

As is known, Abakumov was nominated by Beria thanks to Kobulov. This is not forgotten, but in the "court intrigues" the feeling of gratitude gradually turns into a different quality - extreme caution. Because the slippery parquet of power is dangerous, first of all, for a young career.

General Commissar of State Security L.P. Beria is better known as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (1938). However, since March 1939, he has been a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, since February 1941 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's

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Commissars of the USSR. In this position, he oversaw the work of the NKVD, the NKGB, the people's commissariats of the timber and oil industries, non-ferrous metals, and the river fleet.

During the war years (June 30, 1941) Beria became a member of the State Defense Committee. As you know, it was in the hands of the State Defense Committee that all power in the country was concentrated. Since February 1942, Beria was entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the GKO decisions on the production of aircraft, engines, weapons and mortars, as well as monitoring the implementation of the GKO decisions on the work of the Red Army Air Force. In December 1942, Beria was appointed a member of the GKO Operations Bureau. At the same time, he was additionally entrusted with the duties of controlling and supervising the work of the People's Commissariat of the coal industry and the People's Commissariat of Railways. In May 1944, Beria was already appointed Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Chairman of the Operational Bureau (control and supervision of the work of all People's Commissariats of the defense industry, railway and water transport, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal, oil, chemical, rubber, paper and pulp, electrical industry, power plants).

Thus, L.P. During the war years, Beria carried out the most important assignments of the country's leadership and its ruling party, both related to the management of the national economy and at the front. Moreover, in 1944 it was he who was entrusted with "supervision over the development of work on uranium."

As is known, Abakumov was appointed one of Beria's deputies as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in February 1941. On July 19 of the same year, he became the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, and after the unification of the NKVD of the USSR and the NKGB of the USSR into a single People's Commissariat, he once again became deputy L.P. Beria. In April 1943, Stalin appointed Viktor Semyonovich as head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH of the NPO of the USSR - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. However, if he remains the head of the GUKR SMERSH until 1946, then the prefix "deputy people's commissar of defense" disappears already on May 20, 1943.

On this day, a special resolution of the State Defense Committee "On the deputies of the people's commissar of defense" was issued, according to which V.S. Abakumov, while remaining head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of SMERSH NPO, was relieved of his post as deputy NPO. As writes

Xia in the book "SMERSH", "among other deputies of the Supreme Commander of the military branches and heads of the Main Directorates."

The leader had only two deputies for NGOs: G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. At the same time, even now Viktor Semyonovich worked directly with the leader, although he was not his deputy. And all he had were two bosses: Stalin and Beria. And if the first was before the arrest of the future Minister of State Security, then the second was officially until December 1945, when Lavrenty Pavlovich was relieved of his post as head of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

Since March 1946, Lavrenty Pavlovich has been a member of the "seven" members of the Politburo (the most important issues of state administration, including foreign policy, foreign trade, state security, weapons, the functioning of the armed forces). And on May 4, 1946, V.S. Abakumov will be appointed Minister of State Security. That is, he will officially report directly to Stalin. Only then will Viktor Semyonovich be able to bypass his benefactor, being perfectly aware of his position. For in a state where the leader is the complete master, it is necessary to focus only on the leader. So, in fact, it was. And this despite the fact that since March 1946, Beria became a member of the Politburo, and, in addition, was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he supervised the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of State Control.

So since 1946, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was not so dangerous for the young Abakumov. Viktor Semyonovich already worked directly for the leader, having freed himself from the dangerous eye of Beria. But only in the period from March 1949 to July 1951, there will be a sharp strengthening of Beria's positions in the country's leadership, which will be facilitated by the successful testing of the first atomic bomb in the USSR, the work on the creation of which Lavrenty Pavlovich supervised. But it will be later.

But during the war years, Beria was the direct boss of Viktor Semyonovich. And in some ways more dangerous than the leader himself. Because Abakumov rarely communicated with Stalin and only in second and third roles. Most often, the head of the GUKR SMERSH met with Lavrenty Pavlovich, talked with him much more often by phone and most often sent various documents to him for his

SIGNATURE.

However, Beria never became a man. Why? Yes, because he was not a person close to him. Didn't enter his house. Was not admitted, as they say, to the body.

But it was the service under the leadership of Beria during the war years that became the most significant school, the most significant experience for Viktor Semyonovich. The young commissar of state security, and then General Abakumov, had a lot to learn from his boss. And especially in the most difficult time for the country ...

Lavrenty Pavlovich himself went to the front three times. Twice in August-September 1942 and in March 1943 to the Caucasus as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The third time he accompanied Stalin in August 1943 to the Kalinin Front. It was then when General Serov provided the protection of the leader.

After the arrest, Beria will be accused, among other things, of sabotage intentions, which were expressed in the refusal to give the front the divisions of the NKVD that were under his control.

"Why did you, having more than 120 thousand people of the NKVD troops at your disposal, not allow them to be used for the defense of the Caucasus?" Marshal I.S. will ask him. Konev.

"I affirm that there was no shortage of troops there. The passes were closed. I believe that we have done a lot of work to organize the defense of the Caucasus. I have not said before why I did not give the NKVD troops for the defense of the Caucasus. The fact is that the Chechens and Ingush were supposed to be evicted," a former comrade-in-arms of Stalin will answer.

As he writes in the book about Beria B.V. Sokolov, "at the very beginning of the war, on July 8, 1941, Beria authorized a military operation "to eliminate the Chechen bands" who had taken refuge in the Hildikharoevsky and Maistinsky gorges of Georgia, with the forces of 6 regiments of internal troops, reinforced by several detachments of the NKVD. The insurrectionary movement especially intensified in the summer of 1942, with the German troops approaching the Main Caucasian Range. During the days of Beria's stay in the Caucasus, at the end of August, Chechen detachments liquidated collective farms and Soviet bodies in a number of villages in mountainous Chechnya and entered into battle with military garrisons located in regional centers. In late September and early October, a major uprising broke out in the Vvedensky and Cheberloevsky districts, in the preparation of which German paratroopers took part. In total, up to 25 thousand rebels operated on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.

"The Karachays and Balkars also fought against the Soviet power, and it was restless in Dagestan," continues B.V. Sokolov. Under these conditions, Beria was afraid to send parts of the NKVD to the front, believing, not without reason, that then a wave of repression would flood the North Caucasus. Beria saw the only way to eliminate the insurgent movement in the immediate deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Karachais and Balkars, otherwise the Germans, if they managed to break through the Main Caucasian Range, would receive replenishment of tens of thousands of fighters - staunch opponents of the Soviet authorities. However, the encirclement of the German group in Stalingrad at the end of November 42 sharply changed the overall strategic situation in favor of the Soviet Union, including in the Caucasus, which made it possible to postpone the deportation.

Only in 1944, Lavrenty Pavlovich had to start the long-planned deportation of the North Caucasian peoples. In January 1944, Beria approved the "Instruction on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush", and in February he issued an order for the NKVD on the deportation of Chechens and Ingush.

On February 20, he arrived in Grozny with his assistants and personally supervised the operation, in which he involved up to 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and SMERSH, as well as about 100 thousand officers and soldiers of the NKVD troops, drawn from all over the country to participation in "exercises in the highlands".

On February 22, Beria met with the leadership of the republic and the highest spiritual leaders, warning them about the operation and inviting them to carry out the necessary work among  
population.

On the morning of the 23rd, the eviction operation began. The next day, Lavrenty Pavlovich reported to the leader: "The eviction is proceeding normally... Of the persons scheduled for removal in connection with the operation, 842 people were arrested." As a result of three operations, up to 650,000 Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks and Karachais will be deported to the eastern regions of the USSR.

In addition to these nationalities, Beria suggested to Stalin that the Balkars be evicted, and already on February 26, he signed the order "On measures to evict the Balkar population from the Design Bureau of the ASSR". On March 11, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs reported to the owner about the deportation of 37,103 Balkars.

As B.V. Sokolov, in total in 1944 "about 873 thousand Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush,

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Crimean Tatars, as well as Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians of Crimea. In total, including the first post-war years, 62 nations and nationalities were repressed. Of these, by October 1945, only 741.5 thousand people remained alive in places of exile in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.



Such "operations", equated to military ones, were also a good school for the head of the SMERSH counterintelligence department. Moreover, they were rewarded much more generously than for combat and especially important counterintelligence operations.

By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 8, 1944 Merkulov received the Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Kobulov received the Order of Suvorov 1st degree, Serov received the Order of Suvorov [degree. Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov was given the Order of Suvorov, 11th class. Apparently, only because of the smaller number of "Smershevites" participating in the operations in relation to the workers of the NKVD and the NKGB.

It is noteworthy that during the war years the head of the SMERSH Main Directorate of the Military Command received his first award during the war years, the order of the commander, in the spring of 1944, for the operation to evict the North Caucasian peoples.

Another of this kind of "combat" operations fell on the shoulders of Abakumov in the summer of 1945. Her backstory is...

"According to the Stalinist understanding, a small stratum of Poles who collaborated with the Nazi authorities were less "suspicious persons" in Poland than the people who supported the Polish government in exile and the Home Army, which organized the uprising in Warsaw in the summer of 1944, writes Anthony Beevor. - Stalin treated this event as a criminal anti-Soviet act. In his eyes, it was nothing more than an attempt to capture the Polish capital and move there the "London government in exile" right under the noses of the advancing Red Army. The army that fought and died for the liberation of Warsaw."

"... The Craiova Army was officially an armed force fighting on the side of the Allies" and "Stalin deliberately pursued a policy in which the Craiova Army and Ukrainian nationalists from the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) organization were put on the same plane. At least he was trying to prove that they worked closely together."

"The conviction of the Soviet leader in the need to liquidate the Home Army was clearly manifested in a small incident,

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occurred between the military representatives of the USSR and the USA. On February 5, 1945, shortly after the start of the Yalta Conference, an American B-17 aircraft piloted by Lieutenant Miron King made an emergency landing near the town of Kuflevo. Soon a young Pole approached the plane and asked the American pilots to take him with them. The guy was taken on board and taken to the airfield in Shchuchin, where it was planned to carry out a more thorough repair of the combat vehicle. The Pole was dressed in a flight uniform and, after landing, he was passed off as a member of the team, Jack Smith. General Antonov later noted in his report that it was only after the Soviets intervened that Lieutenant King was forced to admit that this Pole was not a member of the team, but a foreigner of whose origin they had no idea. Nevertheless, the Americans took him on board and wanted to take him to England. According to Antonov, this Pole is none other than a terrorist and saboteur sent to Poland from London. The United States government was forced to apologize. (...)

Stalin managed to unleash this incident in full. He told Averell Harriman, the American ambassador in Moscow, that this case proved that the US was supplying the White Poles to strike at the Red Army.

One way or another, but the repressions in Poland, carried out by the NKVD and SMERSH, fully affected the so-called Home Army. One such action took place in the summer of 1945. It is almost completely disclosed in the cipher telegram of Abakumov Beria No. 25212 dated July 21, 1945, in which the head of the SMERSH GUKR reported the following:

"In accordance with your instructions, on the morning of July 20, I was sent by plane to the city of Troiburg pom. early GUKR SMERSH Major General Gorgonov with a group of counterintelligence officers to carry out the liquidation of the bandits arrested in the Augustow forests... On July 19, a combing of these forests was carried out, 7049 people were detained. After the check, 5115 people were released, out of the remaining 1934 detainees, 844 bandits were identified and arrested, including 252 Lithuanians who had connections with gangs in Lithuania and therefore were transferred to local bodies of the NKVD-

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Lithuanian NKGB. 1090 people are being checked, of which 262 Lithuanians were transferred to the NKVD-NKGB bodies for the same reasons. Consequently, those arrested on July 21 this year. only 592 people are registered, and 828 people are detained, who are being checked. 11 mortars, 31 machine guns, 123 machine guns, rifles, pistols and grenades and 2 radio stations were confiscated from the arrested bandits in the forests in hiding places... (...)

If you find it necessary to conduct an operation after such a situation, then we plan to carry out the liquidation of the bandits in the following way:

1. Eliminate all identified bandits, in the amount of 592 people. For this purpose, an operational staff and a battalion of troops of the SMERSH Directorate of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which we have already tested in practice during a number of counterintelligence measures, will be allocated.

Operational workers and personnel of the battalion will be carefully instructed on the procedure for eliminating bandits.

2. During the operation, the necessary measures will be taken to prevent the escape of any of the bandits. For this purpose, in addition to a thorough briefing of operational workers and battalion soldiers, the forest areas where the operation will be carried out will be cordoned off and a preliminary search of the area will be carried out.

3. Responsibility for carrying out the liquidation of bandits will be assigned to the assistant chief of the SMERSH Main Directorate, Major General Gorgonov, and the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Zelenin.

T.t. Gorgonov and Zelenin are good and experienced Chekists and they WILL PERFORM this task.

The remaining 828 detainees will be checked within 5 days, and all bandits identified will be eliminated in the same way. You will be informed about the number of identified bandits from this group of detainees.

I ask for your instructions.

Abakumov "(Petrov N. According to the scenario of Stalin).

By the way, all these bandits in different periods of time from 1939 to 1945 were members of the formations of the same Home Army, and out of 592 people, only two were detachment commanders, three were platoon commanders, and the rest were privates. It is their execution that today is called "Little Katyn".

Moreover, modern historians argue that this kind of liquidation cannot be called the great merits of SMERSH counterintelligence. Well, today, in hindsight, everything is seen differently and in completely different colors. Nevertheless, all this was, just as there were really significant operations, battles won by the military security officers.

ABOUT THE TRIUMPH OF SMERSH AND HIS "APOSTLE"

Viktor Semyonovich headed the Directorate of Special Departments at the very beginning of the war, when military counterintelligence was just beginning to get on its feet, sometimes solving completely new tasks by trial and error. Often he personally selected people himself, creating a workable team around him, easily nominated those who showed good results and, in his opinion, were promising. Abakumov himself mastered his new position, studied with his subordinates. But it was during the Great Patriotic War that the military counterintelligence took a huge step forward.

Abakumov's subordinates first of all noted in him a strong grip. The chief always demanded the unquestioning execution of his instructions and never forgot about these instructions. Moreover, he never backed down from his decision, firmly insisting on his own. And further. Viktor Semyonovich quite often, based on the smallest details, made the right conclusions and made the right decisions. His senses were well developed. He paid the main attention to search work, he knew it well. He was a sharp person and held all his heads of departments in the center, all the heads of departments at the fronts firmly in his hands. There was no need to wait for indulgence in work from Abakumov.

According to the states of the central office of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, approved on August 15, 1941 and supplemented on January 24, 1942, Abakumov was entitled to three deputies and a secretariat. The department consisted of an operational department, an investigative department and 8 departments.

At the Higher School of the NKVD of the USSR, from June 26, 1941, training courses for operational workers for special departments of 850 people began to function.

In total, there were 387 people in the states of the Office of Special Departments. And in June 1942 they staffing amounted to

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225 people. But on the other hand, Abakumov became 4 deputies. The number of departments has increased to 12.

After the transformation of the Directorate of Special Departments into the Main Directorate (GUKR) of the SMERSH NPO of the USSR, the staff of the latter already amounted to 646 people, providing for the positions of four deputy chiefs and his 16 assistants with an apparatus of 69 operational employees at the level of department heads, senior security officers and assistant security officers. The new Regulations defined 14 departments as part of the GUKR SMERSH NCOs together with the secretariat.

For the training and retraining of the operational staff of SMERSH bodies, four permanent schools were organized (1st Moscow for 600 people, 2nd Moscow for 200 people, Tashkent for 300 people, Khabarovsk for 250 people) and courses with a four-month a period of study in the cities of Novosibirsk (250 people) and Sverdlovsk (250 people). The period of study in schools was indicated by Stalin himself: from six months to nine. At the beginning of November 1943, the Novosibirsk courses for the training of operational staff were organized into a school (400 people). Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and Saratov courses soon also became schools

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F.D. Bobkov in the summer of 1945 was sent to the Leningrad counterintelligence school SMERSH. In his memoirs, he recalls:

“The requirements for students at school were high, but we ourselves studied diligently, and not only from textbooks. Both practical exercises and theoretical training were carried out with us, widely using documents and files of military counterintelligence. Of course, the experience of the just ended war was also mastered.

It was very interesting to study. We got acquainted with the documents related to the exposure of the fascist agents operating in our rear, studied the methods of infiltrating these agents by the German special services, analyzed in detail the activities of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, sabotage and intelligence schools created by the Germans

in the occupied territory. Along with this, of course, we studied operations to infiltrate our intelligence and counterintelligence into the German special services, into sabotage schools and troop headquarters. It was necessary to master all this experience accumulated over the years, because work in counterintelligence will require very serious professional training.

Another state security veteran, B.V. Geraskin, in his book "Behind the Seven Seals" writes:

"The priority of the SMERSH organs — which their appointment obliged them to do — was given to the fight against espionage. In the search for and neutralization of numerous enemy agents, along with traditional methods, radio games were successfully used using the radio stations of the captured German agents. Work was also actively carried out to infiltrate the intelligence schools and punitive bodies of the Nazis. Investigative measures acquired a wide front, in particular, the creation of operational groups of employees with the inclusion of German agents who turned themselves in as identifiers. Acting at railway stations, bazaars, checkpoints and food checkpoints, and in other crowded places, the agents searched for and identified traitors known to them from joint studies in intelligence schools and stay in special camps. The apparatus of the head office literally bit by bit collected information about the wanted agents, carefully analyzed it and promptly issued orientations for subordinate bodies.

Other tasks assigned to the SMERSH bodies were also actively solved: the fight against terror, betrayal and desertion, misinformation of enemy intelligence services and the Wehrmacht, counterintelligence protection of offensive and defensive operations of the fronts and armies.

Counterintelligence officers V.S. Abakumov was opposed by a serious, if not to say, insidious opponent. According to historians, more than 130 reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence teams of the SD and the Abwehr operated on the Eastern Front alone, there were about 60 schools where agents were trained to be sent to the rear of the Red Army.

The German military intelligence and counterintelligence body Abwehr ("repulse", "defense", "defense") was formed in 1919 as a department of the War Ministry as a counterintelligence body of the Reichswehr.

Since 1935, the Abwehr was headed by Canaris Friedrich Wilhelm (1887-1945). He became the fifth and penultimate head of this body. The forty-eight-year-old admiral was born into the family of the director of a metallurgical plant. During the First World War he served on the Dresden cruiser as a lieutenant. And who knows who he would have become if not for a chain of accidents. In December 1914, the German squadron was

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destroyed by superior British forces off the Falkland Islands.

Only one Dresden cruiser managed to hide in the bays of Tierra del Fuego. But left without fuel and food supplies, the cruiser anchored in Chilean territorial waters, where the Glasgow cruiser suddenly appeared and opened fire on it from all guns.

Then it was decided to flood the ship. The wounded were evacuated by the Chilean authorities to Valparaiso, while the rest of the sailors and officers were interned on the island of Kiriakina.

On this island, Canaris perfectly studied Spanish and in the fall of 1915, posing as a Chilean, fled the island. The journey from the southwestern part of South America to Europe made the future chief of the Abwehr do the impossible - to travel 1,200 kilometers on foot or on horseback. In Argentina, Canaris made documents for himself under the name of the Chilean widower Reed, and under this name on the ship "Frisia" went to Rotterdam. During the voyage, in conversations with the British, he improved his knowledge of English.

Canaris took up reconnaissance work in the summer of 1916 in Madrid as an assistant to the German naval attaché, captain 111 rank von Kron. In Spanish ports, he acted as the Chilean Reid Rosas and recruited agents to monitor the movement of ships. In addition, his job included searching for ship captains and merchants who were ready to supply German submarine bases with food supplies. At the same time, he rushed to the front, torn between the sea and intelligence, until his report was satisfied.

However, he again needed to make an incredible journey through southern France and northern Italy to Switzerland. But the unexpected happened. When leaving Italy for Switzerland, Reid Rosas was arrested along with his companions. This cost Canaris several weeks of imprisonment awaiting court martial. Soon, through influential people and through diplomatic channels, reports arrived in Italy confirming the identity of Reid Rosas. Then the future admiral, together with a Spanish priest, was sent on a Spanish cargo ship via Marseilles from Genoa to Cartagena, with the hope that the French counterintelligence would expose the Chilean Reid Rosas as a spy for Germany. Therefore, Canaris had no choice but to open up to the captain of the ship and persuade him not to enter Marseille.

The captain agreed. In Cartagena, a German submarine managed to take Canaris on board on the port road only on the third attempt.

After a safe return, Canaris was transferred to the submarine fleet, and after a few months of training, he began teaching at a diving school. In 1918 he was appointed commander of a submarine, and in 1922 Canaris served as a senior officer on the cruiser Berlin. And yet the ways of the Lord again led him into exploration.

In 1938, on the basis of the counterintelligence of the Reichswehr, the Abwehr-foreign department was created under the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). The administration consisted of departments:

the Abwehr [was engaged in the collection of intelligence information about foreign armies and fleets, the training of radio operators, radio interception, the production of cover documents and operational equipment;

Abwehr P — preparation of sabotage and terrorist agents and their deployment behind enemy lines, the development and manufacture of means of terror and sabotage, the organization of sabotage and terrorist acts, the organization of national legions, the creation of Germans living in the territories of enemy countries, special formations to capture strategically important objects. At the disposal of the Abwehr-P were special military formations: the division "Brandenburg-800" and the regiment "Elector";

Abwehr Sh — counterintelligence work in the armed forces of Germany, military administrative and military-economic institutions and at objects of defense significance;

The foreign department of the Abwehr Abroad - by studying the economy and foreign and domestic policies of foreign states on the basis of information received from military attachés, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other official institutions abroad; development of issues of interaction between the German army and the armies of other countries; the study of international press and broadcasting;

Central department - staffing; the provision of material and financial resources, the development of mobilization plans for the Abwehr in wartime.

Abverstelle were the main links of the Abwehr and carried out practical counterintelligence and sabotage work against the USSR in each military district. They were subordinate to the corresponding departments of the Abwehr-abroad administration and coordinated their work with the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the military districts (departments "1-C").

In the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, four territorial bodies of the Abwehr were organized: Abverstelle - Ukraine, Abverstelle - South of Ukraine, Abverstelle - Crimea, which identified agents of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as persons who were hostile to Nazi Germany, fought with partisans and prepared their agents for

army front teams. In large cities occupied by the Wehrmacht, local counterintelligence departments, the Abvernebenstelle (ANST), were created, and their branches, Lusenstelle, were located in small cities located near the border and convenient for agents to drop in.

In June 1941, in order to conduct reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, a special body, the Abwehr Abroad Headquarters, was created. He was subordinate to the relevant departments of the Directorate of the Abwehr Abroad and the department for the study of foreign armies of the OKW of the Eastern Front. A few words about this department.

The department "Foreign Armies of the East" solved the tasks of studying the state of affairs in the Red Army. On April 1, 1942, it was headed by General Reinhard Gehlen. The first group dealt with the weekly assessment of the enemy's forces and the position of his troops. The second group assessed the prospects for the situation by analyzing the information received and supplementing it with materials from other sources. The third group, with the help of specialists in Russia, was engaged in the translation of documents. As a result of the agreement reached between Canaris and Gehlen, the following scheme for the passage of intelligence information was developed: all military intelligence units that conducted operations in the army's zone of operations reported their results to its intelligence department and at the same time to the intelligence department of the army group. From there, she was heading to the 1-C service and, in parallel, to the Wally 1 headquarters. From the headquarters of "Valli 1" to the department "Foreign armies of the East". At the same time, the Abwehr received copies of all documents submitted to the Gehlen department. The Wally's chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Heinz Schmalschleger.

The first department directed military and economic intelligence on the Soviet-German front. Under his command were intelligence teams and groups attached to the headquarters of army groupings and armies to conduct intelligence work in the corresponding sectors of the front, as well as an economic intelligence team and groups that collected intelligence in prisoner of war camps;

The second department dealt with Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgroups to carry out sabotage and terrorist work in units and in the rear of the Red Army;

The third department is responsible for the counterintelligence activities of the Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgroups subordinate to it in the fight against Soviet intelligence officers, partisans, anti-fascists in the occupied territory, in the front-line, army, corps and divisional rear areas.

The headquarters of "Valli" also subordinated two reconnaissance schools with a branch and an air squadron (4-6 aircraft).

In March 1942, a special counterintelligence body, Sondershtab-R, was formed at the headquarters of the Wally. This department carried out intelligence work to identify partisan detachments, anti-fascist organizations and groups in the rear of the German army. Since 1943, he launched work on undercover intelligence in the rear of the Soviet troops.

The first department was engaged in intelligence work, the second department was engaged in counterintelligence, the third department was engaged in propaganda with the aim of disintegrating partisan detachments, and the fourth department was administrative and economic work.

Headed "Sondershtab-R" Boris Alekseevich Smyslovsky.

In March 1942, the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany created a special reconnaissance and sabotage body for subversive activities for the political decomposition of the Soviet rear - the Zeppelin Enterprise.

In its work, Zeppelin interacted with the Abwehr, the command of the Wehrmacht and with the imperial ministry for the occupied eastern regions.

Subordinate to the Uÿ management of the RSHA as a special unit, Uÿ Tsep is a member of the Uÿ C group (department) that conducted political intelligence against the USSR and the countries of the Middle East. The headquarters of the "Zeppelin" consisted of the office of the head of the body and three departments: "Tsep-1" was engaged in

acquisition, operational management and supply; "Tsep-2" - training agents; "Tsep-3" - processing all materials about the activities of special camps, front-line teams and agents deployed to the rear areas. In its work, Zeppelin was guided by the "Action Plan for the Political Decay of the Soviet Union".

In itself, the mechanism of interaction between the Gestapo, the security service and the Abwehr was defined in a document called

"The Ten Commandments of Cooperation" (1936), which followed a clear delineation of their powers. Military intelligence in the enemy countries remained under the jurisdiction of the Abwehr, and the sphere of counter-espionage only mainly belonged to the Abwehr, despite the fact that the concept itself was somewhat blurred in the signed agreement. The Abwehr was in charge of preparing covert combat use in case of war (reconnaissance and sabotage operations).

The Secret State Police were in charge of the operational investigation of all serious state crimes and the extraction of political information from abroad, especially from countries hostile to Germany.

In 1938, another reorganization of the SD foreign intelligence service was carried out into the Sixth Directorate of the GUIB, which in the summer of 1941 was headed by Walter Schellenberg. And less than a year later, another agreement was concluded between the SD and the Abwehr, along the lines of the Ten Commandments. But this was already the program of Schellenberg, who, according to Gehlen, "cooperated in good faith with representatives of Canaris within the framework of an agreement concluded between the military intelligence and counterintelligence department and the police services. However, the situation changed as soon as Schellenberg became the chief of foreign intelligence of the security service."

"By the end of February 1942, the position of Admiral Canaris was no longer secure," Schellenberg wrote in his memoirs. "His friends and subordinates could not have been unaware of this, but I knew that Hitler was seriously considering the question of how to get rid of him." Indeed, Hitler was not satisfied with the head of the Abwehr in many respects. So Hitler's plan to invent an impeccable pretext (operation) for attacking Poland and entrusted to Heindrich and Admiral Canaris only disgusted the latter. The admiral still managed to evade its implementation. Over time, he culturally refused the Fuhrer's task to kill Churchill and similarly ignored his order to search for the fled French General Henri Giraud, the French High Commissioner in North Africa. According to Gehlen, "Canaris strongly rejected political assassinations. His deep religious conviction absolutely forbade him to even think of such a possibility." The admiral was seriously concerned about the approaching

war with Russia.

Schellenberg recalled: "He sharply criticized the leaders of the Wehrmacht, who, despite excellent knowledge, were so irresponsible and stupid that they supported a man like Hitler with his idea to end the Russian campaign within three months. Canaris did not share the Fuhrer's point of view either, and could not understand how such generals as Brauchitsch, Keitel and Jodl could be so placid, out of touch with life optimists. However, it was useless to protest.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel once told him:

"My dear Canaris, you may know something about military intelligence matters, but you are a sailor and you should not try to give us lessons in strategic and political planning."

Admiral's assistant Oscar Raile described his boss as follows:

"At 38, he already had snow-white hair. Therefore, the officers of the Abwehr among themselves very soon began to call the admiral "old man" or "gray-haired". But experience and extraordinary

fate made Canaris, above all, extremely silent, one of those who showed sincere concern for all the suffering and needy, who knew a lot about good, evil and unrealizable. Such people prefer to remain silent rather than act recklessly or even immodestly. He couldn't stand chatterboxes and braggarts. But at the same time, he was not an unsociable person in society. True, Canaris listened with pleasure, but if he said something after those present had long and lengthy discussions about any subject, then often, to their surprise, it was found out how carefully he followed the discussion and what deep conclusions ladies came."

Back in 1935, the admiral created a completely new direction of the Abwehr - counter-espionage ... Gehlen, like many other officers who respected the head of the Abwehr, along with religiosity and loyalty to officer honor, was most struck by the fundamental education of Canaris. A rare phenomenon among the highest officers of the Wehrmacht. According to Gehlen, Canaris had the ability to understand the interrelationships of a global scale: "His subtle perception of the development of political events was connected with this, which he quite often retold with amazing accuracy."

One of the shortcomings of the Abwehr in World War II was the lack of a department that would analyze and evaluate the post.

soldering intelligence information. In his book Gehlen draws the following conclusion on this matter: "As a result of the lack of a constant and systematic analysis using all the materials available in the department, undercover reports were rated too highly."

But Canaris himself was an excellent analyst, but he could not do this work alone. But the most serious problem for Canaris and his organization was the struggle of the security service (SD) for leadership, since the admiral had to constantly counteract these reconnaissance operations, which often bore the stamp of haste and amateurism. According to Gehlen, "he was in the position of the defending side, because he did not have the support of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht."

In 1942, Canaris persistently warned Gehlen about the cunning of the chief of foreign intelligence, Schellenberg. It is believed that he "figured out the intention of Himmler and his assistants to take the Abwehr into their own hands."

On a Sunday evening in August 1944, Walter Schellenberg received an order from SS-Obergruppenführer Müller to go to Canaris and inform him that he had been arrested. Then take him to Furstenberg and not return with him to Berlin until everything is cleared up.

And the decline of the admiral's career began much earlier. In February 1944, Canaris was suspended from work after Abwehr agent Fermeren fled to Cairo from Turkey. Hitler was furious. He ordered to convey to Canaris: "The Führer, in connection with the incident with Fermeren, ordered that the Abwehr be reassigned to the Main Directorate of Imperial Security." But then there was the conspiracy of July 20, 1944, which was investigated by Müller and Kaltenbrunner.

When Schellenberg arrived in Berlin-Schlachtensee, Canaris himself opened the door for him. They talked in private, and the chief of political intelligence explained to him the essence of the matter and the nature of his tasks.

"It's a pity," the admiral replied, "that we have to say goodbye in such an environment. However, we will overcome it. Promise me honestly that within the next three days you will provide me with the opportunity to talk to Himmler in person. All the rest - Kaltenbrunner and Müller - are just dirty executioners, thirsting for my blood."

As it turned out, two courier bags with incriminating documents were found in the safe of one of Canaris's offices.



documents. Nevertheless, he was not executed, but sent to the Flossenburg concentration camp in Bavaria. Only in April 1945 did Hitler give the order for the execution of the admiral.

Walter Schellenberg took over the military intelligence department, whose functions were divided between the 4th and 6th departments of the RSHA.

The first and second departments were merged into the "MIL service" (RSHA), the third department in an abbreviated form retained a certain number of specialists in the protection of military secrets for the Wehrmacht, and the fourth department and the department of management were disbanded.

As Oscar Reile wrote, "Admiral Canaris's life's work was thoughtlessly destroyed to the detriment of the Reich." But it was precisely such an opponent that SMERSH defeated under the leadership of V.S. Abaku-mov.

As the authors of the SMERSH book note, "only after the victory of the Soviet troops near Moscow, and then near Stalingrad, the activity of the special departments of the NKVD of the USSR in the fight against the special services of the enemy increased. Gradually, a system was formed to collect operational data on German intelligence agencies, their structure, deployment and personnel, on the methods of their subversive and espionage work, on equipment and camouflage. The work of special officers behind the front was also getting better."

For example, by the middle of the summer of 1942, the NKVD of the USSR registered 36 German military intelligence schools operating in the territory temporarily occupied by the Nazi invaders, and received data on 1,500 intelligence officers and saboteurs from among prisoners of war. On the German side, it was considered a success if at least one of the 10 agents recruited in a hurry carried out the assigned task. However, the massive deployment of practically untrained and unverified agents into the Soviet rear did not achieve its goal.

For example, in February 1943, a suspicious citizen "N" was detained in the city of Maloarkhangelsk. He looked mentally ill, his speech was incoherent, his behavior was unconventional, and his sloppy clothes were defiant. The "mentally ill" "N" wandered around the city and its environs every day, often appearing in the areas where military units were located. This attracted the attention of counterintelligence officers. After checking the documents, they did not find anything suspicious, as they confirmed his incapacity and were in perfect order. However, operational

However, we decided to proceed with the test. "Blessed" was released, and, surprisingly, in the basement of the destroyed house, where he "led" the "Smershevites", a portable radio station of the "North" type, a "Nagant" revolver, food and money in the amount of 9225 rubles were found. The ciphers and the schedule of radio communication sessions became the property of the counterintelligence officers.

The "mentally ill" turned out to be the route agent (radio operator) Deev, aka Fomin, born in 1919, a native of the Oryol region. He graduated from the Oryol intelligence school and, on the instructions of the head of the school, was left in the city of Maloarkhangelsk after the retreat of the German troops. For better legal residence and movement, the agent was provided with a certificate from the evacuation hospital and a birth certificate addressed to Sergey Petrovich Mashenin.

According to documents, in 1941-1944, the special departments of the NKVD of the USSR and the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR from 55 to 65% of all enemy agents were identified and exposed directly in the combat zone. In 1945, this figure reached 88%. Moreover, "if in 1941 the frontline zone accounted for about 45% of the total number of agents of the fascist special services exposed by the military counterintelligence agencies, then in 1943 this figure increased to 55%." Only in the period of preparation and during the Battle of Kursk, counterintelligence officers of the Western, Bryansk, Central and Voronezh fronts neutralized more than 1,500 German agents and saboteurs. Counterintelligence officers of the Central Front in June and July 1943 neutralized fifteen reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the enemy. Some of them were intended to attack the headquarters of the front and commit

terrorist act against the commander of the front, General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky.

"By the summer of 1943, the reorganization and the main personnel appointments for the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies were practically carried out," says Doctor of Law V. Khristoforov. — They coincided with the period when, after the winter offensive of 1942/1943, the Red Army was ordered to go on the defensive, consolidate on the achieved lines, accumulate and regroup forces and means for further offensive operations against the Soviet Union. German front.

The Germans, for their part, also took measures to transfer troops and equipment eastward from Western Europe and Africa, and after

powerful and successful counterattack south of Kharkov in February-March 1943, they took up a strong defense and prepared for a decisive battle on the so-called Kursk salient. The armies of the Wehrmacht were replenished not only with people, but also with new types of armored vehicles and aircraft. Hitler's troops were still a formidable force.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence played an extremely important role. They managed not only to detect in advance the preparation by the Germans of an offensive in the Kursk direction, but also to determine the place and date of the operation. Having comprehensive information about the plans of the enemy, the Soviet command on the Kursk Bulge chose the tactics of "deliberate defense" with the subsequent transition to the counteroffensive. In accordance with this task, the USSR special services were given the goal of strengthening disinformation measures in order to hide the preparation of a Soviet offensive operation. To achieve this goal, military counterintelligence officers actively used radio games, broadcasting from radio stations captured from enemy agents.

As a result of the battle near Kursk and Belgorod, an attempt at a large-scale offensive by the Wehrmacht was thwarted.

By the way, the radio was mastered by the special services of the warring states during the Second World War. Therefore, radio games with enemy reconnaissance have become the latest direction in their activities, the main task of which was the systematic transmission of false information to the opposing enemy, on the one hand, and on the other hand, thanks to radio games, military counterintelligence agencies maintained the enemy's confidence that the reconnaissance groups abandoned by him are working quite actively. This, of course, stopped them from further action.

Enemy agents captured along with portable shortwave transceivers were used to conduct radio games.

And those agents who usually cooperated, working under control, systematically conveyed false information to the enemy. Since the spring of 1943, all radio games, except for the games "Mo Nastyr", "Couriers" and "Berezina", were under the jurisdiction of the GUKR SMERSH. As Yu. Lenchevsky emphasizes, "during the war years, 152 radio stations supplied the German intelligence services with disinformation, encouraging them to actively develop the allegedly favorable

current operational situation. About 500 well-trained enemy agents, a significant amount of weapons, radio equipment, money and food fell into the hands of the Chekists thanks to the skillful conduct of radio games.

According to V.N. Stepanov, the author of the book "People's Commissar of SMERSH", "... the main role in successful radio games belonged to Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov. It was he who went against the then existing criminal legislation, which interpreted that the consent of the Soviet a person to cooperate with foreign intelligence is already treason. Abakumov exempted German agents who confessed from criminal punishment, which dramatically increased the effectiveness of the fight against the Abwehr.

Researchers B. Syromyatnikov and N. Poroskov believe that "Abakumov was ahead of his time: only in 1960 did the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopt an addition to Article 1 of the Law on Criminal Liability for State Crimes — a citizen recruited by foreign intelligence is not subject to criminal liability if he did not perform any actions in fulfillment of the criminal task and voluntarily declared to the authorities about his connection with foreign intelligence.

In September 1943, taking into account the accumulated experience of military counterintelligence over the first two years of the war, "Instructions for organizing the search for enemy intelligence agents" were developed. According to this document, "all enemy intelligence agents, without exception, and in the first place, agents who have already been transferred to our side or are scheduled to be thrown out in the near future" were subject to search.

The grounds for declaring a person on the operational wanted list as an enemy intelligence agent were: testimonies of arrested and exposed enemy intelligence agents; statement and testimonies of witnesses; testimonies of prisoners of war from among the former official employees of the enemy; messages from behind-the-front agents and other agents of the Soviet state security organs; lists and other documentary materials on agents captured from enemy intelligence agencies. For each enemy agent (if it was possible to carry out active search measures), a search file was started.

Upon receipt of information about enemy agents in the SMERSH counterintelligence departments of the army, they began promptly

search activities. According to all search orientations and bulletins, the SMERSH counterintelligence bodies systematically checked the personnel of the headquarters of military formations and units, all military personnel of reserve regiments, as well as persons who entered filtration points, camps, escaped from captivity and left the encirclement.

When SMERSH organized an operational search, the tactics of using detective agents, identifying agents, and route agents were of great importance.

Investigative agents acted in places with a large concentration of military personnel. Identification agents were selected from the number of exposed or confessed enemy intelligence officers and saboteurs, who knew well the faces of German agents preparing for the transfer or already operating in the Soviet rear.

The practice of creating operational-search groups (3-4 people) in the frontline zone (3-4 people: an operative worker, a recruited enemy intelligence agent, an external surveillance intelligence officer or a junior commander from a security company of a special department) has also become widespread.

In May 1943, the first collection of "Materials for Recognizing "Forged Documents"" was published. It was the first to systematize the tricks of the enemy to forge fictitious documents. Thus, the experience of exposing enemy agents was systematically generalized. In September 1943, the second collection was published, dedicated to the description of the seals and stamps used by the enemy to "sanctify" the same fakes. And soon a third. Based on the materials of the collections, "Brief pocket guides for checking documents" were prepared, which were also received by SMERSH employees.

In order to expose the enemy agents in July 1944, a special collection of "Materials for the recognition of counterfeit orders and medals of the USSR, manufactured by German intelligence" was published.

One of the military counterintelligence investigators during the war years was Boris Syromyatnikov. In an interview with Evgeny Zhirnov, he told a lot of interesting things:

"How did you become a detective, Boris Aleksandrovich?

— In the forty-first year, immediately after the start of the war, I went to the front as a volunteer and became a political fighter. It was a special

A category of military personnel, intended, we were told, to cement our retreating troops. We were dressed in officer uniforms - we even had commander's breeches - blue, but we had no ranks. We were sent to the Western Front, and almost immediately we found ourselves in battle. Our regiment stopped the Germans. But two-thirds of the guys from our group of political fighters died in this battle. On August 9, 1941, in the battle near Kamenka, I was wounded. Then there was a hospital, a reserve regiment. And from there, already in the forty-two, as a person with an incomplete higher education and, moreover, a good knowledge of the German language, I was sent to study at the Higher School of the NKVD. And after its completion in January 1943 - to the front-line counterintelligence agencies.

— And how many spies did you catch?

- I believe that as many as fell into my field of vision - two. I especially remember the German agent-saboteur Georgy Garkusha, who was thrown not for the first time. He was wanted by SMERSH and other state security agencies. He came to our regiment with reinforcements under the name of Sokolov. Based on the details of his behavior, I suspected something was wrong; despite his purely Ukrainian appearance, he had a Russian surname. He did not correspond with anyone. I managed to establish his true name. Then I checked him according to the orientation of the search and made sure that he was known as an agent of the Brandenburg-800 subversive agency.

The regiment in which I was a counterintelligence officer reached Berlin, right up to the Reichstag. I was included in the search group of German intelligence workers. We were located in the elite district of Berlin — Dahlem. Large industrialists, bankers, scientists and many top Nazi officials lived there. Some of them went to the West, others hid. But I realized that almost any day the remaining bosses would run to the Americans and the British. I figured out which routes they could take to leave Dahlem, took a platoon of guards from the counterintelligence department, then another dozen soldiers of the regiment and set up ambushes.

There were about forty people. And each of them was a big shot. Among the detainees were several major engineers, an admiral, the Deputy Reich Minister of Mines and one intelligence officer. The most important thing was to use the element of surprise - to interrogate them before they recovered from the shock. And in this state, they told a lot of interesting things in general and for our search in particular: who else managed to escape, where they are hiding.

Later, when I was already an employee of the counterintelligence department of the 1st Panzer Army, I detained six employees of the central apparatus of German military intelligence, the Abwehr. They gave information about their other colleagues, but the results of further searches were disappointing. Most of the German intelligence officers moved in advance under the wing of our Anglo-American allies.

— Did you look for the file cabinet of the German agents?

— But how! And it turned out that it was destroyed. But two employees of the Abwehr, secretly from each other and from the authorities, filmed the data on the agents. We started looking for them, but too late. I established that Huebner, head of the Abwehr-Kartai department, handed over his film library to the Americans in the town of Probst-Zella in Thuringia. Of course, having previously spoken out the terms of service from the new owners. The Americans also received a second set of films. We got, one might say, a consolation prize — Abwehr employee Sophia Louise Norvolt-Haupt. She established contacts with French intelligence, but did not have time to escape. This lady had a phenomenal memory and gave us information about the employees and agents of the Abwehr. It was after this operation that I was transferred to serve in the search department of the SMERSH department of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany.

- And who were you looking for?

- Agents of recent allies - the British and Americans. They recruited thousands of Germans and sent them to our zone of occupation. I had to deal with the British intelligence network at the uranium mines in Thuringia - at the Wismuth JSC, which belonged to the USSR. We received information that top secret information about the work of "Wismuth" goes to the West, and began a search. There was practically nothing complicated here. The suspects were identified and interrogated. One of them confessed to working for the British. And he named those English agents whom he knew. They, in turn, named others. So in a few days the entire network was neutralized. And after this success, the leadership offered me to move to the investigative department. But I categorically refused.

He knew only too well that most investigators' careers end tragically. And in September 1950, I was transferred to the investigative department of our head office...

- And you got access to the famous "Search Book

SMERSH"?

— I had access to it as needed both during the war and while working in Germany. There is an aura of mystery around her, but these were simply alphabetical lists of foreign intelligence agents and traitors of all kinds. Installation data and descriptions of the acts committed by them. As the changes accumulated - some were found, additional data was obtained on others - the book was republished. Reading the "Search Book" was more interesting than any detective story.

- For example?

— I remember that there were data on the commander of the warship of the Baltic Fleet, who, together with his senior assistant, shot the senior detective, took his ship to the Germans and surrendered. I remember that there were data on Alexander Tvardovsky's brother, Ivan. The fact that, having been captured by the Finns, he became an agent of Finnish intelligence, was transferred to our rear and had Finnish and German awards for this.

In the summer of 1943, in the SMERSH Directorates of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, for the first time in operational practice, a unique operation in its own way called "Staging "Treason to the Motherland"" was developed and carried out.

So, on June 19, Abakumov was reported from the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the Bryansk Front on the results of operational-Chekist measures under the code name "Treason to the Motherland":

"In May of this year. The 415th and 356th Rifle Divisions of the 61st Army and the 5th Rifle Division of the 63rd Army were the most affected by the betrayal of the Motherland, of which 23 servicemen went over to the enemy. One of the most effective measures to combat traitors to the Motherland, among others, was the performance of staging operations under the guise of group surrenders to the enemy of military personnel, which were carried out at the initiative of the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the Fronts under the guidance of experienced operatives, army counterintelligence departments.

The operations took place on June 2 and 3 of this year. in the sectors of the 415th and 356th rifle divisions with the task of: under the guise of surrendering our servicemen to get close to the Germans, throw grenades at them, so that in the future the enemy would meet the traitors with fire and destroyed.

Three groups of servicemen of the 415th and 356th divisions were selected and carefully checked for the operation. To each group

included 4 people.

In the 415th Rifle Division, one group consisted of the division's scouts, and the second group consisted of staffers.

In the 356th division, one group of scouts of the division <...> was created.

After the selection of the group, they were assigned to the rear of the division, where they underwent special training under the guidance of experienced commanders.

In preparation, special attention was paid to the ability of those participating in the operation to effectively throw grenades at the Germans and quickly hide after it was completed. The preparation was carried out on a terrain similar to the intended areas of action <...>.

At the same time, specific locations for the groups' actions were outlined, action plans and calculations of artillery and mortar fire were prepared to support the groups during the operation.

The places for the operation of the groups were chosen where there were cases of group crossings of the front line by traitors to the Motherland. On June 2, 1943, the first and second (groups) operated in the defense area, on June 3 of this year. a third group operated in the defense area of the 356th Rifle Division.

Operation of the first group (scouts) of the 415th division

June 2 this year At 04:00, after concentrating on the starting line, the group crawled up to the German wire fence, got up and, raising their hands, began to look for a passage in the wire fence. The Germans immediately noticed the marchers and began to call them to them. Three Germans, led by an officer, went out to meet the scouts, approaching the group at a wire fence at 30 m. The scouts threw grenades at the approaching Germans, destroying three Germans, and returned without loss.

The withdrawal of the group was supported by fire from all types of weapons.

Operation of the second group of the 415th rifle division (penalty boxes)

June 2 this year at 3.00 the group concentrated on the starting line 100 meters from the enemy, not far from our wire fence.

At 0400, in two groups of two, with their hands raised, they went to the wire fence, one of the first was holding a white sheet of paper in his hands, which meant a German leaflet.

At the entrance to the wire fence of the Germans, the group saw two German soldiers, who began to indicate the place of passage of the Che

cut the barrier.

The group, having passed the German barbed wire, noticed that there were two lines of communication from the latter to the German trenches, and about 20 German soldiers were waiting for the group in the trenches. When approaching the concentration of Germans at 30 m, the group threw grenades at the German soldiers. And after using the entire stock of grenades, under the cover of artillery and mortar fire, she retreated to our trenches. When leaving, two people from the group were slightly injured, and now are

in line.

Operation of the third group of the 356th division (scouts)

June 3 this year at 0300, the group left the starting line and reached the wire fence of the Germans, where they were met by one German soldier, who stopped them with the word: "halt".

When the leader of the group named the password for the transition - "bayonets to the ground", the German began to show the way to the passage, being 20 meters from the group.

At this time, he was bombarded with grenades, and the group returned to their trenches. The enemy opened fire on the group, but none of them were wounded.

All groups performed the tasks assigned to them excellently, no incidents occurred during the operations.

A question was raised before the military council of the 61st Army on rewarding the participants in the operation, as well as on the removal of a criminal record from a group of Red Army soldiers of the penal company of the 415th division..."

No less successful was the work of SMERSH on the centralization of off-front activities, which very soon gave positive results. Only in the first ten months since the formation of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, 75 agents were introduced into German intelligence agencies and schools, and 38 of them, having successfully completed their tasks, returned to their own.

According to generalized data, front-line agents provided information on 359 official employees of the German military intelligence and 978 identified spies and saboteurs, who were being prepared for transfer to the location of the Red Army units. Subsequently, 176 enemy intelligence officers were arrested by the SMERSH authorities. In addition, 85 agents of the German special services turned themselves in, and five recruited employees of the German

Russian intelligence remained to work in their intelligence units on the instructions of the Soviet counterintelligence.

From September 1943 to May 1944, 345 front-line agents were deployed behind enemy lines, including 50 recruited German intelligence officers. Of these, 102 returned after completing the assignment. 57 agents infiltrated the intelligence agencies, 31 of them returned, and 26 agents remained to carry out SMERSH assignments.

During the operations, 69 German intelligence officers were recruited, of which 29 came to the Soviet state security agencies, the rest remained in German intelligence schools. In total, in six months, 620 official employees and 1103 agents of enemy intelligence agencies were identified. Of this number, SMERSH authorities arrested 273 agents.

In 1943-1944, it became widely practiced to send intelligence groups (operational workers, agents and radio operators) behind enemy lines in order to collect information about enemy intelligence agencies and special schools, infiltrate them, and also capture staff members, agents and Nazi accomplices. In the first ten months of the forty-three year alone, seven intelligence groups subordinate to the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence were sent to the German rear. Out of 44 people, the groups lost only four, while on enemy territory they attracted 68 people to cooperate with Soviet counterintelligence.

On December 27, 1941, Stalin signed the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on the state check (filtering) of the Red Army soldiers who were captured or surrounded by enemy troops (No. 2069 ss). No less stringent procedure was carried out in relation to the operational composition of the state security agencies.

Within the limits of the army rear, the People's Commissariat of Defense created collection and transit points, to which all servicemen were sent in the territories liberated from the enemy. The verification was carried out by operational officers of special departments at special camps in the Vologda, Ivanovo, Tambov and Stalingrad regions. By March 1942, there were 19 special camps. Their task included the filtering of military personnel, which included the identification of traitors, spies and deserters among them, as well as uncompromised persons suitable for

for further service.

Filtration in SMERSH was carried out by the 2nd department of counterintelligence. The primary check of the Red Army servicemen was one of those tasks that was solved by the third departments of the second departments of the directorates of the KR SMERSH fronts. At the army collection and transit (SG)) and front-line check-filtration points (PFL), this check was carried out by personal search and written explanations about the circumstances of being in captivity. Only then

an interrogation was conducted, during and after which counterintelligence operatives identified contradictions in the answers and organized undercover investigations of the suspects. For each person being checked, a file (accounting) was opened with protocols of interrogation and a conclusion based on the results of filtration. A form file was opened against the suspect with the inclusion of materials of an operational nature. Filtration was completed in the front-line PFL, where the corresponding work continued for two months (respectively, in the SPP and PFL, five to ten days). In the PFL, work was carried out in the operational and investigative areas, taking into account the filtering carried out at the SPP and PFL. It should be noted that in terms of scale and scope, forces and means, operational-search and investigative work to filter out prisoners of war of enemy armies, former Soviet prisoners of war, as well as in the state verification of repatriates from among Soviet citizens, had no analogues in the history of the world's special services.

By the summer of 1945, 43 special camps and 26 test filtration camps operated on the territory of the USSR. On the territory of Germany and other countries of Eastern Europe, there were 74 more check-filtration camps and 22 collection points.

Special camps were under the jurisdiction of the USSR NKVD Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees. The "special contingent" was involved in hard forced labor in mines, in the metallurgical industry, at construction sites and logging.

At the end of 1943, special camps were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Gulag, and the "special contingent" was given equal rights with prisoners. Over time, in addition to special camps, filtration camps and special spare military units appeared.

V. Khristoforov tells about one more aspect of the activities of the SMERSH GUKR during the war years:

"The expansion of the scale and growth of the pace of offensive operations of the Soviet troops on the territory of Germany and other European

countries also demanded from the security agencies a larger and more effective operational search work. In this regard, in early January 1945, Stalin approved the initiative to introduce the institution of authorized NKVD of the USSR on all fronts of the Western theater of military operations. Representatives of the NKVD on all seven fronts were appointed major heads of state security and internal affairs. <...>

Commissioners of the NKVD of the USSR were not released from their direct duties. Their deputies were the acting chiefs of the UKR SMERSH of the fronts and the chiefs of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the front.

But in essence, the commissioners of the NKVD of the USSR at the fronts were the main operational chiefs, and their deputies directly carried out and coordinated the work related to the search for enemy agents, ensuring the impenetrability of the front line, clearing the rear of the Red Army from hostile elements, guarding railway junctions and industrial enterprises. Commissioners of the NKVD on the fronts were ordered to immediately carry out measures to identify and arrest members of various enemy organizations, bandit groups, to identify and seize illegal radio stations, weapons depots, underground printing houses, material and technical bases intended for sabotage work.

To implement these tasks, the NKVD Plenipotentiaries for the fronts allocated specially created operational groups, which were entrusted with the task of identifying and arresting employees of the intelligence and punitive organs of the enemy, leaders and members of collaborationist formations, as well as persons who served in the national legions of the SS and so on.

In the process of carrying out these operational measures, the authorized NKVD of the USSR used the forces and means of the counterintelligence agencies of the SMERSH fronts, in addition, all the troops of the NKVD to protect the rear of the fronts numbering 31 thousand 99 people were under their command. Additionally, for these purposes, they were also separated from the internal,



border and rifle troops of the NKVD four divisions and four separate regiments with a total number of 27 thousand 900 people who should have arrived by January 20, 1945 in the regions their use.

1050 experienced security officers were seconded to the offices of the commissioners, uninterrupted high-frequency communication with Moscow was provided.

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As subsequent events showed, the offices of the commissioners played an important role in concentrating and coordinating the efforts of the relevant departments to carry out operational search activities and operations in the areas of offensive operations of the Red Army. In the last months of decisive battles, such a measure was fully justified. Special powers made it possible to carry out maneuvering of forces and means, to closely link the actions of SMERSH bodies with the plans of the military command. The presence of such powers made it possible to accurately and timely inform the country's leadership and almost daily coordinate with them issues that had not only military, but also political significance: after all, the events took place on the territory of foreign states.

As emphasized in the SMERSH book, "in the certificate of the losses of military counterintelligence officers, compiled on the basis of data received from the fronts as of March 1, 1944, it was indicated: 3,725 people were killed, 3,092 were missing, wounded and 3520 people left in hospitals. At the same time, 609 army Chekists returned from captivity or left the enemy's encirclement." And this is also another side of military counterintelligence.

Boris Alexandrovich Syromyatnikov once told about one of his colleagues, about one "of more than 12,000 military counterintelligence officers who laid down their lives during the Great Patriotic War."

"The biography of Prokopy Popov is very typical for that era. Born in 1914 in the village of Barok, Vologda Oblast, he began his career at the age of 15 on a collective farm. From 1936 to 1939 he served in the Red Army in the Far East. Then he graduated from the police school in Smolensk and was sent to Yaroslavl. Here, Inspector Popov proved himself from the very best side, therefore, after the start of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed to the military counterintelligence agencies, which suffered heavy losses at the front and needed personnel.

Judging by the description of officer Popov, dated May 24, 1942, in the 103rd tank brigade they noted his discipline, good military training, courage, desire to constantly be at the forefront, high authority among fighters and commanders. He managed to expose a German intelligence agent, former junior lieutenant Ganin, who managed to infiltrate the higher headquarters. He also managed to open cases of

measured incapacitation of tanks by individual crews in order to evade participation in battles. The command took measures to prevent the recurrence of this in the future. <...>

...When the commander of one of the companies of the motorized rifle battalion of the brigade died, he was replaced by Prokopy Popov. Cutting off the German infantry from the tanks, the soldiers under the command of a counterintelligence officer fought to the last bullet. Popov himself, with his legs broken by a machine-gun burst, surrounded by a large group of Nazis, shot four of them point-blank, and spent the last cartridge on himself.

In the end, the soldiers of the 103rd brigade pushed back the Germans and found Popov's body. He was buried in a solemn ceremony, and the soldiers at his grave swore to take revenge on the enemy..."

In general, the results of the work of the Soviet military counterintelligence are unambiguously impressive:

30,000 exposed German agents, 3,500 saboteurs, 6,000 terrorists. In the period from 1943 to 1945, SMERSH conducted 250 radio games. In the course of organized disinformation of the enemy, more than 400 personnel of the fascist special services were brought to our territory. And this is not counting tens of tons of cargo destined for enemy agents and saboteurs.

Moreover, the enemy himself recognized the effectiveness of Soviet military counterintelligence. So, the former head of the Abwehr department [General Hans Pickenbrock, after the war, said: "Russia is the most difficult country for the introduction of enemy intelligence agents. After the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR, we began to select agents from among the prisoners of war. But it was difficult to recognize whether they really had a desire to work as agents or intended to return to the ranks of the Red Army in this way. Many agents, after being transferred to the rear of the Soviet troops, did not send us any reports.

Former Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, to the question: "What intelligence data about the Soviet Union did you have before the war and during it, and from what sources did this data come from?" - answered: "Before the war, we had very scarce information about the Soviet Union and the Red Army, received from our military attaché. During the war, the data from our agents concerned only the tactical zone, we never received data that would have a serious impact on the development of military operations.

According to General M.A. Kozichev, "Abakumov managed to build a SMERSH management system similar to the General Staff, creating departments along the fronts. This made it possible to know the operational situation on each front well and quickly respond to it. V.S. Abakumov went against the then existing legislation: he exempted German agents who confessed from liability. This dramatically increased the effectiveness of the fight against enemy agents.

Another general, P.I. Ivashutin, believed that "to belittle the merits of Abakumov in the successful work of the GUKR SMERSH is not serious." He was convinced: "The practical results of the activities of SMERSH turned out to be higher than those of the NKGU, which was the reason for the nomination of Abakumov."

No less important evidence is the letter of General M.A. Belousova:

"In the early days of August 1942, the head of the special departments of the Red Army, Abakumov, with a group of his employees, came to the Stalingrad front and was engaged here in clarifying the situation on the front in general and on its front line in particular (apparently doing this on task of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief): whose information, presented to the Headquarters about this, is more objective and truthful - the headquarters of the front or the special department of the front? Those were the days when the question of "surviving Stalingrad" was a matter of life or death for our country.

At the same time, he was also looking for candidates for the role of commanders of the 62nd Army and the Stalingrad Front. He had conversations with many generals: commanders of divisions, corps, army commanders, members of military councils, heads of political agencies. Moreover, he met with most of the generals not in their offices, but at their command post - on the front line, during the battle.

He did not say anything about the purpose of his coming to the front, which I mentioned above, to us, the employees working with him at that time. This is my personal assumption, made from his behavior and activities at the front, which I witnessed for almost five days. (I was the "leader" when traveling around the front.)

Of course, at the same time, he was casually interested in the state of our Chekist work, especially behind the front line. He also showed interest in the course of the formation of detachments, which were then created by the Military Councils of the fronts and armies ...

The period of his stay here then just coincided with the time of the division of the Stalingrad Front, or rather the separation from it

one more - the South-Eastern Front, which also took a lot of time for the visitor (the division of personnel of special departments now into two fronts).

In a word, under the leadership of V.S. Abakumov, military counterintelligence officers or military security officers managed to create an effective system called SMERSH, which reliably protected the Red Army until the very victory over the enemy.

However, we must not forget that the Directorate of Special Departments, and then SMERSH, had to deal with other tasks that were directly related to the policy of repression, when the most ordinary lawlessness was created with the tacit approval of the state system. There are a great many such examples, and to deny them is at least blasphemous. Another thing is that they in no way obscure the special role of the military counterintelligence apparatus in the Great Patriotic War, which it played. There were heroes in SMERSH, there were professionals, there were honest and decent people. But there were scoundrels, scoundrels, and executioners. And it is difficult to agree with the fact that recently Abakumov began to be called the "Apostle." It is clear that the "Apostle" is not according to the gospel tradition, in which each of the twelve disciples of Christ was sent by him to preach his teaching. And "Apostle" in the bookish sense of the word. But even in this case, the "Apostle" sounds like "an ardent follower and preacher of some idea, doctrine. Apostle of goodness and truth" (Modern explanatory dictionary of the Russian language. M., 2004). But with all due respect to the personality of Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov, it is very difficult to call him the "Apostle of goodness and truth." His official mission was always far from these moral concepts...

#### Chapter 4

### MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY AND HIS AFFAIRS

#### LAST POST

Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova was detained by SMERSH counterintelligence officers of the 1st Belorussian Front on April 27, 1945, when fighting was still going on in Berlin. Paul interrogated her first.

kovnik Shkurin. Only then was she taken from Poznan on a military plane to Moscow. In the capital, she was kept incognito in an apartment owned by the wife of a missing officer. Two rooms were furnished especially for her. The hostess herself with the children huddled in the kitchen. SMERSH officers in civilian clothes bring books to Olga Konstantinovna, play chess with her, and bring food every day. Calls, meetings with relatives and friends are strictly prohibited. From time to time she is taken for interrogation. Several officers are politely talking to her in a modestly furnished room. They talk about literature, music, theatre, cinema... About personal contacts with Hitler, his closest associates: "Did Goebbels take any notes during theatrical rehearsals, did he dictate his laws to the cinema, since when rivalry between Goering and Goebbels in the cultural life of Berlin, what is the personal impression of Hitler, Goering, Goebbels and Mussolini, what is known about Bormann.

From the certificate of the 4th department of the GUKR SMERSH:

"While in Moscow, Chekhova was questioned in detail about her connections with the fascist leaders of Germany. In her explanation, Chekhova confirmed that she had repeatedly been a guest at receptions at the German Propaganda Ministry and met with Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, Ribbentrop and others.

However, as Chekhova pointed out, the receptions were only of an official nature, they were attended by diplomats, scientists, writers, and actors. Chekhova explained that in Germany, many of the envy of her as a celebrity, or the desire to compromise her in the eyes of the Russians, can make

a statement that she had close relations with Hitler or anyone else from his entourage, but she had no such ties with these persons.

To the SMERSH operative, who lived with Chekhova in an apartment under the guise of an employee of Intourist, Chekhova also stated that in Germany they would try to slander her.

Conversed with a celebrity, of course, and Colonel-General Abakumov himself. As the counterintelligence officers will easily find out, the actress kept a diary in German, which she carefully hid in the room. Naturally, they confiscated it and looked it over, but nothing serious was found. In Chekhov's diary, she wrote down her impressions of her stay in Moscow:

"Since May 1, I have been in a locked room. For what? I feel like a toy that was found on the road and picked up, but no one knows

what to do with her now. I don't have time to play, but I don't want to quit. The view from the window at the factory with broken glass is disappointing. What am I suffering for?

The next day:

"Tonight I must finally go for the third time to Colonel General "X". I feel like he doesn't know what to do with me. I was brought here on political "suspicions". I'm sure. How comical!

Two days later: "At two o'clock in the morning I was with the colonel general. At three o'clock in the morning we drove through quiet Moscow and headed out of town... Fantastically beautiful. They also said that I had undergone plastic surgery several times, but I hide it. Why are these intrigues going on?

"I am pampered here and all my desires are fulfilled. They sent the best hairdresser, wine, food: caviar, lemons ... It was enough for me to hint that Olya, who remained in Berlin, might need food, as this has already been settled. I have a radio, flowers, perfume, the best books."

Who knows what the great admirer of women Viktor Semenovitch experienced when he met Chekhova? Who knows what might have happened between them during their rare encounters? But the fact that they have developed some kind of special relationship is an indisputable fact.

"She is called here the woman who invented eternal youth," Ada Knipper wrote in October 1949 to "Aunt Olya." And in the same place: "... beautiful, young, no more than 35 years old."

From childhood, young Olga amazed those around her with her beauty, intelligence and self-control...

Since childhood, she dreamed of a career as an actress and was passionately fond of the theater.

"The Knippers are Russified Germans who have long lived in Russia," says B. Khandros. — Olga's father Konstantin Leonardovich, a talented engineer, built the Transcaucasian railway, dug tunnels... Olga has had two native languages since childhood — Russian and German. She spoke French and Italian. Education is classical Russian. Until the age of 17, she lived with her parents either in the Caucasus or in Petrograd. On the eve of World War I, she was sent to Moscow to live with her beloved "Aunt Olya". There he saw the young beauty Mikhail Chekhov, the writer's nephew (later he would be called "the second genius in the Chekhov family"), then an actor of the famous Art Theater. The novel that broke out developed rapidly and soon ended.

secret wedding of the young in a village church near Moscow. This shocked the entire family. Olga Leonardovna, who overlooked her niece, immediately rushed to the newlyweds and "with hysteria and fainting on the stairs in front of the apartment door demanded that Olya immediately return to her." But the exhortations, the tears of the parents did not help ...

Olga Chekhova will call her first marriage, which turned out to be short-lived and not very happy, "folly, for which she later had to pay for a long time." However, it was precisely this, having introduced her into the world of the Art Theater, into the circle of Mikhail's friends, giving her a daughter, and finally, awarding her with a ringing surname, in many respects determined her future life. A series of fleeting hobbies, romances, marriages followed... She left Mikhail Chekhov with a certain Friedrich Yaroshi, a former Austro-Hungarian military man, a handsome seducer and adventurer. She married him, and in January 1921 she went with him to Germany. In Berlin, Olga Konstantinovna, soon parting with her second husband, starts from scratch... Persistence and purposefulness, a beautiful, impassive, impenetrable face, fraught with a constant mystery, a rare ability to work... created a miracle. In "small theaters" and on the big stage she played German-Russian plays. Fame came... But real fame comes to her in the movies: "Masquerade", "Hannerl and her lover", "Beautiful Orchids". The once famous film "Moulin Rouge" (1929) with Olga Chekhova in the title role went around the screens of the world.

Glory, fabulous fees ... In Hollywood, such celebrities as Douglas, Fairbanks, Harold Lloyd, Adolphe Manju are vying with each other. With Charlie Chaplin she gnawed seeds. The king of laughter, spitting out the husk, slyly asked: "Is it going to be in Russian?" |

In 1936, Olga was getting married for the third time. The groom is a Belgian, a millionaire. In the same year, the film "Burg-theater" was released on the screens of Europe ... Divorce again. Olga Chekhova, free and independent, is back in Berlin. Hitler adores her, Goebbels dislikes her. But it is not important. After all, she is under the auspices of the Fuhrer himself.

During the war years, the queen of the Nazi Reich becomes the wife and then the widow of a famous ace pilot. But this is not the end of his personal life either: "An interesting document signed by the head of the Fourth

department of the main department of SMERSHAA, sheds light on her personal life. "OK. Chekhov is currently in Berlin, Friedrichshagen. She lives with ... a certain Zumzer Albert Germanovich, born in 1913, German, teacher at the Physical Education Academy in Berlin, champion in athletics. Lives with Chekhova O.K. and is on close terms with her." "Athletics Champion" is 16 years younger than Olga. The housekeeper helps the "newlyweds" with the housework. The document is dated November 1945. From other documents and memos it follows that the life of Olga Chekhova is personally taken care of by the head of SMERSH, General Abakumov. On his orders, the top-secret agent is helped with food, gasoline, building materials for the repair of the house, where the guard of three people was posted. A letter from Olga Chekhova addressed to Abakumov has been preserved, where she calls him "dear Viktor Semenovich" and asks: "When will we meet?"

After keeping Chekhova in a Moscow apartment for two months, she was sent back to Berlin.

According to the memoirs of State Security General P. Sudoplatov, she was transferred directly to Abakumov, with whom she maintained personal correspondence while in Germany, until his arrest in July 1951].

"A document has been preserved," writes Olga Egorova in the article "Russian Prima of Nazi Cinema," on which, on November 22, 1945, Beria writes: "vol. Abakumov, what is proposed to be done in relation to Chekhova?" In response, counterintelligence takes care of food supplies for the Chekhova family, gasoline for her car, building materials for the renovation of a new house, "the protection of family members and armed escort" on numerous trips. Olga was allowed to travel everywhere - to the American zone, to Austria, on tour, to shoot. She still worked hard, reaching her "pre-war norm" of seven films a year."

In 1980, Olga Konstantinovna passed away at the age of 83. She was stricken with brain cancer...

"No information has been found that Olga Chekhova is an agent of the NKVD," Yu.G. Kabaladze.

"The famous actress Olga Chekhova, the ex-wife of the famous writer's nephew, was close to Radziwill and Goering and through

relatives in Transcaucasia is connected with Beria. Later, in 1946-1950, she was in personal contact with Minister of State Security Abakumov, who replaced Beria," General P. Sudoplatov writes in his memoirs.

This evidence explains a lot. And there was also the opening of the salon, with the time of the company "Cosmetics of Olga Chekhova", and an unimpeded move to western Munich ...

But still, the main event of that era, including for Abakumov, was the end of the Great Patriotic War...

The victors in 1945 began to return home, and, as E. Zhirnov says, "after returning to their homeland, the liberators of Europe behaved towards their compatriots only slightly better than towards the population of defeated Germany." At first, however, it was only about those citizens of the USSR who became such only before the war - residents of Western Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic states.

"From the Transcarpathian Ukraine," Vasily Ryasny, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, said in a message to Moscow, "the cavalry corps of Major General Baranov was moving on horseback to the area of Stanislav. On the night of October 4, while advancing through the Tyachevsky district in the villages lying on the way, they committed a mass robbery of the local population. In the village of Dubove, 197 households were robbed. Representatives of the People's Rada of Transcarpathian Ukraine took into account the following items seized from peasants: 55 sheep, 66 chickens, 26 centners of corn, 11 centners of fruit. In addition, a large number of blankets, pillows, men's and women's clothing and underwear, as well as money were confiscated...

The report and certificates sent in the fall of 1945 by Tkachenko, authorized by the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR for Lithuania, said: other atrocities against the population, massively violates the revolutionary legality ... "

"Recently," Dolgikh, head of the NKVD of the Khabarovsk Territory, reported to Moscow, "hooliganism, and in some cases gangster manifestations on the part of military personnel, have increased significantly in a number of cities in the Khabarovsk Territory, especially in Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk. Returning units from Manchuria lead

themselves extremely cheeky, they get drunk, engage in hooliganism, aimless shooting, and in a number of cases, outright banditry. Over the past two and a half months alone, more than 160 cases of gangster, hooligan and other manifestations have been registered in the region, including armed raids and robberies 21, attempts to rape 6, 75 hooligan manifestations, etc. Citizens were killed as a result of gangster and hooligan manifestations 15 people, 50 wounded.

It is dangerous to walk in Blagoveshchensk at night due to systematic aimless shooting. 10.X this year the commander of the MPVO was killed by a random bullet, on September 11, in the village of the Gorky plant, two servicemen, while trying to rape, beat two girls - factory workers, and then, having undressed them, disappeared. On September 12, in the same place, a group of servicemen broke into the apartment of a factory worker Mishin and raped his wife, and Mishin was warned not to touch them, threatening them with a machine gun. On the same night, in the same area, a group of drunken officers raped citizens Simonova and Kovaleva, workers at the plant ... "

The military considered the nervous state of the soldiers after the battles to be the cause of the robberies ... They saved themselves from a nervous system disorder with vodka. And drinking, judging by reports from the field, was one of the real causes of the crimes of soldiers and officers. In the report from Lithuania there was also such an example: "On September 21 of this year. in the town of Ukmergė, a drunken patrolman, private of the 241st mortar regiment Zykov, shot

submachine gun early SMERSH NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR Major Latyshev and ml. Lieutenant of the same regiment Yermolin ...

The purpose of a huge number of crimes most often turned out to be alcohol. Most of the military echelons moved from one station robbery to another ... "

The picture was no better in the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany. According to E. Zhirnov, "in Germany, only the most principled and lazy did not enrich themselves at the expense of the vanquished. All the rest were actively replenishing their personal material and food reserves before the inevitable meeting with their homeland, where manufactured goods stores were either empty or incredibly high prices if the store was part of a commercial trade network. And products in the conditions of a crop failure and, to put it bluntly, another famine were obtained even on cards.

Somewhat surprised only that such a surge was not stopped. The Soviet military administration consisted of a very

a significant number of state security officers responsible, among other things, to ensure order in the occupation zone and control the activities of the German police. In each federal land, there was an operational sector of the NKVD, to which operational groups in cities and districts were subordinate. At the same time, a considerable number of officers of the military counterintelligence SMERSH were engaged in the Chekist support of military units. If we add to this the border regiments of the NKVD, which were used to guard various Soviet facilities, including special camps where Nazi detainees were kept, and in addition, participated in the operations conducted by the NKVD task forces, we got a very significant group capable of to suppress any negative phenomena, if not with the help of Chekist methods, then by force. And at the head of the KGB group was Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Colonel-General Ivan Serov, known for his extreme determination.

However, the figures showed that the perpetrators in most cases remained unpunished. For example, on February 27, 1946, the head of the operational group for the Leipzig district, Lieutenant Colonel P. Kolomeitsev, reported to the head of the operational sector for the federal state of Saxony, Major General S. Klepov:

"Recently, in the Leipzig district, both on the part of the criminal element from among the Germans, as well as on the part of the Red Army soldiers, cases of robberies, looting, and killings of the civilian population have become more frequent. If in January of this year. took place: cases of robbery - 16, looting - 28, there were no murders, then in February of this year. the percentage of these manifestations increased significantly: cases of murder - 11, robbery - 83, looting - 131. Crimes committed by the Red Army: killed - 5 people, cases of robbery - 3, looting - 53; crimes committed by a criminal element from among the Germans: killed - 6 people, cases of robbery - 80, looting - 78.

Such a distribution looked very conditional, because in the same report of Kolomeitsev it was noted that the perpetrators were not identified and were not found.

For example, here is the story told to E. Zhirnov by the former assistant of the Berlin garrison, Vladimir Shafir: "... in the summer of 1945, he investigated the case of the looting of a small German private bank near the Tempelhoff airfield. Bank

was under the protection of the Soviet commandant's office, and therefore it was not difficult to obtain a list of the abducted. The most valuable thing was missing - two boxes with five hundred gold Swiss watches. Most upset because of the loss of the commandant of the district.

"The commandant was fussing," Shafir recalled, "suggested us all the new versions, called the names of the suspects. The motives for this behavior were not very clear, and we had suspicions. In the midst of the investigation, we learn that our "voluntary assistant" has received leave and is leaving for the Union. This alarmed me even more. We collected data about him and established the facts

squandering and appropriation of trophy property. It was pointless to conduct a search in his apartment: he was not a stupid person and he probably hid his watch securely. When the day of his departure became known to us — and he was flying from an airfield in his Tempelhoff district — we realized that he would not leave valuables in Berlin and should be picked up at the moment of boarding the plane. They set up an ambush on the airfield. He approached the plane; soldiers of the commandant's office carried numerous suitcases - they loaded everything, but something stopped us at that moment. Intuition suggested that he still did not have the main load. The plane started the engines, received a command to take off, and suddenly a Red Army soldier with a suitcase jumped out of some trench, ran to the open door and handed this luggage to the colonel. At that moment we took the commandant. There was a gold watch in the suitcase. But the business did not develop. The colonel, before being appointed commandant, was the commander of a military regiment, he was on the front lines throughout the war, he was awarded orders many times, and the command decided not to bring him to justice.”

Continuing this topic, E. Zhirnov states: “... as archival documents show, officers of the occupying Soviet troops and the Soviet military administration in Germany (SVAG) were not prosecuted for abuse, not only because of past military merit. If everyone who violated the rules for collecting, storing and using trophies were judged, the troops and commandant's offices in the Soviet zone of occupation could be left without command staff.

The appropriation of valuables and products of junior officers was driven by the plight in which they were placed by their own command and their native country. For a ration for one person, for example, 570 marks were calculated from the officer's salary, while the same set of products for the Germans cost 60-70 marks. So the capitalist salary was only enough for three rations.

And the fathers of large families were forced to either starve or find ways to self-supply with food. The most innocent of these were shuttle trips to Poland, where lard was sold much cheaper than in Germany. This fat was fed, it was sold to the Germans or exchanged for other products. And those who could not get a pass to Poland were forced to use army property and trophy valuables as currency. More precisely, that part of it that has not yet been privatized by the authorities.”

On September 27, 1945, Viktor Semenovich himself signed the following order No. 00170, which stated: “The SMERSH Main Directorate has data that some counterintelligence agencies have a significant amount of vehicles that are not authorized by the state and various trophy property.

This property was not taken into account by the SMERSH authorities, which gives rise to an anti-state attitude towards its spending and storage, and also creates conditions for abuse.

In order to restore order in the storage, accounting and use of property located in the SMERSH bodies, I order:

Immediately conduct a thorough documentary audit of all property located in the SMERSH bodies, draw up detailed inventories of all property, which are submitted to the SMERSH Main Directorate, seal all property and prohibit its use until instructions are received from the SMERSH Main Directorate.

The heads of the SMERSH bodies, who, after the audit, will find property that is not registered or spent for other purposes, will be brought to trial by a military tribunal, regardless of their position.

Abakumov.

The document is interesting, if not for one “but”... As A. Teplyakov writes, “being since 1944 the head of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the First Belorussian Front, A.A. At the same time, Vadis created an “illegal warehouse of trophy property” at the administration, from which he made gifts to the deputy heads of the SMERSH UKR V.S. Abakumova N.N. Selivanovskiy, I.I.



Vradiy and other high-ranking Chekists. And V.S. Abakumov in 1945, while in Moscow, Vadis sent "a suitcase with expensive things" to his apartment. He did not forget himself either - he sent valuable property to his family by official plane from Germany to Moscow, and his wife Va

disa speculated on them; he himself took out a wagon of furniture and other things from Berlin, as well as a car. Then Vadis brought to Moscow a lot of "trophies" acquired during his work in Manchuria (furs, silk and woolen fabrics, etc.), where in 1945 he served as the head of the SMERSH UKR of the Transbaikal Front. Again, at the end of 1945, Abakumov received many valuable things from Vadis, including sets of 120 objects and ivory chess sets. Subsequently, Vadis rose to the position of Deputy MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, but in January 1952 he was expelled from the party for not providing measures to eliminate the OUN underground, immoderate drunkenness and excessive love for trophies.

Head of ROC SMERSH of the 5th Shock Army N.M. Karpenko in 1945 requisitioned "a large amount of valuables and currency confiscated in the branch of the Reichsbank in Berlin", of which he appropriated some, and illegally distributed some valuables (platinum, gold, silver, precious stones) to his subordinates and other persons. The same Vadis received from Karpenko 40-50 gold watches, of which he took two pairs for himself, and distributed the rest to the leading employees of the NKGB. Working since 1947 as head of the UMGB for the Altai Territory, Major General Karpenko was arrested in December 1951 for looting in occupied Germany; during a search, four gold cigarette cases, 30 gold watches and many other expensive jewelry items were found in his possession. Convicted for "abuse of official position, embezzlement of state property and false denunciation" to 10 years in prison, Karpenko was released early in November 1958 as an invalid. Among the arrested Abakumovites were then the convicted head of department "D" of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, Colonel A.M. Palkin, who received 15 years in the camps in October 1952 for embezzlement and was released early in 1956, as well as Colonel P.S. Ilyashenko, who worked as deputy head of one of the departments of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR and in February 1953 was sentenced to 10 years in prison for "theft of socialist property". Other corrupt officials got off much easier. Head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Group of Forces, Lieutenant General M.I. Belkin in the second half of the 1940s created a "black box office" and was engaged in speculation. In October 1951, he was arrested in connection with the defeat of Abakumov's entourage, and in 1953 he was released. However, Belkin was then fired from the "authorities" "on the facts of dis

crediting".

Simultaneously with Belkin, Lieutenant General P.V. was arrested for embezzlement in Germany. Zelenin, in 1945-1947. worked as head of UKR SMERSH - UKR MGB in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1953, he was amnestied, but then stripped of his general rank due to discrediting. And the former Commissioner of the MGB in Germany, Lieutenant General N.K. Kovalchuk, promoted to the Minister of State Security of Ukraine, escaped reprisals, although in 1952 A.A. Vadis filed a statement to the leadership of the MGB that Kovalchuk "brought two Pullman wagons of trophy items and valuables from the front"; however, in 1954, the lieutenant general was deprived of his rank due to the facts of discrediting. But it really will be later ...

In the meantime, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 25, the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was transformed into the People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and on March 15 into the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Literally forty days later, on April 27, 1946, V.S. Abakumov was approved as the head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

As P.A. Sudoplatov, "after the end of the war, the problem of reorganizing the Armed Forces came to the fore. Following this, Stalin suggested that the Politburo review the activities of the state security agencies and set new tasks for them. Mamulov and Ludvigov later told me that Merkulov was required to submit to the Politburo a plan for reorganizing the Ministry of State Security. At the meeting, Beria, according to them, fell upon Merkulov for failing to determine the direction in the work

counterintelligence in the postwar period. Stalin joined him, accusing Merkulov of complete incompetence.”

At this meeting, Stalin asked those present:

— Why can't the head of military counterintelligence be at the same time the deputy minister of state security?

The fact is that in connection with the reorganization of the Armed Forces, the military counterintelligence SMERSH was transferred from the Ministry of the USSR Armed Forces to the Ministry of State Security.

“Comrade Stalin,” Merkulov rapped out, “I think that Comrade Abakumov should be appointed First Deputy Minister of State Security.

And then there was a pause, after which the leader of the sarcasm

Chesky remarked:

- Comrade Merkulov behaves like a double-dealer even at the Politburo. I think that it is necessary to replace him as Minister of State Security, as he failed in this positions.

In his memoirs, P.A. Sudoplatov commented on this as follows:

“It seems that Merkulov made a mistake by agreeing so easily with Stalin's proposal, but in fact Stalin was simply looking for a suitable pretext to remove him. Stalin already had a candidate ready - Ogoltsov, an honest man, but a provincial who had never worked in the Center.

Sergey Ivanovich Ogoltsov already at the age of eighteen worked as an investigator in the county Cheka. In 1942, at the age of forty-two, he headed the Directorate of the NKVD of the Kuibyshev region, in 1943 he became the head of the Directorate of the NKGB of the same region, and in 1944 he became People's Commissar of State Security of the Kazakh SSR. In 1945, he was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR.

When Stalin offered him the post of minister, Ogoltsov was frightened in earnest and began to beg the leader not to appoint him to this responsible post. At the Politburo, he stated the following:

— As an honest communist, I am completely unsuitable for such a high post, because I lack the necessary knowledge and experience for such a responsible job.

“Well, if Comrade Ogoltsov refuses, we will not force him,” Stalin replied.

— Then I propose to appoint comrade Abakumov as Minister of State Security.

And this proposal, according to Sudoplatov, was “ardently supported” by A.A. Zhdanov.

And on May 4, 1946, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR V.S. Abakumov was appointed minister. Actually, the post of minister was the last and tragic one in the short life of Viktor Semenovich.

## ALL-POWERFUL OFFICE MGB

As E. Zhirnov writes, “having felt the favor of the leader, Abakumov decided that now everything is possible. Veterans testify: “Viktor Semenovich behaved as if he grabbed God by the beard. He defiantly went to “Aragvi” for lunch, and if he was loaded, the guards brought him shish kebabs from there. Caught on the street cute de-

Vitz and led them to the Moscow Hotel, to bed. He did not refuse when he was presented with trophy things.

All this is true, but there was another ...

V.M. Molotov recalled how, during the days of the Potsdam Conference, several pilots came to Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin and told him without cunning that disasters had begun in the Air Force. Thus was born the corresponding decision: "Investigate!" One of the pilots was the son of the leader - Vasily. By the way, it was after this meeting between father and son that General Vlasik, the chief of Stalin's security guard, called Falaleev, the chief of staff of the Air Force, in Moscow and, in fact, ordered:

- Vasily reconciled with his father. Promptly submit him to the rank of general.

"The title is awarded for merit," he replied. - And in general, without the commander, I can not solve this issue.

Then there was another call...

Shortly before the new, 1946, the commander of the Red Army Air Force, Chief Air Marshal A.A. Novikov was brought for signature by a submission to the guards of Colonel V.I. Stalin to the rank of general.

The commander, after some thought, still did not sign the paper. And on New Year's Eve, the HF telephone rang in the Marshal's apartment. Vasily's father called, who, in a tense conversation, directly asked Novikov:

- And how do you, Comrade Novikov, look at Vasily Stalin being awarded the rank of general?

The marshal began to say that Vasily Iosifovich was very young, that he did not have enough education, that he should learn a little, enter the Air Force Academy. Stalin listened to all the arguments of his deputy for aviation and actually ended the conversation:

- You don't need to write an introduction to the title. Serve as a general list, - and hung up.

Already in the morning, not really getting enough sleep, Novikov called Zhukov in Germany:

— What to do, Georgy Konstantinovich?

What can you do, Sasha? That's an order! — Cursing, the commander answered.

By a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of March 1, 1946, Vasily Iosifovich Stalin was awarded

Indian rank of Major General of Aviation, and on March 24 he turned 25 years old.

Literally on the eve of the birthday of the son of the leader, Abakumov sent a special message to Stalin, which said:

"March 21, 1946 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V.

At the same time, I present a report from an employee of the Main Directorate of SMERSH, Lieutenant Colonel YELISEEV ...

Top secret

Comrade Abakumov

## Report

I consider it necessary to report to you about the great confusion of the head of the Main Directorate of Orders of the Air Force, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Aviation Service SELEZNE VA in connection with the verification of his work.

On March 19 of this year, when I was in the central office of the Air Force on business, I was met by SELEZNEV and expressed fear that he would have to be seriously responsible for accepting unsuitable aircraft. SELEZNEV said that on March 19 of this year, he attended a meeting with Marshal VASILEVSKY, where Air Chief Marshal NOVIKOV failed with a report on the work of the Air Force, since he did not take action and did not report to the government about serious shortcomings in the work of the Air Force. After this meeting, said SELEZNEV, I was completely at a loss and did not know how I would account for the acceptance of substandard aircraft.

Seleznev said:

"We accepted unfinished production cars. I, as the head of the Main Directorate of Orders, could not do anything to improve their quality, because this issue depended entirely on the Ministry of Aviation Industry.

The Research Institute of the Air Force gave biased opinions on testing aircraft manufactured by the aviation industry. The reports of the institute indicated that the aircraft had such and such tactical flight advantages, and at the same time, many design defects were listed in the machine.

Using such conclusions of the research institute, the Ministry of Aviation Industry dragged its machines literally in an unfinished form, and they were launched into mass production.

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The subsequent stage of acceptance from the aircraft industry proved to be the most difficult.

I did not accept unfinished aircraft and informed the Commander of the Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation NOVIKOV and the Military Council about this, but the Ministry of Aviation Industry negotiated directly with NOVIKOV, VOROZHEIKIN, SHIMANOV and REPIN, after which the Main Directorate orders received instructions to receive aircraft, i.e. I had to agree with the Ministry of Aviation Industry.

Our work was also complicated by the fact that the Ministry of Aviation Industry very often independently, without the knowledge of the Air Force, produced aircraft that had not even passed the tests at the Air Force Research Institute.

This was the case with the Yak-9u aircraft, which were put into production without the knowledge of the Air Force. These machines had a lot of defects, and they were completely unusable.

The Ministry of Aviation Industry produced about 900 Yak-9u aircraft, which turned out to be so bad that they cannot be used now. In this regard, the Ministry of Aviation Industry wrote off 800 Yak-9u aircraft, and they are now being dismantled for spare parts. I received 90 such aircraft from the aviation industry and I don't know what to do with them, since they cannot be given in part."

Further, SELEZNEV was especially indignant at the behavior of the chief designer of the Ministry of Aviation Industry YAKOVLEV, saying that the Air Force had no prospects for receiving good YAKOVLEV-designed fighters from the aviation industry, since even the Yak-3 wooden machines were not guaranteed. tiny, because these aircraft are made according to an unfinished model.

Concerning YAKOVLEV, Lieutenant General of the Aviation Engineering Service SELEZNEV stated:

"I am extremely interested in how YAKOV-LEV will get out of this situation, because all the designs of his fighters are crude, not completed and with a large number of defects.

Using his position, YAKOVLEV dragged any of his aircraft, regardless of the Air Force, and put it into mass production.

As a result, the Yak-9u aircraft turned out to be unusable, and the Yak-3 aircraft with a wooden wing were unreliable, and the pilots were afraid of them.

Knowing that his planes were of poor quality, YAKOVLEV nevertheless insisted to the Air Force that they be accepted, using his authority for this.

In the Ministry of Aviation Industry, YAKOVLEV took over all the design forces, but gave nothing and is unlikely to give.

Meanwhile, the state of the fighter fleet of the Air Force largely depends on YAKOVLEV, and if now all this goes unpunished for him, then this will simply be surprising.

It turns out that YAKOVLEV alone decides the fate of fighter aircraft and carries out those measures that suit him."

Pom. early department of the 1st department Ch. management SMERSH

Lieutenant Colonel YELISEEV

March 20, 1946."

Usually, after a fight, they don't wave their fists, the war ended in victory, but life went on, including in the state security agencies.

As Nikolai Smirnov writes, after the end of the war, "there was a trend according to which "criminal groups" led by leaders of entire industries, entire branches of the country's Armed Forces began to be identified. Such was the group headed by the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry, Hero of Socialist Labor, Colonel General of the Aviation Engineering Service Shakhurin Aleksey Ivanovich. This group included: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force of the Soviet Army, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Chief Marshal of Aviation Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Chief Engineer of the Soviet Army Air Force Colonel General of the Engineering Aviation Service Alexander Konstantinovich Repin, Head of the Main Directorate of Orders technical supply of the Soviet Army Air Force, Lieutenant General of the Aviation Engineering Service Seleznev Nikolai Pavlovich, member of the Military Council of the Soviet Army Air Force, Colonel General of Aviation Shimanov Nikolai Sergeevich, heads of the aviation departments of the Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Budnikov Alexander Viktorovich and Grigoryan Hamlet Mkrtychevich.

All of them were arrested in March-April 1946, and already on May 8, 1946, the five-volume case was received by the chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

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"The military collegium recognized that in the system of the People's Commissariat of the aviation industry and the Air Force of the Soviet Army there was an anti-state practice that led to the fact that during the war and in the post-war period the people's commissariat of the aviation industry produced defective aircraft and aircraft engines, which then "criminally they were smuggled into the armament of aviation units."

Seven people were identified as the main perpetrators. Shakhurin was sentenced to 7 years in prison. Budnikov and Grigoryan as accomplices - two years each, Repin was sentenced to 6 years, Novikov to 5 years, Shimanov to 4 years and Seleznev to 3.

Later, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Vorozheykin Grigory Alekseevich, also suffered. At first, he was simply relieved of his post and appointed commander of the 1st Air Army. In 1947, he was dismissed, and on April 11, 1948, he was arrested "for anti-Soviet activities." In addition to "enemy fabrications regarding the leader of the Soviet people", slandering the most important events of the party and government, praising the bourgeois order, Grigory Alekseevich was also remembered to accept defective aircraft into service with air units, as a result of which the combat capability of Soviet aviation decreased and a large number of accidents occurred. The military collegium sentenced the air marshal to 8 years in prison for

keys.

But the aircraft designer Yakovlev was not injured in any way. Apparently, it was not before him ...

It is curious that during the interrogations of the investigator Likhachev and the head of SMERSH Abakumov, the facts of his relationship with Zhukov were slowly pulled out of Novikov. "Aviadelo" seemed to step aside.

Later A.A. Novikov wrote: "They were arrested in the case of the Air Force, but they are interrogating about something else." And here is another entry: "I was a tool in their hands in order to compromise some prominent figures of the Soviet state by creating false testimony. This became clear to me much later. Questions about the state of the Air Force were only a screen.

In 1953, Colonel Likhachev testified:

— The investigation into the case of Shakhurin, Novikov, Shimanov and others was conducted by a specially created investigative group. All are

The prisoners were interrogated every day with short breaks until 5-6 in the morning.

Didn't they get time to sleep? they asked him.

- Yes, in fact it was so, but such was the SMERSH system of investigative work introduced by Abakumov, and protocols of interrogations of those arrested in this case were not drawn up. I drew up generalized protocols in the absence of those arrested, based on my notes.

- Were the protocols of interrogations drawn up according to some kind of cheat sheets?

- There was a vicious style and method of investigation.

At a confrontation with this Colonel A.A. Novikov reported: "When Likhachev brought me into Abakumov's office, the latter spoke to me in a human language for the first time, invited me to sit at a side table and said that I would have to sign a statement drawn up on my behalf addressed to I.V. Stalin. Abakumov took the printed sheets with the text of this "statement" from the table and handed them to Likhachev, who was standing to my right, and left himself.

Likhachev gave me one sheet each to sign.

When this "statement" fabricated on my behalf was signed by me, after some time Likhachev called me again and gave me the printed text of the "statement" with a demand to rewrite it by hand - in his presence.

It was this "statement" that was considered by the Supreme Military Council on June 1, 1946, and already on the 3rd of the USSR Council of Ministers decides to release Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. His well-known disgrace begins and the arrests of those who were

close to Zhukov. I wrote about it. Others also wrote. But I just wanted to remind you two episode.

When in January 1948 Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin, Abakumov personally threatened him with reprisals if he did not sign the charges brought against him. After the refusal, Viktor Semenovich, without the help of his assistants, knocked out his front teeth, and then twice stepped on his groin with his heels. And in the future, the honored general was beaten with a rubber truncheon twice a day, pulling out pieces of meat on his body. They beat him until he signed.

On September 18, 1948, Lieutenant General V.V. was arrested. Kryukov, deputy commander of the 36th Rifle Corps.

First, he was summoned by the deputy head of the investigative unit, Colonel Likhachev, and warned:

"Remember that you are no longer a general, but a prisoner, and conversations with you will be short. If you take it into your head to shut yourself up in your testimony, we will beat you like a "Sidorov's goat."

Vladimir Viktorovich tried to object:

— The MGB did not assign me a title, and it will not deprive me of it, and no one has the right to apply beatings to persons under investigation in the Soviet Union.

"This issue has been agreed where necessary," Likhachev answered. We don't beat ourselves up.

- But excuse me, I'm only under investigation for the time being and have not yet been demoted by anyone.

"Come here," ordered the colonel, and led Kryukov to a window from which the street was visible. "You see, there are people there, there are those under investigation, and you have already been convicted, there is no return from us to freedom, the road is only to correctional camps.

Kryukov was taken from Likhachev's office to Abakumov's office. Viktor Semenovich, as always, was specific:

"If you persist, we will beat you and maim you for life. You understood me?

"But excuse me," the general said, trying to defend himself, "how is it that such methods of conducting an investigation are not allowed in the Soviet Union, it resembles Yezhovism."

"I'll show you Yezhovism," the minister yelled. "I say again, if you don't testify, we'll cripple you for life and still get the necessary testimony from you.

Such was the kitchen in the department of Viktor Semenovich, little changed since the thirties.

"Proximity to Stalin also changed Abakumov's attitude towards other leaders of the USSR," says E. Zhirnov. "Probably, this was also due to his straightforwardness and simplicity: there is only a leader and his devoted follower, and everyone else can be disregarded. And very soon the minister made many enemies for himself. The first was Malenkov. Immediately after the war, Vasily Stalin told his father that the Soviet aviation industry sent to the front not fully tested, and sometimes defective aircraft. The head of SMERSH, Abakumov, was then entrusted with sorting out the situation. The facts were partially confirmed, and some leaders of the aviation industry

lennosti and the air force were arrested. Malenkov also suffered - he was temporarily removed from the post of secretary of the Central Committee.

Abakumov's benefactor Lavrenty Beria was next. Abakumov not only stopped listening to the advice of the marshal, but, having become a minister, he quickly squeezed out of the MGB

most of Beria's nominees, leaving only those who unquestioningly obeyed him. Beria, out of anger, even stopped visiting his office on the Lubyanka. Soon, Abakumov made a move bordering on hardware madness: his subordinates actually recruited Beria's security chief, Colonel Sarkisov, who began to deliver regular reports about the chief's love affairs to the MGB.

The former deputy of Abakumov says: "From time to time, Viktor Semenovich called me on Beria's business: "Is there anything from Sarkisov there?" I took it with pleasure. After some time, he lost interest in these materials. He says: "You don't take this shit from Sarkisov anymore." By this time, he had accumulated more than enough reports about the adventures of Lavrenty Pavlovich. He was fed up and saw that it was easy to slip on this shit. The reports dealt with the wives of so many high-ranking people that the slightest leak of these materials could make Abakumov an enemy not only of Beria, but also of half the leaders of the party and the country.

Soon, with the same ease, Abakumov made himself another high-ranking enemy. As the same veteran said, somehow Abakumov called him and asked if there was "anything interesting about Molotov". "We did not have the slightest right to carry out operational work against members of the political bureau," the veteran recalled. But a ministerial order is an order. I carefully, without pronouncing the names directly, instructed the guys. They recalled intelligence information that had been shelved at one time: someone from the inner circle of Molotov's wife reported on her, to put it mildly, not quite a modest lifestyle. Polina Semyonovna Zhemchuzhina was the head of the textile and haberdashery department of the Ministry of Light Industry. While her husband was writhing in the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Committee of Information, Polina Semyonovna was experiencing a third youth - she devoted a lot of time to her appearance, took milk baths. She behaved quite freely with men - of course, she didn't catch anyone on the streets, but she crossed the line a long time ago.

Abakumov, after listening to this information, grimaced: "We don't need rumors, but the direction is interesting. Try to organize something like this with the guards..." (His hand depicted something resembling the rotation of the reels of a tape recorder.) We made a legend of our interest in the Pearl and soon got what the minister was waiting for. Pearl called an electrician for some minor repairs. This young and handsome guy did not have time to do anything - the respectable lady almost forcibly put him to bed. Viktor Semenovich was satisfied."

And yet, according to eyewitnesses, the first steps of the new minister further strengthened his authority. First, he decisively changed the personnel policy: in 1946, the majority of the employees of the ministry were people who came to work in the bodies in 1939-1940, replacing those who went along the path of their victims. Secondly, he attracted military counterintelligence officers, former front-line soldiers, to the territorial bodies, and sent them not only to leadership positions, but also to ordinary work. The central apparatus was updated. At the same time, Viktor Semenovich kept this apparatus in a tense labor rhythm, regardless of where he was

myself.

As General of the Army F.D. Bobkov, "Abakumov often spoke to various audiences, spoke enthusiastically, sometimes with pathos, and, moreover, he always tried to give the impression of a very accessible, democratic and emphatically modest person, although there were few grounds for this."

Veteran of state security I.A. Chernov recalls Abakumov as demanding, intolerant of any manifestations of negligence and illiteracy.

N.N. Months saw Viktor Semenovich as a stately and handsome man, who was very suited to a military uniform. "The conversation was always calm businesslike," he emphasizes. - He did not force to stand at attention and invited to sit down.



If he treated the junior ranks with care, in a fatherly way, then he kept the higher ones in his fist. The main thing is that from the moment Viktor Semenovich was appointed to the post of minister, the structure of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR began to radically expand and change.

As an independent 3rd Main Directorate, the MGB included military counterintelligence. The 1st and 2nd Directorates of the MGB of the USSR (intelligence and counterintelligence) were transformed into the Main

management. Next came: the 4th Directorate led the search for "foreign intelligence agencies abandoned in the USSR, and other enemy elements; 5th Directorate (operational); 6th Directorate (encryption-decryption); Transport Department; Directorate of Security No. 1 (security of I.V. Stalin); Security Department No. 2; Office of the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin; Department "A" (accounting and archival); Department "B" (operational equipment); Department "B" (correspondence perusal); Department "D" (expertise and forgery of documents); Department "K" (Chekist observations at nuclear industry facilities); Department "O" (operational work on the clergy of all confessions); Department "R" (radio intelligence); Department "C" (translation and processing of materials on the atomic problem); Department "T" (combating persons expressing threats of a terrorist nature against party and Soviet leaders); Investigation Department for Particularly Important Cases; Department "DR" (service for carrying out sabotage and acts of individual terror); Department "DN" (disinformation service); Administrative, economic and financial management; Personnel Department; Inspection under the Ministry; Secretariat of the MGB; Legal Bureau.

In January 1947, by a joint order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 0074/0029 dated January 21, 1947, the transfer of internal troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of State Security was formalized. The Main Directorate of Internal Troops of the MGB was formed (staff 68,582).

By order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 0075/0030 dated January 21, 1947, the transport police was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Transport Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security.

At the same time, Stalin, strengthening the MGB, deprived him of one of the most important areas: foreign intelligence. All intelligence departments and services were united into a single apparatus - the Information Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

But let's go further, to the "country of Abakumov". On the basis of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1130-405ss of April 6, 1948, by the joint order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 00369/0141 of April 9, 1948, troops were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB to protect especially important objects of industry and railways (7301 pers.).

In 1949, the State Treasury of Valuables (GOKhRAN) was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB.

On October 17, 1949, by a joint order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 00968/00334, border troops were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of State Security

and the police, as well as the Military Construction Directorate (AFU). In the autumn of 1950, on the basis of the resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. P77/309 and P77/310 of September 9, the Ministry of State Security of the USSR on the basis of the Department "DR" was created on the basis of departments directly subordinated to the minister: Bureau No. 1 for carrying out sabotage and terror abroad and Bureau No. 2 for carrying out terror (kidnappings and murders). And in the summer of 1950, special settlements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs were transferred to the MGB.

During 1950, all the records and file cabinets of criminals were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB.

Thus, the new minister, literally impudently, took everything he wanted from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the end, he took away from General Kruglov and his deputy General Serov even militia.

For example, to | July 1949 in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs still remained:

Main Directorate of corrective labor camps and colonies;

Prison Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for Combating Child Homelessness and Neglect;

Department of Special Settlements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for Prisoners of War and Internees;

Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for Combating Banditry;

Military bodies (Department of Convoy Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Protection of Particularly Important Facilities and Railways, Special Road Construction Corps, Military Construction Units of the Main Directorate of Industrial Construction Camps of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Main Directorate of Local Air Defense of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs);

Main Directorate of Fire Protection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Main Archival Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Specialized production departments of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Main Directorate of Highways of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Main Directorate of Camps for Industrial Construction of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Main Directorate of Camps for Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Main Directorate of Hydraulic Construction of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Main Directorate of Camps for the Forestry Industry of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs,

special Main Directorate for the Construction of the Far North of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Main Directorate "Yeniseystroy" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR);

Main Directorate of Military Supply of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Main Department of Material and Technical Supply of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Department of Courier Communications of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Department of Transportation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Personnel Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Six special departments;

Central Financial Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Planning Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Mobilization Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Secretariat of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Secretariat of the Special Meeting of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Legal part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

Motor transport sector of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

At the moment, that was all, because Viktor Semenovich took the rest to the MGB!

"Now, under the leadership of Abakumov, unbearable conditions have been created for the joint work of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs," General A.I. Serov. - Both in the center and on the periphery, employees of the MGB are trying to compromise the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as much as possible. After all, Abakumov speaks at official meetings and contemptuously declares that "now we have cleared ourselves of this militia. The Ministry of Internal Affairs no longer dangles underfoot," etc. After all, between the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs there are no official relations necessary for the good of the cause. There has never been such a hostile attitude in the history of organs. The party organizations of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not want to honor the memory of Lenin with joint meetings, but held them separately, and at the same time, the party organization of the MGB did not find it necessary to invite at least the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the mourning meeting.

After all, Abakumov instilled such terror in the ministry that the Chekists, who served together for 20-25 years, and now work alone in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and others in the Ministry of State Security, are afraid to greet each other, not to mention talking. If any of the employees of the MGB needs to come to me on business, then you need to take special permission from Abakumov. This was officially reported to me by the head of the MGB department Gribov and others.

Indeed, in the MGB one can only praise the leadership, talk about achievements in work and scold the previous methods of work.

In the internal troops transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of State Security, officers are forbidden to recall the operations carried out during the war (for the resettlement of Germans, Karachais, Chechen-Ingush, Kalmyks, etc.), you can only scold these operations ...

Not so long ago, Abakumov called one of the heads of the Department and scolded him for not sharply speaking at a party meeting against the old methods of work of the MGB. Everywhere, employees of SMERSH, inexperienced in the work of the territorial bodies of the MGB, were appointed to leadership positions. The employees of the MGB are intimidated by dismissal from their jobs and investigations.

Everyone knows that Abakumov did not check the work of a single SMERSH body and is afraid to do so, because finds a lot of trouble.

MGB officers who come from the periphery say that many regional departments of the MGB did not have a single arrest there during the year. The question is what do 3-4 employees of the RO MGB do during the year.

But you know, Comrade Stalin, how many repatriates arrived in the country, and among them Anglo-American spies ...

I will tell you, Comrade Stalin, the story of the transfer of traffic controllers from the Moscow police to the MGB. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR began to receive statements from the working people of the capital and from visiting citizens that the policemen on the main streets of Moscow were rude and did not want to talk to the population. At the same time, they indicated the numbers of the posts where these policemen were standing. When we started checking, it turned out that in all cases they were MGB guards, standing in police uniforms. We were forced to write about this to Abakumov. Instead of taking action, Abakumov asked me to come in and, together with Vlasik, began to insult me and comrade. Kruglov, declaring at the same time that if they want, they will take all the traffic controllers to their place. Indeed, two days later, an order was received to transfer the traffic controllers to the MGB.

Needless to say, but Viktor Semenovitch multiplied his enemies at an incredible speed.

For example, in the MGB building, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was given his own office, but the young minister ordered the secretary to be removed from Beria's office, and the office to stop cleaning. Soon Lavrenty Pavlovich stopped coming there, and the cabinet

just overgrown with cobwebs ... One can only imagine the fury that seized Beria when he found out about such a dirty trick of the person put forward by him to the top ...

In July 1947, Colonel-General Abakumov signed a letter addressed to Stalin "On the practice of investigation in the bodies of the MGB". After all, the investigation was not just of interest to Stalin, it was the most important element of the punitive policy that had been carried out in the Soviet Union since the birth of Soviet power.

This unique document also contains a description of how the arrested person is interrogated: "During the interrogation of the arrested person, the investigator seeks to obtain truthful and frank testimony from him, meaning not only establishing the guilt of the arrested person, but also exposing all his criminal connections, as well as persons, directing - Shih his criminal activities and their enemy plans.

To this end, during the first interrogations, the investigator invites the detainee to tell frankly about all the crimes committed against the Soviet regime and to give out all his criminal connections, without presenting evidence against him for some time, determined by the interests of the investigation.

At the same time, the investigator studies the nature of the arrested person, trying:

in one case, win him over by easing the regime of detention in prison, organizing food transfers from relatives, allowing him to read books, lengthening walks, etc.;

in another case, to increase the pressure on the arrested person, warning him of strict responsibility for the crime he committed, if he does not admit guilt;

in the third case - to apply the method of persuasion using the religious beliefs of the arrested person, family and personal attachments, pride, vanity, etc.

When the arrested person does not give frank testimony and evades direct and truthful answers to the questions posed, the investigator, in order to put pressure on the arrested person, uses compromising data from the past life and activities of the arrested person, which the latter hides, at the disposal of the MGB.

Sometimes, in order to outwit the arrested person and give him the impression that the MGB authorities know everything about him, the investigator reminds the arrested individual of certain intimate details.

from his personal life, the vices that he hides from others, etc."

Viktor Semenovich himself did not shy away from talking with the arrested. Often they were brought directly to his office, where he gave them some of his precious time.

Thus Vladimir Melnikov, a chemical engineer from Israel, recalls: "I was accompanied to Abakumov for interrogation by my then investigator Lieutenant Colonel Evdokimov. Before the transfer to the Bolshaya Lubyanka, he warned that I would be taken for interrogation to the big authorities and that my whole fate would depend on my behavior. In general, nothing special, the usual set of investigative phrases. But he didn't say what big bosses I'd be taken to...

The reception desk amazed me: firstly, I saw women, and they seemed beautiful to me, and secondly, armchairs with nickel-plated armrests and legs. I have never seen such. Terribly longing to sit on them. But, alas, I was placed facing the wall, so that I no longer saw either women or armchairs. The third thing I noticed was Yevdokimov, ironed, in full dress uniform, some kind of thin, all tense. The wait was short. The office seemed very large to me. On the right side are huge windows half-closed with heavy curtains. Ahead is a large desk, at which sat a rather young colonel-general. To the side at the conference table was another middle-aged man in civilian clothes ...

The military man was dark brown, with a broad face, a short neck, and apparently tall. Facial features are rough. He sat either leaning back in his chair, or leaning on the table ...

Evdokimov introduced me. I was seated at some small table, similar to the ones in the investigators' office, while Lieutenant Colonel Evdokimov stood at attention a little to one side. Abakumov conducted the interrogation calmly, did not shout, did not threaten. In addition to formal questions, he was interested in whether we, and I in particular, have connections in the Central Committee of the Komsomol, why I, a Jew, have a Russian surname, who are my parents, where did Gurevich get Velodok and, of course, whether we were preparing terrorist acts, against whom and when. The entire interrogation lasted 10-15 minutes. In any case, it was not long. I don't know what impression I made on Abakumov, but I liked him: calm, didn't shout, didn't swear, I thought that the investigation would end quickly. I was wrong.

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At the next interrogation, Evdokimov told me that I had been interrogated by the Minister of State Security Abakumov, that he did not like me very much, that I "did not disarm", etc. and the investigation will continue until I take out "all the stones from my bosom."

No less interesting is the story about the meeting with Abakumov of the NTS member Yu.A. Tregubova: "I enter and I am immediately struck by the contrast of light and shadow. This room is even larger than the one I was just in, but it seems almost dark. Carpet underfoot. To the right, against the wall, gleams a monstrous safe. Directly against the wall is a desk with a telephone. It has something bronze on it. On the table is a lamp with a green shade. Someone sits at a table and writes. Only bright hands are clearly visible. I stand silently for a minute and then say in an undertone:

- Arrested Tregubov Georgy.

It comes out very quiet in the big room, but that's how they're supposed to talk in this place. The seated person raises his head and makes some kind of hand sign that can be interpreted as an order to come closer. I'm coming. Now I'm standing three steps away from him. Next to me is a deep Voltaire leather chair. The seated person looks at me. He is fifty years old. He has a smart, clean-shaven, full, slightly puffy face with a scar on his face. It seems very tired. Unhealthy shadows - either purple or blue - under the eyes, puffy bags. He is in a civilian dark suit. Snow-white collar with a small snake head tie at the throat. His eyes look at me calmly, intelligently and very kindly.

- Do you know who I am? he says wearily.

I don't have the honor to know.

— I am Minister of State Security Abakumov.

"Very glad," I answer, bowing a little.

The hand makes some indefinite gesture.

- Sit down! I called you here because I need to ask you some questions.

I silently nod my head. I feel no fear, no surprise, no embarrassment. I imagined Abakumov in a completely different way, and now I somehow can't even believe that it was him. And he calmly and indifferently writes something. Then suddenly puts aside the pen.

— Tregubov!

It sounds like a teacher calling out to an inattentive child.

"Tell me, Tregubov, were you an American spy after all or not?"

— No, never was.

- Were not? So why? After all, it was so natural for you after the collapse of Germany to collude with a new enemy?

- Firstly, I did not believe at all that the Americans were your enemies, Citizen Minister, and secondly, the work of an intelligence officer is not my specialty. I am not a scout.

“Of course, I understand that no one is born a scout, and I used to intend to become someone completely different, but many, Tregubov, die scouts. Would you like to retrain?

There is something like a smile on Abakumov's face.

“But before we talk further,” Abakumov begins again, “tell me first, what is your attitude towards Soviet power?”

- My attitude? Sharply negative.

Abakumov nods his head.

“That's so good, Tregubov. Well, what about now?

And now it's exactly the same.

The pale face is again gloomy and motionless. Abakumov is silent for a few seconds.

“Do you know, Tregubov, that if the enemy does not surrender, then he is destroyed?”

- I know. Are you talking about me?

- Yes.

“There is no need to destroy me. Long since destroyed.

"And you don't feel sorry for yourself?"

I am silent.

- So, how do you live? Health? Feeling well?

Abakumov smiles again.

- Badly. I am very weak and hungry.

- Fine. I'll write you extra food.

Abakumov is silent again.

— A pity, Tregubov. You still think. Together, we could do colossal things.

I feel that the audience is over and I start to rise from my chair. Abakumov is not trying to hold me back. I stand up, bow and say:

- Goodbye.

Then I add:

Thank you, sorry to disturb you.

Abakumov nods his head slightly in amazement. It was then that I realized: you have to be extremely polite with Chekists, this is what confuses them most of all.

Only in the cell do I begin to think about all that I have said. The impression of Abakumov's words and my own is mixed. What he said looked like recruitment, but maybe not. And the result of what I said, the future will show. Then it occurs to me that I could probably ask him for some more clothes - a warm padded jacket or a pea jacket. Because I don't have anything. But now it's too late. Abakumov kept his promise to provide additional food. Since June 1, they bring me to the cell not 650, but 750 grams of bread, a few grams more sugar, and a spoonful of meat sauce is added to the porridge for lunch. In general, all this additional food is sheer nonsense. But it's still a plus, not a minus.

Viktor Semyonovich interrogated A. Andreeva right in Lefortovo. She will remember how she was led to him: "... on the way to the office, every one and a half meters there is a soldier. They led me into the room, where my investigator and the head of the department were sitting, and with them a very large, imposing and stout oriental man in a black suit. He starts interrogating me.

- You had a weapon. Why don't you say where it is?

"Because I don't know," I answer.

— Did you have a weapon?

— So if you, minister, say that we had weapons, it means that we had them. But I never saw.

Having lived under Soviet rule for so many years, it never occurred to me that the minister could be lying. He came close to me and looked:

- What a young ... How did you get involved in all this?

Father Yuri Danilovich Komisarov was arrested in 1950 right in the office of A.Ya. Vyshinsky. He was given "only" five years as a "Japanese and English" spy. But first, Abakumov himself knocked out two of his teeth with keys, threw him on the floor from a chair and kicked him ...

In anger, Viktor Semenovich was unpredictable. Yes, but he didn't always beat the arrested. Beal was especially stubborn. With accommodating and talked quite politely. However, someone really wanted to beat really from the heart - it did not always work out. his enemies

were at positions and ranks - noble. And Ivan Serov can be considered one of these...

September 8, 1946 I.A. Serov, in his first letter of complaint against Abakumov, writes: "I consider it necessary to report to you, comrade. Stalin, about the non-Party attitude to mine. Abakumov.

T. Abakumov throughout the war tried to compromise me on every little thing, but I did not pay attention, because. at that time he had limited opportunities to do so. At the present time, when these possibilities have increased many times over, I found it necessary to turn to you for help.

There are many facts confirming my words, but I will dwell on only a few of them.

During the Patriotic War, on behalf of Comrade. Beria, I repeatedly traveled to the Special Departments of the Fronts to assist in the work and eliminate shortcomings in war conditions.

For example, at the beginning of 1942, information was received that on the Southern Front there were many cases of group crossings of our soldiers to the side of the enemy, that the head of the Special Department, Major of State Security Zelenin, was not engaged in work on

to prevent cases of treason, but decomposes, cohabits with typists and awards them medals, that Zelenin lured the wife of the head of the Political Department of the army to an apartment, made her drunk and raped her.

Departure to the place, I organized undercover work in the Special Divisions of divisions to warn the command about impending betrayals and arrest traitors. Zelenin was called by comrade Abakumov, but I don't know about the decision taken, because. I was transferred to the Kerch front.

In any case, Zelenin has now received the rank of lieutenant general, works as head of the Counterintelligence Department in Germany, keeps one of the former typists as his wife, and enjoys great authority with Abakumov. Zelenina's real wife was captured by the Germans, got mixed up with them and now lives separately...

On the Kerch Front, the head of the Special Department was Major General Belyanov, who, together with the front command, deceived the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the situation at the front, in connection with which, at the direction of Comrade. Beria, he was removed from his post by me and

dismissed from the Special Departments.

From the first days of the war, I was instructed to lead the destruction battalions and troops of the NKVD to protect the rear of the fronts. Due to the fact that the troops of the rear guard and the destruction battalions detained enemy spies a lot, the employees of the Special Departments tried in every possible way to take suspicious persons and spies detained by our bodies and account for them.

On this basis, Comrade Abakumov and I repeatedly had major conversations. This can be confirmed by Lieutenant General Petrov.

During the difficult situation near Stalingrad, in August 1942, comrade. Beria sent Comrade Abakumov there to restore order in the city and organize a crossing across the Volga.

Some time later, the Military Council of the front sent a telegram that there was no order in the city of Stalingrad, panic began among the population due to the lack of a crossing, etc.

In this regard, Comrade Beria sent me to Stalingrad, but recalled Abakumov.

Upon arrival in Moscow, Comrade Abakumov began to spread rumors that Serov asked for it to go to Stalingrad and etc.

Comrade Abakumov was particularly indignant at your decision to send NKVD representatives to the fronts, who played a positive role in the last stage of the war.

First, Comrade Abakumov categorically rebelled against sending operatives to staff the apparatus of the authorized agents.

Secondly, he tried in every possible way to separate SMERSH workers from the Authorized Fronts, even in some cases to the detriment of the common cause ...

In this case, Comrade Abakumov reached the point of childishness. He called the head of the SMERSH Directorate of the Byelorussian Front, General Vadis, and his deputy, General Sidnev, and demanded that they did not appear on my call and did not follow my instructions on work. At the same time, he threatened with penalties and even arrest.

At the end of the war, Comrade Abakumov really removed General Vadis immediately and sent in his place the "reliable" worker Zelenin.



Obviously, General Sidnev will suffer the same fate as soon as he becomes subordinate to Abakumov.

Recently, when SMERSH was no longer operationally subordinate to me, I received many statements about outrageous work

SMERSH, I always informed Zelenin, and reported the most characteristic facts to the Ministry and took the necessary measures to eliminate them. For example, at the beginning of this year, drunk SMERSH workers went to a field near the city of Halle in the evening to carry out the sentences of the Military Tribunal. Drunk, the corpses were buried so casually that in the morning the Germans passing along the road near this place saw two hands sticking out of the ground and a head from three corpses. Then they dug up the corpses, saw holes in the backs of the heads of the corpses, gathered witnesses and went to report to the local police. We have taken urgent action.

In the same year, two German women, arrested in the English zone of Berlin, ran away from the SMERSH workers of the division of General Stalin V.. After escaping, they told the British about their arrest by the Russians. SMERSH workers tried to hide all this, but General V. Stalin found out about this, intervened in this matter, informed me, in connection with which the necessary measures were urgently taken. Dozens of similar facts can be cited.

T. Abakumov was always indignant that they were interfering in his affairs, although he knew that the intervention helped the cause.

In one of his conversations with me, Comrade Abakumov said: "During the war, you spoiled a lot of blood for me and my workers."

This statement shows that Comrade Abakumov is trying to protect the honor of his uniform, and does not consider eliminating shortcomings in his work in the interests of our common state cause. And besides, he sees in me the main culprit of all the troubles caused to him, and not his subordinates who made mistakes in their work.

Recently, Comrade Abakumov's employees came to me and warned that Comrade Abakumov was very interested in me, and "hinted" to his close associates Zelenina, Malinin and others that it was necessary to pick up compromising materials on Serov.

In pursuance of these instructions, Malinin now walks around the Ministry of State Security and boldly declares when meeting with acquaintances that we will get to Serov.

This can be confirmed by employees working for comrade Abakumov. And now there is a collection of materials for me, but it is carried out very rudely.

In conclusion of his complaint to the leader, Ivan Serov adds: "T. Abakumov, like all of us, is still a young Chekist, and so

As a young minister, the party and the state entrusted him with enormous tasks, especially in the current conditions, he must achieve the friendly, purposeful work of the KGB team in order to fulfill these tasks, and not engage in intrigues. We will all help him in his work, but Comrade Abakumov must understand that the Ministry of State Security has not been handed over to him in order to settle personal scores with people he dislikes.

I'm very sorry, comrade. Stalin, when Comrade Abakumov insults me undeservedly. I try to work without looking back, I achieve the fulfillment of the work entrusted to me, no matter what. I know that if I make a mistake in the course of my work, they will correct me.

Therefore, I ask you, comrade. Stalin, protect me from insulting persecution by Comrade Abakumov..."

Ivan Alexandrovich Serov (three years older than Viktor Semenovich) could well not like Abakumov as a person who came to the authorities from the army. In addition, Serov, unlike the Minister of State Security, was educated. Behind him were three years of the Leningrad Infantry School, studies at the Military Engineering Academy and the Academy. Frunze. From 1928 to 1935, Serov went from the commander of a fire platoon to the acting chief of staff of an artillery regiment. And in 1939, he was immediately deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia of the NKVD of the USSR, major of state security. And in the same year, in 1939, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Senior Major of State Security, then Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank.

From 1941 to 1947, Serov was Deputy People's Commissar - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank, Colonel General.

From 1945 to 1947, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany for Civil Administration Affairs.

At the end of May 1945, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (plus the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal) was added to two Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov 1st Class and Kutuzov 1st Class of General Serov.

In February 1947, Serov received a new appointment to the post of First Deputy Minister of the Interior. And having arrived in Moscow in early April, he launched a fight against Abakumov with renewed vigor ... Because he, among other things, undertook

believe the genealogy of General Serov. According to N. Petrov, "finds made during the war years by V.F. Korotkov, head of the department of secret funds of the Main Archival Directorate, which was then part of the NKVD, from which it followed that Serov's father was a royal gendarme. Going through the card index, Korotkov found information about two employees of the Vologda provincial gendarme department (GZhU) at once. They were Alexander Pavlovich Serov, born in 1870, an employee of the GZhU from 1907 to 1913, and Alexander Pavlovich Serov (year of birth unknown), who worked there from 1911 to 1917.

Korotkov quickly found out that the files on them were stored in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vologda Oblast in fund 35 (case 1750) and in fund 17 (case 330). After that, he prudently made copies of the cards and at the end of 1944 reported to his superiors. His immediate supervisor, Gordeev, reported the discovery to the head of the Main Archive Department, I.I. Nikitinsky. And then he allegedly told Korotkov that it was really about the father of Deputy People's Commissar Serov. But at that moment, the story did not receive further development. Perhaps because Serov's sister Khristina also worked in the same archival department. Most likely, Serov found out about what was happening and took action.

Going to work in the MGB after the war, Korotkov showed copies of the cards to the head of the 1st department of the 5th directorate, Agayants. This was immediately reported to Minister Abakumov, who immediately summoned the former archivist to his office. Abakumov questioned Korotkov in detail and ordered Serov to be checked in the archives of the MGB and in Vologda.

Two days after this meeting, Korotkov and Agayants were sent to the Vologda archive. However, Agayants was clearly weary of his mission and on the way scolded Korotkov for this "dirty deed" and cautiously praised Serov. Little was found in Vologda. In the archives, two cards exactly the same as in Moscow were found, but file No. 1750 was not in place. The second case was also lost - in the folder numbered 330 something completely extraneous was stored. The head of the archive could not clarify anything either, who answered all questions that he had only recently been at this job.

A visit to the city of Kadnikov, where the first A.P. Serov. It turned out that Serov's father owned a farm there with arable land, a forest and a meadow, and before the First World War he built a two-story mansion. But no documents confirming that he was a gendarme could be found.

Approximately the same result was given by the search for the second A.P. Serov, who served in the GZhU. Agayants and Korotkov visited the village of Zalesye, made sure that the one they were looking for really lived there, then was exiled and disappeared forever.

Agayants and Korotkov returned to Moscow practically with nothing. If Abakumov could prove that Serov's father was a gendarme, the enemy would be defeated. However, the case, which seemed so promising to the Minister of State Security, burst like a soap bubble. Abakumov realized that more serious steps were needed against Serov in order to make him calm down for a long time."

After the arrest of the head of the government communications department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I.Ya. Vorobyov, already in October 1947, Abakumov reported to Stalin that in December 1942, Serov, who supervised the work of this department, had given instructions to prepare a daily report on all the conversations of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Such certificates were compiled until the end of 1944. And only after Serov left for the front, their compilation stopped.

According to the historian N. Petrov, "it was very similar to unauthorized wiretapping of conversations, and not of anyone, but of the Supreme Commander himself. For this, Serov could cruelly pay.

On October 23, 1947, Abakumov strikes again. In an official letter, he informs Stalin and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Kuznetsov about the facts of bribery by the employees of the Moscow police. The militia in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is supervised by First Deputy Minister Serov.

Abakumov understands that blows must follow one after another. On November 29, 1947, he sent a new letter to Stalin and Kuznetsov. This time, about cases of looting, theft and appropriation of valuables by the former head of the operational sector of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Thuringia, Major General G.A. Bezhanov. The certificate attached to the letter stated that Bezhanov seized the jewelry box from the German General Gertmann and appropriated it. Abakumov also accused Bezhanov of releasing Nazis who agreed to cede their property to him. Other crimes were also mentioned, for example, the unjustified arrests of Germans carried out by the operational sector in Thuringia (ten people committed suicide while in custody), as well as the provocations widely practiced by Bezhanov with the creation of "underground Nazi groups". The Germans who refused to participate in this, Bezhanov's people simply

killed. Stalin's reaction can be judged from the resolution in the letter. As usual, Abakumov himself wrote down Stalin's oral resolutions on papers read by the leader. This time he wrote: "It is proposed to arrest Bezhanov. I personally received instructions about this from Comrade Stalin on December 6, 1947.

Already the first results of Bezhanov's interrogations made Abakumov unspeakably happy. On January 28, 1948, he told Stalin: "Bezhanov testified that Serov appropriated valuables and shipped them to the USSR." Bezhanov spoke about bags of money captured by Serov's people in the Reichsbank during the storming of Berlin. The German Reichsmarks were used by Serov allegedly for "operating expenses"...

In the same letter, Abakumov asked for sanctions for the arrest of the former chiefs of the operational sectors of Saxony and Berlin, Generals S.A. Klepov and A.M. Sidnev and, in addition to them, M.A. Khrenkov - Serov's adjutant from November 1942 to August 1947. Stalin gave the sanction.

Now it was Serov's turn, and on February 8, 1948, he wrote a second letter to Stalin: "I apologize, Comrade STALIN, for having to disturb you once again, but now the situation has developed around me that I have decided to write to you.

Since I sent you, Comrade STALIN, an explanatory note about BEZHANOV's false testimony, Abakumov has arrested up to 10 people from among the employees who worked with me, including two adjutants. Employees of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR know about these arrests, "testimonies" and openly say that ABAKUMOV is getting closer to me.

I am still working, not paying attention to what is happening, however, I consider it necessary to report to you about this, Comrade STALIN, because I am sure that ABAKUMOV is reporting a lie.

With this note, I want to tell you in more detail what ABAKUMOV is.

As far as I know, statements were made in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that ABAKUMOV, for the sake of his career, was ready to destroy anyone who stood in his way. This truth is known to very many honest people.

Undoubtedly, ABAKUMOV will try to settle personal scores not only with me, but also with the rest of his enemies - this is from TT. FEDOTOV, KRUGLOV, MESHIK, RAPAV, MILSHTEIN and others.

ABAKUMOV told me in 1943 that he would shoot MESHIK one day anyway. Well, now, as a minister, there is every opportunity to find another way of revenge. ME SHIK knows this and is careful. Abakumov and other honest comrades are also afraid.

Comrade STALIN, I have no doubt that you will not work for Abakumov for a long time with such methods let me.

I will cite a few facts known to me as a result of communication with ABAKUMOV over a number of years.

Now, in order to denigrate me, ABAKUMOV is trying with all his might to drag me to Zhukov. I am not afraid of these efforts, because besides ABAKUMOV, there is a Central Committee, which can sort things out objectively. However, ABAKUMOV is silent about himself, as he praised ZHUKOV and fawned over him like a boy. I will cite the facts, Comrade STALIN.

When the Germans approached Leningrad and a difficult situation arose there, it was none other than the all-knowing ABAKUMOV who spread rumors that "Zhdanov was at a loss in Leningrad, he was afraid to stay there, that Voroshilov was unable to organize the defense, but Zhukov arrived and that was it. turned the case, now Leningrad has not surrendered

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dut".

Now ABAKUMOV will undoubtedly retract his words, but I will be able to remind him.

Second fact. In Germany, Ulbricht from the Central Committee of the Communist Party addressed me and told me that in three districts of Berlin, the British and Americans appointed district judges from Germans who identify and arrest functionaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, therefore it is impossible to organize party work there. At the end of the conversation, he asked the Central Committee for help in this matter. I instructed secretly to put three judges in the camp.

When the British and Americans found out about the disappearance of three judges in their sectors of Berlin, they made a statement at the Control Council asking them to investigate who had arrested the judges.

ZHUKOV called me and demanded their release in a blunt manner. I did not consider it necessary to release them and told him that we did not arrest them. He was indignant and told everyone that SEROV was not working correctly. Then the Inter-Allied Commission investigated, did not confirm the fact that the judges had been arrested by us, and that was the end of the matter. The Central Committee of the Communist Party expanded its work in these areas.

ABAKUMOV, having learned that ZHUKOV scolds me, decided to curry favor with him. To this end, he instructed his faithful friend ZELENIN, who at that time was the head of the SMERSH Department (now under investigation), to confirm that the judges were arrested by me. ZELENIN found out about the arrest of the judges and reported to ABA-KUMOV.

At the end of the meeting, ABAKUMOV approached me and offered to go together to the Ministry. On the way, ABAKUMOV began to tell me that he had established for sure that the German judges had been arrested by me, and knew where they were being held. I have confirmed this because before the Chekist did not consider it necessary to hide. Then ABAKUMOV asked me why I hid this from ZHUKOV, I replied that ZHUKOV did not need to tell everything. ABAKUMOV tried to give me a lecture that "Zhukov needs to be told everything", that "Zhukov is the first deputy of the Supreme Commander", etc. I interrupted him with a question why he curtsied so zealously before ZHUKOV. To this, ABAKUMOV told me that he had told Zhukov about the arrest of the judges and that I would be in trouble. For this I called Abakumov a fool and we parted ways. And now it is permissible to ask ABAKUMOV what caused such a desire to curry favor with Zhukov.

It is unpleasant for me, Comrade STALIN, to recall the numerous facts of Abakumov's self-supply during the war at the expense of trophies, but I consider it necessary to report on some of them.

Probably, ABAKUMOV did not forget when during the Patriotic War a trainload of more than 20 wagons with trophy property arrived in Moscow, among which ABAKUMOV's zealous sycophants from SMERSH sent him a full wagon loaded with property with the inscription "ABAKUMOV".

Probably, ABAKUMOV has already forgotten when the blood of soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army, who liberated Sevastopol, was still shed in the Crimea, and his adjutant KUZNETSOV (now "protecting" ABAKUMOV VA) flew to the head of the SMERSH counterintelligence department and loaded a plane full of captured equipment. Frontal aviation command did not refuel ABAKUMOV's plane with gasoline on the way back, because there was not enough fuel for combat aircraft fighting the Germans. Then adjutant ABAKUMOVA did not lose his head, deceptively refueled and flew away. The commander of the aviation corps complained to me about this and showed the receipt from adjutant ABAKUMOV. These are the meannesses made by the ABA

KUMOV during the war, spending the motor resources of the SI-47 aircraft and fuel. These outrages are still covered up by the phrase: "The plane flew for the arrested". Now ABAKUMOV does not allow his planes arriving from abroad to be checked at Checkpoints in Moscow, exposing MGB soldiers, despite the Government's decree on the search of all without aircraft exclusions.

Let ABAKUMOV tell the Central Committee about his cowardly behavior during the difficult time of the war, when the Germans were near Moscow. He walked around like a wet chicken, groaned and sighed about what would happen to him, but did not attend to business. His cowardice was perceived by the subordinates of the apparatus. Abakumov sent his sycophant IVANOV, who was in charge of household matters, to take measurements from our feet for sewing wading boots in order to escape from Moscow. ABAKUMOV sewed such boots for many generals and himself. After all, the generals who remained in Moscow at that time saw the behavior of ABAKUMOV.

Let ABAKUMOV refuse, as in the difficult days of the war he walked around the city, chose girls of easy virtue and took them to the Moskva Hotel.

And now he has forgotten this and put Lieutenant Colonel TUZHLOV in prison, who in the first days of the war was the head of the border outpost, fought the Germans to the last bullet for seven hours, was wounded and received the Order of the Red Banner.

Of course, now ABAKUMOV probably "forgot" about the conversation that we had with him in October 1941 about the situation near Moscow and what assessment he gave then. ABAKUMOV told me in secret that "troops have arrived from Siberia, it seems that things near Moscow should go better." To this I answered him: "Comrade STALIN near Moscow turned the tide of the war, the people will carry him in their arms for the salvation of Moscow." And at the same time, he told you personally, Comrade STALIN, the words when the late SHCHERBAKOV reported to you that Hitler's order had been intercepted, in which he indicated that on November 7 he would conduct a parade of troops on Red Square.

When you calmly and confidently said to this: "That Hitler is a fool! He does not even imagine how he will run away from Russia without looking back."

... During the war, I had to meet Abakumov more often in my work and less often in everyday life, Serov concludes. "I have observed and studied him. I made a certain about him

opinion, which was fully confirmed by recent events. In order to create fame for himself, he goes to any meanness, even to the detriment of the cause.

Continuing his struggle, "On February 24, 1948, Abakumov sent a new letter to Stalin, Molotov and Kuznetsov, to which he attached the protocol of the interrogation of the arrested Khrenkov. "I must say that Serov, being a man greedy for other people's good, began to engage in appropriation of values and property while he was in Poland," Khrenkov said during the investigation. In the city of Lodz, Serov sent property from the mansion of the German Gauleiter to Moscow - a whole carriage. The carriage was accompanied by Serov's wife and Khrenkov with a paper from Serov about a customs-free pass. In the mansion of Grand Admiral Raeder in Babelsberg, on the orders of Serov, Khrenkov broke out a marble fireplace. The fireplace was installed in Serov's Moscow apartment. Bags of money captured in the basement of the Reichsbank were not credited, Serov and Sidnev spent their contents uncontrollably. Abakumov asked Stalin to authorize the arrest of L.S. Nikitin, Serov's other adjutant. Another employee of Serov, V.M. Tuzhlov, his secretary, had already been arrested. Tuzhlov also told the investigation a lot of interesting things about Serov."

However, all the efforts of Viktor Semenovich were in vain. Stalin nevertheless saved Serov from Abakumov's persecution. As N. Petrov writes, Stalin "felt that in the case of Serov, despite his obvious guilt, Abakumov was also pursuing some personal interests of his own. But Stalin did not like this. As a result, Serov retained his high positions and titles, however, Stalin no longer accepted him in his Kremlin office.

## PRIVATE LIFE OF THE MINISTER

According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, Viktor Semyonovich did not like to drive an official car, he preferred to walk, and on the streets he ordered his escorts to give one hundred rubles to beggars, mostly old women. He liked it when the old women were baptized, thanking for the alms. And yet, the love for German cars did not bypass Viktor Semenovich. His subordinates told Yevgeny Zhirnov how their tall boss was rushing around Moscow in a tiny sports convertible VMU 327.

legends, owned by the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. It was on it that the Minister of State Security traveled to report to Stalin in the Kremlin. Before that, after his appointment as Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, two official cars were assigned to Viktor Semenovich: from Gera and Ryutuyu.

The guards brought kebabs from Aragvi to Abakumov — he was not indifferent to good kebabs. Moreover, three offices worked round the clock in "Aragvi". In his book "Secrets of a Tired City", E. Khrutsky writes how the necessary foreigners were received there, and there, high-ranking officials from the KGB met with no less eminent informants. High-ranking officials came there at night to rest from worries.

For these reasons, and perhaps not only, a team of labor shock workers and top-class cooks worked in the kitchen of this restaurant. For half an hour, the waiters laid a luxurious table. Well, the kebabs, which, besides Abakumov, Vasily Stalin ordered for himself, were the best in all of Moscow.

Viktor Semenovich did not change his other habits either. As before, he adored the foxtrot and for the purpose of cute entertainment, that is, to dance with a beautiful girl, he went to the famous Sport restaurant.

"Thunderstorm of spies and enemies of the people most of all liked to "beat" a forbidden, ideologically alien dance," recalled E. Khrutsky. - He came to the restaurant "Sport" incognito, like a king from fairy tales, who wanted to know how his subjects live.

Viktor Abakumov, despite his tall stature, loved dancing, drinking, and women. It was because of them that a fight broke out in a restaurant, and the minister was decently beaten. The reprisal against the offenders was immediate, but, as I was told by knowledgeable people, no one was imprisoned, just Abakumov's guys pretty decently swept away the perpetrators.

And yet the main passion of Viktor Semenovich was football. His deputy recalled: "He did not miss a single interesting match. The Dynamo team was considered his property. He emphasized all the time: "Help the Dynamo team, find a good referee for the match to judge honestly. Give them good equipment."

Dynamo players blew one of the most important games. The Minister assembled the team in his office. He was rude even in ordinary times, but in my memory he reached such a degree of unbridledness only this one time.

He began to find fault with them all from soul to soul. "Bastards" and "scoundrels" was the mildest of what he said. Kostya Beskov especially got it.

"You need to play, but not, mother-rewind, read art books! I expected only victory from you! Blow out this military stable!" In my opinion, they lost to the team of the Central House of Krasnaya Ar  
missions.

I was sitting on the edge, at the far end of the table, but splashes of anger reached me as the deputy chairman of the Dynamo society, responsible for football: "What the hell are you doing there? Our team should only win, and you should help them!"

Officer of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases I.I. Eliseev once talked about his meetings with Abakumov, the red thread of which is football.

It was like this: "... Eliseev and a friend, being late for football and not waiting for the elevator, ran down the central staircase. Finding themselves already in the lobby, they almost ran into a tall, fit, athletic figure entering the building...

The newcomer looked with interest at the young, out of breath people.

- No football?

- Yes sir.

He looked at his watch.

"Then hurry up, you're running out of time."

Passing by sentries, Ivan Ivanovich and his friend asked:

- Who is this?

"Minister of State Security Abakumov," the man with the gun explained to the uninformed.

A year later, Eliseev again ran into Abakumov, but already in the corridor of the Lefortovo prison. The minister stopped and looked at him carefully.

- Come on, come to me.

They went to an office specially equipped for the minister at the end of the corridor. Everything is rather modest. A table, chairs, a small hard sofa, a safe, several telephone

devices, including the Kremlin with the coat of arms.

- Well, how then, did you manage to play football?

- Do you remember the score?

- No.

"So ours lost..."

Cinema was another hobby of the minister. Every day at 4 in the morning he invited all the leadership of the state security to his cinema hall, and until 7 in the morning everyone watched trophy and domestic films...

When Abakumov is arrested and thrown into solitary confinement, one of the next groups of investigators will again make an excursion into the past of the former minister, up to the thirties. All the women who knew him will be fully revealed, and even those with whom he once accidentally exchanged a few words. For example, among them will be three students whom Abakumov met in the summer of 1945 at a pay phone booth on Gorky Street ...

And there was another one, with a sequel. Lyudmila Kafanova wrote about it in 2005 and published it in the Chaika magazine. The story of this woman seemed to me extremely interesting and therefore I decided to bring it on the pages of my book.

"Valya B., blond, gray-eyed with a gentle blush on her thin cheeks, studied in the same class as me, the daughter of the head of the Glavastronomer of the USSR Ministry of Trade. Charming, funny, she was not a diligent student, and being in the class older than all of us (because of the war she was late with her studies), she thought more about dresses and novels. I fell in love with her, and we often, instead of sharpening our brains by solving algebraic and geometric problems or sharpening our pens, poring over the essay "Onegin and the Revolutionary Movement in Russia", walked kilometers along the Moscow streets, with the aim of looking at people and ourselves show. On one of these trips, on a warm spring day at the corner of Neglinnaya and Kuznetsky, we ran into a tall, somewhat overweight man. Valya pulled my hand and whispered: "Look at him, don't miss anything ... This is my "handsome". Already several times I met him on the street and ... fell in love. I looked more attentively: a youthful, but already puffy, slightly bulldog face. Ash gray hair combed back. A tenacious and, I would say, strangely curious look of cold, expressionless blue eyes... An interesting man, at least in Valya's taste, is somewhat similar to her father and her favorite Moscow Art Theater actor Vladimir Lvovich Ershov . "Nothing," I said.

I will not bore the reader with a long, albeit fascinating, story about how the acquaintance with this man happened. A street acquaintance that both mothers warned us against. We had no idea who we met, we were only given a first name and patronymic: Viktor Semenovich. We had already met him several times, walking along Neglinnaya and Petrovka, when we came across Valya's neighbor Yurka. Seeing the three of us, he whistled impudently and made an obscene gesture with his hand. Soon we said goodbye to Viktor Semyonovich and went to Valya's house. Yurka was standing at the entrance, no doubt waiting for us. "Well girls," he said. "Wow, they found a gentleman!" We stared at him in surprise, and he continued: "This is Deputy Minister of State Security Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov!" Valya and I just froze like stone. "What, you didn't know? My father worked with him before the war. He was a major. Father said, junk worker, more and more about drinking and women. For some reason, SMERSH led the war. Do you know what it is? And now - army general, deputy minister! Wow, career! The information is not all correct, but more on that below. Soon Abakumov became the Minister of State Security.

Not long, but short, close relations were established between Valya and Abakumov, and in the position of her beloved friend, I found myself drawn into this love story. Together with Valya, I met Abakumov many times. He was at home...



Now, recalling what happened, I can say that Abakumov was an extraordinary person, different from the Soviet nomenklatura, at least outwardly. He, for example, liked to walk around Moscow on foot, without guards (!). He rarely drove a car, and if he did, he almost always drove himself. He could be seen at the skating rink at Petrovka 28, where he sometimes skated, but more often he stood among "normal" people on the terrace and looked at the skaters. At the stadium where he went to "cheer" for Dynamo, he also sat among ordinary mortals. In addition to sports, he was also interested in theater - he went to premieres and performances at the Bolshoi, Moscow Art Theater, Maly, Vakhtangov. He never sat down in the government box, sat in good seats in the parterre, and during intermissions he walked in the foyer. People around did not even guess what a terrible minister was next to them. He never spoke to anyone, never played democratic, never lowered his noble status. Interestingly, he loved serious music, constantly attended symphony and

instrumental concerts in the Great Hall of the Conservatory, in the Tchaikovsky Hall.

Once there was an incident that, in my opinion, in a certain sense, is typical for Abakumov. My neighbor Anatoly Petrovich Novikov, a major worker of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, did not get good tickets for some interesting concert in the Tchaikovsky Hall. "Well, okay," he decided. "I'll wait until the lights go out and sit down in an empty seat in the stalls." Thought - implemented. The lights were dimmed, the accompanist gave a note, the musicians tuned in and fell silent. Anatoly Petrovich, seeing two good free places in the stalls, took one of them. A moment later, a tall man with a lady appeared beside him. "Excuse me," the man said, "these are our seats." "No," came the answer, "these are my seats." The man shrugged his shoulders in surprise and quickly walked away. During the intermission, my neighbor came out into the lobby and saw a couple, whose seats he took. A friend whispered to him, pointing to the man: "Minister of State Security Abakumov." Anatoly Petrovich seemed to be blown out of the concert hall by the wind. He came home and immediately rushed to me, told me everything and asked: "What will happen now? You know him..." — "In my opinion, nothing will happen." The answer did not satisfy the neighbor, and he waited for three days to be arrested...

Naturally, neither with Valya, nor, even more so, with me, Abakumov touched on any serious topics, and when the three of us walked, they talked about mere trifles. It was obviously important to Valya that I take part in these walks. She stuttered a lot, and for this reason she could not keep up a conversation and transferred everything to me. Abakumov treated me with mocking curiosity. It occupied him that at the age of fifteen I had my own opinion, showed interest in history, politics, international affairs, asked questions and made assumptions. Often, about my statements, he said: "You, young lady (he always told me "you"), have too long a tongue. He won't do you any good." And one day, after listening to some of my considerations, he flared up and said sharply: "You think what you say. I would advise you not to repeat what you just told me in front of anyone!.."

And there was also such a case: once he told me and Valya about Germany, where he entered together with the Soviet troops, and it is possible that he had been there before. About the Germans, about their way of life, life, about everything that he saw in that country, he spoke with delight. All of it

it surprised, touched, delighted: cars, appliances, houses, cities, things and, especially, for some reason, German peasant tiled kitchens. "How did it happen that we defeated them?" I exclaimed in genuine surprise. Abakumov suddenly fell silent, looked intently at me and said with some kind of malicious sarcasm: "Don't you know that our country is the strongest, most advanced and most beautiful in the world? Don't you know about the moral and political unity of the Soviet people? About his selfless devotion to the party and our leader Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin? I ask you to remember all this and try not to ask more stupid questions." I remember that this outburst of his scared me then. I thought, "I won't open my mouth again." But then somehow everything was forgotten and the walks continued.

And Valya and I perceived the Minister of State Security in complete isolation from the post he held, and did not unite him with the horror that, we knew, reigned around. The reason for this was our youth and stupidity. And yet, perhaps, a fierce devoted love was responsible for this.

Wali. She drowned in these relationships, and I am convinced that they dragged on for almost a year only because Abakumov could not reject such sincerity and devotion. He was not married, he did not hide his relationship with Valya, and she saw in this the possibility of a certain development.

The day came, in my opinion, it was the October holidays of the 45th year, when Valya said: "Viktor Semenovitch invites us to visit tomorrow, to his home." He lived in Telegraph Lane near Chistye Prudy in a mansion where he occupied an entire floor. We came first. Other guests began to follow us. I was surprised that among those invited there were no "high-ranking" men and women, nomenklatura muzzled fat and elderly bosses. All the guests were young: some girls, young women and young people. Valya and I had never met any of them and had no idea who they were, where Viktor Semenovitch recruited them all from. Later, Valya told me that at all the parties at Abakumov's, which she attended, there was just such a young audience.

I don't think Abakumov was a truly educated person...

It seemed to me that he had some intense interest in America. American magazines "le", ook" were lying everywhere in the house. It was the first time I saw them with him. Abakumov dressed according to them

(and he dressed in exquisite fashion, in beautifully tailored suits, foreign shirts, and in general everything foreign). According to American magazines, he furnished his numerous rooms. Served a table. He said that he liked to watch American films because he was interested in any information "from there": how people live there, what they wear, what they eat, what cars they drive ... In my opinion, he really wanted to look like a "Western" person. He even told Valya that he studied English three days a week with an English teacher.

Judging by what was in his apartment, he took out "half of Germany". Pictures, dishes, crystal, furniture, carpets, chandeliers - everything was trophy. The owner, which was noticeable, tried to understand this splendor and bring it into line with the last picture of the brochure that arrived from abroad.

Remembering Abakumov, I can say that he was completely deprived of what is called "pleasantness", "charisma". Moreover, he was uncomfortable in personal communication - coldly arrogant, contemptuously mocking. Unconditionally accepting "Western" life, in the form in which it reached him in the form of films and magazines, he despised the Soviet reality. Everything Soviet - newspapers, books, movies, cars - aroused in him rejection and disgust. He felt the same feelings towards his colleagues from the MGB and the nomenclature workers. Valya told me under great secrecy that he hated Stalin, his benefactor who raised him so high, so much that he could not (or did not want to?) hide it. Once she was at his place when the phone rang - he was called to see Stalin. Stepping away from the phone with his face contorted with anger and disgust, he swore dirtyly and said: "I must come"" <...>

Vali's romance with Abakumov ended as unexpectedly as it began. Once Abakumov announced to Valya that he was marrying his former secretary Tonya. He allegedly marries because the said secretary knows too much. I didn't believe in this version: couldn't he "remove" this too knowledgeable lady, as was customary in the USSR, and not only with secretaries? But I was silent. As they say, it's none of my fucking business. Valya was terribly worried about this gap: she faded, turned ugly and believed that her life was over. However, after a short time she entered the Plekhanov Institute, married the son of Marshal G. Life circumstances separated us at times

directions. We hardly saw each other, rarely called each other. The last thing I heard from Valya about Abakumov was her story that she and her husband were invited to a grand celebration ... the anniversary of her "handsome", as she put it. It was either at the end of the 50th, or at the beginning of the 51st year. And suddenly, in the summer of 1951, rumors spread that Abakumov had been arrested."

Antonina Nikolaevna Smirnova, Abakumov's second wife, was twelve years younger than her husband. They met when she worked in the Naval Intelligence Department of the MGB.

The minister fell in love with the most beautiful woman in his department at first sight. And then a stormy romance of mutual and mature love began to spin.

"Tonya was his wife or not, but everyone knew her, although she never went to his office," recalls Zinaida Pavlovna Alekseeva. — She worked in the secretariat, in naval counterintelligence, on another floor. We all went to the dining room together. The same girl as we were, my age, in my opinion, she did not differ in any clothes. Only if I went in a tunic, then she was in an ordinary dress ... Although no, I can't say for sure - Abakumov married her, because then I met her in the Moscow administration. Husband and wife weren't supposed to work together, so she was transferred there."

In May 1951, Antonina gave birth to a son, Viktor.

Viktor Semenovich's first wife, Tatyana Andreevna (by the way, also Smirnova), was having a hard time, as she thought, with her husband's next novel. But everything turned out to be much more serious.

The young minister left her, leaving everything, including the apartment on Telegraph Lane. Fortunately, they did not have to get divorced, since they lived together for a long life without registering a marriage.

Offended, Tatyana Andreevna, even during the first meetings between Abakumov and Antonina, wrote a letter to him, in which she "complained that Viktor Semenovich was cheating on her, sometimes he beat her, asked, no, just informed that Abakumov has a love affair with A.N. Smirnova, an employee of her department."

His new "apartment" - a mansion in the center of Moscow in a quiet Kolpachny Lane - Viktor Semenovich looked after by chance. Somehow, while walking in his spare time with an adjutant following behind, he saw a house, which, despite its neglect and undemanding, he liked very, very much. At that moment in

it huddled whole [6 families, numbering 50 people. It is known that all of them soon received separate apartments, which in those days (the end of the forties) was a true miracle!

The overhaul of the house was carried out under the personal supervision of the young minister. They say that he often appeared at the carefully guarded site and personally gave instructions to a group of architects and a separate foreman. I built something for myself.

As Leonid Repin writes, Abakumov "thought everything out: on the first floor there is only security, and the entire second floor - a spacious study, a spacious bedroom, an immense dining room and other premises with a total area of more than 300 square meters - these are already private quarters where you can was to rise solely on duty or by invitation.

People who saw the palaces of royal nobles in the newly liberated Europe and visited the house of the Minister of State Security admitted in a whisper that the Moscow citadel of Abakumov was in no way inferior to these palaces in its luxury. Although outwardly the mansion looked much more modest. Abakumov understood: luxury should not hurt the eyes.

Behind the façade, of which there are many in Moscow, everything shone, sparkled. Crystal chandeliers brought from Europe cast streams of light onto light, perfectly polished marble, mirrors framed with intricate carvings, marble stairs and everything else that makes mere mortals open their mouths and eyes wide. It is probably unnecessary to remind that all this was done not for the personal money of the minister, but exclusively at public expense.

Subsequently, in the representative mansion on Kolpachny Lane, various negotiations will be held with the heads of the intelligence services of the socialist countries.

Incidentally, the father of Abakumov's second wife was a certain Nikolai Andreevich Smirnov, born in 1883. The doctor, an artist of the original genre, who specialized in mental magic and sessions of hypnosis, including mass hypnosis, had the pseudonym Orinaldo.

According to literary scholars, it was Orinaldo's sessions that prompted Mikhail Bulgakov to introduce the spectacular scene of Woland's performance in the Moscow variety show into the novel *The Master and Margarita*. Nikolai Andreevich himself toured the country quite actively in the 20s of the twentieth century. In 1935, together

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with his wife Dora Petrovna, Orinaldo created an illusion theater in which two eccentric extravaganzas "The Invisible Man" (based on the book of the same name by HG Wells) and "The Thousand and Second Night of Scheherazade" were shown. It is argued that, despite the content weakness of the plays, from the point of view of constructing an illusionary performance, these productions were innovative, since the tricks, mainly based on the principle of the "black cabinet", were united by a single storyline. Nikolai Andreevich, according to eyewitnesses, was a very strong hypnotist, later he began to practice therapeutic hypnosis: he lulled patients who were subject to surgery, and they did not feel any pain.

There is also an opinion that Orinaldo in the thirties was in secret work in the NKVD...

The only son of Viktor Semenovich, Igor Viktorovich Smirnov, despite what he experienced after his father and mother, still managed to get a good education and become an outstanding scientist.

In the 80s of the last century, he made the greatest discovery in the field of the study of the subconscious. Using psychosemantic analysis, he developed a computer technique and a special device for psychosensing. Having received international recognition, Igor Viktorovich refused to head a research institute in Germany...

## INTRIGUES AND NEW "SPY" FACES

Speaking with the former Deputy Minister of State Security E.P. Pitovranov, Yevgeny Zhirnov notes: "Beria was furious that Abakumov, having become the head of the Lubyanka, stopped listening to his instructions. Moreover, in the first few months of his leadership, Abakumov removed almost all of Lavrenty Pavlovich's henchmen from senior positions in the MGB and replaced them with his Smershevites.

The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the united military and political intelligence, created in May 1947 - the Committee of Information (CI) - Molotov also grew a huge fang on the new minister of state security. He was always irritated by the diplomatic scandals that often arose after Abakumov's "measures" against foreigners. In addition, the arrogant head of the MGB managed to slip him into the CI as the first deputy general Pyotr Fedotov, a not stupid man, but

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extremely indecisive. As a result, when Molotov was absent, Fedotov did not risk making any more or less responsible decisions on his own, and the work of the firm competing with the MGB was stalled for many days, or even weeks.

But the leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs Sergey Kruglov and his first deputy Ivan Serov, were especially fiercely at odds with Abakumov. The head of the Lubyanka sought to transfer one subdivision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after another to his subordination ...

His enemies could take revenge on Abakumov in only one way - by showing Stalin that the Minister of State Security was good for nothing. It was known in the corridors of power that the father of the peoples treated the minister of state security in the same way that shepherds in the mountains treat the shepherd dogs guarding them.

sheep: well guarded - valued, badly - killed. And in the fall of 1947, the campaign to discredit Abakumov, planned and directed by Beria, began.

The cunning Lavrenty, on the basis of the reports of the CI and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, began to prove to Stalin that the MGB was not fighting the British agents who had dug in everywhere, that due to Abakumov's oversight, American spies had penetrated the Soviet atomic project and were wrecking it with might and main. Real failures were added to the fictitious ones: "The autumn operation of the MGB against Ukrainian nationalists," General Serov informed the leader, "was known to the nationalists ten days before the start, and many of them disappeared. It's a fact. And Abakumov presented hundreds of employees for awards for the operation."

Clouds began to gather over the Minister of State Security's head. He urgently needed to uncover some dangerous spy or terrorist network. To win such a victory over the enemies of the people that could restore Stalin's favor to him. For example, to expose the Jewish conspiracy."

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC) was at that time the only official Jewish organization. "It was created in 1941 with the active participation of the NKVD, which at that time was in charge of absolutely all public organizations, which was then headed by Beria, in order to exert a beneficial influence on the public opinion of the West for the USSR. The JAC successfully coped with this task. But after the war, it turned out to be a big problem for the authorities - it was inconvenient to close it, and, as it soon became clear, it was impossible to integrate it into the Soviet system.

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The JAC lived its complicated and troubled life, and the idea of using the foreign family ties of the JAC members for the benefit of the Land of Soviets was in the air all the time. The first to try to implement it was the intelligence of the party, the international department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. But the JAC quickly became a bargaining chip in the internal CC intrigues, and the matter did not pan out.

The Information Committee became the next curator of the JAC. They have not yet forgotten that in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, when Soviet intelligence achieved outstanding successes, this happiness was 100% Jewish. In a country where the Jews live well, the diaspora helped willingly and disinterestedly. Agents were covered up, documents were taken out for them, they were taken out to be useful people. In 1947, there was a struggle over the future of Palestine, in which Molotov assigned a significant role to the JAC. As a first step, career intelligence officer Grigory Kheifets was appointed as the executive secretary of the JAC.

For Abakumov, all this was a gift from above. Having exposed a nest of spies or terrorists in the JAC, he cast a shadow on both Beria and Molotov and, at least for a long time, protected himself from their attacks. Such a prospect should have been to the taste of Stalin, too, "E. Zhirnov believes.

Solomon Mikhoels, the head of the State Jewish Theatre, People's Artist of the USSR, was also the chairman of the JAC. It was to him that a relative of Stalin, Yevgenia Alliluyeva, came to the theater. And he, completely unaware of how the leader relates to the Alliluyevs in general (he could not stand them), often communicates with her. According to E. Zhirnov, "the Nazi virus affected not only Abakumov. Mikhoels was writing from all over the USSR about the symptoms of an impending epidemic, and he rushed about trying to stop it. And when Yevgenia Alliluyeva came to his theater, he tried through her, a relative of Stalin, to convey his anxiety to the leader.

But how to turn everyday conversations, gossip about Stalin and chance meetings into a dangerous spy network, and then turn everything into a conspiracy, the MGB not only knew, but also had rich experience in this regard. And this despite the fact that some confidential information about the family life of Joseph Vissarionovich somehow got on the pages of the foreign press. It was not difficult to find channels for leaking such information. For this, it was only necessary to start listening to apartment and telephone conversations.

ditch most of the leader's relatives, to establish their connections and contacts. Very soon, critical conversations about Stalin in the apartment of Anna Alliluyeva and Yevgenia Alliluyeva were recorded by "operational equipment". The first was the sister, and the second was the wife of the LEADER'S brother.

But let's listen to E. Zhirnov: "At half past eleven on the night of December 9, 1947, Abakumov reports the "Mikhoels case" to his master. Already at the beginning of the first, Svetlana was brought to Stalin's office. Judging by the fact that she does not write anything about this meeting in her memoirs, she did not want to remember what happened there. Apparently, she confirmed that she had spoken to her aunts about her father. Be that as it may, on the same day, Stalin gave Abakumov the order to arrest Yevgenia Alliluyeva.

Evgenia Alliluyeva was arrested not alone. Her new husband, Molochnikov, was also arrested. At the end of January 1948, the turn came for Anna Alliluyeva. According to the historian G.V. Kostyrchenko, information about Stalin's personal life and the fate of his family members went abroad through one channel through the eldest daughter of Evgenia Alliluyeva Kira Pavlovna and her friend who worked at the US Embassy in Moscow (Zaitsev V.V.), in another way through friends Alliluyev, Molochnikov and Stalin's daughter Svetlana and her husband Grigory Morozov, and above all I.I. Goldstein and 3. Grinberg. The economist Goldstein worked together with Molochnikov and Evgenia and Pavel Alliluyev at the USSR trade mission in Berlin from 1929 to 1933. The writer Grinberg, a friend and collaborator of Solomon Mikhoels at work in the JAC, introduced the latter to Evgenia Alliluyeva's circle.

On December 16, Evgenia Alliluyeva "testified during interrogation that her old acquaintance Goldstein, visiting her from time to time, asked about Stalin, his daughter Svetlana." Three days later, Goldstein was arrested on the personal instructions of Abakumov.

In the summer of 1953, Colonel Komarov testified that at the end of 1947-beginning of 1948, a minister called him in his office in the Lefortovo prison and stated: "Instances believe that Goldstein was interested in the personal life of the head of the Soviet government not on his own initiative, but on his own initiative. foreign intelligence stands with its back."

Deputy Head of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases M.T. Likhachev, after receiving this instruction, ordered the following

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to Colonel G.A. Sorokin, who is in charge of Goldstein's case: "unwind Goldstein's espionage connections and reveal his spy face."

Goldstein himself, in a letter to Malenkov on October 2, 1953, reported: "On December 19, 1947, I was arrested in Moscow by the USSR Ministry of State Security and taken to the Lubyanka, and then to the remand prison in Lefortovo. Here, without giving the reasons for my arrest, they demanded that I myself confess and tell about my supposedly hostile activities against the Motherland.

They began to beat me severely and for a long time with a rubber truncheon on my soft parts and bare heels. They beat me to the point that I could neither stand nor sit... After some time, I was asked to sign a protocol (supposedly dictated by me), which stated that I pleaded guilty. I refused to sign such a protocol. Then the investigator Sorokin and another colonel began to beat me so hard that for several weeks my face was terribly swollen, and for several months I began to hear badly, especially with my right ear ... This was followed by new interrogations and new beatings. In total, I was beaten eight times, demanding more and more confessions."

As a result of the beatings, Goldstein testified that, according to Grinberg, he knew that in the presidium of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, notorious bourgeois nationalists seized leadership, who, distorting the national policy of the party and the Soviet government, are engaged in functions unusual for the committee and are carrying out nationalist activity. In addition, Goldstein testified about espionage activities

Mikhoels and that he showed an increased interest in the personal life of the head of the Soviet government in the Kremlin. According to Goldstein, American Jews were interested in such information from Mikhoels.

Soon after the testimony was beaten out, Viktor Semyonovich personally arrived at the Lefortovo prison and asked Goldstein:

- So, then Mikhoels is a bastard?

"Yes, you bastard," replied the prisoner.

On January 9, 1948, the MGB prepared appropriate material for the leader, in which Goldstein's testimony was as follows: "Mikhoels gave me the task of getting close to Alliluyeva, of getting personally acquainted with Grigory Morozov. "Necessary

to notice all the little things, - said Mikhoels, - not to lose sight of all the details of the relationship between Svetlana and Grigory. Based on your information, we will be able to develop the right plan of action and inform our friends in the USA, as they are interested in these issues."

On January 10, the leader got acquainted with the materials and gave Abakumov "an urgent task to quickly organize the liquidation of Mikhoels by the employees of the USSR Ministry of State Security, entrusting this to special persons."

In 1953, while in prison, Abakumov testified: "Then it was known that Mikhoels, and with him his friend, whose name I don't remember, arrived in Minsk. When this was reported to I.V. Stalin, he immediately instructed it in Minsk and to carry out the liquidation of Mikhoels under the guise of an accident, that is, that Mikhoels and his companion should die after falling under a car.

In the same conversation, senior officials of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, who could be entrusted with the conduct of this operation, were moved. It was said that the execution of the operation should be entrusted to Ogoltsov, Tsanova and Shubnyakov.

After that, Ogoltsov and Shubnyakov, together with a group of workers trained by them for this operation, left for Minsk, where, together with Tsanova, they carried out the liquidation of Mikhoels.

A word to E. Zhirnov: "As the author was told by a direct participant in the operation, the head of the department for work with the intelligentsia of the second head office of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Colonel Fyodor Shubnyakov, according to the original plan, the murder was to take place in Moscow.

The militants from Lubyanka established surveillance of the artist, but they did not succeed in seizing the moment and pushing Mikhoels into a car in the capital. The popular actor has never been on the street alone. And then he almost stopped coming out altogether. The militants decided that he had discovered the observation and understood everything. Although, perhaps, he was simply frightened by the arrest of Yevgenia Alliluyeva and the subsequent arrests of Isaak Golstein and Zakhar Grinberg, people whom the MGB predicted as contacts between her and Mikhoels.

It was too risky to take Mikhoels to the apartment, which was located in the theater building - unwanted witnesses could appear. Therefore, they decided to move the scene of action to Minsk, where Mikhoels went to watch performances - contenders for the Stalin Prize. First of all, he was urgently changed his companion - he became an informer of the MGB Vladimir Golubov-Potapov. In that

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two militants boarded the same car. They were responsible for ensuring that Mikhoels did not try to get off the train along the way. Minsk decided not to follow the victim. The liquidators wanted him to feel safe there. In addition, Golubov reported on every step of Mikhoels MG'.

He was well known to Alexander Borshchagovsky, who wrote the following about him in Novy Mir in 1993: "Hardly anyone then took on faith the official version of an accidental death, a collision or a car accident. Rumors have multiplied...

An important piece of evidence for me was that two days before Mikhoels' departure for Minsk, his companion suddenly changed: instead of the theater critic Yu. the author of the first book about Ulanova, a former Minsker who graduated from the Institute of Railway Engineers in Belarus. Not suspecting my glorious, drinking colleague Volodya Golubov of collaborating with the state security agencies, mourning him as an accidental victim of murderers, I could not help but think about why he was almost forcibly forced to go to Minsk. He would be happy to travel with the wise and cheerful Mikhoels, who, as you know, did not blunder in wine-glass battles either with Fadeev, or with Alexei Tolstoy, or with the Moscow Art Theater luminaries ...

But Golubov was nervous, he could not find a place for himself.

On the day of departure, I saw him twice - at the WTO, where I looked through Pushkinskaya Square from my editorial office of Novy Mir, and at the Belorussky railway station before the train left. Not knowing that I would come to the station, Mikhoels called me at home, told my wife Valentina not to worry - he would return in a few days and read my play to the troupe: he was going to stage in the GOSSET my a play about the times of the fascist occupation of Kiev.

At the station, Golubov somehow forlornly clung to me, confessed that "like this," he ran his chubby hand over the collar of his coat, "he doesn't want to go, didn't think and doesn't want to ... "Why did you give consent? You don't serve in the WTO, you would send them away." He looked at me seriously and sadly, said dejectedly that they needed, they asked, they asked very much, then he brightened his face a little - they say, it was still interesting with Mikhoels.

Golubov could not suspect that they were doomed, that life was over, but as a painfully impressionable person, he rushed about, something

frightened him in the haste of the business trip, forebodings drove from his face a half-childish, some kind of unprotected smile. A gentle, ironic, slyly condescending person, he enjoyed our common love, the thought of his dependence on a terrible punishing force never occurred to anyone. "When I get drunk," he once complained, "I always end up on the railroad... I remember rails, rails, rails, empty cars, steel shields on transitional platforms, vestibules—no human voice, no beeps, only the railway iron..."

Black, disastrous nights, probably, made him a hostage.

The organizer of the murder needed a dependent, broken person and certainly a former resident of Minsk, who left some roots, old acquaintances and connections there."

Following the story of E. Zhirnov, "On January 10, 1948, Stalin demanded a report on the case and Abakumov came to him together with the head of the investigative unit for especially important cases of the MGB Leonov, his deputy Likhachev and investigators Kuleshov, Sorokin and Sokolov. After a long report, only the minister remained in Stalin's office. In those five minutes, it was decided to change the leaders of the operation. Now it was headed by Abakumov's first deputy, General Sergei Ogoltsov, and the aforementioned Fyodor Shubnyakov was included in the group. That same night, they, along with the rest of the militants, drove to Minsk in Ogoltsov's car.

Shubnyakov's task, as he told the author, was to keep in touch with Golubov, who was supposed to inform the group about Mikhoels' plans. Shubnyakov claimed that he had never seen an agent before and knew him only by description. Meeting him at the appointed place - at the Minsk post office, the colonel was amazed: Golubov, who had not been warned about the purpose of the trip, was nervous as if he knew what was about to happen.



According to Shubnyakov, Abakumov called several times and urged Ogoltsov on: "Let's get there as soon as possible." The operation was scheduled for the evening of January 12, 1948. At about 6:00 pm Mikhoels and Golubov had dinner at a restaurant and returned to the hotel. Then, as agreed with Golubov, a militant called him and "persuaded" him to come to the wedding together with Solomon Mikhailovich. At eight o'clock, the car of the Minister of State Security of Belarus, Lieutenant General Lavrenty Tsanava, drove up to the hotel. The militant driver and a "friend of the newlyweds" who came with him took the victims to Tsanava's dacha. Before the very

The car slowed down at the gate, and both passengers were turned off by chokeholds. They pulled them out of the car in the yard.

All members of the group were standing a few meters from the bodies. Shubnyakov claimed that he had never been present and did not want to be present at such a thing, so he turned to go to his room in the country. But Ogoltsov ordered: "Everyone stand as they stood!" The militant hit Mikhoels and Golubov on the head with a heavy club. It was all over - the leaders of the group went into the house. Then the corpses were taken to the city, and when the militants returned, the whole team, except for Tsanava, left for Moscow in Ogoltsov's car.

After the liquidation, according to the third variant, the corpses were taken to a sparsely populated (dead) street in the city of Minsk, laid on the road leading to the hotel, and run over by a truck. This created a plausible picture of the accident of a car hitting people returning from a party, especially since such cases in Minsk at that time were very

are frequent.

And on January 13, 1948, the bodies of Mikhoels and Golubov were discovered by a worker on his way to the morning shift. The investigation into the circumstances of the death continued for about a month, after which a memorandum from the Main Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on February 11, 1948, lay on the desk of the Deputy Interior Minister, Colonel-General I.A. Serov.

The final part of this document stated:

"Since the contingent of acquaintances of Mikhoels and Golubov-Potapov consisted mainly of the artistic world, the development of which should be carried out by the MGB authorities, the obtained investigative and intelligence materials concerning these persons were transferred to the 2nd Directorate of the MGB of the USSR, and all further verification of these connections was carried out by the apparatus of the 2nd Directorate.

Everything is simple and clear, except that in the autumn of 1948 the participants in the liquidation were awarded military orders: General Tsanava - the Order of the Red Banner, Colonel Shubnyakov and two more officers (colonel and senior lieutenant) of the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, and two majors - orders of the Red Star.

well

Encouraging rivalry among the leaders of a group of individuals, Stalin, not without reason, supported the attempts of G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria to compromise N.A. Voznesensky and A.A. Kuznetsova.

There is evidence that the leader in private conversations suggested that he saw the secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo A.A. as his successor on the party line. Kuznetsov, and according to the state - a member of the Politburo, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky.

It is believed that the reason for fabricating false accusations against A.A. Kuznetsov was served by the All-Russian Wholesale Fair held in January 1949 in Leningrad. It was after its completion that G.M. Malenkov put forward against A.A. Kuznetsov and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR M.I. Rodionov, secretaries of the Leningrad regional committee and city party committee P.S. Popkov and Ya.F. Kapustin accusations that they held the fair without the knowledge and bypassing the Central Committee and the government. Meanwhile, it was documented that the fair was held in pursuance of the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

And it was like that. In October 1948, at a meeting of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, chaired by G.M. Malenkov considered the report of the Ministry of Trade of the USSR and Tsentrsoyuz on the remains of stale goods and measures for their sale. Due to the fact that the state has accumulated such goods worth up to 5 billion rubles, which could not be sold under normal trade conditions, the Bureau instructed the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Trade to develop appropriate measures to solve this problem.

In November, the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, again under the chairmanship of Malenkov, adopted a resolution "On Measures to Improve Trade". In pursuance of this resolution, the USSR Ministry of Trade and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR decided to hold the All-Russian Wholesale Fair in Leningrad from January 10 to 20. On January 13, 1949, during the fair, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR M.I. Rodionov informed the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Malenkov, about a fair that had opened in Leningrad with the participation of trade organizations of the Union republics. However, Malenkov wrote on this message: "Beria L.P., Voznesensky N.A., Mikoyan A.I. and Krugikov A.D.

I ask you to read the note Comrade. Rodionov. I believe that such events should be held with the permission of the Council of Ministers."

On December 25, 1949, another event took place that became a harbinger of Stalin's wrath. On this day in Leningrad

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The 10th regional and US city united party conference was held, at the end of which the elections of candidates for the position of the first secretary of the regional committee and the city committee of the AUCP(b), the first secretary of the oblast committee of the AUCP(b), the first secretary of the city committee of the AUCP(b) and the Chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee were held. After the usual for those times voting and counting of ballots, the following were appointed respectively to the highest party positions: Popkov P.S., Badaev G.F., Kapustin Ya.F., Lazutin P.G.

In a word, everything is as usual, everything is legal, everything is in compliance with all the necessary procedures for this. However, a certain party member wrote an anonymous letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks addressed to Stalin, in which he said that the elections of party leaders in Leningrad and the region were rigged, the votes were counted incorrectly, in violation of any norms, since in many ballots the names of Popkov, Badaev and Kapustin were crossed out. Stalin immediately summoned Malenkov and instructed him to urgently look into this matter. The Party Control Commission immediately carried out an inspection and found out that 4 communists voted against Candidate Popkov, 2 against Badaev, 15 against Kapustin, and 2 against Lazutin.

The commission also drew attention to the following fact: the minutes of the counting commission indicated that all participants in the plenum voted unanimously. Since the commission managed in just three days, from January 10 to January 12, 1949, just as urgently, after the readiness of its results, Popkov was summoned to Moscow for a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

On February 15, 1949, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a resolution was adopted "On the anti-party actions of a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Kuznetsov A.A. and candidate members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) vols. Rodionova M.I. and Popkov P.S.

On February 21, 1949, a joint meeting of the bureau was held, and on February 22, a joint plenum of the Leningrad Regional Committee and the city party committee. They were attended by G.M. Malenkov and a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks V.M. Andrianov. With a report on the anti-party actions of A.A. Kuznetsova, M.I. Rodionov and P.S. Popkov was made by G.M. Malenkov. So, let's say, the defendants were accused of unauthorized organization in Leningrad in January 1949 of the All-Union Wholesale Fair, which allegedly led to the squandering of state commodity funds and caused material damage.

the state.

On January 24, Kuznetsov attended the meeting of the Orgburo for the last time, and four days later he was appointed head of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. According to the rules of the game of those years, Rodionov, Kuznetsov and Popkov were removed from their posts, they were announced party penalties - a reprimand.

With regard to N.A. Voznesensky in the resolution of the Politburo stated: "Note that the member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade Voznesensky, although he rejected the proposal of comrade Popkov on "patronage" over Leningrad, pointing out to him the incorrectness of such a proposal, nevertheless nevertheless acted it is wrong that Comrade Popkov did not report to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in a timely manner about the anti-Party proposal to patronize Leningrad.

On March 7, Voznesensky was relieved of his duties as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers for Metallurgy and Chemistry, removed from the Politburo and sent on leave for medical treatment.

The fact is that a memorandum from the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Gosnab, M.T., was used against Voznesensky. Pomaznev that the State Planning Committee of the USSR underestimated the industrial production plan of the USSR for the 1st quarter of 1949, and on March 5, 1949, the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On Gosplan", in which Stalin's phrase was recorded: "An attempt to adjust the figures to fit this or that preconceived opinion is a crime of a criminal nature". As a result, the following protocol entry appeared: "Comrade. Voznesensky unsatisfactorily manages the State Planning Commission, does not show the obligatory, especially for a member of the Politburo, partisanship in the leadership of the State Planning Commission and in defending government directives in the field of planning, incorrectly educates the employees of the State Planning Commission, as a result of which non-party morals were cultivated in the State Planning Commission, anti-state actions took place, facts deceit of the government, criminal facts of adjusting figures, and, finally, facts that testify that the Gosplan executives are tricking the government."

On the same day, Voznesensky was removed from the post of chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. E.E. Andreev in July 1949 presented a note on the loss by the State Planning Committee of the USSR for the period from 1944 to 1948 of more than 200 documents, including 9 from the personal secretariat of the chairman. Among them: a note on measures to develop the oil and coal industry

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industry in 1947, materials on the restoration of ferrous metallurgy in the South, a note on the main indicators of the plan for the production of non-ferrous metals in the USSR, measures to organize the production of radar stations, etc.

In early September 1949, Shkiryatov, chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, proposed to expel Voznesensky from the Central Committee members and bring him to justice for the loss of official documents. On September 11, the Politburo decided to submit both of these proposals to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and on September 12, 1949, the Plenum approved them.

In the MGB, the preparation of the "Leningrad case" began in the summer of 1949. For this purpose, a number of materials were fabricated on charges of A.A. Kuznetsova, M.I. Rodionov and the leaders of the Leningrad Regional Party Organization in the counterrevolutionary activities.

On July 21, 1949, Abakumov sent one of the memorandums to Stalin, after which he received an order to arrest Ya.F. Kapustin and the head of the Leningrad regional department of the MGB P.N. Kubatkin.

On August 13, A.A. was arrested in Malenkov's office. Kuznetsov, P.S. Popkov, M.I. Rodionov, P.G. Lazutin, N.V. Solovyov.

Viktor Semenovitch understood perfectly well that Beria and Malenkov, using Stalin, would remove Kuznetsov and the "Leningraders" with his hands. But what was he to do? What could he do against them all?

And although Leonid Mlechin calls the "Leningrad case" the largest action of Abakumov, this is not quite so.

It is known that his people were investigating Kuznetsov and the Leningrad case in general, without digging into the depths at all. And Abakumov instructed Komarov to handle the case of Kuznetsov. It is understandable, Viktor Semenovitch had friendly relations with Kuznetsov. They met with him in an off-duty setting.

When Komarov reported to Abakumov the plan for investigating the Kuznetsov case and started talking about espionage, Viktor Semyonovich got up from the table and, pacing around the office, reasoned aloud:

- Actually, which of these arrested people is espionage? They have been in sight for a long time, they were constantly under the protection of the MGB, their every step was known ... we start asking questions about their connection with foreign countries.

tsei, the Central Committee will laugh.

And then the minister said to Komarov:

We are soldiers, whatever they order, we must do!

Komarov understood everything correctly and did not interrogate Kuznetsov about espionage.

And one more fact: "After the emergence of the "Leningrad case" and the arrest in 1949 of the former Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Kuznetsov, the shadow of Stalin's distrust also fell on Abakumov, writes N. Petrov. - And this is not accidental, because Abakumov had a rather close relationship with his former curator. And so much so that a number of current issues preferred to be resolved at the level of Kuznetsov, without bringing them to Stalin. Back in early 1948, the leader drew attention to this. Then, without agreement with him, Kuznetsov allowed Abakumov to bring the two offending officers to the "court of honor" in the MGB. On March 15, 1948, on the initiative of the angry Stalin, the Politburo issued a penalty to Abakumov for actions "without the knowledge and consent of the Politburo" and to Kuznetsov for "single consent to the organization of the court."

It is difficult to say whether at that time Stalin had the idea to get rid of the minister of state security altogether, but at least the leader's Jesuit calculation was that it was Abakumov who should ensure the "Leningrad case", in which, among others, Kuznetsov was involved. . And only then, when the need for Abakumov disappears, get rid of him.

But let's go back a little to understand some of the details of the internal party struggle for power...

In the struggle between Beria and Malenkov for power, a provoking occasion soon appeared, which, for their luck, was given by the son of A.A. Zhdanova Yuri. In December 1947, Zhdanov, an assistant at the Department of Organic Chemistry, Moscow State University, was appointed head of the Science Department of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee. Energetic and strongly desiring to show himself in leadership work, the twenty-seven-year-old young man immediately decided to attack the scientific work of "a clever adventurer, demagogue and more than a mediocre scientist who, since 1938, headed the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences. IN AND. Lenin (VASKhNIL) "T.D. Lysenko. Having received specific information from classical geneticists about the deplorable state of affairs in domestic agrobiolgy, while using Abakumov's information from scientific biological circles (from trustworthy sources), Yuri Zhdanov at the seminar

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On April 10, 1948, lecturers of the regional party committees gave a decisive battle to Lysenkoism.

In his report "Controversial Issues in Modern Darwinism" he said:

"We will tell our biologists, who are now at war with Trofim Denisovich, to be bolder in practice, bolder in life.

When the frightened Lysenko turned to Stalin for protection, he ordered the scandal to be investigated and discussed at the Politburo. Malenkov most carefully studied the report of Zhdanov's son, and in May 1948 Lysenko also gave him his own comments on it, which consisted of 24 extracts with comments and explanations.

Thus, the conflict between Zhdanov Jr. and Lysenko was skillfully presented by Malenkov in his own interests, after which Stalin turned away from A.A. Zhdanov.

At the meeting of the Politburo, which opened on May 31, the leader, indignant, declared that "Zhdanov Jr. set as his goal the defeat and destruction of Lysenko, forgetting that today he is Michurin in agricultural technology."

And, summing up, Stalin, very quietly and with a "sinister" note in his voice, said:

- It is necessary to approximately punish the guilty, but not Yuri Zhdanov, still young and inexperienced, but the fathers, - while pointing the mouthpiece of the pipe at Zhdanov Sr.

On July 1, 1948, Malenkov was again elected Secretary of the Central Committee and returned to the Secretariat along with Ponomarenko (another enemy of Abakumov), and on July 6, the Politburo sent Zhdanov on vacation to two month.

The last time the leader received the disgraced ally was on July 12, but he never left the vacation, having died on August 30, 1948 in Valдай.

Malenkov immediately set about reorganizing the apparatus...

ON THE. Voznesensky was arrested on October 27, 1949. It is noteworthy that the course of the investigation in the case was personally directed by G.M. Malenkov. It is known that he was present during interrogations, during which illegal methods of investigation, painful torture, beatings and torture.

After Kuznetsov was removed from his post, he was sent... to study - in Perkhushkovo, in a branch of the Military Political Academy named after Lenin.

"- On August 13, dad told us: "Here's some money for you, run to Voentorg and buy ice cream," recalls Galina Kuznetsova. "Just don't eat without me." Wait." Gone. Valerka and her mother still managed to wave to him through the window... We were waiting for him. One, two, three...

And at seven in the evening, it was still light, the bell rang in the apartment. Four men in dark suits and wide-brimmed hats entered the hallway. People in civilian clothes were looking for the same letter that Stalin handed to Kuznetsov in besieged Leningrad and which read: "The Motherland will not forget you." So they didn't find it. Disappeared - as if evaporated ...

- During the arrest of Kuznetsov, Alla and I rested in Sochi, - recalls Sergo Anastasovich Mikoyan. - When we returned, my father called me to his room and informed me about the arrest of Kuznetsov. He listed the allegations. And I remember how trifling they seemed to me. I knew that in the 1930s Bukharin and Zinoviev were accused of espionage. And even in the fact that they wanted to kill Stalin ... Then it made an impression. In this case, the accusations were as follows. Allegedly, Kuznetsov said that there were many non-Russians in the Politburo. From the Caucasus - Stalin, Beria and my father. Jews - Kaganovich. As if Kuznetsov said: they say, when Stalin dies, he will try

change it.

And he was also accused of exalting his own role in the defense of Leningrad, and that even in the Museum of the Defense of Leningrad, on his instructions, his portrait was hung ... "

For example, in a letter from the Politburo to members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, even such nonsense was written: "At present, it can be considered established that at the top of the former Leningrad leadership a group hostile to the party has been formed for a long time, which included Kuznetsov A., Popkov, Kapustin, Solovyov, Verbitsky, Lazutkin.

At the beginning of the war, and especially during the siege of Leningrad, the Kuznetsov group, having become cowardly and completely at a loss in the face of the prevailing difficulties, did not believe in the possibility of victory over the Germans.

Kuznetsov's group nurtured plans to seize leading positions in the party and the state.

In the enemy group of Kuznetsov, the question of transferring the capital of the RSFSR from Moscow to Le

ningrad".

And here is what Kuznetsov's son Valery says: "There is a backstory here. When the war began, Zhdanov, at that time the first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee, was resting in Sochi. The father became in fact the first figure in the city. Constantly talked on the phone with Stalin on the preparation of the city for defense. Stalin highly appreciated this work. In the winter of 1942, in the presence of GKO members, with my own hand, which I did very rarely, I wrote a personal letter to Kuznetsov. The letter ended with the words: "Aleksey, the Motherland will not forget you"...

— I am convinced that even at that difficult time, Stalin calculated future personnel combinations. In this demonstrative letter giving a mandate for absolute power in Leningrad, after all, there was no need. Leningrad was led by the living Zhdanov. Stalin was the first to start talking about inviting Kuznetsov to Moscow under the pretext that young people should be promoted. My father was very popular and loved by the people of St. Petersburg. Stalin took into account these sentiments. Why did he need another Kirov in St. Petersburg? ..

In reality, Stalin set his envious entourage on his father. Quite indicative in this sense is Mikoyan's confession that in 1948, at a dacha in Ritsa, in the presence of the "five" - Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Malenkov and Kaganovich - Stalin declared that he would like to appoint Kuznetsov as General Secretary, and - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of St. Petersburg Voznesensky - he then headed the State Planning Commission ...

- In fact, this meant the command "face". And so they understood her. Six months later, the massacre began. The secretary of the Leningrad city committee, Kapustin, was accused of having links with British intelligence. And the city leadership is in conscious opposition to the center. Arguments now would cause a smile. For example, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR organized the All-Russian Fair of Wholesale Goods in Leningrad. The Leningrad leadership invited guests from other Union republics to attend. Malenkov regarded these invitations as an open challenge to the center. And the consent to hold the fair was given by the father ... "

And now a few words about Pyotr Nikolaevich Kubatkin. In August 1941, he was appointed head of the State Security Department for the Leningrad Region. In 1945, he became authorized by the NKGB of the USSR for the 2nd Baltic Front.

In July of the same year, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. In 1946, a new position: head of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security (from June 15 to September 7, 1946).

In September 1946, he was sent to head the Gorky Directorate of the MGB.

What happened next, says N. Petrov: "The point in Kubatkin's career was set in 1949 - in connection with the Leningrad case. On February 22, 1949, Minister of State Security Abakumov sent a letter to Malenkov, in which he characterized Kubatkin from the worst side: he does not provide for the area of work he heads, is idle and, flaunting his closeness with the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Kuznetsov, intimidates the Chekists, does not behaves to the party with operatives, shouts and rudeness, suppresses the initiative of the Chekists in the field, ignores the regional party committee. In December 1948, during the election of the party committee of the UMGB in the Gorky region, Kubatkin did not get into the party committee, the collective voted against him.

Moreover, Kubatkin, according to Abakumov, had worked poorly before, both in the UNKGB of the Leningrad Region and in the 1st Main Directorate of the MGB. The conclusion of the Minister of State Security was merciless: "He has proven himself to be an idler and a petty tyrant, and his further stay at work in the bodies of the MGB is highly undesirable."

But that was not all. On July 21, 1949, Abakumov informed Stalin that Kubatkin, when he was the head of the Leningrad UNKGB, ordered to destroy compromising materials on the secretary of the city party committee, Kapustin. Stalin gave the command to arrest both of them.

Among other things, in the fall of 1945, Kubatkin received a trophy car as a gift from a certain Biterman, who was later arrested in the Scorpions case. Kubatkin, who replaced D.G. Kubatkin as head of the Leningrad Department of the MGB. Rodionov, who previously held the post of deputy head of the 2nd Directorate of the MGB, brought the operational development of the Scorpion to its logical conclusion. Moreover, during the three years of his stay in Leningrad, he sent about three hundred confidential special messages to the Minister of State Security V.S. Abakumov and, often visiting Moscow, personally reported to Stalin "on everything that was happening in Leningrad", including the connections of the party and Soviet leaders Kapustin, Popkov, Kuznetsov and others with corrupt officials. His information indicated that the local leadership

get up

took the path of fraud and completely ignores the operational information of the state security agencies about the state of affairs in the city, related to interruptions in the supply of food and manufactured goods to the population, about the facts of exceeding their official powers by individual officials. According to him, in 1946 alone, 1,775 people were dismissed from the militia.

Professor of St. Petersburg State University of Economics and Finance B.A. wrote about these and other facts. Starkov in his work "The fight against corruption and political processes in the second half of the 1940s".

So, the agent-operational development "Scorpions", carried out by the Department of the Ministry of State Security of the Leningrad Region in 1946-1947:

"During 1945-1946. in the name of the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee Kuznetsov, who replaced A.A. Zhdanov, there have repeatedly been statements about the unfavorable situation in the fight against crime in the city. On his instructions, the employees of the UMGB took up the investigation, but soon Kuznetsov was transferred to Moscow to the post of secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and became a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. By this time, it was established that a criminal group was operating in the city, headed by the swindler Karnakov and officials from the city prosecutor's office, court, advocacy, VTEK, city housing department, OBKhSS, Leningrad city police department, passport department, military institutions of the LenVO and etc. Before the war Karnakov lived in Leningrad under the names Berezin, Balakanov and Sher. In a number of criminal cases, he is referred to as "one of the district prosecutors" or "deputy. director of the regional bureau for the distribution of labor". In 1941, Karnakov was evacuated to Sverdlovsk, where in 1943 he was arrested for "anti-Soviet activities" and sentenced under article 58, paragraph 10, part 2 to eight years in labor camp, but six months later he was released and in May 1944 he returned to Leningrad. Undercover operational measures established that, posing as a responsible Soviet

worker, through bribery and bribery of officials and fabrication of fictitious documents, he organized a criminal group of representatives of law enforcement agencies and a number of state institutions of the city. Employees of the UMGB revealed about seven hundred connections between Karnakov and other persons of the criminal group. To the intelligence and investigative development, which received

Name

"Scorpions", the best operatives, external surveillance, special equipment were connected. At the same time, it was decided not to exchange information on this case with the police department, the city prosecutor's office, the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, the regional committee of the CPSU (b) and the Leningrad executive committee ... However, as subsequent events showed, such tactics turned out to be quite justified. The first operational data showed that the criminals relied on a large group of corrupt officials from high-ranking officials who were able to crack down on any person who discovered their criminal activity. Many of the defendants were armed, and some got personal protection. State security officers established a scheme of interaction between members of the group, appearances, passwords, symbols, and methods of work. Curious detail. The investigation found that none of the state organizations, including law enforcement, to which Karnakov applied, never made inquiries about him, did not clarify information about his personality. Corrupt officials provided paid "services" for illegal registration, early release from places of detention, provision of living space, demobilization from the ranks of the Soviet Army, issuance of medical certificates of disability, etc. They arranged a "collection of tribute" from the directors of industrial enterprises, shops, bases, warehouses. At the same time, part of the "tribute" was in kind in the form of pieces of cloth, industrial, wine, vodka, and tobacco products, and sets of scarce foodstuffs. During the investigation, it was established that a number of employees of the prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs created fictitious investigative files for the purpose of extortion. In total, 316 people were involved in the case, including 59 police officers, 47 prosecutors, courts and lawyers, 10 municipal health departments and social security, 7 housing systems, 8 military personnel and 185 others (employees of trade, supply, bases, canteens, various artels and business executives). On February 8, 1946, information about the progress of Operation Scorpions was reported to A.A. Kuznetsov. However, there was no reaction from Smolny. At first glance, it was strange. However, let's look at the other side. According to the documents for 1946, the two-storey mansion for the secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Orgburo, referred to as the "object Kamenny Ostrov", did not differ in modesty. It included more than twenty rooms, excluding various utility rooms. The house contained carpets, rare crystal chandeliers, furniture, paintings, radios, expensive crockery. Then

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The same investigation established possible links between corrupt officials and top officials of the city. However, the head of the Leningrad State Security Department, Lieutenant-General Pyotr Nikolaevich Kubatkin, did not give further progress to the investigation in this direction.

In July 1949, Kubatkin was arrested. The arrest warrant stated that "working in 1941-1944. in leading positions in Leningrad, he maintained a criminal relationship with a group of persons hostile to the party and government "...

All those arrested in the "Leningrad case" were prepared for trial for more than a year, subjected to rude bullying, brutal torture, threatened with reprisals against their families, and placed in a punishment cell. For example, A. Kuznetsov had his spine broken and his ear shell broken. Others were put in a concrete cube and kept for a day without food or water, tied to an iron bed with prickly flooring. It is also known that on the eve and during the trial itself, the psychological processing of the accused intensified. The defendants were forced to memorize the protocols of interrogations and not deviate from a pre-prepared scenario of a court farce.

January 18, 1950 V.S. Abakumov introduced I.V. Stalin was given a list of forty-four arrested persons and suggested that "a group of 9-10 main defendants be judged in a closed session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in Leningrad without the participation of the parties, that is, the prosecution and defense," and the rest in the general order.



Colonel Komarov went to Leningrad for the trial of Kuznetsov and Voznesensky together with ten investigators. Before leaving, the minister sternly warned him:

- Remember the most important thing, that Zhdanov's name should not be mentioned at the trial. You answer with your head!

September 4, 1950 V.S. Abakumov and Chief Military Prosecutor A.V. Vavilov was introduced to I.V. A note to Stalin with a proposal to condemn N.A. Voznesensky, A.A. Kuznetsova, P.S. Popkova, Ya.F. Kapustina, M.I. Rodionov and P.G. Lazutin, to sentence I.M. to 15 years in prison. Turko, by the age of 10 - T.V. Zakrzhevskaya and F.E. Mikheev.

And on September 30, at the end of the trial (September 29-30) in Leningrad, these proposals were accepted by the Politburo.

Central Committee of the CPSU (b). "07

The General Prosecutor of the USSR R.A. Rudenko at a meeting of the activists of the Leningrad party organization on May 6, 1954: "By order of Abakumov, Kapustin was arrested and, without the sanction of the prosecutor, was imprisoned on July 23, 1949. The sanction for the arrest of Kapustin was received from the prosecutor only on August 1, i.e. 8 days after the actual arrest and after receiving the so-called "confession" from Kapustin.

Former investigator Sorokin testified that Abakumov demanded that Kapustin testify by any means that he was an English spy. During interrogations, Kapustin denied belonging to British intelligence, which caused anger and discontent among Abakumov. After that, Abakumov ordered to start beating Kapustin.

Sorokin testified: "At the same time, Abakumov's order was given to me that I should not return to the ministry without Kapustin's testimony about espionage. After beating Kapustin, he began to testify that, while on a business trip in England, he was recruited by British intelligence. However, these testimonies of his were confused and so lifeless that I could not believe them and did not write it down in the protocol of the interrogation."

Indeed, from the materials of the criminal case against Kuznetsov, Kapustin and others, it is clear that Kapustin was not charged with espionage, although he "confessed" to this crime.

From July 23 to August 4, Kapustin was continuously interrogated, and on August 4 he signed a falsified protocol of interrogation about hostile activity in Leningrad, naming a number of participants - Kuznetsov, Popkov, Voznesensky and others.

Abakumov personally supervised the investigation into the case. His closest assistant was Komarov. As Komarov testified, Kapustin was subjected to beatings at the direction of Abakumov. After receiving false testimony from Kapustin, the rest of the defendants were arrested in August 1949.

The testimony of Turko, Zakrzhevskaya, Mikheev gives an idea of the methods of the investigation, of how the "confessions" were obtained.

I will now read to you an extract from the testimony of the former. Secretary of the Yaroslavl regional party committee, and earlier second secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee Turko, who was interrogated by me.

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Turko showed:

"... Indeed, at the preliminary investigation, I signed protocols in which I pleaded guilty to committing a number of counter-revolutionary crimes and confirmed my guilt in court, despite the fact that I did not commit any crimes and I was not guilty of anything.

I thought and I don't. I had to testify about the crimes allegedly committed by me as a result of the prison regime created for me, threats from the investigation, placement in a punishment cell and systematic beatings. Immediately after my arrest, investigator Putintsev summoned me and, without bringing any charges, began to rudely demand that I confess to the crimes I had committed. I told the investigator that I didn't know what I was arrested for. I didn't commit any crimes. To this, Putintsev replied: "Think about it. And to make it easier to think, I will send you to a military prison." On the same day I was sent to the Lefortovo prison, where the investigation took place.

Investigator Putintsev called me systematically at night and demanded that I confess to hostile activities and threatened that if I did not confess, they would beat me. Putintsev told me that they were not like me, persuaded. But since I denied my guilt, Putintsev began to systematically beat me during interrogations. He hit me on the head, on the face, kicked me. Once he beat me so hard that blood came out of my ear. After such beatings, the investigator sent me to the punishment cell. He threatened to destroy my wife and children and sentence me to 20 years in the camps if I did not confess..."

By checking Turko's testimony, it was established that from August 26 to October 29, 1949, he was called for interrogation 41 times. Most of the calls took place at night, and the interrogations lasted until the morning. This method also served the purpose of physical and moral exhaustion of the arrested person, because, according to the rules of the prison regime, prisoners are not allowed to sleep during the daytime. The first report of Turko's interrogation with a "confession", and not written down by hand, but typed on a typewriter, is dated October 30th. In this protocol, Turko pleaded guilty to anti-Soviet hostile activities and testified against others.

It must be pointed out that on October 27, Turko was imprisoned for 5 days in a punishment cell. He was released from the punishment cell ahead of schedule on October 29, after he agreed to sign the falsifications required of him.

twisted indications.

The former investigator Putintsev, when asked about the reasons for the imprisonment of Turko in a punishment cell, testified: "I admit that the detention of Turko in a punishment cell at the direction of Komarov and Abakumov was in order to obtain confessions ... I admit that a violation of the law was committed in the Turko case, threats were used, I told Turko that you could be beaten." All this was done on the basis of direct instructions from Abakumov and Komarov.

If Komarov came to Turko's interrogations, he certainly beat him, because that was his usual rule... I must frankly admit that I personally doubt the accusations brought against Turko and Zakrzhevskaya. But we demanded such testimony as a result of pressure from Abakumov."

False testimonies were also extorted by similar methods from the former head of the department of party, Komsomol and trade union bodies of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU, Zakrzhevskaya, who was brought to justice in this case.

Zakrzewska was arrested and imprisoned while pregnant.

As a result of the conditions in which she was in prison, Zakrzewska suffered a miscarriage. Despite the extremely difficult physical and mental condition, Zakrzhevskaya was subjected to systematic calls for night interrogations, during which she was required to confess to the counter-revolutionary crimes allegedly committed by her, as well as to expose other persons in this. At a confrontation with Zakrzhevskaya, Komarov testified that when he first saw Zakrzhevskaya during interrogation, he drew attention to her pregnancy and, having arrived at the ministry, reported that the interrogations of a pregnant woman were carried out at night. As Komarov showed:

"Abakumov rudely circumcised me, saying: "I also found a defender. The doctor does not forbid, but you determine the possibility of her interrogation. Don't get involved and mind your own business."

Zakrzhevskaya was summoned for interrogation not only by investigators, but also by Abakumov, who demanded false confessions from her about criminal ties with Kuznetsov. After some time, Zakrzhevskaya was given falsified protocols of interrogations to sign. Brought to a state of moral and physical exhaustion, Zakrzhevskaya signed these falsified, false confessions."

At 2:00 o'clock on October 1, 1950, an hour after the announcement of the verdict, N.A. Voznesensky, A.A. Kuznetsov, M.I. Rodionov, P.S. Popkov, Ya.F. Kapustin, P.G. Lazutin were shot in Leningrad.

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In total, 214 people were convicted in the "Leningrad case" in the period 1949-1951, of which 69 were the main defendants, and 145 were close and distant relatives. In addition, 2 people died in prison before trial.

At the same time, 23 people were sentenced by the Military Collegium to capital punishment (execution), 85 people were sentenced to various terms of detention in camps and prisons for a period of 5 to 25 years, one person was placed in a psychiatric hospital for compulsory treatment and 105 people, by the decrees of the Special Meeting of the Ministry of State Security, were sent to remote areas of the country in exile for various periods, mainly from 5 to 8 years ...

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The "Leningrad case", in which Stalin forced Viktor Semyonovich to destroy his friend, became for the minister a new test of his sincerity in the eyes of the leader. Check, we note, severe.

Nevertheless, at the end of 1950, Abakumov tried to get closer to Mamulov, who had direct access to Beria. Viktor Semenovich "asked him to arrange it this way," writes P.A. Sudo Platov - so that Beria would accept him, and claimed that he was always loyal and never participated in intrigues against him.

But Lavrenty Pavlovich did not make this contact. He had something to be offended by ...

Chapter 5

## THE CASE OF GENERAL ABAKUMOV

### LOSS OF TRUST

As you know, Stalin spent his holidays, as a rule, in the Caucasus. Some variety in such periods was made by trips to picturesque places.

"Once we started one of these trips late," writes V. Kevorkov. - the sun is already  
rose high and quite strong

but it was hot.

An unusual column stretched along the road: cars with guards, guests, the owner himself, a car with the leadership of the state security. On the way, Stalin liked to arrange picnics... We stopped at a cozy green meadow surrounded by trees. Behind every tree and bush, a guard immediately hid. The attendants, who were part of the security department, trained on the leader's picnic whims, in an instant rolled out a huge tablecloth right on the ground, setting it  
food and drink. All this was done so quickly and so deftly that those who slowly got out of

cars, the guests should have had the complete impression that it was here and at that time that they were expected and the table was set in advance.

It was warm. Stalin took off his traditional headdress, unbuttoned his collar and, choosing the highest point around the table, took his place. The rest immediately sank to the ground, each not without regard to his position. Stalin looked paternally at all those present.

— And where is Comrade Abakumov? I don't see him," the LEADER asked.

"He is serving, Comrade Stalin," Vlasik, the head of security, reported.

- It's commendable. And, nevertheless, please ask Comrade Abakumov to interrupt the service for a while and join us.

When Abakumov arrived, Stalin showed him a place not far from him, then picked up the bottle in front of him and proclaimed:

Now let's fill our glasses. I poured myself almost to the top. Everyone followed his lead. Abakumov did not touch the bottle, which did not escape Stalin's attention. — But Comrade Abakumov for some reason stubbornly refuses to actively participate in our feast.

- I, Comrade Stalin, do not drink at all, and even more so in the service.

"So we freed you from official business for a while," Stalin continued. "Therefore, please, please, pour Comrade Abakumov. - And when the glasses were filled, he looked around at everyone sitting with a sly look, smiled enigmatically and said: - And now let's drink to Comrade Stalin.

In terms of content, the toast was flawless. In those days, dying and drinking for Comrade Stalin were equally popular. Therefore, all those present at the meal, including Abakumov, drained their glasses with pleasure and to the bottom.

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Stalin turned towards Abakumov and, obviously pleased with the success achieved, pointed his index finger straight at his face, after which he announced loudly:

- He said he doesn't drink. - And after a short pause he added: - Comrade Abakumov wanted to deceive us, but we exposed him.

Viktor Semenovich was never a person close to Stalin. Even if you look at all the photographs of those years, you can easily note their quite understandable removal. Thus, Stalin made it clear to the minister the difference between them... And between them there were always those who were especially close... On the other hand, Abakumov, as the minister of state security, was higher than other ministers according to an unwritten law and in any case was somewhat closer to "himself" ...

In 1951, a fire broke out on board the ship Pobeda. Returning from the USA to Odessa, it caught fire not far from the coast of Crimea. During the fire, several dozen people died, but many died from burns already in the hospital. Unfortunately, among the dead was a Chinese commander who, at the invitation of Mao Zedong, was returning from exile to China. A scandal was brewing. The State Commission very quickly found out the causes of the fire on the ship. It turned out that the projectionist was rewinding film for the film screening and inadvertently lit a cigarette. The film flared up like gunpowder. The sailor himself received severe burns, but before his death he managed to tell what caused the Pobeda to catch fire. The State Commission drew up an act and a note, but Beria did not like such conclusions, and he called Stalin.

"The work of the commission cannot be called satisfactory," said Lavrenty Pavlovich, "because they didn't understand it at all and brazenly lie. According to my information, Comrade Stalin,

the ship was set on fire by American intelligence in order to destroy Fen Yuxian and complicate relations between the USSR and China.

Stalin ordered a secondary investigation. Therefore, together with the employees of the General Prosecutor's Office, employees of the MGB flew to Odessa. The investigative experiment confirmed the conclusions of the State Commission: they simulated a fire on the high seas, turned on the chronometer and everything came together. However, Prosecutor General Safonov and Minister of State Security Abakumov refused to sign this opinion. Fear of the leader made them squabble for a long time, before Viktor Semenovich himself decided to

lie about it.

And I must say, he literally managed to find Stalin in a good mood. Therefore, everything worked out.

Abakumov himself recalled this as follows: "We just laughed together with Iosif Vissarionovich at Lavrenty, but parted ways."

"In May or June 1951," Sudoplatov wrote, "when I last spent several hours in Abakumov's office, he looked very confident in himself, made decisions without hesitation."

How else! Viktor Semenovich was always self-confident and if he hesitated, he did not show it. His strong will could be the envy of many today.

I think that he perfectly assessed the situation around him, but in principle he could not know some things. Because no one knows everything.

Abakumov knew or could have known about the aspirations of Beria and Malenkov to eliminate him. But he could not even imagine what means his enemies would use to achieve their goal. And such an opportunity for them presented itself very soon ...

According to the author of the book "The First Chairman of the KGB Ivan Serov" N. Petrov, "there are clear signs indicating the loss of Stalin's trust by Abakumov. So, in February 1950, he instructed G.M. Malenkov to organize a "special prison" for the "most important political defendants", which would not be in the MGB system, but under the control of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. At the same time, not the investigators of the MGB, but the employees of the party apparatus themselves conducted an investigation into the cases of these arrested people. There is evidence that Serov also played an important role in the organization of this prison.

In the spring of 1950, Stalin unexpectedly expressed to Abakumov his thoughts on the need to arrest the head of the "DR" department (sabotage and terrorist work) of the MGB, Lieutenant General P.A. Sudoplatov, his deputy Major General N.I. Eitigon and a number of other senior officials of the MGB. Abakumov, to the displeasure of the leader, not only showed indecision in this matter, but, worse, shared his doubts with Beria.

Later, Beria, having already been arrested, himself spoke about this episode, which sheds additional light on the background of the arena.

stov in the MGB:

"... In 1950, in the middle or beginning of the year, Abakumov, being in my Council of Ministers on other issues, said that he had instructions from I.V. Stalin to arrest Sudoplatov, Eitigon and a number of other employees. Abakumov did not tell me why they should be arrested. It was clear to me that the arrest of Sudoplatov meant his destruction. Therefore, I told Abakumov to talk to Stalin again, especially since Abakumov did not name the reasons for the arrest of Sudoplatov. I told Abakumov: "If I were you, I would save Sudoplatov and not let him destroy it."

Another demarche of Stalin against Abakumov and his omnipotence in the apparatus of the MGB lay in the organizational plane. In January 1950, Stalin decided to create a collegium in the MGB and gave appropriate instructions to Abakumov. According to Stalin's plan, this collegial governing body of the ministry would have strengthened control over Abakumov's activities and helped to dissolve his ambitions. The initial proposals were prepared by Abakumov and S.I. Ogoltsov on January 31, 1950 and sent to Stalin. Their letter, in particular, contained a proposal to send to the MGB "one or two major party workers, bearing in mind that they should also be members of the Collegium of the MGB of the USSR." Over the previous 3 years, it was written further, 540 party and Soviet workers were sent to the MGB, but at the same time "among them there are no workers of a large scale with a broad outlook, which could be among the members of the Board of the MGB of the USSR." But for some reason, Stalin was in no hurry to make a decision and gave Abakumov time to concretize the proposals.

The second version (and final) of Abakumov's letter to Stalin on the creation of the Collegium of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, the increase in the number of deputy ministers to 7 people and the personnel transfers of the leadership was prepared on August 2, 1950. A draft resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee was already attached to it. However, the decision to create the Collegium of the MGB was taken almost six months later, on December 31, 1950, only after Stalin returned from another long vacation, in which he was from August 11 to December 21, 1951. Most likely, he simply did not have time to make a decision before his departure, and it is unlikely that the delay in this matter was connected with Stalin's decision to wait for the end of the "Leningrad case", as they sometimes write about it.

Thanks to the surviving notebooks (journals) of records of persons accepted by I.V. Stalin from 1924 to 1953, it is easy to trace

the attitude of the leader towards Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, namely, how much he needed the latter for some work or emergency issues. It happened like this.

In 1943, Stalin received Abakumov eight times: March 31, April 13, April 15, April 18-19, April 21, May 31, June 5, June 15.

In 1944, he received it three times: February 21, July 31, December 13.

In 1945, once: December 17th.

But in 1946, eight times: February 23, March 2, April 22, April 24, May 10, May 18, June 19, September 7.

Eighteen times in 1947: January 8, January 29, February 22, March 19, April 17, April 25, May 21, May 30, June 17, June 25, August 9, August 14, November 21-22, 8- December 9, December 19, December 23 (twice), December 27.

In 1948 four times: January 10, | April, April 26, December 24.

In 1949, twelve times: January 3, January 7, January 10, January 27, February 14, April 11, April 25, May 24, June 20, July 13, July 23, August 20.

In 1950 six times: January 9, January 17, February 1, May 27, July 14, | August.

In 1951, only twice: April 6 and July 5.

Here is what N. Petrov writes about this: "Having arrived in Moscow after his vacation, Stalin sharply reduced contacts with Abakumov, inviting him to his Kremlin office only once, on April 6, 1951. It is difficult to say whether Abakumov understood how serious this sign is and that something is being planned against him. After that, in the journal of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office, Abakumov's name will appear only on July 5, 1951, when the decision had already been made to remove him from the post of minister.

In the book "Stalin: Truth and Lies", published in 1996, its author Vladimir Zhukhrai tells about the fall of Abakumov. He has his own view: "The fall of Abakumov began, it would seem, from a trifle" - from the case of Spetstorg. Two members of the Politburo, Mikoyan and Kosygin, made a proposal (under the pretext of a lack of necessary resources) to liquidate Spetstorg, which provided food and consumer goods to KGB cadres. Abakumov very sharply objected to this proposal.

"Why," he said, "the Ministry of Defense has a Voentorg, although it is now in a peaceful situation, it does not fight, but

The Ministry of State Security, which fights daily and hourly with the intrigues of foreign intelligence services, should Spetstorg be deprived?

In some kind of incomprehensible vehemence, Abakumov crossed the permitted boundaries allowed in polemics at meetings of the Politburo, in fact calling Mikoyan and Kosygin fools. Stalin abruptly cut Abakumov off.

"I forbid you," he said, "to call the members of the Politburo fools.

Of course, Stalin's anger was not caused by Abakumov's behavior towards the two members of the Politburo. This he would have forgiven the Minister of State Security, whom he sympathized with, if it were not for the recently revealed serious and not yet clear enough circumstances for Stalin. Dzhuga, at one of his regular reports, provided him with a photograph in which a smiling Abakumov in the Hermitage Garden gave a huge bouquet of roses to a beautiful young woman, who, under covert verification, turned out to be connected with British intelligence.

According to V. Zhukhrai, after the signal, a commission was created to check the work of the Special Trade. "She uncovered significant abuses in Spetstorg. The director of the central warehouse of Spetstorg turned out to be a man who in the past was prosecuted for speculation and removed from his post as head of the Kazan Spetstorg for fraud. The leadership of the Moscow regional Spetstorg stole products and industrial goods worth more than 2 million rubles, for which the head of the Mosoblspetstorg was sentenced to 25 years. Abakumov, in whose subordination, along with nominal subordination to the Ministry of Trade of the USSR, was Spetstorg, received from Stalin the first severe reprimand with a warning.

But it is not for nothing that they say that trouble never walks alone. Abakumov's star was clearly at sunset. All the same Dzhuga, now a general, in the course of studying Abakumov's service activities, managed to detect major failures in the work of one of the most secret departments of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, which was headed by Lieutenant General Shevelev.

Abakumov hid these failures from Stalin and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Moreover, one of the main critics of shortcomings in the work of this department, who repeatedly spoke out with criticism at party meetings

nyah, the head of the department, State Security Major Yevgeny Shchukin, was sent by Abakumov on a business trip to North Korea, where he died under mysterious circumstances.

On Stalin's instructions, the department headed by General Shevelev was removed from the USSR MGB and became one of the special divisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Abakumov received a second severe reprimand with a warning."

In the same book, the author, through the mouth of an unknown General Dzhuga, talks about other crimes of Abakumov: "Even during the war, Abakumov fell ill with a trophy disease. He kept in specially created warehouses, supposedly for operational needs, large material values, mostly trophy ones, hiding them from official records. I dragged everything I wanted from these warehouses. According to confirmed data, Abakumov took from these warehouses for personal use more than a thousand meters of woolen and silk fabrics, several sets of furniture, dining rooms

and tea sets, carpets, products from Saxon porcelain. During the period from 1944 to 1948, Abakumov stole valuables for more than 600 thousand rubles. According to the information I have, more than three thousand meters of wool are currently stored in Abakumov's apartment. silk and other fabrics, a large number of expensive artistic vases, porcelain and crystal dishes, various haberdashery goods, a large number of gold items.

In 1948, Abakumov resettled 16 families from house No. 11 on Kolpachny Lane and occupied this house as a personal apartment. More than a million rubles were spent illegally from the funds of the ministry for the repair and equipment of this apartment. For 6 months, more than 200 workers, the architect Rybatsky and the engineer Filatov, worked on the re-equipment of the house in Kolpachny Lane. At the same time, some of the high-quality materials were delivered from unknown, so far unidentified sources. Fearing responsibility for this crime, Abakumov in March 1950 ordered the destruction of the accounting records of the 1st branch of the Ministry's Administration, which is in charge of the economic services of the leadership.

At the direction of Abakumov, for his personal needs, the head of the secretariat of the ministry, Chernov, appropriated about 500 thousand rubles from the funds earmarked for operational needs.

All this was, but in the context of the struggle for power among Stalin's associates, it was not the most decisive. I dare say

to give that Abakumov was removed by the hands of Stalin for other reasons and completely different people. It is enough to look at other persons closer to the leader. So, for example, shortly before his death, Stalin, after much whispering from Beria, agreed to the elimination of his two most faithful assistants, A.N. Poskrebyshv and N.S. Vlasik. YES. Volkogonov, in his fundamental book about Stalin, noted quite accurately: "At the end of his life, the "leader" did not trust anyone. Yes, no one. Beria did not believe either, but could not succumb when he long and persistently compromised Poskrebyshv and Vlasik, who had worked around him for more than two decades. The fact that Stalin did not trust Beria is evidenced by such a document.

Lieutenant General Nikolai Sidorovich Vlasik was arrested on December 16, 1952. Beria himself interrogated him, as well as Kobulov and Vlodzimirsky. The head of the Main Directorate of Security of the Ministry of State Security, Vlasik, was charged with "indulging poisoning doctors", acquaintance with the "spy" V.A. Stenberg, as well as abuse of official position ("use of government products"). But the main thing, of course, was not in this stereotyped set of accusations. In a letter to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov in May 1955 from the Krasnoyarsk Territory, where the former lieutenant general was in exile, said:

"The head of the government, being in the south after the war, in my presence expressed great indignation against Beria, saying that the state security agencies did not justify their work of proper provision ... He said that he had instructed to remove Beria from leadership in MGB. He asked me how Merkulov, Kobulov and later about Goglidze and Tsanova work. I told him what I knew... And then I became convinced that this conversation between me and the Head of Government became known to them for certain, I was amazed by this..."

Further, Vlasik, in his letter addressed to Voroshilov, continues: after being summoned for interrogation to Beria, "I realized that, apart from death, I had nothing more to look forward to, because. Once again I was convinced that they had deceived the Head of Government... They demanded evidence against Poskrebyshv, twice more Kobulov called in the presence of Vlodzimirsky. I refused, stating that I had no data to compromise Poskrebyshv, I only told them that the Head of Government at one time was very dissatisfied with the work of our bodies and leadership

Beria, cited the facts that the Head of Government told me about the failures in work, which he accused Beria of ... For refusing to testify against Poskrebyshv, they told me - you will die in prison ... "



I will only add that yesterday's "comrades" applied to Vlasik the whole complex of "measures" to obtain evidence. Vlasik wrote that "unacceptable bullying" was applied to me. At "my age and state of health, I could not bear it. I got a nervous breakdown, a complete shock and lost all self-control and common sense ... I was not even able to read my answers compiled by them, but simply under abuse and threats in sharp handcuffs worn to the bones, I was forced to I had to sign this terrible compromise for me... at that time the handcuffs were removed and promises were made to let me go to sleep, which never happened, because the trials were going on in the cell..."

Such were the "palace" mores. Everyone was followed. No one, absolutely no one, was exempt from suspicion. Beria felt the "leader's" cooling towards him and could wait for any turn of events. But Stalin waited, thought about something, outwardly remaining the same as before.

What is there to say about "some" Abakumov, if people close to Stalin, with his own permission, were dealt with enough

fast...

## BEFORE ARREST

On August 29, 1948, the head of the Main Security Directorate of the MGB, Lieutenant-General N.S. Vlasik received a letter from an employee of the electrocardiography room of the Kremlin Hospital, L.F. Timashuk: "28 / USh-s / g I was called by the beginning. LSUK Professor Egorov to comrade. Zhdanov A.A. to take an ECG.

On the same day, together with Professor Egorov, Academician Vinogradov and Professor Vasilenko, I flew from Moscow by plane to their destination. At about 12 noon, A.A. ECG, according to which I diagnosed "myocardial infarction in the region of the left ventricle and interventricular septum," which I immediately informed the consultant about.

o

Etc. Egorov and Dr. Mayorov told me that this was an erroneous diagnosis and they did not agree with it, that A.A. had no heart attack. no, but

says "functional disorder on the basis of sclerosis and hypertension" and suggested that I rewrite the conclusion, not indicating "myocardial infarction", but write "carefully" as Dr. Karpay did on previous ECGs.

29/USHUu A.A. a heart attack recurred (after getting out of bed), and I was summoned from Moscow for the second time, but by order of Acad. Vinogradova, etc. Egorova ECG 29/M SH on the day of the heart attack was not done, but scheduled for 30/US, and I was again categorically asked to redo the conclusion, not indicating myocardial infarction, which I informed Comrade. Belova A.M.

I think that the consultants and the attending physician Mayorov underestimate A.A.'s undeniably grave condition, allowing him to get out of bed, walk in the park, go to the cinema, which caused a secondary attack and could lead to a fatal outcome in the future.

Despite the fact that, at the insistence of my boss, I redid the ECG without indicating "myocardial infarction" in it, I remain of my opinion and insist on observing the strictest bed rest for A.A.

29 / USh-48

Head office.

Handed over to Major Belov A.M. 29 / W111-48 in their own hands.

Just a few hours later, this statement was in Moscow. And on August 30, 1948, he was handed over personally to Stalin. The accompanying note, signed by Abakumov, stated: "Top secret. Comrade STALIN I.V.

At the same time, I present to you the statement of the head of the electrocardiography room of the Kremlin hospital, doctor TIMASHUK L.F. in relation to the state of health of Comrade Zhdanov A.A.

As can be seen from TIMASHUK's statement, the latter insists on her conclusion that Comrade Zhdanov has a myocardial infarction in the anterior wall of the left ventricle and interventricular septum, while the head of the Kremlin's medical department Egorov and academician Vinogradov suggested that she redo the conclusion without pointing to myocardial infarction .

Appendix: Comrade Timashuk's statement and electrocardiography then

comrade Zhdanov ... "

As you know, A.A. Zhdanov was at that time in disgrace, and, apparently, therefore, Stalin did not attach much importance to the statement. As V. Kevorkov writes, "having carefully read the letter, he became noticeably gloomy and returned it to Abakumov with words that surprised the minister.

- The possibilities of modern medicine are limited, and with them the possibilities of doctors. Doctors are people too, and they may have different opinions about the same disease. As for this woman," Stalin looked at the signature under the letter, "the doctors themselves say that the cardiogram is like the Bible, which everyone can interpret in their own way. And while everyone will be right. So let's leave this matter. Whatever the result of our investigation, we will not be able to return the person. So give the letter to the ashes and let's not take the name of the deceased in vain.

Stalin somehow hopelessly waved his hand.

Returning to his office, Abakumov sat down at the table and wrote a resolution in sweeping handwriting on a square piece of paper specially attached to the letter: "Comrade Stalin reported. Submit to archive.

In his interview to the professor of the Department of Forensic Medicine of the Moscow Medical Academy named after M.V. Sechenov A. Maslov, the son of Lydia Timashuk, a former military pilot Yuri Alexandrovich Kuraev, told the following: "My mother Lidia Fedosyevna Timashuk worked all the time in the Kremlin hospital. She was a gynecologist by specialty, but she retrained and became a therapist, she studied ECG with Professor Fogelson. Graduated from the 1st Moscow Medical Institute...

On duty, as I understand it, she was not supposed to talk about her work. But when she was removed from the 1st polyclinic, when she had to go with a demotion and a decrease in salary, of course, she talked about it. Mom had no other support than her family, and therefore we know a lot.

Yes, my mother wrote. but we didn't know about it. She wrote directly in Valdai, applied to the Central Committee and handed this letter over to Zhdanov's bodyguard, since she had no one else to turn to.

At Valdai, she was invited to a council of professors. They called her at night and called her as an experienced specialist - my mother did an ECG for all members of the Politburo: both Kalinin and Zhdanov, knew the ECG of all patients by heart. Zhdanov family she all the time

observed, so that she knew all of Zhdanov's ECG. She was convinced that he had a heart attack. The council included Mayorov, the attending physician Zhdanova, Vinogradov, Vasilenko, Egorov and my mother.

After the consultation, the Zhdanov family invited all the medical workers not to a banquet, but simply to have lunch in the dining room, my mother was not present there, but she said that the table was full of booze. She returned in complete confusion and, of course, immediately began to tell what had happened to her. And this is what happened: Zhdanov became ill, and his mother, in her specialty, began to examine him - it turned out that Zhdanov had a heart attack. When she began to report about this, other consultants immediately rejected her proposal and said that Zhdanov did not have any heart attack, but there was heart failure. Mother looks at them and thinks: either she is going crazy, or they are crazy ... Moreover, she took an exam at the institute for Vinogradov, this is her teacher ...

She says: how is it, they claim that there is nothing like that ... She had no choice but to act herself. But how to act? Turn to the patient? Turning to the family is unethical ...

And she decided to turn to the guard, Major Belov, wrote a letter, a purely medical letter. The letter was addressed, I remember, to the Central Committee. Mom did not have the opportunity to consult, she was upset. She accomplished a civic feat: she was not afraid of her immediate superior, Yegorov, and this was a magnitude. Circumstances forced her to do it. If she were in Moscow, I think she would personally run, I don't know where, but she would run to save a person. I started to bother, but Valdai is far from Moscow."

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor J. Etinger, in his article "Doctors and Their Killers," writes: "On August 31, Zhdanov died. Professors Vinogradov, Zelenin, Etinger, Gelstein and several other Moscow therapists, including Professor V.E. Nezlin. V.E. Nezlin was asked to analyze the ECG, recalled his brother, who was also arrested at the time, professor of pulmonology S.E. Nezlin, but the name of the patient was not reported. After careful examination of the ECG, he indicated that it corresponded to the symptoms of chronic coronary insufficiency. After that, he was asked if there were signs of acute cardiac pathology on this ECG. After re-study

ECG V.E. Nezlin emphasized that there were no changes indicating that the patient had a myocardial infarction. In the evening of the same day, V.I. Nezlin got a call from S.E. Karpay and said that the ECG belonged to Zhdanov, who died that day in the sanatorium of the Central Committee of the CPSU near Valdai.

At first glance, it was a purely medical conflict. You can read the electrocardiogram in different ways, there is nothing unusual in this. A tried and tested method of resolving a medical dispute is a consultation. But for some reason Timashuk decided to look for an arbitrator in the state security agencies. In 1948, her letter was not given a move.

Professor Ya.G. Etinger came to the attention of the state security as early as 1944, regularly visiting the JAC, where he read the foreign Jewish publications that arrived there and spoke in support of the project of creating a Jewish republic in the Crimea. As a result, in the fall of 1949, he was removed from the leadership of the department at the 2nd MMI and fired.

He got into the "development" of the organs after the arrested executive secretary of the JAC Fefer showed him during interrogation (April 22, 1949).

The latter said that "Etinger is very dissatisfied with the fact that the Soviet Union does not provide assistance to the State of Israel, and accused the Soviet government of pursuing an allegedly hostile policy towards the Jews."

After such a statement, operatives from the counterintelligence of the MGB installed listening devices in the professor's apartment and recorded one of the conversations with his adopted son Yakov, a student at Moscow State University, and then the conversation between Etinger and Professor Zbarsky.

V.S. Abakumov reported to Stalin about these "anti-Soviet" dialogues.

As G.V. Kostyrchenko, "the leadership of the MGB raised the issue of Etinger's arrest with the Kremlin more than once: first in November 1949, then in April 1950. However, Stalin granted Abakumov's request only shortly before November 18, 1950, when Etinger, in fact, was taken into custody. The professor, who was escorted to Lubyanka, was charged with "slandorous fabrications" against Shcherbakov and Malenkov, whom he, according to "operational data", considered the main inspirers and organizers of the policy of state anti-Semitism in the country. A month earlier, the stepson of Professor Ya.G. Etinger

ger (Sitterman), who was required to testify against his adoptive father. And on July 16, 1951, the wife of Ya.G. was taken to the MGB prison. Etinger's R.K. Viktorova, who was forced to confirm that her husband and son regularly listened to anti-Soviet radio broadcasts from the BBC and Voice of America."

At the very beginning of the investigation, Etinger was accused of bourgeois nationalism and nothing more. The professor categorically denied this and insisted on the absolute legitimacy of his talk about the oppression of Jews in the USSR. The Etinger case was led by Lieutenant Colonel Ryu-MIN, Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases of the Investigative Department of the MGB.

At the first meeting, he said to the arrested:

— You are under arrest for spreading hostility towards the Soviet power. Do you plead guilty to this?

- No. I do not admit this, since I have not done anything of the kind," Etinger answered him.

On January 5, 1951, the stubborn professor was transferred to the Lefortovo prison and put in a cold cell. He was forbidden to lend books, use the stall and take walks.

Later, while under investigation, Viktor Semenovitch told the investigator: "Tell the truth, don't lie," I suggested to Etinger. To my questions, he immediately answered that he had been arrested in vain, that the Jews were oppressed in our country. When I began to put pressure on him, Etinger said that he was an honest man, he treated responsible people. He gave the name of Selivanovskii, my deputy, and then Shcherbakov.

Then I told him that he would have to tell how he healed Shcherbakov. Here he began to prove in detail that Shcherbakov was a very sick, doomed person.

During the interrogation, I realized that there was nothing, absolutely nothing connected with terror here.

And then they reported to me that Etinger did not give something new, worthy of attention.

Therefore, the Minister of State Security ordered the investigator to stop the investigation, but Ryumin instead continued to interrogate the professor, forcing him to stand on his feet for hours without sleep...

Yakov Etinger says: "But let's go back to the end of 1950, when my father was arrested. His case was handled by one of the most terrible Stalinist executioners, a senior investigator for especially important cases.

under

Colonel M.D. Ryumin. At the very first interrogation on November 20, 1950, he accused Etinger of "wrecking treatment" of the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov. In order to obtain "confessions", Ryumin severely beat and tortured father.

Sometimes Minister of State Security Abakumov took part in the interrogations. In December 1950, he came to the conclusion that there were no facts of criminal treatment by Etinger, and in January 1951 he instructed "to stop working with Ya.G. Etinger", limiting himself to accusations of "anti-Soviet activities" and "anti-Stalinist sentiments". Nevertheless, Ryumin continued to seek "recognition" by his own methods. But the father was seriously ill: as follows from

case materials during the investigation, Etinger had 29 heart attacks. "Each subsequent attack of angina pectoris," said the certificate from the medical unit of the Lefortovo prison, "can lead to an unfavorable outcome." On March 2, 1951, returning to the cell after another interrogation, the father, as the case file says, "went up to the table, bit off a piece of bread, took a few steps towards the door and fell unconscious." Death came from heart failure.

The death of his father did not at all pity the executioners. On July 16, 1951, my mother, R.K., was also arrested. Viktorov. At the very first interrogation, Colonel Rodovansky told her that she knew about Shcherbakov's "sabotage treatment". He did not let his mother sleep, put her in a punishment cell, handcuffed her, poured ice water over her, trying to get her to confess that she knew about her husband's "terrorist actions". Once Rodovanovsky, together with another investigator, severely beat her, a sick woman who was then 62 years old. On March 1, 1952, she was sentenced to 10 years in prison. And I got 10 years in a special camp. (I was arrested before my father and mother, in October 1950.) On May 12, 1951, a decision was made to confiscate all our property."

So, on the second of March, after another interrogation, Etinger returned to the cell and died at 5.15. According to the medical report, he died "suddenly from cardiac paralysis as a result of coronary artery thrombosis, atherosclerosis and thoracic angina."

At the same time, the doctors warned the investigating unit about the weak physical condition of Etinger, who could die due to further interrogations. | \_

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Moreover, Colonel Likhachev pointed out to Ryumin the end of the protocol of the professor's interrogation. Nor did Ryumin comply with Abakumov's order to draw up general protocols of Etinger's official interrogations.

Now that he had died, Ryumin was chastised and reprimanded at a meeting of the party bureau. Ryumin was also subject to an internal investigation. And who knows what results it could lead to.

However, Ryumin turned out to be more cunning than anyone could have imagined. Before Etinger's death, he "managed to squeeze out of his defendant a 'confession' that he deliberately wrongly contributed to the death of the secretary of the Central Committee Shcherbakov in 1954 with 'sabotage' treatment." In this he was very consistent. G.V. Kostyrchenko writes about this: "This version looked so absurd and far-fetched that Abakumov from the very beginning resolutely rejected it, anticipating what unpredictable consequences it could cause if it were reported to the painfully suspicious Stalin. Being a poorly educated person and naturally straightforward, the chief of state security was afraid of such adventurism, preferring to deal with extremely simplified, albeit crudely put together scenarios. Knowing that Stalin defined bourgeois nationalism as the worst enemy of the Soviet state, Abakumov believed that, as the leader of the "armed detachment of the party," he must first of all ruthlessly fight against real and imaginary adherents of this ideology, whether, for example, , armed detachments of Ukrainian nationalists or the Jewish intellectual elite - the guardian of the culture and traditions of their people.

But because of his psychological primitiveness, he did not catch the nuance that Stalin, and partly the apparatus of the Central Committee, had long been infected with anti-Semitism, declared a secret war not only on the bearers of the national idea, but also on the assimilated people associated with them by ties of common origin. parts of the Jews. Consequently, a subordinate, a lieutenant colonel, turned out to be much more far-sighted than his minister.

According to the "JAC case", investigators of the MGB were required to prove the espionage and sabotage of its activists. The Politburo was preparing for the next propaganda. However, time passed, and the case could not be completed. It literally fell apart. Then the restless Ryumin tries to

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expand the case by arresting more and more people indirectly participating in the work of the JAC. And, I must say, he manages to drag out the investigation.

#### LIEUTENANT COLONEL RYUMIN

Mikhail Dmitrievich Ryumin was thirty-eight years old in September 1951. The arrogant, short, cruel, rude, stupid, bald lieutenant colonel with a belly did not like many colleagues. Most of all they were irritated by his pretentious arrogance. In the questionnaires, with an air of importance and without blinking an eye, he wrote down his incomplete higher education, and then could not explain what exams he took at the university. For example, here is how Ryumin was characterized by the operational secretary of the MGB, Major Burlaka, in a memorandum dated May 15, 1953:

“I got the impression that Ryumin was an illiterate person, he often asked how this or that word was spelled or what punctuation marks should be put. He has a very small vocabulary. I haven't read a single book from start to finish. An addiction to alcoholic beverages, to have a hearty lunch on time - this, perhaps, is the whole range of Ryumin's interests.

Misha Ryumin was born in 1913 in the village of Kabany, Shadrinsk district, Perm province, in the family of a middle peasant. He graduated from the eight classes of the school. Since May 1929, he worked first as an accounting house, and then as an accountant for the Udarnik agricultural artel in the Ural region. From April to June 1930, he attended the Shadrin accounting courses of the regional Union of Consumer Societies. Since February 1931, he was an accountant-instructor of the Kabanievsky district collective farm, the district communications department. After graduating from the Shadrinsk communications courses (studied from June to September 1931), he was an accountant, senior accountant, accountant-instructor of the Ural Regional Communications Administration (September 1931 - June 1933).

Also in the personal file of Ryumin, studies at the Komsomol branch of the Communist University named after V.I. Lenin in 1931-1932, 1934 (Sverdlovsk).

From May 1934 to September 1935, Ryumin was already the chief accountant of the Sverdlovsk regional communications department.

In September 1935, Mikhail Dmitrievich was drafted into the army. But even there he did not disappear: he served as a private at the headquarters of the Ural military

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district, then in the same place - an accountant-economist. At the end of the service, in July 1937, Ryumin returned to his previous job - the chief accountant of the Sverdlovsk Regional Administration

connections.

But very soon, the former defender of the Motherland was accused of misappropriation of funds and that he enjoyed the patronage of the head of the regional communications department, who had been arrested by that time as an "enemy of the people." According to him, not without humor, of course, N. Petrov "Ryumin acted sensibly. He understood how to be saved. He immediately left the place and left for Moscow. Here, after a month of looking for a job, on September 13, 1937, he got a job as an accountant-auditor of the Financial Sector of the Central Administration of River Routes of the People's Commissariat of Water Transport of the USSR, and from September 1938 until the start of the war he worked as a chief accountant and head of the planning and financial department. Office of the Moscow-Volga Canal in Tushino. Here in 1939 he was accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU (b).

After the outbreak of the war, Ryumin, given his "rare specialty," was sent in July 1941 to study at the Higher School of the NKVD of the USSR.

From September 1941, Ryumin was an investigator, senior investigator, deputy chief, head of the yU department of the Special Department of the NKVD - the Counterintelligence Department of the People's Commissariat

defense of the Arkhangelsk military district.

On December 28, 1941, he was awarded the special rank of "Junior Lieutenant of State Security", on February 11, 1943 - "Senior Lieutenant of State Security", on June 18, 1943 - "Captain", on March 3, 1944 - "Major". In 1943, Ryumin was accepted from among the candidates for membership in the party.

There was enough work in the Special Department of the NKVD, and then in the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the Arkhangelsk Military District. In addition to everything else, the British naval mission was located in Arkhangelsk during the war years, and the 126th Naval Base and the Air Force group were also quartered. For example, in October 1943, the British naval mission in Arkhangelsk consisted of 52 people: 18 senior and middle officers, 34 junior officers and enlisted men. The apparatus of the British 126th port base consisted of 49 people: 10 senior and middle officers, 39 junior officers and privates. At the same time, the mission included many officers who certainly knew Russian. Soon, counterintelligence officers established that the "military experts" sent by the British to work in the port of Arkhangelsk, for the most part, did not correspond to

They served their purpose, they do not know the work in the specialties "assigned" to them, and therefore they try to evade participation in the repair of weapons and consultations on various technical issues. In a word, real intelligence agents arrived who were engaged in military, economic and political intelligence, propaganda of anti-Soviet ideology, and the creation of a network of intelligence sources from among Soviet citizens. True, all intelligence and operational work on the British and Americans was concentrated in the counterintelligence department of the NKVD in the Arkhangelsk region. The special departments of the Arkhangelsk Military District and the White Sea Military Flotilla were ordered to transfer to the regional administration all the developments and agents for the British and Americans, not related to the development of the Red Army military personnel, and the Navy, and only in agreement with the KRO to carry out activities for the relations of Soviet military personnel with foreigners. And there was a certain sense in this: according to counterintelligence data on | September 1943, out of 1,000 Soviet citizens whose contacts with foreigners were recorded by surveillance, 90% were women.

Nevertheless, the counterintelligence work of SMERSH was and was built against British intelligence mainly in two directions: the identification of British intelligence officers, their connections and the suppression of their activities at army and navy facilities. At the same time, the fact was taken into account that, by the nature of their service activities and in everyday life, the British had extensive communication with military personnel and the civilian population. All points of contact between the British and our citizens were taken into account in the operational work of military counterintelligence.

In total, during the years of the war, counterintelligence officers identified 100 regular employees of the allied special services in the Soviet North, but only 6 of them were expelled from the country.

However, despite such a wide field of activity, the SMERSH officer Ryumin mastered, first of all, the art of falsifying cases.

"In the end, to his misfortune, he was noticed by the chief army counterintelligence officer Abakumov, who was in great need of professional knockers to testify," emphasizes N. Petrov. - After all, it's not all the same to beat the defendants yourself. We need to grow a change.

In Arkhangelsk, Ryumin conducted an investigation into the case of a photojournalist of the newspaper "Patriot of the Motherland" arrested in December 1944.

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I.P. Yermolin, the reason for the arrest of which was only a report of external surveillance that he had visited the British naval mission. Abakumov became interested in the case. As Ryumin testified later during interrogation: "When I arrived in Moscow with the Yermolin case, the arrested person was also brought to the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence. At the very first interrogation by Abakumov, Yermolin stated that he gave false testimony as a result of the beatings. Abakumov called me and I

told him how the Yermolin case had been falsified. Abakumov, apparently, liked my frankness, because when he asked: "Was Yermolin beaten badly?" - I answered: "They beat me as much as they could", he grinned and told me to come to the head of the investigative department of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence Leonov, who announced to me that I was staying in the central office as a seconded."

So Ryumin became a senior investigator at SMERSH, already directly under the wing of Abakumov.

It is worth noting one small touch to the biography of this "officer". On July 31, 1944, he will be awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 11th class — "For the exemplary performance of special tasks of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army", and on September 13, 1945, the Order of the Red Star with the same wording. I think it's easy to guess what was behind these beautiful words...

But back to the story of N. Petrov: "Since May 1946, he took the post of deputy head of the 2nd department of the 6th (investigative) department of the 3rd Main Directorate of the MGB. In 1948, Ryumin participated in the investigation initiated by Abakumov on the orders of Stalin in the "Marshal" case, to prepare materials for the arrest of Georgy Zhukov. He led the case of the arrested Hero of the Soviet Union, Major P.E. Braiko, beating him, forced him to sign a statement against "one of the Marshals of the Soviet Union". Also, seeking evidence against Zhukov and Serov, he burned the tongue of a cigarette to the arrested former storekeeper of the Berlin NKVD operations sector A.V. Kuznetsov.

In general, "worked with a twinkle", tried. On March 19, 1948, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Living conditions have improved. And quite traditional for that time way. Around 1949, Ryumin moved to a more spacious apartment No. 4 in house No. 4 on Staropimenovskiy Lane, which had previously been occupied by

Deputy Head of the Investigation Department

Rhodes. In September 1949, Ryumin was transferred to the position of senior investigator in the investigation department of the MGB, and he took part in the interrogations of those arrested in the Leningrad case. He beat the arrested Solovyov (former chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, and at the time of the arrest the secretary of the Crimean regional committee). In his acquittal statements to the military collegium in 1954, Ryumin bluntly stated that, as in a number of other cases, the command to "beat Solovyov" was given by Stalin himself, who was following the progress of the investigation.

At the same time, Ryumin remained in the position of senior investigator. His career, despite all the efforts, somehow stalled. And in May 1951, it failed. As Ryumin testified during the investigation: "The personnel department of the USSR Ministry of State Security became interested in the incorrect information that I gave about my relatives. They demanded an explanation from me - why I hide the compromising data known to me about them." It turned out that Ryumin hid the true financial status of his father (and he was very prosperous), in addition, the father of Ryumin's wife served in Kolchak's army. And finally, Ryumin lost his investigation file on the bus. In addition, he was reprimanded by the party for not recording the testimony of the arrested doctor, Professor Ya.G. Etinger, who died under investigation by Ryumin. In general, the situation is almost hopeless.

Thus, he was clearly threatened with dismissal from the authorities. A few years later, Mikhail Dmitrievich will remember: "I carefully thought over and weighed everything. The fact is that by the summer of 1951 I found myself in a rather unpleasant, precarious position.

So what does the "shibzdik", as Stalin called him, do? He turns to the reception of the Central Committee to the assistant of Comrade Malenkov Sukhanov. As P.A. Sudoplatov, "the result of this meeting became fatal for the fate of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia."

Lieutenant Colonel Ryumin rewrote his denunciation letter eleven times, being in the waiting room for about six hours. This is evidenced by Sudoplatov, who at the same time adds: Sukhanov "himself negotiated the content of the letter to Stalin with Malenkov."

When the leader read Ryumin's statement, he said:



- Here, a simple person, but how deeply he understands the tasks of state security agencies. And the minister is not able to understand.

So what did this "simple man" write on July 2, 1951

Stalin?

"To Comrade STALIN I.V.

From the senior investigator of the MGB of the USSR

lieutenant colonel Ryumin M.D.

In November 1950, I was assigned to conduct an investigation into the case of the arrested Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor Etinger.

During interrogations, Etinger admitted that he was a staunch Jewish nationalist, and as a result, he harbored hatred for the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government.

Further, having told in detail about the ongoing enemy activities, Etinger also admitted that he, taking advantage of the fact that in 1945 he was instructed to treat comrade. Shcherbakov, did everything to shorten the life of the latter.

Etinger's testimony on this issue I reported to the deputy chief of the investigative unit, comrade. Likhachev, and soon after that me and Comrade. Likhachev, together with the arrested Etinger, summoned Comrade. Abakumov.

During the "interrogation", or rather the conversation with Etinger, comrade. Abakumov hinted to him several times that he should retract his testimony about the villainous murder of Comrade. Shcherbakov. Then, when Etinger was taken out of the office, Comrade. Abakumov forbade me to interrogate Etinger in the direction of revealing his practical activities and plans for terror, arguing that he - Etinger - "will lead us into the wilds." Etinger understood the desire of comrade. Abakumov, and, returning from him, at subsequent interrogations he retracted all his confessions, although his hostile attitude towards the CPSU (b) was irrefutably confirmed by the materials of secret eavesdropping and the testimony of his associate, the arrested Brozolimsky, who, by the way, told during the investigation and that Etinger expressed to him his hostile attitude towards Comrade. Shcherbakov.

Using these and other evidence materials, I continued to interrogate Etinger, and he gradually began to recover on his previous testimony, about which I wrote daily certificates for a report to the leadership.

Around January 28-29, 1951, I was summoned by the head of the investigative unit for especially important cases, comrade. Leonov and, referring to the instructions of comrade. Abakumov, proposed to stop working with the arrested Etinger, and the case on his charge, as Comrade put it. Leonov, "put on a shelf".

At the same time, I should note that after calling Comrade. Abakumov, the arrested Etinger, established a more severe regime for him, and he was transferred to the Lefortovo prison, to the coldest and dampest cell. Etinger had an advanced age - 64 years, and he began to have attacks of angina pectoris, about which on January 20, 1951, an official medical document was received by the investigative unit, which stated that "in the future, each subsequent attack of angina pectoris can lead to adverse clear outcome."

Given this circumstance, I several times raised the question before the leadership of the investigative unit that I should be allowed to really participate in further interrogations of the arrested Etinger, and I was refused. All this ended with the fact that in the first days of March, Etinger died suddenly and his terrorist activities remained uninvestigated.

Meanwhile, Etinger had extensive connections, including those of his associates among major medical specialists, and it is possible that some of them were related to Etinger's terrorist activities.

I consider it my duty to inform you that Com. Abakumov, according to my observations, has a tendency to deceive government bodies by hushing up serious shortcomings in the work of the MGB bodies.

So, at present, I am in the process of investigating the case against the former deputy general director of the Wismuth joint-stock company in Germany, Salimanov, who fled to the Americans in May 1950, and then after 3 months returned to the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, where he was detained and arrested.

Salimanov testified that in May 1950 he was removed from work and he was supposed to return to the USSR, but he did not do this and, taking advantage of the lack of supervision by the MGB, defected to the Americans.

Further, Salimanov said that, having betrayed the Motherland, he fell into the hands of American intelligence officers and, communicating with them, established that American intelligence had detailed information about the activities of the Wismuth Joint-Stock Company, engaged in the extraction of uranium ore.

These testimonies by Salimanov indicate that the organs of the Ministry of State Security poorly organized counterintelligence work in Germany.

Instead of informing government authorities about this and using the testimony of the arrested Salimanov to eliminate serious shortcomings in the work of the IHL bodies in Germany, comrade. Abakumov forbade recording Salimanov's testimony in interrogation protocols.

At various times, the Ministry of State Security arrested agents of the American and British intelligence services, and many of them, before their arrest, were secret employees of the MGB and double-dealing.

In his information on such cases Comrade. Abakumov wrote: "We caught, we exposed", although in reality: - we were caught, we were exposed, and besides, for a long time we were taken for nose.

In passing, a few words about the methods of investigation.

In the investigative unit for particularly important cases, the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government on the work of the MGB bodies in relation to recording calls for interrogation of those arrested by interrogation protocols, which, by the way, are drawn up irregularly and in almost all cases, is grossly and systematically violated. some cases is not objective.

Along with this, Abakumov introduced the practice of violating other Soviet laws, and also pursued a line, as a result of which, especially in cases of interest to the government, the testimony of those arrested under force of coercion was recorded with unacceptable generalizations, often distorting reality.

I am not citing specific facts, although there are a lot of them, since the most complete picture in this respect can be given by a special check of cases with the interrogation of those arrested.

In conclusion, I will allow myself to express my opinion that Com. Abakumov did not always strengthen his position in the state apparatus in honest ways, and he is a dangerous person for the state, especially in such a sensitive area as the Ministry of State Security. He is also dangerous by the fact that within the ministry he puts "reliable", from his point of view, in the most key positions and, in particular, in the investigative unit

vision, people who, having received a career from his hands, gradually lose their party affiliation, turn into sycophants and obsequiously do everything that comrade wants. Abakumov.

(Ryumin)".

"The beginning of the campaign of personnel purge of the MGB system, which was accompanied by the arrests of high-ranking employees, was initiated by a special decision of Stalin and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks after consideration of the application of M.D. Ryumin, senior investigator of the investigative unit for especially important cases (OVD) of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, N. Petrov comments on Ryumin's letter. — It would be more accurate to say that Ryumin's statement was more of a pretext, because the idea of carrying out a purge and arrests in the MGB... had been brewing in Stalin for a long time. After Stalin received Ryumin's statement in his hands, it was time to act. What did this investigator write? Ryumin's letter, dated July 2, 1951, contained a number of accusations against Abakumov. Firstly, he "put out" a very promising, from the point of view of the author of the letter, case of doctor Ya.G., arrested by the MGB. Etinger, who could give important evidence about "pesticians". Secondly, Abakumov hid important information from the Central Committee about the shortcomings in counterintelligence work in Germany at the Wismuth enterprises, where uranium ore was mined. And, finally, thirdly, he grossly violated the rules of investigation established by the decisions of the party and the government. In the letter, Ryumin called Abakumov a "dangerous person" in an important

#### ARREST AND CONSEQUENCE

N. Petrov tells: "On July 5, 1951, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted the following decision (182/404): "to instruct the commission composed of comrades. Malenkova (Chairman), Beria, Shkiryatova and Ignatiev to check the facts stated in Ryumin's statement and report on the results of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The term of the commission's work is 3-4 days.

On the night of July 5-6, 1951, Ryumin and the heads of the MGB Abakumov and his first deputy S.I. were received by Stalin in the Kremlin. Ogoltsov. Molotov, Bulganin, Beria and Malenkov were present. Stalin accurately thought out the scenario of the meeting. At first, in the presence of other members of the Politburo, Abakumov was invited to the office at exactly one in the morning, and only after Stalin had the opportunity to clarify all the questions of interest to him, at 1:40 a.m. Ryumin was called into the office (very similar to a face-to-face ku). And Ogoltsov was invited only five minutes before the end of the audience. Most likely, in order to entrust him with the temporary performance of the duties of the Minister of State Security.

Abakumov had not yet been arrested, but already on July 8, 1951, he was interrogated by the acting Prosecutor General K.A. Mokichev. The day before... Abakumov wrote an explanatory note on the charges brought against him (see appendix. — Note by the author). The note described the circumstances of the Etinger case: in November 1950, Abakumov sent a note to Stalin in Sochi asking him to authorize Etinger's arrest; Poskrebyshhev redirected Abakumov to Bulganin, who gave the sanction. Etinger was arrested on November 18, 1950 and, according to Abakumov, did not give any significant evidence, he had frequent heart attacks, and in the end, as a result of interrogations conducted by Ryumin, he died. Abakumov dismissed all Ryumin's accusations in connection with the Etinger case, assuring Stalin of his personal loyalty.

Then, in those gloomy July days, Viktor Semyonovich was summoned by Lavrenty Pavlovich. Abakumov decided for himself that he would talk to him one on one frankly and at least some hope would appear. But it was not there. In Beria's office, as if by chance, there was also Malenkov, who asked:

- What about the aviators serving their sentences?

"Novikov, Shimanov, Seleznev's term of imprisonment has expired," Abakumov answered.

Why are you holding them? asked Malenkov discontentedly.

- It is not in my competence. You know who makes such decisions," Abakumov avoided answering.

After this conversation, Viktor Semenovich nevertheless met with Beria in private and asked him to report specifically on this issue to the owner. He no longer accepted him and did not even want to talk to him.

"After all, if they are released," said Viktor Semenovich, "then Shakhurin and Shimanov will undoubtedly come to Malenkov and tell how they wrote a statement against him addressed to Comrade Stalin.

But Beria made it clear that he himself would get out of this story, to which he had no  
no relationship.

On the same day, Malenkov calls Ryumin and takes written explanations from him. Then calls Abakumov and gives them to read.

Thus, Malenkov calls Viktor Semenovich the only culprit of the "Aviation Case"...

Knowing full well what he could expect in the near future, on July 9 Abakumov wrote two whole letters addressed to Stalin. The first after a private meeting with Beria, where he points out: "I evaded answering, meaning that this is a special case, since during the investigation they wrote statements addressed to you regarding Malenkov G.M.

After that, I met separately with Comrade L.P. Beria. and asked him to report specifically to Comrade I.V. Stalin."

Second, after reading Ryumin's written explanations in Malenkov's office: "Indeed, as you know, on special instructions, the arrested Shakhurin, Novikov, Shimanov and others were interrogated in relation to Malenkov G.M. At the same time, their testimonies, in accordance with the instructions received, were drawn up in the form of handwritten statements addressed to you and were presented to you."

The fact is that the statement on behalf of Shakhurin and Shimanov against Malenkov, similar to the statement against Zhukov, was not prepared in a single copy. Therefore, Viktor Semenovich, who kept one copy as compromising evidence, just in case, was disingenuous to the leader, just as when he sent these statements addressed to him and pointed to them: "in a single copy." He reserved the right to defend and attack.

[J] July, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks takes a special decision (P82/437) "on the unfavorable situation in the MGB", in which all Ryumin's accusations against Abakumov were repeated and new ones were added.

And on July 12, 1951, Viktor Semenovich was summoned to the USSR Prosecutor's Office. He was already ready for this and understood everything. The Prosecutor General, State Counselor of Justice 1st Class G. Safonov, announced two decisions to him - on the initiation of a criminal case on the grounds of Article 58-1 "b" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (treason committed by military personnel) and on the choice of a measure of restraint in the form of detention.

After the "procedures" necessary in such cases, Viktor Semenovich was placed in a solitary cell at Matrosskaya Tishina. Only the head of this prison knew who was designated in it as "prisoner No. 15". Such are the precautions taken against the former all-powerful and all-powerful Minister of State Security

the past of the USSR.

It is noteworthy that "before the arrest of Abakumov, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria ordered to switch the telephones of the Kremlin automatic telephone exchange: home to the officer on duty in the security room, and

official - to the reception; this was done so that Abakumov could not connect with him."

It was thanks to the arrest procedure that a verbal portrait remained in the case of the former minister: "Height is high; shoulders - drooping; hair color - dark blond; eyes - brown; the face is rectangular; forehead - high; eyebrows - arched; the nose is wide; the back of the nose is straight, the base of the nose is raised; mouth - large; lips are thick; chin - straight; ears are large, oval. He remained for history ...

According to Kirill Stolyarov, "Colonel-General Abakumov was a respectable, self-aware man with a pleasant appearance, a hard, piercing look, suggesting that this man trusts few people."

As state security veterans told E. Zhirnov, "they kept him in more than tolerable conditions and it was as if even lunch was delivered from his beloved "Aragvi". He did not give any confession. And then, in the investigation unit for especially important cases, the MGB compiled an album with photographs of things seized from Abakumov during the search. Now such a list is unlikely to surprise anyone, but then dozens of pairs of shoes, a pile of ties and everything else was a hit in the top ten. Stalin, who walked in patched boots, ordered that Abakumov be treated as a state criminal.

Immediately after the arrest, Abakumov's apartment and dacha were searched.

Particular attention was drawn to the large amount of ashes found in his office, which indicated the burning of many of the documents he kept at home. However, the former minister did not burn everything. Documents marked "top secret" were seized from his desk. It was dirt on Beria and Malenkov: police protocols related to sexual scandals (L.P. Beria) and copies of statements from 1946 regarding the marriage of aircraft (G.M. Malenkov). As for junk, for a minister with a salary of twenty-five thousand rubles, all this was trifles, taking into account the possibilities of Abakumov in the past as the head of the SMERSH GUKR.

So, they found at Viktor Semenovich's: "1260 meters of various fabrics (these were mostly cheap varieties of viscose silk used to decorate the walls of his apartment), a lot of silverware, 16 men's and 7 women's watches, including 8 gold, about 100 pairs of shoes, a suitcase of men's suspenders, 65 pairs of cufflinks, 22 china sets, 78 art vases, furniture sets, refrigerators, radios, many cameras, a movie projector, a Lincoln Marshmallow car and a library (one thousand five hundred volumes). In house number eleven on Kolpachny Lane that day, the windows on the second floor were tightly curtained...

By order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 25, 1951, No. 12537 and dated July 26, 1951, No. 12637, apartments No. 2 in house 1] along Kolpachny lane and No. 8 in house 8 along Telegraph lane, as well as the MGB dacha in the village of Petrovo- Further transferred to the reserve of the Council of Ministers. Both of these documents were signed by Stalin.

On July 13, Abakumov's second wife was also arrested along with her baby. Moreover, as K. Stolyarov writes, "the child caused a lot of trouble to the employees of the Union Prosecutor's Office — the mother immediately lost her milk, and in order for the boy to survive, they had to take care of artificial nutrition."

By the way, in the apartment of the mother of Antonina Nikolaevna (Abakumov's mother-in-law), during a search, two books were found, published for official use, about the work of British counterintelligence and the American Federal Bureau of Investigation. The possession of such literature only exacerbated the guilt of the second wife of the former Minister of State Security. The first wife was much more fortunate. At first they also wanted to arrest her, but the USSR Prosecutor General did not see sufficient grounds for her arrest.

After a series of interrogations, she was evicted from the apartment, allowing only her personal belongings to be taken from there, and then completely left alone.

The second wife of Abakumov, together with her son, spent 2 years and 8 months behind bars and was released on March 9, 1954. And ten months later, on January 26, 1955, she was summoned to the police, where they took away her passport and gave her another instead - without the right to reside in Moscow.

In the meantime, something unimaginable happens. On July 13, 1951, the head of the investigative unit of the MGB A.T. was arrested. Leonov and his

deputies: M.T. Likhachev and L.L. Shvartsman. On July 25, 1951, the manager of the affairs of the MGB, M.K., was arrested. Kochegarov, and the next day another deputy head of the investigative unit of the MGB V.I. Komarov. At the same time, arrests in the MGB continued further.

Abakumov's duties began to be performed by his deputy S.I. Ogoltsov, but, sensing something was wrong, on August 3 he reported to Stalin that he was ill and, according to the doctors, needed bed rest. For himself, he proposed the candidacy of E.P. Pitov is early.

He was assigned to fulfill the duties of the Minister of State Security, and besides, he was assigned to participate in interrogations in the case of Abakumov, the former boss!

N. Petrov says: "Shortly before the vacation, on July 24, 1951, Stalin held one important meeting with the leaders of the MGB in the presence of Beria and Malenkov, at which he gave instructions on a serious restructuring of intelligence and operational work, proposing to reduce the secret network of the MGB by % (leaving only a part of agents and reducing all informants). On the eve of his departure, on August 9, Stalin appointed party apparatchik S.D. Ignatiev, defiantly leaving him part-time as head of the Department of Party, Trade Union and Komsomol Bodies of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In the same month, the composition of the deputy ministers of state security was revised ...

M.D. Ryumin, as a reward for exposing Abakumov, was appointed in July acting head of the investigative unit for the Internal Affairs Department of the USSR Ministry of State Security and received the rank of colonel. But he did not want to rest on his laurels and, having sent a new revealing letter to Stalin to the south, he became the initiator of another wave of arrests in the MGB apparatus. On October 10, 1951, Ryumin sent a copy of this letter to Malenkov. It spoke about the shortcomings in the work of the 2nd Main Directorate of the MGB and that the leading employees of the MGB: E.P. Pitovranov, F.G. Shubnyakov, L.Kh. Raikhman, N.N. Selivanovsky, A.S. Blinov, V.P. Rogov, I.A. Chernov and others worked closely with Abakumov for many years and were under his hostile influence.

Around mid-October 1951, Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev and his deputy N.P. Stakhanov went to the south to meet with Stalin. At the meeting, Stalin asked Ignatiev in detail about the work of the MGB and, in particular, about whether it was good

work E.P. Pitovranov, F.G. Shubnyakov and other high-ranking Chekists. Ignatiev replied that at the present moment "the Chekists are working better", and those about whom Stalin asks are "honest people". After listening to him, Stalin declared: "You are a blind man, you don't see anything that is happening around," and gave Ignatiev a letter from Ryumin to read with accusations against Pitovranov and others. Immediately, along the way, Stalin gave the order to "remove all Jews" from the MGB. Ignatiev, perplexed, asked - where? And then the leader said: "I am not saying that you should drive them out into the street. Plant and let them sit", adding a phrase that is destined to become winged: "The Chekist has only two ways - to be promoted or to prison."

At the same meeting, Stalin categorically demanded that Ryumin be appointed not only the head of the investigation department, but also the deputy minister of state security. Ignatiev tried to object, referring to the fact that A.N. Kidin (who worked as the first secretary of the Vladimir regional committee), to which Stalin reacted rather sharply, saying: "I don't know such a thing." Of course, Stalin knew all the first secretaries of the regional committees very well, but Kidin's candidacy did not suit him. Stalin's decision about the boss

investigative part was strictly carried out. Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 4010-1837ss of October 19, 1951 M.D. Ryumin was approved by the Deputy Minister of State Security, a member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of State Security and the head of the investigative unit for the Department of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ministry of State Security.

It should be noted that, in addition to the arrests of Jewish Chekists, there was another wave of arrests in 1951, associated mainly with cases of corruption.

Deputy Prosecutor General K. Mokichev was the first to interrogate Abakumov. In fact, he replaced his boss Safonov, who got into a car accident and ended up in the Kremlin hospital for several months.

So, Mokichev asks Abakumov:

Why didn't you arrest Etinger for a long time, and after your arrest you forbade interrogating him about terror, telling Ryumin that Etinger would "lead you into the wilds"?

"The leadership of the 2nd Directorate reported to me," Viktor Semyonovich answers, "that Etinger is hostile. I instructed to prepare a note to the Central Committee. The note outlined Dan

nye, who convincingly proved that Etinger is a big bastard. It was in the first half of 1950, I don't remember the month. But we did not receive a warrant for arrest. And after the sanction was lowered from above, I asked to bring Etinger to me, because I knew that he was an active Jewish nationalist, a sharply anti-Soviet person. When I began to press him, Etinger said that he was an honest man, he treated responsible people. He gave the name of Selivanovsky, my deputy, and then Shcherbakov. Then I said that he would have to tell how he healed Shcherbakov. Here he began to prove in detail that Shcherbakov was a very sick, doomed man.

During the interrogation, I realized that there was nothing, absolutely nothing connected with terror here. And then they reported to me that Etinger did not give something new, worthy of attention.

- Do you know that Etinger was transferred to the Lefortovo prison with the creation of an unusual regime for him?

- It is not right. Both internal and Lefortovo prisons are the same, there is no difference.

- Did you give instructions to keep Etinger in special conditions dangerous to his life?

- In what special? Abakumov asks in surprise.

- Harder than everyone else? After all, Etinger was placed in a damp and cold cell.

Viktor Semenovich understands the question and, smiling, answers:

"There is nothing special here, because he is an enemy. We can also beat those arrested - in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I and my first deputy Ogoltsov were repeatedly warned that our Chekist apparatus should not be afraid to use physical measures against spies and other state criminals when necessary.

An arrested person is an arrested person, and a prison is a prison. There are no cold and warm cells there. It was about the stone floor - so, as far as I know, the floor is stone everywhere. I told the investigator that it was necessary to seek the truth from the arrested person, and I could tell him not to lead us into the jungle.

The author of the documentary story "Golgotha" Kirill Stolyarov comments on this duel as follows: "I must say that the forces during the interrogation turned out to be unequal. Deputy Prosecutor General Mokichev was a lawyer of the highest qualification with a certificate of pro

professor, while, I remind you, Abakumov's educational background was limited to four grades of elementary school. And yet, I gradually got the impression that they should have been swapped in the protocols of interrogations - it all painfully looks like a dialogue between a layman and a tough, quite competent interlocutor.

During the interrogations, Viktor Semenovich, admitting his mistakes, shortcomings and failures in the work of the Chekist, no longer considered himself guilty of anything. His argument was indeed the strongest: "I was all in front of the eyes of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Every day they knew what was going on in the Cheka." Well, what do you say in response, how do you object?

In solitary confinement, the former minister writes a letter to HIM: "Now, regarding the statement of comrade. Ryumin that I allegedly hinted to Etinger that he retract his testimony on terror. This was not, and could not be. It is not true. If there were any concrete facts that would make it possible to catch on, we would have skinned Etinger, but we would not have missed this case. I must tell you directly, Comrade Stalin, that I myself am not a person who would not have shortcomings. There are shortcomings both personally and in my work. At the same time, with an open mind, I assure you, Comrade Stalin, that I give all my strength to obediently and clearly carry out the tasks that you set before the organs of the Cheka. I live and work, guided by your thoughts and instructions, Comrade Stalin, I try to firmly and persistently solve the questions that are put before me. I cherish the great trust that you have placed in me over the entire period of my work, both during the Patriotic War in the organs of the Special Departments and SMERSH, and now in the USSR Ministry of State Security.

I understand what a big deal you, Comrade Stalin, have entrusted to me, and I am proud of it, I work honestly and give my all, as befits a Bolshevik, in order to justify your trust. I assure you, Comrade Stalin, that no matter what task you give me, I am always ready to carry it out under any conditions. There can be no other life for me than to fight for the cause of Comrade Stalin.

V. Abakumov.

It is not by chance that Viktor Semenovich avoids some words ("arrest", "prison"). About three weeks have passed since the arrest, and he still believes that the leader will figure it out and declare him innocent.

But the one before whom Victor Semenovich bowed respectfully from solitary confinement, having received this letter, read it and left it with

myself. And 20 days later, Mokichev received an instruction personally from Malenkov, transmitted through the new Minister of State Security S. Ignatiev: on August 20, 1951, "to send Comrade Stalin the protocol of the interrogation of Abakumov."

Viktor Semenovich, sitting in prison, did not know that from July 1951 to September 1952, 42 thousand people were purged from the ranks of the MGB, 600 agents were expelled from intelligence networks in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, 3 thousand people were fired for non-compliance legality or violation of discipline, 1583 were fired for professional unsuitability, the rest - for other reasons.

The purge of Abakumov's henchmen was the hidden reason for this purge. Officially: the work and operational abilities of the state security improved. The new Minister of State Security, Semyon Denisovich Ignatiev, described the MGB as a "stagnant, bloated bureaucratic" structure.

Ignatiev was forty-seven years old. In the party since 1926. In 1935 he graduated from the All-Union Industrial Academy, and immediately he was hired by the industrial department of the Central Committee. From 1937 - Secretary of the Buryat-Mongolian Regional Party Committee, from 1943 - First Secretary of the Bashkir



Regional Committee of the Party, from 1946 - First Deputy Head of the Department for Checking Party Personnel, from 1947 - Secretary of the Central Committee of Belarus for Agriculture and Procurement, from 1949 - Secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee and Commissioner of the Central Committee for the Uzbek USSR, from 1950 - Head of the Department of Party, Trade Union and Komsomol Personnel of the Central Committee.

By nature, a gentle person and timid in front of Stalin. According to an eyewitness, he "completely obeyed the requirements of the higher leadership" and "implicitly carried out any instructions."

Leonid Mlechin emphasizes in his book: "Ignatiev's softness did not extend to the arrested, whom he ordered to be beaten and tortured." That says it all!

But back to the interrogations of the former minister.

Mokichev calls Abakumov again.

— Why were the consideration of cases and the terms of the investigation in the MGB unacceptably delayed?

"Indeed, there are cases that have been dragged out," Viktor Semyonovich replies. — This was done by special order of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks or was dictated by operational considerations.

I will give examples: there is a case of General Telegin and others - 8 people. This is a very important matter, and henceforth it should also be kept and not finished. It is associated with Marshal Zhukov, who is a very dangerous person.

Mokichev understands everything and asks another question:

— Your employees systematically violated the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, according to which it is necessary to draw up each protocol of interrogation. For what purpose was the decree of November 17, 1938 violated?

Viktor Semenovitch is adamant here too:

- It's time to put before the Central Committee the question of its abolition, it is outdated.

- Tell me, why did MGB investigators make only rough notes during interrogations, and then "generalized" protocols were drawn up?

- In the investigative unit for especially important cases there are good investigators, but those who do not know how to write. And there are, on the contrary, competent investigators who do not know how to interrogate. Hence the "generalized" protocols.

Briefly and clearly. But there is another question:

- Who was entrusted with the compilation of "generalized" protocols?

- Leonov - as the head of the investigative unit for particularly important cases, Shvartsman - as his deputy and a competent person ...

Meanwhile, a completely different work was in full swing behind the scenes of the prison. A special investigative group was created in the MGB, which carefully studied the data of undercover observations taken from the archive, phonograms of secret listening in the apartments and offices of doctors, and medical history.

But the worst thing is that none of the arrested doctors gave the necessary evidence.

Once Stalin called Ignatiev and asked:

- How is the work on the "case of doctors" going?

The new minister had nothing to say. Times and customs have changed, and most importantly, the style of work of state security. And the leader demanded the most decisive measures.

- I'm not a petitioner to the MGB! - Stalin got more and more excited. "I can demand and punch you in the face if you don't comply with my demands. We will drive you like sheep! he was furious. - The MGB is full of Chekists who do not see further

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own nose. You have sunk into the state of complete idiots there and do not want to follow the directives of the Central Committee ...

"By the end of January 1942, in almost all conversations with comrade. Stalin, I heard not only sharp abuse, - Ignatiev recalled, - but also threats of approximately the following nature:

"If you do not uncover terrorists, American agents among doctors, then you will be where Abakumov is now... I am not an EMGB officer. I can demand and directly declare this to you if you do not fulfill my requirements ... We will manage you like sheep, "etc."

At the end of 1951, Ryumin, at a report to Stalin, expressed doubts about the work of the prosecutor's office, saying that they were unlikely to be able to unwind the Abakumov case.

"They are Chekists," the leader answered, reflecting. "You won't get anything from them by persuasion, you have to..." and he hit the table several times with the edge of his palm.

Having become the deputy minister in charge of the investigation at the MGB, Ryumin approved (February 22, 1952) a resolution "according to which the investigation of the criminal case of Abakumov" was transferred to the Ministry of State Security. After that, Abakumov and other arrested people were very soon transferred from Matrosskaya Tishina to Lefortovo. There Viktor Semyonovich was shackled. But that was not all.

The detainees were kept in handcuffs around the clock, interrogated without sleep, and beaten until they bled. In room No. 65 of the Lefortovo prison, only those who were not talkative were beaten. "However, beaten to the blood, mutilated Abakumov did not admit to anything."

K. Stolyarov writes: "Abakumov was tried to extradite his connections with foreign special services. During daily interrogations, he was accused of being a "servant of enemy intelligence", they suggested not to evade, but to say what made him "serve the British and Americans so diligently", and once they said: "It has been established that wrecking You also carried out subversive work in military counterintelligence. Abakumov, stop lying and reveal your true enemy plans!" Exhausted by torture, Abakumov had the strength to smile and ask: "What do you think, did I work for the Germans?"

Having provoked an unprecedented upheaval in the Lubyanka, the "doctors' case", starting from 1952, was developed by the MGB under the supervision of

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leadership of M.D. Ryumin. The leader read the protocols of interrogations every day. He demanded from the MGB the maximum development of the version about the Zionist nature of the conspiracy and about the connections of the conspirators with British and American intelligence through the "Joint" (Zionist charitable organization).

In September 1952, with the help of beatings from the former deputy head of the MGB investigative unit, Colonel L.A. Shvartsman received "important" testimony against Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Merkulov, Kobulov, Mamulov and a number of other associates of Stalin and Beria. But

The most important for the Soviet leadership were Shvartsman's confessions that he allegedly prepared terrorist acts against Malenkov and that Abakumov, Raikhman, Palkin, Colonel L.E. knew about his plans. Itkin - Head of the Investigation Department of the Counterintelligence Department of the Moscow Military District, Eitigon and Prosecutor Doron. Shvartsman's testimony turned out to be so timely that the Abakumov case itself henceforth became known as the Abakumov-Shvartsman case.

"According to the former head of the State Archival Service of the Russian Federation, Professor RG. Pikhoy, Stalin personally supervised the investigation and determined the degree of guilt of one or another participant in the "conspiracy". He makes notes in the margins: "Abakumov and Vlasik handed over Timashuk to be punished by foreign terrorist spies Yegorov, Vinogradov, Vasilenko, Mayorov." Or: "He (Zhdanov) did not just die, but was killed by Abakumov," writes J. Etinger.

On November 3, 1952, Ryumin approved the decision to bring an additional charge: "Considering that the investigation in the case of Abakumov collected evidence incriminating him that he:

a) hatched treasonous plans and, striving for the highest power in the country, put together a criminal group of Jewish nationalists in the USSR Ministry of State Security, with the help of which he deceived and ignored the Central Committee of the CPSU, collected materials discrediting individual leaders of the Soviet government, and also fenced off the Chekist apparatus from the leading party bodies;

6) relying on his accomplices, carried out sabotage subversive work in the field of counterintelligence activities...

- additionally charge Abakumov Viktor Semenovich with committing crimes under Art. 58-7, 58-8, and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

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It was cold in Lefortovo prison. Abakumov was deprived of walks, a stall, books, and was fed, as I.A. Chernov, "starve." He recalled: "They worked out a sadistic technique - they turn you on your back, take off your trousers, spread your legs and let's whip with a rawhide whip. The pain is inexpressible, especially if they hit with a pull. After such torture, I drank a decanter of water, I was thirsty - everything inside was on fire. Here you can even sign that you strangled your own mother three years before your birth.

Since February, Viktor Semyonovich, as they say, was passed through the Lefortovo conveyor: for the first eight days they were kept in a dark and cold cell, and for a month they were allowed to sleep for an hour and a half a day.

On April 18, he was given the opportunity to write a letter, and he writes: "To Comrades Beria and Malenkov": "At all interrogations there is a continuous cursing, bullying, insults, ridicule and other brutal antics. They threw me from my chair to the floor. On the night of March 16, they seized me and brought me to the so-called punishment cell, but in fact, as it turned out later, it was a refrigerating chamber with a pipeline installation, without windows, completely empty, measuring 2 meters. In this monster, without air, without food (they gave me a piece of bread and two mugs of water a day), I spent eight days. The installation turned on, the cold intensified all the time. I fell into unconsciousness many times. I have never seen such atrocity and I did not know about the presence of such refrigerators in Lefortovo - I was deceived. This stone bag can give death, injury and a terrible disease. On March 23, it almost ended in death - they miraculously left me and put me in the medical unit, injecting heart preparations and putting rubber bladders with hot water under my feet. I kept asking who gave me permission to do this thing to me. They answered me: "The leadership of the MGB." Through questioning, I found out that this is Ryumin, who does what and how he wants.

In conclusion of his letter, Viktor Semenovich asks:

"1) Finish everything and get me back to work... I need treatment.

2) If this story continues for some time, then take me away from Lefortovo and get rid of Ryumin and his friends. Maybe we should return to the Matrosskaya Prison and let the prosecutors interrogate...

Maybe you can bring your wife and child home, I will always be grateful to you for that. She is a very honest and good person.

Respectful V. Abakumov."

What is most surprising in this letter is Abakumov's persistent appeal to those who, in principle, are not interested in help. Moreover, it can be seen that the letter rather resembles a memorandum not from the former minister, but allegedly from the current one, but temporarily under investigation.

Viktor Semyonovich, a steadfast and courageous man, for some reason is sure of the short duration of his time behind bars. But already in the short time that he spent on interrogations and in solitary confinement, his health has been severely undermined and even causes fear among prison doctors:

"Prisoner No. 15 can hardly stand on his feet, moves with outside help, complains of pain in his heart, weakness, dizziness... Pale, lips and mucous membranes with a cyanotic tinge. On palpation of the back, pain in the muscles in the intercostal spaces ... The feet are hyperemic, pasty ... For health reasons, it needs to be transferred from the punishment cell to the cell.

Now it is allowed to interrogate him "only lying down for 2 hours".

In the autumn of 1952, Viktor Semenovich was once again given the opportunity to write: "More than a year has passed, and they continue to interrogate me without interruption. All this time I was asked a large number of questions - strange, absurd and simply provocative. For example, the question about the trial of the "Leningraders": "Why did I achieve the execution of Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and others?" You know very well how it all happened. Investigator Ryumin must know that the Central Committee decides such questions, but for some reason he asks me about it. Now a new line. They continue to torture me, calling me a "usurper". Mind-blowing testimonies of various persons are cited. Many sat in the refrigerator and lie, as best they can. About this monster - the refrigerator - I wrote to you about the last time.

No, Viktor Semenovich does not want to give up. He still persistently turns to Beria and Malenkov and, as before, only informs them about his situation, terrible and terrible, in which the Minister of State Security cannot be for a long time. Not former, but current!

"How many lies, slander and dirt are written on paper. They, obviously, should take refusal protocols from people who lied and slandered. Otherwise, how can you leave papers with such records.

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Perhaps it would be better to finish this whole story before the departure of comrade. Stalin on vacation? I say this because sometimes during the holidays some issues were resolved more acutely. Understand my position and therefore excuse me for this advice.

Once again I ask you for a wife and a child. Bring them home. The wife's health is poor, and the child needs air. Otherwise, you can ruin both her and my dear, only son. Please help me in this."

K. Stolyarov comments on these two letters as follows: "The letters have one more peculiarity: they are all provided with postscripts, in which Abakumov assures Beria of unchanging devotion, swears that "he loves comrade with all his heart. Stalin and comrade. Beria", calls him "the closest person", hints that "he will come in handy in the future", etc.

For him, this was the last hope, and she, as you know, is the last to die. What Viktor Semenovitch wrote to his enemies was one thing, and he showed everyone else, including them, that it was impossible to break Abakumov. It is also impossible to force one to show against oneself. He believed, he hoped, and maybe even was sure that they would stop the experiments and release his.

And he was stubbornly silent.

At the next interrogation, Colonel Sedov asks Abakumov:

— By unfoundedly denying the crimes you have committed, you once again show your hostile attitude towards the CPSU(b) and the Soviet state. When are you going to disarm and tell the truth about your criminal activities?

- At previous interrogations, I already showed that I did not commit crimes against the CPSU (b) and the Soviet state. I can't add anything to these testimonies of mine at today's interrogation, as if Viktor Semenovitch answers with memorized words. (Break from sixteen thirty to seven o'clock. And so on until four forty-five minutes.) But absolutely nothing new. Though some things are changing...

N. Petrov says: "Now Ryumin's star shone in full splendor. Between July 1951 and November 1952, he was received five times by Stalin in the Kremlin office. Directly from the lips of the "Kremlin highlander" he received instructions on how to conduct business, whom and with what intensity to interrogate, who to keep in handcuffs around the clock, who to beat and torture. But there were also numerous telephone instructions from Stalin.

In this dizzying career of Ryumin, one can first of all discern the belief typical of Stalin in a "little man" capable of exposing the "enemy machinations" of presumptuous bureaucrats from the near-Kremlin layer of managers who are extinguishing popular initiative. The main thing is to support such a small whistleblower from above, to lend him a helping hand directly from the Kremlin. And together with him to torture, smash, crush yesterday's authorities.

Yes, Ryumin's biography is simple and unpretentious, and the length of service and experience in Chekist work is not great. But is this the main thing. For Stalin, he is a "little man" who was not afraid to speak out against his superiors and expose "enemy intrigues". The former Minister of State Security Ignatiev wrote about Stalin's especially reverent attitude towards Ryumin in an explanatory note in March 1953: about the fact that the Chekists have forgotten how to work, have become obese, lost and forgotten the traditions of the Cheka of the Dzerzhinsky era, have broken away from the party, they want to stand above the party, - picked up a note on the results of an examination on the heart preparation of comrade Zhdanov, asked who took this initiative, and in response to my answer that Ryumin did this with his workers, Comrade Stalin said: "I keep saying that Ryumin is an honest man and a communist, he helped the Central Committee to uncover serious crimes in the MGB, but he, poor fellow, does not find support among you, and this is because I appointed him against your objection. Ryumin is a good fellow, I demand that you listen to him and bring him closer to you. Keep in mind that I don't really trust the old employees of the MGB."

Despite the constant pressure from Stalin, Ignatiev and Ryumin could not achieve the desired result. As Ryumin showed: "By September 1952, despite the falsification of the investigation and other tricks, it became obvious that the case of the employees was failing, since none of the arrested, except Shvartsman, managed to obtain the evidence we needed about the roots of sabotage, referred to in their "testimonies". Then I and Ignatiev went to the last resort and obtained permission to apply measures of physical coercion to the arrested. On November 4, together with the assistant head of the investigation unit, Grishaev, I went to the Lefortovo prison and ordered a group of arrested Chekists to be beaten with rubber truncheons and whips, but these measures also did not produce any results."

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In the same way, the investigation into the "doctors' case" was forced. On the night of November 12-13, 1952, Ryumin was especially raging. He personally took part in the beating of Professor V.Kh. Vasilenko. Vasilenko spoke about this episode in detail during the trial of Ryumin:

"Ryumin then came to my cell, ordered me to be handcuffed and transferred to another room. I was taken to some special room, where Ryumin asked me if I would tell the truth. I replied that all my testimony given to the investigation was true and I did not know any other truth. Then Ryumin hit me, and his assistants knocked me to the floor and started beating me. I fainted. Ryumin again demanded that I confess to the crimes. Since I did not change my testimony, the beating procedure was carried out twice more. (...) Ryumin beat me in the face with his hands, and his assistants hit me with rubber sticks on the body, and Ryumin kept shouting to beat me harder. (...) After the beating, the next day, Ryumin came to the investigator's office, and I then told him that I would sign about anything and that I was very afraid of Ryumin."

Ryumin was zealous, but it was too late. Stalin suddenly became disillusioned with him. The dictator's mercy was quickly replaced by anger. On November 13, 1952, by Stalin's decision, Ryumin was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of State Security and Head of the Investigation Department of the MGB for "not getting to the root of the matter" and "not being able to fulfill" the government's instructions to investigate the cases of Abakumov-Shvartsman and "doctors" who "still remain undiscovered to the end".

In general, Ryumin was removed from his post and only in February 1953 was he "attached" to the position of senior controller of the USSR Ministry of State Control. But not for long...

And on November 17, 1952, the assistant chief of the investigation department for especially important cases, Lieutenant Colonel Grishaev, reported to the deputy chief of the investigation department, Colonel Sokolov: "According to the order of the Minister of State Security of the USSR Comrade Ignatiev S.D. to cell No. 77 of the Butyrskaya prison... from the six cells located at the end of the corridor where cell No.

there are no prisoners.

For the purpose of secrecy, this part of the corridor is fenced off with a special curtain. At the door of the cell there is a round-the-clock post from among the most trusted guards. The guards were warned that the arrested No. 15 is capable of allowing any provocation and may resort to suicide.

Therefore, it is necessary to conduct especially careful monitoring of it. Also, for the purposes of conspiracy, it was decided to attach to the arrested person No. 15 the most proven, able to keep his mouth shut doctor and to call other doctors to the arrested person only in emergency cases. According to the Minister's instructions, arrested No. 15 is handcuffed, which will be removed only during meals. For the rest of the time, arrested No. 15 will sit in handcuffs, and in the daytime with his hands behind his back, and at night with his hands on his stomach.

Interrogations continued in Butyrka prison. There he was interrogated by the former secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee V.N. Zaichikov, who told N. Mesyatsev how Abakumov was brought in for the first time:

- Did they give me a rookie investigator?

- How did you determine?

- You were a deputy of the Supreme Council, you still have a trace of a badge on your lapel, boots from abroad.

Abakumov immediately saw through him.

And again, Viktor Semenovitch denied betraying the Motherland, saying that there were mistakes, shortcomings, and blunders.

I am ready to answer for them. I did not betray the Motherland, he repeated.

They did not dare to torture him anymore, because Abakumov's health was deteriorating.

And what to do with it then? For example, the secretary of the party bureau of the party organization of the investigation unit for especially important cases of the MGB of the USSR Tsvetaev in his report indicates:

"According to the available medical reports, arrested No. 15 allegedly suffers from heart disease, and the doctor watching him allowed him to be interrogated for no more than 3-4 hours and only in the daytime.

In this situation, given the behavior of arrested No. 15, in my opinion, it is impossible to get him to confess his guilt in the crimes he committed. He further suggests:

"It seems to me that it would be expedient to inform the Instance about this and take the necessary measures in order to obtain a confession from arrested No. 15. Such a measure

In my opinion, there may be a thorough medical examination of arrested No. 15 and, if necessary, the use of urgent medical means to quickly restore his health so that after that he could be actively interrogated and be sure to use sharp methods in this.

But the former subordinates of Viktor Semenovitch tried with might and main ... and gave gratitude indications.

For example, Colonel Yakov Mikhailovich Broverman, former deputy head of the secretariat of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, the same age as the minister and a Zhytomyr Jew, said so much that the investigators did not have time to write it down.

Here are some of his answers that speak for themselves:

"... SHVARTSMAN, RAIKHMAN, PALKIN, BELKIN and I, holding responsible positions in the USSR Ministry of State Security and being staunch Jewish nationalists, not only spread enemy thoughts regarding the national policy of the party, but also actively helped ABAKUMOV deceive the Central Committee of the CPSU and carry out wrecking work in the Chekist organs.

For example, RAYKHMAN, as deputy head of the 2nd Main Directorate, together with ABAKUMOV, ruined the counterintelligence work of the USSR Ministry of State Security, concealed from the party the criminal failures of the KGB measures.

For a number of years, the nationalist PALKIN headed the department responsible for providing Soviet intelligence officers with cover documents and means of secret communications, and also destroyed this important section in the MGB system of the USSR.

Abakumov's active accomplice in the collapse of counterintelligence work beyond the cordon is the nationalist BELKIN, named by me during previous interrogations, who holds the position of deputy head of the 1st Directorate of the MGB of the USSR.

SHVARTSMAN, being one of the leaders of the Investigation Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security, on the instructions of ABAKUMOVA, smeared cases against arrested Jewish nationalists, excluding from their protocols of interrogation testimonies about terrorist and other hostile activity..."

"... Being a convinced nationalist, I, of course, could not remain indifferent to the fate of the arrested like-minded people.

I warmly sympathized with the struggle waged by the Jewish nationalists against the Soviet state.

My nationalist feelings were especially evident in 1948-1949, when I had to correct the protocols of the interrogation of the arrested leaders of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee LOZOVSKY, FEFERA, SHIMELIOVICH and others.

This is explained by the fact that I fully shared the enemy plans and practical activities of Jewish nationalists and American spies who carried out subversive work under the cover of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

I thought that the leaders of the committee had done the right thing by orienting their enemy activity towards reactionary circles in the United States of America.

I also approved of the slanderous fabrications that FEFER, LOZOVSKY and their accomplices were intensively spreading about the situation of the Jewish population of the USSR.

I also positively assessed the hostile work of the former leaders of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, designed to create a convenient springboard in the Crimea under the guise of the Jewish Republic for the Americans to invade the USSR.

I must confess that I met the arrest of LOZOVSKY, FEFER, SHIMELIOVICH and other Jewish nationalists and American spies with deep regret.

Therefore, while correcting the protocols of the interrogation of LOZOVSKY, FEFERA and other arrested nationalists, I did my best to soften certain wordings in the testimonies of those arrested.

"In 1949, among us, the nationalists who made up ABAKUMOV's close circle, a rumor spread, I don't know who, that supposedly soon ABAKUMOV should take the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and would lead all intelligence and counter-raz - the national authorities.

I thought that, having taken a high position in the state apparatus, ABAKUMOV would acquire more opportunities for patronage of persons of Jewish nationality, and in particular to us, Jewish nationalists, who worked with him in the USSR Ministry of State Security.

Broverman gave this testimony on December 3, 1952. Somewhat earlier, or rather on November 27, Yakov Mikhailovich showed no less terrible things:

"At previous interrogations, I also did not hide my guilt in following the enemy instructions of Abakumov to deceive

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the government, and repeatedly, on its instructions, fabricated false information sent to the decision-making bodies.

So, in 1945, with the former beginning. Department "D" of the MGB of the USSR PALKIN, as well as the former head of the 1st Directorate UTEKHIN and the head of the Investigation Department for Particularly Important Cases LEONOV, on the instructions of ABAKUMOV, fabricated a photo album sent to the Central Committee of the party about the subversive work of white émigré organizations operating in Manchuria.

It must be said that most of the documents, photocopies of which were placed in the album, belonged to the 30s and did not represent any interest in 1945. However, ABAKUMOV, wishing to create the impression that the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies allegedly succeeded in completely



defeat white émigré organizations and seize documents about their activities during the Second World War, ordered us to stick the dates on the documents in the album.

Preparing for sending to the Central Committee summary information on the work of the MGB bodies on the search and arrest of foreign intelligence agents, as well as authors and distributors of anti-Soviet leaflets and anonymous letters, I, by order of ABAKUMOV, indicated in them only the number of spies and authors of anonymous documents found and concealed the fact that for a long time the bodies of the MGB had not identified and caught several tens of thousands of criminals of the above category. This made it possible for ABAKUMOV to hide from the Central Committee of the CPSU the unfavorable situation with the search for spies and authors of anonymous enemy documents.

Colonel of State Security I.A. Chernov recalled: "They pressed hard, demanding to expose Abakumov's conspiracy, and then abruptly changed tactics - they decided first to dirty me from head to toe, so that there was nothing to hope for. Confess, they say that you wrote falsified letters from "aviators" to the Leader of the people. I - in no way, there was no such thing and that's all, at least cut it into pieces. Then they arranged a confrontation with Broverman, who muttered that it was my job. "What are you weaving?! I shouted in my heart to Broverman. - Do you settle accounts with me for the old? Is it my fault that you got demoted?" Broverman is silent, averts his eyes, and I am shaking. "How long have you been beaten?" I ask him. "Third month," he squeezed out. "What are you doing? I turn to the investigators. "Are you forcing us to slander each other with clubs?!" And for them - at least something, they drew up a protocol and my words were not entered there. "

From the protocol of interrogation of I.A. Chernov dated May 27, 1952:

"... in 1943, ABAKUMOV ordered me to take ten thousand rubles from the financial department of SMERSH from the funds allocated for operational needs. Immediately ABAKUMOV warned me to always have this amount of money with me.

Fulfilling this order, under the pretext of paying operational expenses, I repeatedly took 9-10 thousand rubles from the financial department and spent them on the instructions of ABAKUMOV for handouts to his close associates.

In order to cover up the traces of the crimes, I periodically made fictitious reports addressed to ABAKUMOV, in which I falsely indicated that this money was allegedly spent for operational purposes.

"... in 1950, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposed to investigate the signals about his official abuses against the former head of the counterintelligence department of the MGB of the Central Group of Soviet Occupation Forces BELKI NA ...

Even before the Soviet troops left the Soviet Union, BELKIN repeatedly sent gifts to Abakumov from the front. Therefore, having received an order from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to investigate the facts of official abuses of BELKIN, ABAKUMOV in every possible way delayed the implementation of this instruction of the Central Committee.

After the investigated facts of BELKIN's abuses were confirmed, ABAKUMOV took measures to shield BELKIN. For this purpose, in the letter on the results of the investigation of the BELKIN case, compiled by me at the direction of ABAKUMOV and sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the most serious crimes committed by him were not indicated, and the facts reported in the letter were essentially blurred.

Instead of punishing BELKIN, ABAKUMOV subsequently nominated him to the post of deputy head [of the Department of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR].

"...ABAKUMOV maintained close contact with the former secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks KUZNETSOV. ABAKUMOV more than once boasted of his closeness to KUZNETSOV, saying that before making any decision concerning the MGB, KUZNETSOV always consulted with him - ABAKUMOV.

In 1946-1947, ABAKUMOV often visited Kuznetsov in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In turn, KUZNETSOV visited Abakumov several times in the building of the Ministry.

It was with the help of KUZNETSOV that ABAKUMOV placed people he liked in leadership positions, who later formed his reliable support.

Colonel Schwartzman was even more talkative. On November 21, 1952, he testified:

"In 1946, when the Ministry of State Security was headed by ABAKUMOV, who had previously worked with me and REIKHMAN in the secret political department of the NKVD of the USSR. Even before that, during the war, I acquired new adherents of nationalist convictions in the person of the former deputy head of the ABAKUMOV secretariat for military counterintelligence - BROVERMAN, prosecutor for special cases DORON, head of the investigative department of the 2nd Main Directorate of ITKIN, chief nickname of department "D" PALKIN.

With all these individuals I maintained close contact and exchanged nationalist sentiments.

Special mention should be made of my relationship with BROVERMAN. With the latter, we spoke frankly on nationalistic topics and expressed sympathy for American and Palestinian Jews.

BROVERMAN and I spoke disparagingly about the Russians, praised the Jews in every possible way, extolled their intelligence and abilities, declaring that, supposedly, the Jews, by history itself, are called to rule over the world. At the same time, we spoke out that Jews in the USSR and other countries should follow the example of American Jews, who penetrated into all parts of the economic and political life of the country, influencing the foreign and domestic policy of the American government.

"In August 1950, I learned that together with Leonov and Komarov I was to go on a business trip to Sochi to draw up and agree on one important document with the Head of the Soviet Government, who was spending his vacation in the south.

Assuming that G.M. MALENKOV, I decided to use this opportunity to commit a terrorist act.

In practice, I intended to carry out my enemy plan, depending on the situation: either directly on the government highway, or in the case of reception by G.M. MALENKOV

ABAKUMOV, LEONOV, KOMAROV and me on the issue of compiling the said document. For this purpose, I took with me from Moscow a personal weapon - a pistol "Walter".

N. Petrov writes the following about Shvartsman: "Yes, he himself, as a former investigator who had vast experience in extracting evidence, understood: in order to avoid torture, it is better to admit everything, and even in excess. Shvartsman did just that, but they still beat him. His testimony contained everything that Ignatiev and Ryumin needed for new arrests of high-ranking employees of the MGB. And this despite the fact that Shvartsman gave such fantastic testimony that the question arose whether he was damaged in his mind?

He confessed that he was preparing an assassination attempt on Malenkov and involved "certain leaders of the party and government" for this, confessed to espionage in favor of British, American, French, Japanese and Norwegian intelligence services. The medical-psychiatric commission convicted Shvartsman of pretense. As Ryumin, one of the creators of the case of the "Zionist conspiracy" in the MGB, admitted during interrogation in June 1953: "During the investigation of these cases, another crime was committed, Shvartsman's deliberately fictitious and slanderous testimony was used by Jewish MGB officers, although Ignatiev and I were well aware of his provocative behavior during the investigation."

Lev Leonidovich (Aronovich) Shvartsman came to the NKVD at the age of 30 from the newspaper Rabochaya Moskva, where he worked as an executive secretary. In the secret political department, Schwartzman became an indispensable person. He wrote not only protocols of interrogations, but also party meetings. In the future, he began to specialize exclusively in the investigation, skillfully combining an ordinary scuffle and literary work. For example, he conducted an investigation into the cases of A. Kosarev, I. Babel, M. Koltsov, V. Meyerhold. For his special skills, his career was swift, and he himself is indispensable. At 32, he was appointed assistant head of the NKVD investigative unit, and at 33, deputy head of the investigative unit of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD.

N. Petrov emphasizes: "The arrested General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League Kosarev, having fallen into the hands of Shvartsman, experienced all his investigative methods. As Shvartsman later cynically admitted during interrogation: "The arrested man, realizing the hopelessness of his position

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nia, agreed to testify about his enemy work." In the 1950s, a former employee of the authorities A.S. Kozlov described what it looked like: "Kosarev was lying on the floor upside down and wheezing. Makarov held him by the legs, Rhodes by the head, and Shvartsman beat him with a rubber band." But why did Kosarev not refute his testimony given under torture at the trial? Many did this, although who, except the judges, will hear them at a closed meeting of the Military Collegium. Yes, and to whom it helped ... It turns out that even here Schwartzman's cunning could not have done. Depending on the behavior at the trial, Kosarev was promised to save his life. Shvartsman himself testified about this during the investigation: I don't remember the court of the USSR, contrary to the existing order, I myself gave Kosarev a paper and offered to write a statement about saving his life in the name of Beria ... Such a statement was written, and I personally, bypassing the immediate superiors, reported to Beria . However, Beria, after reading the statement, cursed, rejected Kosarev's request, and did not give the statement any further movement ... "On February 23, 1939, Kosarev was shot."

The talented Shvartsman invented the most incredible stories that he told to the investigators. According to him, his aunt helped him in his Zionist work, who prepared special Jewish dishes. Those who ate them immediately became staunch Zionists. The most invaluable thing in this business was the soup that Aunt Tsilya cooked. It was on the basis of the testimony of this colonel that charges were brought against 30 high-ranking employees of the MGB - Jews by nationality ...

From the protocol of interrogation E.P. Pitovranov dated April 24, 1952:

"... Using the support of KUZNETSOV, ABAKUMOV tried by all means to isolate the Chekist apparatus from the control of the Central Committee, to tear off the organs of the MGB from the party.

In this regard, it is appropriate to repeat that in 1947, as I have already shown about this, a group of employees of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks arrived at the USSR Ministry of State Security to check on the state of political education of the Communists of the 2nd Main Directorate and the theoretical training of leading employees of this Directorate.

Upon learning of this, ABAKUMOV became angry and began to shout: "What kind of test is this? I won't allow any scrutiny!" After that, ABAKUMOV telephoned Kuznetsov in my presence, and

check has been cancelled.

The criminal connection of ABAKUMOV with KUZNETSOV is also confirmed by the fact that KUZNETSOV assisted ABAKUMOV in creating an atmosphere of silence and complacency in the Ministry.

Question: In what way?

Answer: At the end of 1947, a meeting of party activists of the USSR Ministry of State Security was held. KUZNETSOV, who was present at this meeting, delivered a lengthy, long speech, in which he did not mention a single word about the shortcomings in the work of the Chekist, and reduced his entire speech to the fact that the authorities

The Ministry of State Security under ABAKUMOV achieved significant success, and thus made it clear to all the delegates present that one should not talk about the shortcomings of the work and criticize ABAKUMOV.

Thus, ABAKUMOV, having ensured during the period of KUZNETSOV's work as secretary of the Central Committee, a favorable arrangement of people for himself, having gained, with the support of KUZNETSOV among the Chekists, the fame of a person close to the Central Committee, a "major figure" and relying on us, his accomplices and accomplices, created the conditions for eventually, as I showed earlier, to achieve the highest power in the country.

These enemy plans of ABAKUMOV should have come to light much earlier, after the arrest of KUZNETSOV and his accomplices, but this did not happen, since ABAKUMOV put his cunning into play. I say this on the grounds that he entrusted the interrogations of KUZNETSOV to one of his closest associates - the former personal secretary KOMAROV, who undoubtedly helped Abakumov get out of the water dry and hide his criminal connection with KUZNETSOV "(See appendix. - Author's note).

The fate of General Pitovranov is remarkable in that he managed not only to get out of the "Abakumov-Shvartsman case", but also out of prison. E. Zhirnov tells how it happened: "Pitovranov, sitting in a prison cell, wrote a letter to Stalin not with a request to pardon him, but with a list of proposals for the reorganization of intelligence and counterintelligence, realizing that such a letter would be reported to the leader. And so it happened. The new minister, Semyon Ignatiev, kept this letter for a month, and then nevertheless reported to Stalin.

"There were no good leaders in intelligence for many years," Pitovranov wrote. - Under Comrade Merkulov, the incompetent Fitin, under Abakumov, the rogue Kubatkin, and then, although smart, but not very

operational and not sharp Fedotov. I am convinced that Comrade Savchenko is also not the person who should head the intelligence service so that it ensures the fulfillment of the requirements of the Central Committee ...

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks repeatedly noted that the enemies managed to tear off the Chekist apparatuses from the party organs. I think that the condition for this separation is to some extent created by a peculiar caste, a flux-like one-sidedness of many Chekists, connected to a certain extent with the peculiarities of their work.

If you consider it necessary, I could report my thoughts on this issue and the proposals arising from them to Comrade Ignatiev ...

Knowing your strictness, but also your generosity, I, as a father, ask you, Comrade Stalin, to give me the opportunity to improve."

The leader said to the new Minister of State Security, Semyon Denisovich Ignatiev:

- I think that Pitovranov is an intelligent person. Isn't he sitting in vain? Let's let him out after some time, change his last name and hire him again in the state security agencies.

Pitovranov continued to write to the leader. And after that, Pitovranov told reporters, the attitude towards him in prison changed. They gave him books...

On November 2, 1952, Pitovranov was brought directly from prison to Minister Ignatiev, who congratulated him on his release and conveyed Stalin's words: "We will not change Pitovranov's last name. Let's fix our mistake. We will be understood. Let him rest a little. It will be needed soon." |

On November 13, Pitovranov was summoned to the Kremlin. He received the highest remission of sins."

The former minister, although he also wrote letters, nevertheless turned out to be among the few who held on. He just kept going like this...

Documents testify to what this led to: "The patient walks, staggering in different directions, while using either the support of others, or leaning on walls and objects ... Complaints of pain in the heart, radiating to the left hand, on pain in the legs and swelling of the legs, notes weakness and rapid fatigue. However, the doctors considered Viktor Semenovitch able-bodied during the working day (up to six hours) ...

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#### PROSECUTION AND JUDGMENT

Academician of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor, Minister of Health of the USSR E. Smirnov recalled how, shortly before January 13, 1953, he was visiting Stalin at his residence near Sochi: "We were walking in the garden, talking. Stalin, pointing to the trees where lemons and oranges grew, told them what kind of care they require. And suddenly, without any transition, he asked:

- Comrade Smirnov, do you know which doctor treated Dimitrov and Zhdanov?

"I know," I answered and gave my last name.

- Strange. One doctor treated - and both died.

- Comrade Stalin, the doctor is not to blame here ...

- How is it "not guilty"?

- I was interested in the history of Dimitrov's illness, the pathoanatomical conclusion. I can assure you, nothing could be done. I know, by the way, that I myself recommended this doctor to Zhdanov. I considered him an educated and tactful person, a qualified specialist.

Stalin was silent. But I felt that I hardly convinced him. He was always distinguished by suspicion, and towards the end of his life this feature became almost pathological.

What was there to cover for the famous academician, if even more famous academician, G.F. Lange, the leader once said: "Doctors do not know how to treat. Here in Georgia we have many strong centennial old men. They are treated with dry wine and put on a cloak."

The argument is strong!

But it wasn't just said. Stalin was not a cow with a bell, that is, a "botal", he was always responsible for his words. So in this case...

On January 13, 1953, a TASS message appeared in the central Soviet newspapers:

"Some time ago, the organs of State Security uncovered a terrorist group of doctors whose goal was to shorten the lives of active workers in the Soviet Union by means of sabotage treatment. Among the members of this terrorist group were: Professor Vovsi MS, general practitioner; professor Vinogradov VN, general practitioner; Professor

Kogan M.B., therapist; Professor Kogan B.B., general practitioner; Professor Egorov P.I., therapist; Professor Feldman A.I., otolaryngologist; Professor Etinger Ya.G., general practitioner; Professor Grinshtein A.M., neuropathologist; Maierov G.I., general practitioner.

The criminals admitted that they, taking advantage of the illness of Comrade A.A. Zhdanov, incorrectly diagnosed his disease, hiding his myocardial infarction, (...) and thereby killed comrade A.A. Zhdanov. The investigation established that the criminals also shortened the life of comrade A.S. Shcherbakov. Criminal doctors tried (...) to incapacitate

Marshal Vasilevsky A.M., Marshal Govorov L.A., Marshal Konev I.S., General Shtemenko S.M., Admiral Levchenko G.I. and others, but the arrest foiled their villainous plans.

(...) Most of the members of the terrorist group (Vovsi M.S., Kogan B.B., Feldman A.I., Grinshtein A.M., Etinger Ya.G., etc.) were associated with the international Jewish the bourgeois nationalist organization "Joint", created by American intelligence. Other members of the terrorist group (V.N. Vinogradov, M.B. Kogan, P.I. Egorov) turned out to be longtime British intelligence agents. The investigation will be completed soon."

Iosif Vissarionovich always liked to create all sorts of conspiracies and terrorist groups. Some circus performances with political overtones and a bloody full house. Even this fabricated "doctors' case" speaks of a return to the thirties, somewhat reminiscent of "Yezhovism." The plot, if not the same, then at least there are more than enough parallels!

But this time it all fell apart...

Nikolai Nikolaevich Mesyatsev, in an interview with V. Chikin, told how he worked on the "case of doctors":

"... There were three of us: Vasya Zaichikov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol; Pyotr Kolobanov, first secretary of the Chelyabinsk regional committee, and I, at that time a post-graduate student of the Academy of Social Sciences. On a January evening I return from the skating rink in Ostankino Park, I see: a huge car is standing by the house (I used to live on the Yaroslavl Highway - now Prospekt Mira). Fir-trees-winders, for whom did this "dick-carrier" come? I go up to my fourth floor, I hear male voices in my apartment. Getting in. "Finally... Nikolai Nikolaevich, Ma is waiting for you.

lenkov. We must go immediately." "I'm going to change now." - "No need". Anyway, I changed.

They rushed to the "Big House" instantly. Climbed to the secret floor. In the office of G.M. Malenkov were S.D. Ignatiev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Minister of State Security, Secretary of the Central Committee A.B. Aristov, someone else. Shaking my hand firmly, Malenkov sat me down opposite.

"We invited you on behalf of Comrade Stalin, he looked at your personal file. He liked you. Comrade Stalin said that young, beautiful, as a rule, are always bold. We ask you to go to work in the investigation unit for especially important cases of the Ministry of State Security. The people working there are misleading the Central Committee of the Party. - Malenkov finished with pressure: - The Central Committee needs the truth. We must help Semyon Denisovich Ignatiev in establishing the truth in investigative cases." It was impossible to make another decision, how to agree. Malenkov added that the minister would take care of the position and rank and "decide in a good way." You have to start work tomorrow. The next day, in the minister's office, all three of us met: Vasily, Peter and I. Ignatiev acquainted us in some detail with the situation in the investigative unit and singled out two group investigative cases. One of them is the so-called "doctors' case" and the second is the former minister Abakumov and other ministerial workers.

"It is felt that we are being confused," the minister said, "you must bring a fresh stream into the work, get to the bottom of the truth, make it the property of the Central Committee and Stalin."

Zaichikov was supposed to study the Abakumov case, Kolobanov the "doctors case", and I had to work on these two cases, since I was the only one of the three who had a legal education and investigative practice.

It was clear that these cases, as they say now, are resonant, only the resonance is very painful for the country. Most of the doctors involved in the "case" were Jews, which means that the flywheel of anti-Semitism is spinning, and this is superimposed on the campaign against cosmopolitanism. What is the authority of a country that has defeated fascism? Not to mention that it is essentially vicious for a socialist society. The artificiality of the concocted "doctors' case" was revealed without much difficulty. The writers didn't even bother with a serious cover-up. Shamelessly took from the history of the disease high

congenital or acquired ailments over the years and attributed their origin or development to the criminal intent of the attending physicians. So much for "enemies of the people"...

- Did the initiative come from Beria or someone else?

- Beria had nothing to do with this. He came to the leadership of the security agencies after the death of Stalin, with the unification of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB. The initiator must be considered the head of the investigation unit, Ryumin, who is known as a notorious careerist... Some believe that the impetus for the emergence of the "doctors' case" was Stalin's alleged suspicion that the deaths of former Politburo members Kalinin, Shcherbakov, and Zhdanov were to blame. doctors who treated them. The MGB decided to confirm the "guess" of the leader. A statement from an employee of the Kremlin hospital, Lydia Timashuk, appears. An expert commission is created, headed by Ryumin. And the car started spinning.

A lot of speculation was built on the "case of doctors". And now there are allegations that this was a kind of preparation for the mass deportation of Jews. Even the dates of the trial are given: March 5-7, 1953. But Stalin, they say, died, his entourage rebelled, the investigation was terminated, and the doctors were released. Thus, a "logical chain" with the desired conclusions is adapted to the chronicle of events. But life builds a different logic. Having discovered that Ryumin's investigators were "confusing" politicians, it was Stalin, Malenkov and others who insisted on a thorough revision of the investigation. And they sent "Komsomol members". On January 13, there was a message about the arrest of doctors, and on January 19, our team had already started work. By mid-February, our conclusion was unequivocal: the "doctors' case" was falsified, the doctors were innocent, they should be released. Reported by S.D. Ignatiev, he informed the Politburo. I personally did not see any indictment in the "doctors' case" in the materials of the investigation, and nothing indicated the "prepared deportation" either.

In February 1953, the last version of the indictment against Abakumov, or the "Draft indictment in the case of the enemy group Abakumov - Shvartsman", was prepared. Investigative file No. 5428. This document is of interest also because Comrade Stalin personally edited it. There are ten accused. In addition to the names of Abakumov, Broverman and Shvartsman, there appear: Raikhman, Leonov, Likhachev, Komarov, Chernov, Sverdlov, Palkin.

After listing the names and positions of the accused, Stalin's hand inscribed (further in brackets. - Note by the author): "... in that they (traitors to the Motherland - inscribed above the crossed out line) conducted (subversive work against the Communist Party and the Soviet government - written above the crossed out line).

Using their leadership position in the USSR Ministry of State Security, they prevented the party and the government from fighting the enemies of the Soviet people, maliciously (blurred) cases against terrorists, Anglo-American spies and other especially dangerous state criminals, protected the worst enemies from failure party and the Soviet state, opposed the full exposure of the arrested and their enemy ties, systematically deceived the Central Committee of the CPSU (they fenced off the Chekist apparatus from the party and took it away from the control of the Central Committee - crossed out in ink).

Being enemies of the Soviet government, they carried out malicious sabotage in the organs of state security along all the main lines of Chekist work, and above all in the field of investigation and counterintelligence work to combat American and British intelligence agents, making it easier for the enemies of the Soviet state to carry out subversive work. against the party and the government."

But let's digress a little and return to the memoirs of N.N. Mesyatsev: "Nikolai Nikolayevich was not directly involved in the case of Abakumov, that is, he did not interrogate his former boss through SMERSH, this was done by Zaichikov with the advisory support of Mesyatsev. This case had a severe twist. Mesyatsev went to London to find out if the Kremlin doctors had a connection with

"Joint" - an organization that was suspected of Zionist espionage activities. It was at this time that Stalin decided to get acquainted with the progress of the Abakumov case. He summoned Ignatiev, his deputy Goglidze and Zaichikov to the near dacha. Zaichikov's story about this meeting is given by Months in his book. Stalin made an impression on Vasily Nikiforovich of an old, preoccupied man with slumped shoulders in a shabby uniform and hemmed felt boots. (This was already shortly before the fateful March.) Without any preamble, he began to ask how Abakumov was behaving, what the investigation intended to do in order to extract confessions. In his report on the interrogations of Abakumov, Vasily noted: my impressions are that Abakumov is dragging out the investigation, hoping for something, but I don't know what exactly, they say. Ignatiev advised to take into development the topic of household

cleanliness and offered to look at the album with photographs taken during the house search. Stalin began flipping through the pages, outwardly he was calm, but his hands trembled nervously. And the minister at that time was listing: 350 pairs of various shoes were confiscated, a room was found with shelves filled with cuts of wool, silk, and other fabrics, door handles cast in gold, and the like.

Having not finished reading, Stalin threw away the album and lit a cigarette. After a pause, he muttered: "If you show the album to the workers and tell them that the Soviet minister, the minister of state security, who is called upon to defend their interests, is engaged in money-grubbing, then they, the workers, all of us together, must be dispersed."

And, already turning to Zaichikov, he concluded: "During the interrogation of Abakumov, your knees should not tremble when you mention different people to him, no matter how high they stand. You, Comrade Zaichikov, cannot but guess on whose patronage Abakumov is counting and who controlled the Cheka on behalf of the Central Committee for so long. I do not trust Beria; he surrounded himself with some dark personalities."

We were perplexed," notes Nikolai Nikolaevich, "when the three of us discussed Vasily's story about the meeting with Stalin, why did he say this in front of Goglidze? Apparently, the old lion was already preparing to jump on his "sworn companion".

So, the first paragraph of the indictment: "The confessions of the accused, the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence collected in the case established that for a long time the enemy group of ABAKUMOV-SHVARTSMAN was operating in the MGB of the USSR, which aimed to undermine the state security of the Soviet Union.

The most serious damage to the security of the Soviet state was caused by ABAKUMOV and his accomplices by deliberately smearing (underlined, in the margin the question: "What is this?") signals received by the USSR Ministry of State Security about the terrorist activities of the enemies of the Soviet people against the leaders of the party and government.

Back in 1948, the Ministry of State Security of the USSR received a statement from the doctor TIMASHUK L.F., in which she reported on the use of the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU A.A. Zhdanov of deliberately incorrect methods leading to fatal consequences for the life of the patient.

As established by the investigation, ABAKUMOV did not take any measures to verify this extremely important signal about a direct threat to the life of comrade ZHDANOV.

The arrested VLASIK, the former head of the Main Directorate of Security of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, testified about this during the investigation:

"The statement of the doctor TIMASHUK dated August 29, 1948 I had on August 30 or 31, 1948. I did not read the statement myself, but on the same day, as it was reported to me, I took it to Abakumov. He also did not read it, but kept it with himself and did not give me any instructions on checking the application."

Further, VLASIK showed:



"This extremely important signal, which gave reason even then to suspect the presence of a criminal conspiracy among the doctors who took part in the treatment of A.A. ZHDANOVA, I also did not attach any importance and did nothing to check it.

The investigation further established that ABAKUMOV and VLASIK, having deliberately done nothing to verify TIMASHUK's statement, took all measures to present this statement as not deserving of attention and trust, and the doctor TIMASHUK was sent for reprisal to those exposed at the present time. time to foreign spies-terrorists Egorov, VINOGRADOV, VASILENKO, MAYOROV, whom she accused of wrecking the treatment of comrade ZHDANOV.

The former head of Lechsanupra EGOROV, a member of the spy-terrorist group of doctors arrested by the USSR Ministry of State Security, testified: "There is no doubt that if ABAKUMOV and VLASIK had carried out a due check of TIMASHUK's statement immediately after it was received, then we, the doctors, were guilty of the death of A. A. ZHDANOVA, would have been exposed as early as 1948.

Acting for the benefit of us pest doctors, ABAKUMOV and VLASIK indifferently passed by TIMASHUK's signal, did not organize a verification of her statement and, thus, helped us hide the fact of killing A.A. ZHDANOVA and deal with the unwanted TIMASHUK".

Another member of the terrorist group of doctors, the English spy VINOGRADOV, testified on this issue:

"When the doctor TIMASHUK L.F. tried to expose us in the criminal treatment of A.A. ZHDANOVA, I, EGOROV, VASILENKO and MAYOROV took every measure to cover up the traces of their atrocities. We collectively accused Timashuk of ignorance and dealt with her."

Maliciously smearing the investigation into the statement of TIMASHUK, ABAKUMOV and his accomplices in the subsequent time also

The skies prevented the exposure of a group of poisoning doctors operating in Lechsanupra.

Already at the beginning of 1949, having at its disposal materials on the terrorist statements of ETINGER (the word is written in ink above the word: "to the murderer of Comrade Shcherbakov." In the margins on the left is written: "Not only. More details are needed"), who, as it turned out now, was a participant in A gang of killer doctors, Abakumov, prevented the arrest of this declared enemy of Soviet power for a long time. When ETINGER was arrested and began to testify about the harmful treatment of A.S. Shcherbakov, Abakumov, with the help of his accomplices, the accused Likhachev and Leonov, hid these testimonies from the Central Committee of the CPSU, declared them far-fetched, and smeared and extinguished the ETINGER investigation file, stating that it did not deserve attention and would lead the USSR MGB into the jungle.

The accused LIKHACHEV, setting out the circumstances under which the case of the terrorist ETINGER was extinguished, testified:

"I helped ABAKUMOV to smear and conceal from the Central Committee of the Party the case of the terrorist ETINGER...

ETINGER testified ... that, being a Jewish nationalist, he set out to shorten the life of A.S. Shcherbakov, whom he, as a doctor, treated. ETINGER also showed that A.S. SHERBAKO VU, he was hostile ...

ABAKUMOV asked ETINGER directly: "Did you think all this up in prison?" ETINGER had no choice but to confirm the already prepared answer contained in the question: "Yes, I invented all this in prison," said ETINGER, realizing that he was being given the opportunity to retract his testimony about terror" (entire paragraph crossed out crosswise, and in the margins it is written: "I hid all this from Pr-va").

And (it is crossed out and in the margin it is written: "Likhachev shows") further: "When ETINGER was taken away, ABAKUMOV told me and RYUMIN that ETINGER was showing nonsense, that these testimony should not be recorded in the protocol, since such testimony of ETINGER could lead us into the wilds.

... ABAKUMOV forbade not only to record in the protocol ETINGER's confessions about his involvement in the murder of AS SHCHERBAKOV. and to interrogate in this direction, but in general to draw up protocols of interrogation with ETINGER.

... As a result, ETINGER died in prison (crossed out in ink, and Stalin's handwritten in the margins: "He didn't just" die ", but was killed

Abakumov") and his criminal activities and connections ... remained unexposed."

The accused LEONOV, who was directly involved in the settlement of the ETINGER case, testifying to the role of ABAKUMOV in this crime, stated during the investigation:

"Having familiarized myself with the materials of the case, I decided to find out from ABAKUMOV his point of view on ETINGER's testimony regarding the improper treatment of SHCHERBAKOV.

To this end, at one of the regular reports ... I reminded ABAKUMOV that ETINGER had previously confessed to the wrong treatment of SHCHERBAKOV. ABAKUMOV said about what I said: "This is nonsense. ETINGER's testimony regarding the incorrect treatment of SCHERBAKOV is far-fetched. I summoned him to my office, and during my interrogation he refused these testimonies."

Thus, the materials of the case prove that ABAKUMOV and his accomplice, having blurred the statement of the doctor TIMASHUK in 1948, subsequently consistently jammed and hid from the Central Committee of the CPSU the signals that testified to the existence of a gang of killer doctors in Lechsanupra, saved these monsters from being exposed who for a long time, on the instructions of the imperialist intelligence services, carried out terrorist activities to shorten the lives of active workers in the Soviet state.

The investigation also established other facts of deliberate smearing by ABAKUMOV and his accomplices of investigative cases against especially dangerous state criminals.

Acting as demolitionists, ABAKUMOV and his accomplices LEONOV and KOMAROV ignored (crossed out and written in ink in the margin: "hid the necessary instructions from the investigating authorities") the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU on investigating the connection with foreign intelligence of the enemy of the people KUZNETSOV and participants in his treason - skoy group, operating in the party and Soviet apparatus (the proposal was added by Stalin's hand "in Leningrad").

For criminal purposes, he directed the investigators to consider the case of KUZNETSOV and his like-minded people as a local isolated group with no connection with foreign countries."

On this occasion, the accused KOMAROV testified: "...He (ABAKUMOV) directly pointed out that the case of KUZNETSOV and his enemy group was local and that those arrested in this case did not and could not have espionage connections with foreign countries. ..

... Ultimately, it turned out that I myself did not actively interrogate Kuznetsov about the possible connection of the anti-party group with the zakordon and did not orient the investigators to this.

As a result of the hostile actions of ABAKUMOV, LEONOV, KOMAROV, the espionage activities of the members of the KUZNETSOV group (it was written in ink in the margin: "and their participation in the murder of Comrade Zhdanov") was not investigated, and thus this investigative case was smeared (crossed out, added in ink "hidden". The entire paragraph is underlined on the left and it says: "Not that, you need more details").

The accused ABAKUMOV, together with LEONOV, SHVARTSMAN, LIKHACHEV, KOMAROV, and BROVERMAN, involved in the present case, sabotagely investigated the criminal activities of the arrested American spies and Jewish nationalists, acting under the guise of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. After widespread interrogations of the arrested, during which their espionage activities were not fully clarified, and the question of terror was not investigated at all, the investigation in question was completed and abandoned for a long time.

The accused Likhachev testified:

"We, by the will of ABAKUMOV, reacted criminally to the end of the investigation in the case against the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet state, who operated in the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

...From the materials of the case, I knew that the head of the said organization, MIHOELS and FEFER, traveled to America during the war, where they established criminal links with American intelligence agencies.

...Despite this, while investigating the FEFERA case, I actually did not interrogate him on issues related, perhaps, to the tasks they received from American intelligence on terror against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government."

Concerning his participation in smearing the case of the leaders of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the accused BROVERMAN admitted that, ardently sympathizing with the struggle of Jewish nationalists against Soviet power, he: "correcting the protocol of interrogation of LOZOVSKY, FEFERA and others ... did everything to soften. .. wording in the testimonies of those arrested."

Along with the deliberate cancellation of important investigative cases, ABAKUMOV and his accomplices, guided by enemy motives

deniya, concealed from the Central Committee of the CPSU materials about the terrorist activities of the enemies of the Soviet people.

The accused LIKHACHEV testified: "The hostile activity of the arrested, aimed at committing terrorist acts against the leaders of the Soviet state, was not revealed, and if, contrary to the wishes of ABAKUMOV and LEONOV, the investigators exposed the terrorist criminals, then ABAKUMOV and LEONOV, as well as I, KOMAROV and SHVARTSMAN lubricated such cases."

As established by the investigation, the traitor to the Motherland ABAKUMOV, together with the traitors SHVARTSMAN, LIKHACHEV and LEONOV, deliberately hid from the Central Committee of the CPSU that the members of the Jewish youth organization, which called itself the "Union of Struggle for the Cause of the Revolution" ("SDR"), hatched villainous plans and developed plans to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government.

Particularly active in this crime was the accused SHVARTSMAN, whom ABAKUMOV instructed to correct (underlined, handwritten in ink in the margin: "and correction") the protocols of interrogation of the arrested members of the "SDR" sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Admitting his guilt in this, SHVARTSMAN testified: "... ABAKUMOV ... gave a criminal order to omit testimony about terror from the protocol of interrogation of the arrested SLUTSKOY ...

Motivated by nationalist feelings and sympathy for the enemies of the Soviet regime, I... achieved the exclusion from the interrogation protocol of SLUTSKOY of any mention of terror... in total, in the case of the SDR participants, I compiled four interrogation protocols: SLUTSKOY. FURMAN, GUREVICH and PECHURO. From all these protocols, I excluded testimonies about the terrorist plans of the members of this nationalist organization, although the arrested gave detailed testimonies about this.

Moreover, the accused SHVARTSMAN, this out-of-the-ordinary (the word "bourgeois" is written above) nationalist, having embarked on the path of revenge on the Soviet authorities for the arrest of the leaders of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, himself hatched terrorist plans and took practical steps to commit a terrorist act against Comrade MALENKOV G.M. (last name written in ink).

During interrogation on November 21, 1952, SHVARTSMAN testified about this:

"In 1948, the nationalists operating under the cover of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were defeated. In order to take revenge, I decided to commit a terrorist act against MALENKOV. And further:

"My plan for the terrorist act was as follows: I wrote letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU. At first glance, this was a repentant statement, but in it I, in essence, did not report anything about the crimes I had committed. I expected that on this application I would be personally summoned to the Commission of the Central Committee by MALENKOV and during the reception I would commit a terrorist act using my personal firearms."

Deceiving the party, ABAKUMOV and his accomplices LEONOV and KOMAROV hid from the decision-making bodies (crossed out, written in ink above the text: "Pr-va and the Central Committee of the Party") the testimony of the participants of the arrest in the city. Astrakhan group of terrorists - ABAIMOV, POLYAKOV, GULIN and others (convicted).

In 1950, on the direct instructions of ABAKUMOV and LEONOV, the testimonies of these criminals about terrorist plans against the leader of the Soviet people were excluded from the protocols of interrogations of arrested American intelligence agents GAVRILOV, LAVRENTIEV and others reported to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

In addition to concealing from the Central Committee of the CPSU data on the terrorist activities of the enemies of the Soviet state, the investigation also established other facts of malicious deception of the Party and the Government on the part of ABAKUMOV and his participants.

The accused ABAKUMOV, LEONOV, KOMAROV and LIKHACHEV deceived the party in the case of the major state criminal SALIMANOV by concealing from the Central Committee of the CPSU the course of the investigation into the case and SALIMANOV's testimony about the scope and nature of the information given by him to American intelligence about the top-secret defense operations conducted in the USSR works.

In the information sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1951 about the capture of several American and British spies thrown into the territory of Lithuania and Ukraine, ABAKUMOV, RAYKHMAN and others concealed that the MGB authorities knew about the planned deployment of intelligence officers, but did not take the necessary measures to detain them. at the time of the release, as a result of which some spies managed to escape and establish contact with the nationalist underground.

Earlier, in 1949, the accused ABAKUMOV and RAYKHMAN, after the failure of the operation to catch

A group of British spies led by BERISHVILI hid from the Central Committee of the CPSU the fact of BERISHVILI's unhindered crossing of the Soviet-Turkish border and his departure back to Turkey.

In the same 1949, ABAKUMOV concealed from the Central Committee of the CPSU the failure of the operation to read the mail of the Turkish diplomatic courier FUAT GYUZALTAN and sent deliberately false information to the Central Committee about the reasons for the suicide of this diplomatic courier.

In 1948, ABAKUMOV, deceiving the Central Committee of the CPSU, hid an attempt to escape abroad by an MGB agent, whom the Argentine embassy tried to illegally take out of the Soviet Union, and portrayed his accidental capture as a "combination" allegedly carried out by state security agencies.

The accused ABAKUMOV and his accomplices further hid from the Central Committee the unfavorable situation with the protection of the state border, the facts of its violations with impunity.

Having materials about each case of treason on the part of Soviet citizens on the territory of Germany and Austria, ABAKUMOV did not report these hostile manifestations to the Central Committee. In those cases when the fact of treason to the Motherland could not be hidden, he withheld from the Party and the Government the materials that the MGB had in relation to the traitors before their escape.

In the final memoranda sent periodically to the Central Committee of the CPSU on the Chekist work on the search and arrest of foreign intelligence agents, at the direction of the accused ABAKUMOV, they deliberately cited only positive results of search activities and concealed the fact that the MGB did not catch more than 50 thousand wanted foreign intelligence agents, traitors to the Motherland and other state criminals.

The investigation also revealed a number of other facts of deception of the party by the accused ABAKUMOV, CHERNOV and BROVERMAN, who sent deliberately false information to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Thus, it has been established that the traitor ABAKUMOV and his accomplices, pursuing a line to separate the state security organs from the party, deliberately jammed the signals about the terrorist activities of the members of the enemy underground against the leaders of the party and the Government, systematically deceived the Central Committee of the CPSU, hiding the results of the investigation on the most important cases and numerous failures of serious KGB events

ty. They prevented the Central Committee of the CPSU from revealing in time a conspiratorial group of poisoning doctors who were carrying out the tasks of foreign agents in terrorist activities against the leaders of the Party and the Government, prevented the disclosure of espionage links between the enemy of the people KUZNETSOV and members of his treacherous group with foreign intelligence, and also smeared and extinguished a number of other cases against dangerous state criminals (the entire paragraph on the left is underlined and in the margin it is written: "Not that")."

The second paragraph of the indictment (of the draft dated February 17, 1953) Comrade Stalin carefully studied and crossed out!

In the third paragraph, he made only two minor corrections: "Parties and Governments" and "systematic violations" and, apparently, on the whole he was satisfied. And if so, then you should familiarize yourself with the accusation of Abakumov. It is in this paragraph:

"Based on the foregoing, the following are accused:

1. ABAKUMOV Viktor Semenovich, born in 1908, native of the mountains. Moscow, Russian, former member of the CPSU, former Minister of State Security of the USSR, Colonel General in that,

having betrayed the Motherland, he created an enemy group in the MGB of the USSR with the aim of carrying out subversive work against the Party and the Government;

together with his accomplices, he deliberately blurred the investigation into the statement of doctor Timashuk and extinguished the case of the terrorist Etinger, preventing the Central Committee of the CPSU from exposing in time a group of pest doctors who, on the instructions of imperialist intelligence, carried out terrorist activities to shorten the life of active workers in the Soviet Union;

together with other defendants, he deliberately disrupted the investigation into the connection with foreign intelligence of the treacherous group headed by Kuznetsov and seeking to blow up the party from within and usurp the party leadership;

together with the defendants Shvartsman, Leonov, Likhachev, Komarov and others, deliberately smeared investigation cases against terrorists, Anglo-American spies and other especially dangerous state criminals;

Together with his accomplices, he systematically deceived the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government, concealed the results of the investigation on important cases and criminal failures in the work of the organs of the MGB, fenced off the Chekist apparatus from party organs and took it out of control of the Central Committee of the CP

carried out malicious sabotage along the main lines of Chekist work, and above all in the field of investigation and counterintelligence work to combat the agents of the American and British intelligence services, which made it easier for the enemies of the Soviet people to carry out subversive work against the Party and the Government, that is, in crimes, provided for in Art. 58-1 "6", 58-7 and 58-1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR..."

It is clear that reading this nonsense is very tedious and difficult, but this is exactly the key to understanding what is happening then. Comparing documents with facts, it is difficult not to notice the obvious. Playing by Stalin's rules was difficult, because these rules could change 180 degrees at any moment.

Why am I quoting the first paragraph of the document in such detail? I am doing this with only one purpose, so that the reader himself, as they say, see with his own eyes the kitchen of Stalinist repressions and understand forever: all Stalinist conspiracy trials were a bluff of the dictator and their director. Only in this way did Stalin protect his sole power. Only in this way did he restore order in power according to his understanding!

According to Zaichikov, Stalin "criticized the draft indictment presented to him, mainly because the document unconvincingly showed the causes and process of Abakumov's fall."

"Stalin urged the Chekists to write in the indictment "the whole truth about this, whatever it may be." It is curious that in this conversation, Stalin allegedly laid all the blame on Beria for bringing Abakumov's movement to such a high leadership position. According to Zaichikov, he literally stated the following: "We did not inspire confidence in Abakumov's candidacy. We appointed him at the insistence of Beria. Soon after the appointment, it became clear to the members of the Politburo that Abakumov was out of place. It is because of this attitude to the selection of personnel that I dislike Beria and do not trust him. "

N. Petrov in his book about Ivan Serov writes: "Stalin subjected to serious editing the draft indictment in the Abakumov-Shvartsman case. The general thrust of Stalin's editing was reduced to emphasizing Abakumov's personal guilt, which consisted in the fact that he and his accomplices "ignored the instruction of the Central Committee of the CPSU to investigate links with foreign intelligence of the enemy of the people Kuznetsov." That is, the "espionage" component of the "Leningrad case" was extinguished.

On February 26, 1953, the draft indictment in the case of Abakumov-Shvartsman, revised taking into account Stalin's remarks, was again sent to Stalin and Malenkov. Now, Kochegarov, the former head of the MGB affairs department, has been added to the previous 10 defendants ... Stalin did not have time to consider this project.

After his death in March 1953, Viktor Semenovich was temporarily left alone. Companions of the leader were not up to him. They shared power.

On March 5, Ignatiev was elected secretary of the Central Committee for law enforcement agencies, the MGB was merged with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria became the minister, quite rightly.

A new purge has begun. Already on March 16, Lavrenty Pavlovich ordered the arrest of Ryumin. Abakumov continued to sit. P.A. Sudoplatov recalled: "Abakumov was not released. Beria and Malenkov had a grudge against him. He was accused of falsifying the Zhemchuzhina case. At that time I was not interested in Abakumov, I had my own reasons not to like him, but I learned from Reichman that

Abakumov denied accusations linking him to the Zionist conspiracy, despite Ryumin brutally torturing him. Reichman told me that he behaved like a real man with a strong will.

But Ryumin started having problems. And serious...

"Shortly before Stalin's death, clouds began to gather over Ryumin," says N. Petrov. - In February 1953, a certain citizen P. came to the reception of the First Deputy Minister of State Security Goglidze with a complaint about "Ryumin's unworthy behavior." The story that happened to her is quite typical. In October 1951, her husband was arrested, and a month later, having obtained an audience with Ryumin, she pleaded for him. Ryumin promised to sort it out, but at the same time he began persistently to visit her. Then something happened that is now commonly called sexual harassment. Goglidze promised to put things in motion, and all this was formalized by P.'s official statement of February 24, 1953.

Becoming head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after Stalin's death, Beria immediately became interested in this story. Still would! Such wonderful material against the Stalinist favorite, responsible for the "Mingrelian" and other cases, during which there were persecutions against the people of Beria. Immediately, on March 14, 1953, P. was summoned to an appointment with Beria, and on the same day her story was drawn up in a protocol. She spoke about visit

to her apartment Ryumin | March 1952: "After drinking four stacks of one hundred grams, Ryumin became very drunk, began to pester me, threw me on the couch and tried to take possession of me. Ryumin did not succeed in doing this properly, and he only soiled my linen. After that, he slept with me until 11 am." Ryumin also visited me for the second time - on March 22, 1952: "... Ryumin came to me in a new suit, and when I paid attention to this, he began to flirt, grimace and ask my opinion whether the suit suits him, well whether it is sewn, etc."

On March 17, 1953, Ryumin was arrested, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under the leadership of Beria, was preparing the rehabilitation of the arrested doctors. It was presented on an all-Union scale. In April 1953, in the editorial of the Pravda newspaper dedicated to this event, of course, the main organizer of the case, Stalin, was not named, but Ryumin, who was responsible for the fabrication of the case, was called a "contemptible adventurer", and Ignatiev "political blindness with a mouthful". Ryumin was actively interrogated at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and especially biased about the former minister Ignatiev. Beria was not satisfied that he was only expelled from the Central Committee of the CPSU. He really wanted to see Ignatiev in prison."

And what about Viktor Semenovich? Many have tried to break it since 1951 for more than three years, but no one succeeded. He behaved in such a way that he commanded respect even among ardent enemies. However, the living Abakumov no longer needed anyone: neither one nor the other.

When Gennady Afanasyevich Terekhov summoned him and let him read a newspaper with a message about Beria's exposure, Viktor Semyonovich read it in silence and, "without flinching an eyebrow, turned over the sheet and began to read about sports."

To the same Terekhov, he somehow confidently said:

"Your eyes are too beautiful, I'm sorry to shoot you!"

At the next interrogation, where Abakumov's former subordinate was present, Viktor Semenovich could not resist and asked him:

- How could you admit that the investigation into the case of Beria was conducted by the prosecutor's office?

And to the unintelligible answer of the MGB officer he said:

"Do you believe that I, the Minister of State Security, will be tried?! Yes! Then put on the top hat, there are no more organs!

E. Zhirnov writes:

"In prison, even to his own detriment, he continued to behave as before - rudely and straightforwardly. They say that. When the new Prosecutor General of the USSR Rudenko came to interrogate him, Abakumov asked: "Well, has Nikita now become our most important person?" - "How do you know?" Rudenko was amazed. "Well, who, besides him, will appoint you, asshole, as the Attorney General?"

Rudenko asked Viktor Semenovich about his relationship with Beria. Abakumov was adamant:

- I have never been to the apartment and to the dacha with Beria. Our relations were purely official, official and nothing else.

But all the same, the Prosecutor General will call him a member of the Beria gang.

After the death of the leader, little has changed ...

"Beria and Malenkov decided to put an end to Abakumov," writes P.A. Sudoplatov. - At a meeting in his office, Beria officially announced that although Abakumov's conspiracy charges were unfounded, he still remains under investigation for squandering government funds, abuse of power and, more seriously, for falsifying a case against the former leadership Ministry of Aviation Industry, Air Force Command, against Polina Zhemchuzhina, for the murder of Mikhoels.

But an unexpected turn of history rescued Abakumov this time too: on June 26, 1953, L.P. was arrested. Beria (December 23, 1953. Beria, Kobulov, Merkulov, Dekanozov, Meshik, Vlodzimirsky, Goglidze were shot).

On August 3, Abakumov is transferred to the Lefortovo prison. There he literally dies: "According to the certificate of the head of the medical unit of the Lefortovo prison of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, lieutenant colonel of the medical service Comrade Yanshin, the arrested person No. arrested No. 15 in the conditions of the Lefortovo prison progressively worsens

his condition.

In this regard... arrested No. 15 was transferred to the Internal Prison of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

And about. Head of the Investigation Department for Particularly Important

Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - Lieutenant Colonel Kozyrev

September 26, 1953".

This same Kozyrev asks Colonel-General Serov, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, to allow arrested No. 15 to use the prison stall and still give him writing paper. The enemy of Viktor Semenovich categorically refuses the paper, and the stall allows, stipulating in the resolution that he finds it possible to spend no more than 150 "old" rubles for this purpose per month.

In the Inner Prison of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Abakumov buys eggs for himself, and borrows books from the library.

P.A. Sudoplatov: "In 1990, I was called as a witness when his case was checked by the military prosecutor's office; I changed my mind about him, because whatever crimes he committed, he paid the price in full in prison. He had to endure incredible suffering (he spent three months in a refrigerator in shackles), but he found the strength not to submit to the executioners. He fought for his life, categorically denying the "conspiracy of doctors". Thanks to his firmness and courage in March and April 1953, it became possible to release all those arrested,



involved in the so-called conspiracy, since it was Abakumov who was charged with being their leader."

It is never possible to get used to the captivity of prison, and even more so of solitary confinement. And even more so for such a strong man as Viktor Semyonovich. But over time, he still ceased to go blind with rage. Tired.

He was waiting for the trial and hoped for its objectivity. No, he was not stupid and naive and thought that all the documents, as well as the established facts, would testify in his favor. There was a certain logic in this.

At one time, Abakumov was served by the smallest guard, and yet the number of guards No. 2 assigned to Soviet leaders reflected their status. If 120 people were assigned to Molotov, about a hundred to Beria, from seventy-five to a hundred to Bulganin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, about 20 to Marshal Zhukov, then Viktor Semenovich had even less.

Paradoxically, despite this fact, Abakumov knew much more than all of them put together. In this he was dangerous to absolutely everyone. And the worst thing is that he headed the MGB for too long.

Stalin never had favorites, and especially could not have them in such an important, in his understanding, political position.

At one time, the leader removed Yagoda, removed Yezhov, and only Beria was pushed away from the NKVD, because he appreciated his organizational talent. But the time has come for Abakumov. At some point it had to come. It was just a suggestion. It turned out to be Ryumin.

The "doctors' case" was a good reason to eliminate Abakumov by proxy. But he was the only one who did not have political ambitions. His task was to lead the department, which dealt with the most important matters for Stalin's policy. And the main thread in its implementation was considered to know as much as possible about everyone. At the same time, despite the enormous powers, despite the fact that he did what he wanted in his department, Viktor Semenovich did not make decisions alone. The policy of the state, both inside and outside it, was decided by order of Stalin himself.

Among other things, Abakumov guarded the approaches to it, controlling a lot, a lot. Viktor Semenovich was distinguished by special caution, and if he had a conflict, he did it with the knowledge of the chief or with his tacit consent.

However, in the "doctors' case", he showed a "criminal" initiative by Stalin's standards, which overwhelmed the latter's patience. By concealing the facts in Etinger's testimony knocked out by Ryumin, Viktor Semenovich hastened the end of his impetuous career. The sick and aging Iosif Vissarionovich, who was afraid of poisoning and did not trust anyone, even from those who faithfully served him for many years, could not understand why Abakumov allowed himself such amateur performance.

"The arrest of Beria, yesterday a powerful leader, caused confusion in the minds," says N. Petrov. - Although the case of Beria for a while pushed Ryumin into the shadows, the investigation went on. On September 12, 1953, the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent Malenkov and Khrushchev a memorandum on the completion of the investigation of the Ryumin case with a proposal to sentence him to 25 years in prison. For some reason, the Kremlin decided to delay, and by the spring of 1954 it was time to take the case to court, and now it was decided to shoot Ryumin.

At the trial of the Military Collegium, which took place from July 2 to July 7, 1954, Ryumin retracted his testimony given during the preliminary investigation, stated that he himself had been subjected to "unbearable torture", was kept for about 40 days in a punishment cell, and all his testimony was under investigation. His statements were distorted. In his defense, he presented to the court two

the simplest petitions, in which he demanded to re-perform a series of investigative actions. The court rejected them, but they were attached to Ryumin's petition for pardon.

What did Ryumin hope for when he spoke about the possible reclassification by the court of Article 58-7 imputed to him (sabotage) to Article 193.17 "a" (abuse of power or criminal negligence)? Yes, very simple. For exceeding power, he would receive a maximum of 10 years. In this case, his term would be subject to halving (under the amnesty declared on March 27, 1953), that is, up to 5 years, and with this term, all under the same amnesty, they would be released. The amnesty did not apply to Article 58, so Ryumin was right, in this case they would definitely be shot. And so it happened - on July 7, a death sentence was passed, on July 19, a petition for pardon was rejected, and on July 22, 1954, at 21.05, Ryumin was shot. His body was cremated the same day at ten o'clock in the evening. The ashes were buried in a grave for "unclaimed ashes" at the Donskoy cemetery..."

Abakumov's turn will soon come...

Viktor Semenovich waited a long time for the trial. And when I waited, it became easier. Under Stalin, he spent one year and eight months. The "doctors' case" dragged on, and only the death of the leader gave him more than a year of life. Today we can say with certainty that if Stalin had lived longer, Abakumov's fate would have been decided in 1953...

Beria's arrest extended Viktor Semenovich's life for another month, and then Khrushchev's struggle for power in the Kremlin saved him. This also played a positive role. As they say, the cards fell like that. In a word, after the death of the leader, Abakumov spent another year and nine months ...

It was hard to forget that day when, on July 12, 1951, a black car drove up to the special prison. The doors opened and the Deputy Minister of State Security S.A. came out. Goglidze, Head of the Main Directorate of Border Troops of the MGB N.P. Stakhanov, two employees of the military prosecutor's office and lightly dressed V.S. Abakumov. Kleymenov was already waiting for the arrivals. How the oldest Goglidze addressed him as the head of the prison first, pointing to Ab

Kumova: Do you know this person?

"That's right, I know.

"Then accept him as a prisoner.

Years passed... On December 14, 1954, an open court session of the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR began.

This action took place in the House of Officers of the Leningrad Military District, in the same place where the "Leningraders" were judged. Apparently, having a good knowledge of the Soviet judicial system, Viktor Semenovich refused the services of a lawyer, and at the same time behaved in court with great dignity. In response to the question of the court whether he pleads guilty, the former minister said: "I do not plead guilty. This is a provocative case, fabricated by Beria, Kobulov and Ryumin."

K.A. Stolyarov in his book "Golgotha" writes:

"During the trial, Abakumov made the following motions:

- to attach to the case his memorandums to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, concerning all issues of the case under consideration;

- attach to the case the decision of the directive bodies on the investigation of the criminal activities of Kuznetsov, Voznesensky, Popkov and others;

- attach to the case the orders and directives issued by him, aimed at eliminating the shortcomings that existed in the work of the investigative apparatus of the USSR Ministry of State Security;

— to attach to the case the decision of the decision-making bodies on the concealment by Merkulov of some materials in the case of the “aviators”;

— to attach to the case the protocol on the completion of the investigation, signed in January 1953, vol. Ilyichev and Kitaev;

— to summon to court as a witness the former First Deputy Minister of State Security S.M. Ogoltsov, who directly oversaw the investigative unit for special important matters;

— to consider at the court session the facts of applying measures of physical coercion to him during the preliminary investigation;

- to record in the minutes of the court session that during the investigation he was not allowed to write statements to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Substantiating these petitions, Abakumov was convinced that without them the court could not establish the objectivity of the decisions taken.

It was about fulfilling the orders of the leaders of the party and the state, implementing the decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, or about the minister's own initiative.

As expected, the public prosecutor R.A. Rudenko said to this: “I believe that most of the petitions filed by the defendant Abakumov are unfounded and cannot be satisfied.” This means that the issue of Abakumov was resolved long before the trial in the Kremlin.

ON THE. Chernov recalled: “They announced to me that the trial would take place in Leningrad only in December, before the departure. They took me there in an ordinary train, in a docked car, without handcuffs, as if I were not arrested, but sent on a business trip. As the train started, Talanov, the new head of the Inner Prison, who was responsible for our delivery, looked into the compartment and politely asked: “Chernov, how are you doing?” “Great,” I reply. “Why don't you give wine to the path?” Talanov cheered up and said: “When we bring it back, we will definitely give it!”

We were judged in the district House of Officers. I had not met my lawyer before, we met right in the court session. Why he was needed, I still do not understand. We didn't talk about anything with him, only once I asked in a whisper: “The court is going on, but not a word about me - they don't interrogate and hardly mention it?” And he replied: “Very good. Sit down and shut up.”

When it was my turn to speak at the trial, I retracted the testimony knocked out of me during the preliminary investigation, and firmly stated that I did not correct the “generalized” protocols of the “aviators” - such work was entrusted only to the masters of this case. “Who do you consider masters?” asked Rudenko, supporting the accusation. “The foreman was Shvartsman, and the foreman was Broverman,” I said without hesitation...

At the trial, Broverman denounced everyone, especially me, while Abakumov behaved with great dignity. I won't say about others, I don't remember, I wasn't up to it - I was waiting for how everything would turn out. And when Rudenko demanded twenty-five years in prison for me, it was then that I realized what kind of benefactors I was dealing with. In the last word, I denied my guilt before the Soviet authorities, and they gave me fifteen years, but not in prison, but in camps. Broverman grabbed a quarter, and the rest were shot. Abakumov, I remember, not a single vein in his face trembled, as if it were not about him ... "

At the open court session of the field session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the following were present: the presiding officer, Lieutenant General of Justice E.L. Zeidin, members - Major General of Justice V.V. Syuldin and Colonel of Justice V.V. Borisoglebsky, secretaries - Captains of Justice M.V. Afanasiev, L.M. Gorbunov and N.M. Polyakov, with the participation of the public prosecutor — the Prosecutor General of the USSR, a real state adviser

Justice R.A. Rudenko and defense - members of the Moscow City Bar Association L.I. Grineva, M.V. Stepanova, M.I. Rogov and L.V. Pavlova.

In the dock were Abakumov, Leonov, Likhachev, Komarov, Chernov and Broverman. Shvartsman acted as a witness - the materials about the criminal acts committed by him were separated into a separate proceeding and he was convicted later...

In his defense, Viktor Semenovich said the following: "I declare that the present case against me was fabricated. I was taken into custody as a result of the intrigues of Beria and the false denunciation of Ryumin, I have been in prison for three years, in the most difficult conditions. They beat me up. The administration does not give me papers. A wife with a small child is kept in prison. My accusation began to be falsified by Ryumin, who accused me of the gravest crimes and reached the point of absurdity, recognizing me as the leader of a Jewish counter-revolutionary organization. Some accusations about my relationship stopped, others appeared. All shortcomings in the organs of the Cheka, accumulated over a long period, are imputed to me as crimes. I didn't do anything myself. The Central Committee gave instructions, and I carried them out. The public prosecutor scolds me, on the one hand, for the excesses I have committed, and on the other, for my mistakes and blurring. Where is the logic here?

Victor Semenovich, having a four-year education, was quite self-educated, distinguished by intelligence and quick wits. But he could not understand in any way: what was his fault? The government's accusations were indeed groundless. But that was precisely what the Soviet system of lawlessness consisted of, that V.S. Abakumov had been in prison for more than three years, which means he could not be innocent. The former almighty minister did not understand that the same mechanism was applied to him, which worked smoothly both before him and under him, and now after him. Where the purely thieves principle acted: "Die you now

today, and I tomorrow!

AND THE VICTIMS AND THE EXECUTIONER

Viktor Semenovich Abakumov was shot in Leningrad on December 19, 1954, one hour and fifteen minutes after the verdict was passed. He was not even given the opportunity to ask for pardon. |

Forty-six years and a lifetime!

"I'll write everything to the Politburo," was all Abakumov managed to say before the bullet hit him in the head...

In June 1953, General Serov returned from Leningrad to Moscow, just a few days before Beria's arrest. Immediately, without hesitation, he, together with General Bogdanov, went over to the side of the participants in the conspiracy against Lavrenty Pavlovich. Thus, the historical events of the summer of 1953 completely changed the fate of Serov, and many other participants in the conspiracy. But that is another story. The main thing is that it is the last one who will win the long-term duel between Abakumov and Serov. How can you forget the words from Serov's letter to Stalin: "After all, there are no official relations between the bodies of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs that are necessary for the good of the cause. There has never been such a hostile period in the history of organs."

Now it's over or almost over...

They say, when dying, a person involuntarily turns to fragments of his memory...

But in the case of Viktor Semenovich, everything was much simpler. He was simply not given that opportunity before his death. He didn't even have a moment...

"The trial of the Military Collegium in the Shvartsman case was held in Moscow from March 1 to March 3, 1955 behind closed doors," says N. Petrov. - He was charged under articles 58-1 "6" (treason), 58-7 (sabotage), 58-8 (terror), 58-11 (action as part of a group of persons) of the Criminal Code

RSFSR. The preamble of the March 3 verdict is, of course, a typical Stalinist burp: "Defendant Shvartsman, having been brought up in the spirit of Zionism, being a bourgeois nationalist in his outlook, found himself at work in the state security organs of the USSR, changed and became carry out subversive, hostile activities against the socialist state."

But nevertheless, at the trial, there were numerous testimonies of witnesses about how Shvartsman, during the investigation, beat the arrested with a rubber truncheon...

As noted in the verdict: "As a result of Shvartsman's sabotage activities, innocent honest Soviet people were exterminated." The verdict was expected - execution.

It is not clear what was going on in Schwartzman's head. His petition for clemency dated March 3, 1955, makes a strange impression. On the one hand, he admitted that he carried out the "criminal instructions" of Kobulov and Abakumov, used "illegal methods" of conducting the investigation, on the other hand, he denied that he was a "traitor to the Motherland" and a "terrorist" and asked for pardon. Quite reasonable! But the paragraph following this is amazing and plunges into the twilight of consciousness: "I ask, however, if the sentence is not canceled, shoot me with shots from a firearm with five explosive bullets, otherwise I will not die from one bullet, nor from two or three, especially ordinary ones, I will continue to live and suffer, and I am completely physically ill, and I can no longer endure the torment and pain."

In general, it turned out both sad and funny, almost according to Zoshchenko: "I really can hardly endure the highest measure," said the hero of the story "Hurry Business", a NEP man who was very frightened of the death penalty. Shvartsman was shot on May 13, 1955, after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR rejected his petition for pardon. Probably five, and even explosive bullets were not needed. The body was sent to the crematorium at the Donskoy cemetery. It just so happened: the executioners go there, to their victims."

well zhu

As Chekist Ilyin recalled, Abakumov grew up thanks to his cruelty. In his own words, Viktor Semyonovich was ignorant, uneducated, a foul-mouthed man, a womanizer and a foxtrot.

Another Chekist, Schrader, called him a mediocre operative, a foxtrot and an unprincipled person. At the same time, a capable and growing falsifier and executioner. Chekist Fedoseev noted that due to the lack of a systematic education, Abakumov lacked analytical abilities and limped his memory.

Well, is that why, before the "Great Terror", Viktor Semenovich did not attract the attention of his superiors in any way. He did nothing and achieved nothing. And only in 1937-1938 fortune unexpectedly smiled at him. Only then did he go up the hill. And

sharp enough. What did it take for this mediocre operative? Of course, healthy fists, sadistic abilities and, probably, proletarian ingenuity. It was then that he turned out to be in demand by Beria and Kobulov as an indispensable person in the Chekist cause. This is exactly how Viktor Semenovich came after the posts of head of the NKVD department and deputy people's commissar of internal affairs in the Department of Special Departments.

According to historians, the activities of SMERSH, which was led and directed by Viktor Semenovich, "exceeded all Stalin's expectations."

Indeed, Abakumov came up with the idea of conducting active work behind the front, infiltrating the enemy's intelligence schools, recruiting fascist agents and sending them back behind the front line behind enemy lines. The success of radio games to disinform the enemy, which Abakumov introduced in 1942, is also undeniable.

Historians of the special services claim that "it was they who helped break the blockade of Leningrad, organize a counteroffensive near Stalingrad, intercept and destroy enemy heavy transport aircraft."

Today, even despite democratic times, it is impossible to deny the fact of the successful work of military counterintelligence during the war, which literally saved the Red Army from collapse and panic in the very first and harsh years.

The cruel mechanism of repression, in fact, prevented the more serious consequences of the catastrophe of 41st. And this, too, was the undoubted merit of Abakumov.

But there was something else — repressions, justified by the policy of the state and its leader, but not justified by any legal and universal norms. Abakumov's participation in them as the head of the SMERSH GUKR, as the Minister of State Security, is also undoubted.

Is Viktor Semenovich guilty of this?

In a review of investigative practices compiled for Stalin in July 1947, Minister of State Security Abakumov reported that in relation to "enemies of the Soviet people" who did not want to confess, the MGB bodies, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 10, 1939, "apply measures of physical influence.

For example, on March 23, 1950, the same V.S. Abakumov submitted to Stalin a list (a list of people sentenced to death) for

85 people. They were to be judged by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in the premises of the Lefortovo prison. Future defendants were deprived of the right to appeal the verdict and file a petition for pardon. In fact, such a judicial procedure was in line with the Law of December 1, 1934, although this law was not directly mentioned in the minister's letter. This list, among others, included the names of those arrested in the "Leningrad case" and in the "case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC)". This time, Abakumov's initiative did not find support from Stalin: he had other plans regarding the Leningrad leaders and workers of the JAC — to organize special trials against them, and not to try "each accused individually," as Abakumov suggested. As for the condemnation procedure itself, it did not arouse objections from Stalin. When, on April 11, 1950, Abakumov submitted for approval an amended list (now for 35 people), from which the accused in the Leningrad case and the JAC case were excluded, Stalin immediately approved it. All those named in this second list were convicted and shot in April 1950, and the defendants in the "Leningrad case" and the "EAK case" were respectively convicted in closed trials in October 1950 and August 1952.

I think even these two examples are enough to say yes!

And yet, on the one hand, Viktor Semenovich could well be mistaken and believe that he was doing the right thing, but he could also realize that he was doing an evil, criminal deed.

Then let's think a little and ask ourselves: did he have a choice?

K.A. Stolyarov, for example, believes that "Abakumov acted under conditions of extreme necessity and carried out the will of Stalin." And I can also agree with this statement. However, the truth is on a completely different plane. It was necessary to be born and live at that time, it was necessary to go through the path that Viktor Semenovich went, both before serving in the organs and during it, in order to understand the psychology of the time in which he lived. To realize what he did and did. I think that it is impossible to judge a person of that era by the standards of today. This is fundamentally wrong. There should be other evaluation criteria here. But this is my personal opinion.

"No just goals and intentions," wrote D.A. Volkogonov, cannot justify the immoral means which

are not only a moral evil in their nature, but also a social evil in their consequences.

From a philosophical point of view, this is true.

But from a legal point of view, Abakumov quite legally carried out all the orders of his boss, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, about the criminality of which he hardly thought.

Then there was its own ideology, the principles of which were formulated by the Bolsheviks in the distant seventeenth. Has anyone challenged them?

According to D.A. Volkogonov, "it is always easier to judge the past than the present. Enriched with the experience of a long journey, we know perhaps more than those who lived at that time. Rightly placing one person at the epicenter of the historical guilt, we must not forget at the same time that this person could be there thanks to the system of relations that ultimately created by many.

Deciding the fate of thousands and millions, the leader became an outstanding political director. Why became? Because it took him a while. In repressions, he pursued his line of legality, in which they served as a justification for the actions of his government. Destroying the ungrateful, talkative, presumptuous, insolent, unreliable (according to his personal understanding), etc. etc., he didn't want to explain the truth to anyone. And in this he was helped by a "brilliant" falsification, in which they believed unconditionally. Many believed. And who did not believe - was doomed.

Over time, the mechanism of work of state security agencies improved. Wiretapping also gave extremely significant results for weaving conspiracies. Ordinary chatter in the kitchen with foul language against the leader became a very significant compromising evidence, which, signed by Abakumov, was reported personally to Stalin. And then the decision was made leader.

"No one can avoid comparing the Gestapo and the MGB: the years and methods coincide too much," writes A.I. Solzhenitsyn in "Archipelago". - Even more natural compared those who themselves went through both the Gestapo and the MGB, like Yevgeny Ivanovich Divnich, an emigrant. The Gestapo accused him of communist activities among the Russian workers in Germany, the MGB - in connection with the world bourgeoisie. Divnich did not draw a conclusion in favor of the MGB: they tortured him both there and here, but the Gestapo still sought the truth, and when the charge was dropped, Divnich was released. The MGB, on the other hand, did not seek the truth and had no intention of letting anyone taken out of its clutches.

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The arrest, by the standards of the security agencies of those years, was already the "moment of truth". The paradox was that the investigation and the court could not change the fate of the arrested person. These templates have been used in the security agencies for decades. They were not looking for the truth!

A person was arrested, already having some kind of "compromising evidence" on him, and then the falsification technique went on.

Such was the system created by the Soviet government, which periodically rotated the flywheel of the meat grinder. Therefore, it is impossible to assess the personality of Abakumov without taking into account Soviet lawlessness.

YES. Volkogonov discovered a top secret document in the archives, which was signed by Abakumov. It was about an American citizen who was accused of espionage. For this he spent eight years. The term ended, and the US Embassy announced that it was ready to return him to his homeland. However, the Minister of State Security reported to Stalin: "We must not let them out. He spent so many years in our camps, he saw so much. It must be liquidated." The leader wrote: "I agree," and the foreigner was destroyed.

But in this particular case, Viktor Semenovich was convinced that he was right...

As a result of the analysis, D.A. Volkogonov called Stalin a political figure through and through. "This person looked at the whole world around him through the prism of his political interests, political priorities, political delusions. Stalin considered it possible to achieve an "earthly paradise" at the cost of incredible suffering and sacrifice of millions of people. In fact, Stalin's policy proceeded from the premise that all previous history was only a preparation for "true" history. They say that the bliss of those distant, future generations that will reach the promised land justifies the torment and bitterness of being of all people who have passed the Earth before and live today. Stalin was ready to sacrifice the past and present of the people in the name of an ephemeral future. But, as Berdyaev rightly said, the past is illusory because it no longer exists, and the future is illusory because it does not yet exist. Stalin could never bridge the gap between the past and the future in politics, believing that today is only "prehistory".

Stalin, recklessly rushing time... was ready to exterminate millions of people in order to "fulfill ahead of schedule" the collectivization plan, considered it natural to plunge thousands of his own into oblivion.

party comrades in order to achieve complete unanimity in the "shortest time". Stalin seemed to believe in absolutes, in his ability to "make happy" millions of future fellow citizens through countless crimes today. His policy of "creating the future", no matter how good intentions it may camouflage, is simply criminal. In order to realize it, Stalin considered it permissible even today to dispose of the future of millions of his fellow citizens.

What then was Comrade Stalin's Minister of State Security supposed to be like?

Correct, relevant. Moreover, fulfilling all his instructions and orders. In a word, a faithful squire and soldier. Viktor Semenovitch was just that. But he, like Yagoda and Yezhov, failed not to slip on this very loyalty.

One of the points of the historical verdict to Stalin D.A. Volkogonov calls the criminal neglect of morality. In his opinion, Stalin was able to deform many great ideas and replace them with his own myths. In particular, he writes: "The dictator has committed a crime against thought. With his whole life and deeds, Stalin proved that lies are a universal evil. All troubles begin with a lie. Violence, autocracy, bureaucracy, dogmatism, Caesarism - everything was illuminated by lies. All this is so. Moreover, all Stalin's crimes involved people who often realized that they were doing evil. Did Abakumov understand this? I think in some cases, yes, I understood. And he, like most of the cogs of that Stalinist totalitarian mechanism, almost never tried to use his chance of conscience.

Thus, Viktor Semenovitch is both a victim and an executioner!

A victim because he suffered from the regime he served.

The executioner, because he was both a tormentor and an oppressor. How else?

On July 28, 1994, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation considered in a court session the criminal case against Abakumov and others. Guided by Article 8 of the Law of the RSFSR "On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions" and Art. 377-381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, the Military Collegium determined: the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of December 19, 1954 in relation to Abakumov, Likhachev, Komarov and Broverman

thread, reclassifying the actions of the convicts to article 193-17 p. "b" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (as amended in 1926) and leaving them the previous penalties.

A few years later, the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia again filed a protest against the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of December 19, 1954 in the case of Abakumov and others.

As a result, on December 17, 1997, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, guided by paragraph 5 of Art. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, decided: to determine Abakumov V.S., Leonov A.G., Likhachev M.T. and Komarov V.I. punishment in the form of 25 years of imprisonment in corrective labor



camps to everyone, excluding in relation to all convicts an additional measure of punishment in the form of confiscation of property.

Reading all these revisions, one never ceases to wonder how it is possible to qualify the same crimes each time in a new way. After all, the current Russian justice at the same time relied on the very articles of the Criminal Code that were in force then. But that's a topic for another book.

APPS

FROM V.S. Abakumova I.V. TO STALIN IN CONNECTION WITH INVESTIGATOR RYUMIN'S STATEMENT

July 5, 1951

Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Comrade STALIN I.V.

In connection with the application filed in your name by Comrade. Ryumin I give you my explanation.

For the first time, the question of the need to arrest Etinger was raised before the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 18, 1950 No. 6669/A. This document reported that Etinger was anti-Soviet, a Jewish nationalist, and repeatedly made hostile attacks against the leader, which was recorded by operational technology. No arrest warrant was received at that time.

In November 1950, on the 16th, under No. 7278 / A, I again sent a note to the city. Sochi with a request to allow the arrest of Etinger. Comrade Poskrebyshhev A.N. he called me and told me that he looked at this note and it was sent to Moscow to Comrade N.A. Bulganin, from whom you will receive the appropriate instructions. The next morning, Comrade N.A. Bulganin called me, said that he had received a letter regarding Etinger, and asked what to do? I answered him that Etinger was a big bastard and he should be arrested, after which Comrade Bulganin N.A. agreed to the arrest, and on November 18, Etinger of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR was arrested.

After Etinger's arrest, I interrogated him in the presence of the head of the 2nd Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, comrade. Shubnyakova F.G. and deputy the head of the department of this Directorate, comrade. Tangieva N.A., who were preparing the arrest of Etinger.

After I remembered that this interrogation was attended by comrade. Tov. Shubnyakov and Tangiev, I asked them about this on July 5th. They

confirm that they were indeed present when I interrogated Etinger.

During the interrogation, I demanded that Etinger tell the truth about his guilt. He denied and stated that he was not guilty and was arrested in vain. I continued to demand that he tell about his crimes, and then Etinger said that he was trustworthy, he treated the deputy. Minister of State Security Selivanovsky and was even invited for consultations together with Professor Vinogradov to the sick comrade. Shcherbakov A.S.

In connection with this, I, somewhat vulgarly, told Etinger that he should tell about his guilt and in this case, how he killed Shcherbakov. To this, Etinger stated that he was not guilty of anything here, because Shcherbakov A.S. was an extremely sick person, and Etinger then began to explain what the seriousness of Shcherbakov's illness was. and that Professor Vinogradov was his primary physician.

Why did I raise this question during the interrogation of Etinger? I knew from intelligence reports and from some employees, whom I don't remember exactly, that many Jewish nationalists believed that, allegedly, on the instructions of Shcherbakov A.S. Jews were removed from the most important departments. Having it in

mind, as well as the fact that the arrested Etinger was himself a Jewish nationalist and that he visited Shcherbakov A.S. as a doctor, I considered it necessary to ask him this question, wanting to find out if Etinger was involved in any evil intentional actions in relation to Shcherbakov A.S., although I did not have any data that would confirm this.

I then asked if Etinger knew who was interrogating him. When he replied that he did not know, I said that the Minister of State Security was interrogating him and that he had the opportunity to start telling the truth about everything he was guilty of - that would be better for him. Etinger continued to deny it, and I, as I remember, told him to go to the cell, think about it, and when you are called in for interrogation, tell me everything.

One of the senior investigators, Comrade Ryumin, was entrusted to conduct the interrogation of Etinger in the Investigative Unit on especially important cases, to whom the 2nd Main Directorate transferred the development and other available materials on Etinger and was obliged, according to the procedures existing in the MGB, to orient the investigator about all

features of this case.

A few days later, Deputy Head of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases, comrade Likhachev reported to me that the arrested Etinger was beginning to talk about his anti-Soviet nationalist sentiments. At the same time Comrade. Likhachev, as far as I remember, said that Etinger was not clear enough, but he said that he could have treated comrade better. Shcherbakova A.S., after which I suggested comrade. Likhacheva, together with senior investigator Ryumin, bring Etinger to me for interrogation.

During the interrogation, Etinger really began to tell me, although not clearly enough, confusingly, that he had anti-Soviet nationalist sentiments, that he declared among his close circle about the oppression of Jews existing in the USSR and expressed his intention to leave for Palestine. After that, I demanded that Etinger tell how he criminally treated comrade Shcherbakov A.S. Etinger, in response, stated that he could not say anything special on this issue and that in general about Shcherbakov A.S. he began to say something because he was being asked to testify about it during the investigation. I asked him again - speak directly, specifically and give facts about how you treated Shcherbakov A.S. incorrectly. Etinger, again, as at the first interrogation, stated that Shcherbakova A.S. Professor Vinogradov constantly treated, and he was invited only periodically, together with Vinogradov.

I demanded from Etinger that he repeat the testimony he had previously given to senior investigator Ryumin. As Etinger stated, he told the investigator that he could insist that Shcherbakov A.S. had more peace, but in fact Shcherbakov A.S. had such peace. True, said Etinger, Shcherbakov A.S. was not a very obedient patient. At the same time, Etinger gave an example when on May 9, 1945, on Victory Day, Shcherbakov A.S. left the house and the doctors only found out about it later.

Further, Etinger said that he told the investigator about the drug, which was allegedly incorrectly used in the treatment of Shcherbakov A.S. In fact, as Etinger argued, this drug could not do any harm. Then Etinger again began to explain to me the seriousness of A.S. Shcherbakov's illness, stating that he was hopelessly ill and this was confirmed later (as I understood, Etinger meant the results of the autopsy).

After that, I told Etinger - don't invent or twist, but tell the truth, how you criminally treated Shcherbakov

A.S. However, despite my insistence, Etinger said nothing new at the time.

Thus, Etinger, both at the first and at the second interrogation, did not say anything concrete, did not give any arguments and facts, and Etinger explained what he told during the interrogation of the investigator Ryumin regarding the treatment of Shcherbakov A.S. that he was required to testify in this regard. From the behavior of Etinger during my interrogation, I understood that confused and unclear

the evidence he gave Comrade. Ryumin, appeared as a result of the fact that at the first interrogation I myself asked Etinger a question about this, and the investigator, obviously, asked him directly. From all this, I internally came to the conclusion that my assumptions about any malicious actions of Etinger in relation to Shcherbakov A.S. were not justified.

Despite this, after the interrogation of Etinger, I instructed Comrade. Likhachev - deputy. Head of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases (I don't remember if Comrade Ryumin was present at the same time) - to continue to intensively interrogate Etinger in order to reveal in detail his criminal activities and enemy connections, at the same time try to reveal anything significant regarding improper treatment of Comrade. Shcherbakova A.S. At the same time, I pointed out that the interrogation of Etinger should be carried out carefully, thoughtfully, so that Etinger would show the truth and betray his criminal connections, but would not be able to lead the investigation in the wrong direction, and perhaps I said: "lead into the wilds."

That's how it all happened, as far as I remember. Subsequently, I reported that Etinger did not give anything significant during interrogations, that he continued to have heart attacks, of which there were more than 20 in total, and that his death occurred immediately after returning from another interrogation from Comrade. Ryumin.

Now, regarding Comrade Ryumin's statement that I allegedly hinted to Etinger that he should retract his testimony. This was not and could not be. It is not true. If there were any specific facts that would make it possible to catch on, we would have skinned Etinger, but we would not have missed this case, especially since I myself, at the very first interrogation, raised a question with Etinger regarding the treatment of Comrade Shcherbakov A.S. However, I repeat, Etinger did not provide any facts or arguments; moreover, he stated that he began to say something on this issue only because he was pressed and demanded, while in reality there were no criminal actions in the course of treatment. Shcherbakova A.S. he did not allow.

As for the fact that I insistently tried to get Etinger to present concrete facts and arguments, I think I did the right thing as a minister.

I had to know the truth, since it was impossible to rely on his obscure and obscure testimony on such a serious issue.

Not having verified and, in fact, not having any data indicating the malicious actions of Etinger in the treatment of AS Shcherbakov, there was nothing to report to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as I believed.

The statement of comrade is not true. Ryumin that I allegedly stated that if Etinger testifies about the criminal treatment of Shcherbakov A.S., then half of the employees of the Sanupr Kremlin and many security workers will have to be arrested. I could not say this, if only because Etinger did not serve in the Kremlin Sanupr. I couldn't talk about the guard either, since the guard had nothing to do with this case...

About how the Etinger case was conducted, Comrade should also know. Ogoltsov, who, as First Deputy Minister of State Security, is directly in charge of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases, approves documents, monitors the progress of the investigation, and receives daily reports from Comrade. Leonov and his deputies. In particular, in the case of Etinger, I approved only the decision to arrest him, and all other reports on this case were reported by Comrade. Ogoltsov and were approved by him.

I must say that I am surprised why and for what reasons Comrade. RYUMIN, such statements ... I cannot understand one thing: the Etinger case was in the hands of comrade all the time. Ryumin, was never passed on to anyone, the arrested Etinger was listed as the same investigator, and no one interrogated him again, and Etinger died, having come from interrogation from Comrade. RYUMINA - why Comrade. Ryumin wrote only now about his doubts after Etinger's death, despite the fact that from the day I interrogated Etinger to the day of his death a few months...

Concerning the second question, which is described in his statement by comrade. Ryumin, is about the arrested SALIMANOV, the former deputy general director of the joint-stock company

"Bismuth"...

As a result of undercover activities, Salimanov arrived at the apartment of the MGB agent and then was captured and taken secretly to Moscow.

I must say that I was not in Moscow then, I was in Sochi, and when Comrade. Ogoltsov, I asked him if all this was true, and asked him to check everything again carefully, since I would report this to Comrade I.V. Stalin. ... After Comrade confirmed the same to me. Tov. Pitovranov and Shubnyakov, I called Comrade Poskrebyshev to report this to you, Comrade Stalin.

It should be pointed out that in connection with the capture of Salimanov, through the line 2 of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, it was meant to consider the possibility of organizing further undercover activities against the Americans.

... With regard to violations in the investigative work, as indicated by comrade. Ryumin in his statement.

As a rule, in all KGB bodies interrogation protocols are compiled by investigators at once. In the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security, where the most important criminals are interrogated, their interrogation is associated with certain difficulties in verifying testimony and selecting materials and documents confirming their testimony. In this regard, indeed, both before and now, the investigators of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases, when interrogating the arrested person, draw up protocols or make records of some fact, and then, on the basis of several protocols and records, constitute a more complete protocol...

Yesterday, at the second call to the commission, comrade. Ryumin presented a new statement, which was read to me. What he wrote in that statement is simply wrong.

First, comrade. Ryumin accuses the employees of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security of beating the arrested. I must say frankly that arrested spies, saboteurs, and terrorists are indeed often beaten in order to force them to tell about their criminal deeds and connections. But this is done wisely and only with the sanction of the Minister of State Security and his first deputy, and in local bodies - with the sanction of the head of the body. There is no mass slaughter or any other violations in this matter, especially since we had the permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on this score.

Secondly, comrade. Ryumin declares that Comrade. Likhachev allegedly instructed the arrested Salimanov to be interrogated in relation to Comrade. Kobulov, and the arrested Etinger - in relation to comrade. Tov. Vannikov and Zavenyagin.

(...) It is only known that during interrogations Salimanov said that, when he was with the Americans, he told them many names of responsible people - who they are and where they work, including about Kobulov, who previously worked in state security organs, and is now in Germany.

Also, there were no grounds, as far as I know, to interrogate the arrested Etinger in relation to comrade. comrade Vannikov and Zavenyagin. In any case, no one reported to me that these names were somehow mentioned in the materials of the development or investigative case against Etinger. I believe that if there were such grounds, then the organs of the Cheka were obliged to interrogate the arrested person, regardless of the persons, including about Vannikov and Zavenyagin ...

Thirdly, Com. Ryumin claims that I allegedly gave orders to interrogate those arrested about leading party workers. It is not clear who and what is being discussed. Indeed, sometimes

interrogations were conducted of those arrested in relation to a number of employees holding responsible positions, but this was done, as you know, on special orders. Tov. Ryumin speaks in his statement about shortcomings in the investigation work of the Ministry of State Security. This is absolutely true.

For my part, I must say that there are much more shortcomings in the work of the organs of the MGB than Comrade writes about it. Ryumin, and they boil down mainly to the following:

We are still not devoting enough time to working with Chekist cadres...

On the part of the management staff, sometimes there is not enough exactingness towards subordinate employees, among the employees of state security bodies there are those who violate discipline, the management team does not always skillfully and subtly take appropriate measures against violators of Chekist discipline...

Our investigators, although they work hard, sometimes still do not purposefully interrogate the arrested, do not always skillfully and subtly use the evidence at their disposal to expose the arrested, and having received confessions from the arrested, they often do not know how to clearly and clearly record their

in the interrogation protocol...

The main circumstance is the fact that not all representations of the Soviet Union abroad have KGB workers to service the Soviet colonies.

There is no way we can complete the defeat of the Ukrainian nationalists in the Western regions of Ukraine, as well as the nationalists in the Baltic republics...

I know these shortcomings and, together with my deputies, do my best to eliminate them...

I always remember your instructions, comrade. Stalin, about the need to be irreconcilable to shortcomings in work in order to timely identify them and eliminate them ...

At the same time, I must tell you with an open mind, Comrade Stalin, that I give all my strength to obediently and clearly carry out the tasks that you set for the organs of the Cheka. I live and work, guided by your thoughts and instructions, Comrade Stalin, I try to firmly and persistently carry out the questions that you put before me ...

I presented a similar explanation to the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrades Malenkov G.M., Beria L.P., Shkiryatov M.F., Ignatiev S.D.

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION S.D. Ignatieva I.V. TO STALIN WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOLS V.S. Abakumov and V.I. KOMAROVA

November 4, 1952

No. 6969/i

Top secret

Comrade STALIN

At the same time, I present to you the protocols of the interrogation of the arrested ABAKUMOV V.S. and Komarov V.I. — Former Deputy Head of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security.

During the interrogations, as well as at the confrontation, KOMAROV exposed ABAKUMOV that he concealed from the investigators the instructions of the Central Committee of the party to interrogate KUZNETSOV and his accomplices in

direction of revealing their criminal connection with foreign intelligence services.

S. IGNATIEV

Transcript

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

accused ABAKUMOV Viktor Semenovich

dated July 8, 1952

ABAKUMOV V.S., born in 1908,

mountain native. Moscow, Russian. Before the arrest

Minister of State Security of the USSR.

Interrogation began at 2:00 pm. 30 min.

Question: Describe the nature of your connection with A.A. Kuznetsov.

Answer: I had absolutely no connection with A. KUZNETSOV. About the period when KUZNETSOV, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was entrusted for some time with monitoring the work of the USSR Ministry of State Security, I can show the following.

In fact, KUZNETSOV did not monitor the work of the MGB and did absolutely nothing. For all the time I was called to him only 2-3 times, no more, on official matters.

myself.

Kuznetsov himself, through me, was not at all interested in any questions of the work of the MGB.

The fact that he did nothing, I reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

KUZNETSOV had a negative attitude towards me and was very averse to the USSR Ministry of State Security in general.

I remember that once I had a rude conversation over the telephone with KUZNETSOV on his part. I do not remember when, one of the heads of departments informed me that supposedly a group of workers had arrived from the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks KUZNETSOV, who intended to test the political knowledge of the heads of the main departments.

This circumstance aroused surprise in the person who informed me about this, since there was no such form of verification in the practice of Party work. And no one knew about it beforehand.

I immediately phoned Kuznetsov and asked if it was true that such a group of workers had been sent to them. KUZNETSOV immediately rudely began to tell me that yes, he did it. I told him that I asked him again because it was the first time I came across such a form of verification. As a rule, verification, already on the basis of the existing experience of party work, as I told Kuznetsov, is carried out according to the long-established procedure.

KUZNETSOV did not answer me, hung up the phone, and some time later called me on the phone and said that supposedly there had been some kind of confusion and the people who were sent to the USSR Ministry of State Security had received the wrong instructions.

This question was over, and, as I was later told, KUZNETSOV returned his workers.

I got the impression that KUZNETSOV was very dissatisfied with my conversation with him.

Question: Was your connection with Kuznetsov limited to this?

Isn't it better to tell the truth to the end?

Answer: This question surprises me. I once again declare that I had no connection with KUZNETSOV, and his attitude towards me and the USSR Ministry of State Security of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is known.

The arrest of KUZNETSOV was carried out on the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by me. Subsequently, I interrogated KUZNETSOV several times together with OGOLTSOV.

Question: Whom did you instruct to interrogate the arrested KUZNETSOV and direct the investigation into the case of the members of the enemy group headed by him?

Answer: The case was handled by the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security. The group of investigators in this case was headed by KOMAROV, and, as I remember, I was instructed to interrogate KUZNETSOV KOMAROV.

Question: Did you instruct KOMAROV to interrogate KUZNETSOV and his accomplices about connections with foreign intelligence services?

Answer: I was instructed to KOMAROV to interrogate Kuznetsov and to conduct the whole affair, but now I don't remember what specific instructions were given for interrogations.

Question: You are not being asked about instructions in general, but on a specific question—about the connection between the enemy KUZNETSOV group and foreign intelligence services.

Answer.

Answer: I can't say anything else, and I repeat that I instructed KOMAROV to interrogate Kuznetsov, but I don't remember what specific instructions were given.

Question: The arrested KOMAROV testified that you forbade him to conduct a case in the direction of exposing the links of the enemy KUZNETSOV group with foreign intelligence services.

Do you confirm these testimony of Komarov?

Answer: This is not true. Such instructions, about which Komarov speaks, were not given on my part. On the contrary, as I remember, in the so-called Leningrad case, all necessary measures were taken to reveal links with foreign intelligence services. In particular, special attention was paid to this in connection with the interrogations of Kapustin. Consequently, there could be no question that I allegedly gave instructions not to interrogate those arrested along this line. I remember that all the investigators dealt specifically with this issue.

Question: An examination of the archival and investigative files on KUZNETSOV and his other accomplices established that not a single protocol of interrogation, from which it could be concluded that the investigation was conducted in the direction of opening the links of the enemy group of KUZNETSOV with foreign intelligence services, is not in the case. available.

Tell me why you smeared this case?

Answer: I declare once again that I remember very well that the investigators in the Leningrad case deliberately interrogated those arrested, and very intensely, for ties with foreign intelligence services. They were especially careful in clarifying this issue during many interrogations, as I remember, in relation to KAPUSTIN. This was because Kapustin had been on a business trip abroad for some time. The minutes of interrogation of KAPUSTIN about this should be in the file.

I also recall that when I raised the question of Kapustin's arrest, I specifically drew attention in my presentation to the fact that he was on a business trip abroad.

I think there is no reason to say that this case was allegedly smeared to some extent.

Question: In the KAPUSTIN case, there are indeed protocols of interrogation about his stay and connections in England. But you are being asked about something else - why did you forbid interrogating Kuznetsov and his other accomplices about their connection with foreign intelligence services?

Answer: I categorically deny it. I have already said above that there were no such instructions from my side.

Question: In that case, we will expose you with the testimony of KOMAROV at the confrontation.

(The arrested KOMAROV is brought in.)

Question to Abakumov: Do you know with whom you are confronted?

Answer: Yes, I know — with KOMAROV, the former deputy head of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security.

Question to ABAKUMOV: What kind of relationship did you have with KOMAROV?

Answer: My relations with KOMAROV were purely official.

Question to KOMAROV: Do you know the arrested Abakumov, who is sitting in front of you, and is he correct about your relationship with him?

Answer: I have known ABAKUMOV since 1941, since he was appointed head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, simultaneously acting as Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

As for my relationship with Abakumov, he showed correctly that our relationship was purely official.

Question to KOMAROV: Did ABAKUMOV instruct you to conduct an investigation into the case of the arrested KUZNETSOV and the members of the enemy group headed by him in the direction of revealing their connections with foreign intelligence services?

Answer: In 1949, after KUZNETSOV's arrest, ABAKUMOV instructed me to interrogate the arrested KUZNETSOV, and since at that time I was acting head of the Investigative Unit, since LEONOV was ill, and LIKHACHEV was on a business trip abroad, ABAKUMOV instructed me to lead the investigation and in the case of other arrested persons, in the so-called Leningrad case.

I never received instructions from ABAKUMOV to interrogate KUZNETSOV and other arrested from among his enemy ties in the direction of revealing their involvement in foreign intelligence agencies, with the exception of one case when he instructed me to interrogate KUZNETSOV, POPKOV and Voznesenskoy, the former Minister of Education of the RSFSR, about their relationship with the delegation from Yugoslavia, headed by Tito, who came to Moscow at one time.

In addition, at the direction of ABAKUMOV, the arrested KAPUSTIN, in respect of whom there was evidence that he was on a business trip in England, I was instructed to interrogate him about his possible connection with foreign intelligence.

Subsequently, ABAKUMOV personally instructed KAPUSTIN to be interrogated on the same issue to PITOVORANOV, the former head of the 2nd Main Directorate, later Deputy Minister



State Security, and SOROKIN, assistant to the head of the Investigation Department, who was directly in charge of the KAPUSTIN case.

Moreover, ABAKUMOV misguided me in the matter. There was a case at the end of 1949 or the beginning of 1950, I don't remember exactly now, in the presence of OGOLTSOV, who was in ABAKUMOV's office, with whom they were going to interrogate KUZNETSOV and POPKOV, I reported to ABAKUMOV that the arrested KUZNETSOV and others, according to the reports of the investigators, as if everyone had told the investigation about the crimes they had committed, and asked Abakumov in what direction to lead the investigation further.

I remember exactly that ABAKUMOV then asked me a question - what data do we have about the connections of the arrested KUZNETSOV and others with foreigners. I then replied to Abakumov that we only had information about Kapustin's stay in ENGLAND and his suspicious connections with an Englishwoman. However, he denies any connection with foreign intelligence.

In addition, on his instructions, the arrested KUZNETSOV, POPKOV and Voznesensky were interrogated about their relationship with Tito and other members of the Yugoslav delegation that came to the Soviet Union, however, these arrested did not give any significant evidence of interest to the MGB. gave.

ABAKUMOV, pacing around the office, began to argue aloud that there was no espionage among those arrested in the Leningrad case, and it could not be, since all those arrested were former leading party workers and their connections were limited.

He then said that the Central Committee, they say, was well aware of the behavior of Kuznetsov, the former secretary of the Central Committee, who was constantly guarded and his every step was registered.

ABAKUMOV also said that if you start interrogating the arrested Voznesensky, the former chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, about his connection with foreign intelligence, the Central Committee will laugh and, they say, react negatively to our actions, since the Central Committee is well aware that Voznesensky was very cautious there was even a case when Voznesensky, having learned about the proposed appointment of his brother Voznesensky to a position associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which entailed the inevitable communication with foreigners, opposed this and asked the Central Committee not to appoint him

brother for this position, as this could compromise Voznesensky himself.

Thus, from what ABAKUMOV said, it was clear that he imagines the Leningrad group as a local group, not connected with foreign countries, and for me, ABAKUMOV's references, as Minister of State Security, to the Central Committee were an indication not to interrogate those arrested in this direction.

As a result, I myself did not actively interrogate KUZNETSOV about his connections with foreign countries, and at the operational meetings of the investigators subordinate to me I did not orient them about conducting investigations in this direction.

Question to ABAKUMOV: Why did you orient Komarov in this way, essentially forbidding him to conduct an investigation into the case of KUZNETSOV and his accomplices in the direction of exposing the connection between the enemy group and foreign intelligence services?

Answer: This is incorrect. Nor can such a conclusion be drawn from the testimony of Komarov, which he has now given here.

I'll tell you everything in order.

It is absolutely correct that I instructed KOMAROV to interrogate KUZNETSOV and direct the investigation of those arrested in this case.

I told Komarov, as was always done in such cases, to carefully investigate the whole matter and fully reveal their enemy activities. But what was said in detail, I now no longer remember.

I know that KOMAROV, as well as other investigators, while interrogating KUZNETSOV and others arrested in the so-called Leningrad case, worked very hard and hard, tried to reveal all their crimes.

It is correct that I repeatedly gave orders to thoroughly interrogate KAPUSTIN, as well as other people arrested for ties with foreign intelligence services. Indeed, it was about interrogating KAPUSTIN in connection with his stay in England, as well as with regard to the connections of the members of the anti-Soviet Leningrad group with the Yugoslav JILAS. Therefore, KOMAROV and all other investigators constantly knew and paid attention to the need to reveal links with foreign intelligence services during interrogations.

This is also confirmed here by KOMAROV.

I also remember that KOMAROV reported to me that they were interrogating all those arrested very carefully for connections with foreign intelligence services, in particular KAPUSTIN about his stay in England, as well as through the Yugoslavs, but no evidence of espionage was obtained.

I repeat, the arrested were interrogated along this line for a long time. In relation to KAPUSTIN, in addition to the interrogation, a thorough check was also carried out and materials were collected about his stay in England. The emphasis on revealing connections with intelligence through KAPUSTIN was made because KAPUSTIN was a close person of KUZNETSOV and POPKOV.

Therefore, I believe that the Leningrad case was conducted correctly and the investigators conducted interrogations along this line.

I repeat that I do not remember the details of the conversations with KOMAROV - how and what to interrogate KUZNETSOV, and in such cases they usually talk about the main questions. But I know that KOMAROV himself is a fairly experienced investigator, and I am sure and I know that he also interrogated Kuznetsov through his espionage connections.

OGOLTSOV and I knew from KOMAROV's reports, which he is now talking about here, that those arrested as espionage in the so-called Leningrad case were interrogated, but nothing was found.

Moreover, in order to more thoroughly investigate and achieve the identification of possible espionage connections of the participants in the Leningrad case, KOMAROV correctly says that, on my instructions, the head of the 2nd Main Directorate PITOVRANOV was involved in the interrogations of KAPUSTIN,

Question to Abakumov: You did not give an answer on the merits of Komarov's testimony. He stated that you asserted that Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Popkov and the others who had been arrested were in the past in leading Party work and could not have connections with foreign intelligence services, and that if we interrogate them in this direction, the Central Committee will condemn our such actions.

By such reasoning, as KOMAROV further testified, you oriented him, and he, in turn, the investigators, that the case of the enemy group of KUZNETSOV was local.

Answer specifically - you confirm this testimony of KOMA

Answer: No, it didn't. In the so-called Leningrad case, despite the fact that there were no materials that would speak about the connections of any of the arrested with foreign intelligence services, with the exception of KAPUSTIN and the arrival of DZHILAS in Leningrad; interrogations of the arrested were carried out along this line.

Question to Abakumov: You have already been convicted that there are no protocols on this issue in the files.

The investigation once again demands, answer - do you confirm the testimony of KOMAROV or not?

Answer: I reiterate that on my part, as a minister, when I instructed Komarov to handle the case, the instructions on the case were given correctly - to conduct interrogations and reveal the criminal activities of the members of this group.

There were no such conversations about which KOMAROV speaks about the alleged fact that KUZNETSOV, VOSNEENSKY and others could not have connections with foreign intelligence services, and I think KOMAROV is confusing something. This is confirmed by the fact that we all the time focused on revealing links with foreign intelligence services, and therefore KOMAROV knew perfectly well, just as other investigators knew, that this issue was important, and they were engaged in interrogations along this line.

Question to KOMAROV: ABAKUMOV denies your testimony that he misguided you about the investigation into the case of KUZNETSOV and his accomplices.

Are you insisting on your testimony?

Answer: I testified during the investigation and now at the confrontation as it was in reality.

I am surprised why ABAKUMOV does not remember his alleged conversation with me concerning the interrogation of the arrested KUZNETSOV and others in the direction of their possible connection with foreign intelligence.

ABAKUMOV then made a statement that cannot be forgotten, but I must invent, since ABAKUMOV relayed to me a conversation that allegedly took place with him in the Central Committee in relation to Voznesensky.

ABAKUMOV testified correctly in the part that at the beginning of the investigation he gave instructions to me, and through me, consequently, to the rest of the investigators interrogating the arrested under the so-called

to the Leningrad cause, to ask them one question so that they would tell what they were guilty of before the party and the Soviet state.

As I have already shown, due to the fact that, according to the reports of the investigators, as well as the testimony of KUZNETSOV, whom I personally interrogated, they all spoke about their guilt before the party and the state. At the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950, I asked Abakumov what direction the further investigation should take.

I repeat once again that ABAKUMOV then asked me what kind of materials we have in relation to the connections of KUZNETSOV and other arrested persons with foreign intelligence.

Then I answered him that the investigation had information about KAPUSTIN's stay in England and his suspicious connections with an Englishwoman, but he denied any connection with foreign intelligence.

I also reported to ABAKUMOV that, on his instructions, KUZNETSOV, POPKOV and Voznesensky, the former Minister of Education of the RSFSR, were interrogated about their relations with the Yugoslav delegation headed by Tito, who came to the Soviet Union. However, the arrested persons did not give any significant evidence on this issue either. Yes, ABAKUMOV himself knew about this, since he, together with OGOLTSOV, interrogated KUZNETSOV and POPKOV about their connection with Tito and other members of the delegation.

At the same time, as I have already shown, ABAKUMOV, walking around the office, reasoned aloud that the arrested KUZNETSOV and others could not be connected with foreign intelligence, since they

being leading party workers in the past, they were constantly guarded and the Central Committee knew their every step.

Such a statement did not come from anyone, but from ABAKUMOV, who at that time was the Minister of State Security, and I had to accept this as his instruction, especially since he said that supposedly the Central Committee would react negatively and would laugh, if Voznesensky and Kuznetsov are asked questions about their connection with foreign intelligence.

I must say that from the very first day of the investigation into the case of KUZNETSOV and others, I was strictly warned by ABAKUMOV not to take any investigative actions on my own, since those arrested were former senior officials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and, as ABAKUMOV stated, he coordinates all his actions in relation to the investigation in their case with the Central Committee.

Under such circumstances, my initiative in interrogations was fettered, I was strictly guided by the instructions emanating from Abakumov.

All his instructions regarding the investigation of the KUZNETSOV case and his enemy connections, I immediately passed on exactly to the investigators.

Question to KOMAROV: Do you have any questions for the accused ABA-KUMOV?

Answer: No, I have no questions for Abakumov.

Question to Abakumov: Do you have any questions for Komarov?

Answer: No, I have no questions for KOMAROV.

The interrogation ended at 21:30.

The protocol from our words was written down correctly, we read it.

V. ABAKUMOV.

KOMAROV.

INTERROGATED: Deputy. Minister of State Security of the USSR Colonel Ryumin

Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor of the Soviet Army Major General of Justice Kitaev

Art. Investigator of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security Lieutenant Colonel LEVSHIN

Art. Investigator of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant Colonel MOTAVKIN

Art. Investigator of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant Colonel Ozherelyev.

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